SANDERS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After the State charged Jerrod Rakeem Sanders with murder, a jury convicted him of the lesser-included offense of reckless homicide ¹ and found he knowingly used a firearm when committing that offense.² The trial court sentenced Sanders to five years, enhanced by twenty years for use of a firearm, all executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Sanders asks us to review and revise his aggregate twenty-five-year sentence, arguing it is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Sanders and Keneisha Rose were in a dating relationship. But by the late summer or early fall of 2022, they were no longer together, and Rose was living in South Bend with her new boyfriend, Christopher Yakim. Still, Rose often called Sanders when she needed help.

[3] Sanders and Yakim did not get along. Sometime around August or September 2022, the men got into an argument in front of Rose, and Yakim punched Sanders several times. After the incident, Sanders—who was prohibited from possessing a gun due to prior criminal convictions—stole a gun from his cousin. Rose believed Sanders was acting as though he wanted revenge on Yakim.

[4] On September 28, 2022, Rose and Yakim argued while driving around town, and Rose got out of the car near a gas station. After Rose refused to get back in, Yakim left Rose at the station and drove back to their home. Rose called Sanders to pick her up. Sanders arrived and drove Rose to the house to get her things.

[5] After they arrived, Rose said she planned to stay with Yakim at the house. Sanders got upset, got out of the car, and approached the home with the stolen gun. Yakim came out to the front porch, and the two men got into a verbal argument. Yakim then went inside the house and closed the door behind him. Sanders fired three shots at the closed door then fled the scene in his car. Police responded to the report of shots fired and found Yakim just inside the house, unresponsive, and bleeding from his abdomen. He later succumbed to his injuries. Sanders was located and arrested the next day in Michigan.

[6] The State charged Sanders with murder and sought a sentencing enhancement based on Sanders’ knowing use of a firearm when committing the offense. At trial, the court instructed the jury on reckless homicide as a lesser-included offense of murder. The jury convicted Sanders of reckless homicide and found the circumstances existed to support the firearm enhancement.

[7] The trial court held a sentencing hearing on May 6, 2025. The trial court found Sanders’ criminal history—including prior felony convictions for armed robbery and domestic battery—a significant aggravating factor. It considered his expression of remorse a mitigator. Finding the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigator, the trial court sentenced Sanders to five years for reckless homicide. Regarding the firearm enhancement, the trial court explained its imposition of a twenty-year term:

[T]his is not a situation, Mr. Sanders, in which you had a right to possess a firearm and you used it in a reckless manner and ended up killing somebody. This was a situation in which you had absolutely no right to possess a firearm based on both your armed robbery conviction and your domestic battery conviction. You chose to possess one. You chose to use it. And you took someone's life with it. So I find that a 20-year enhancement is appropriate.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 65–66.

Sanders’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[8] Sanders asks us to revise his sentence. The Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise a trial court's sentencing decision as provided by rule. Ind. Const. art. 7, § 6. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” The principal role of appellate review is to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived correct sentence in each case. Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 288 (Ind. 2022). Therefore, “we reserve our 7(B) authority for exceptional cases.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 160 (Ind. 2019) (per curiam).

[9] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). The two prongs of 7(B) review are “separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 126 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conner v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 218 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[10] The question “is not whether another sentence is more appropriate; rather, the question is whether the sentence imposed is inappropriate.” Helsley v. State, 43 N.E.3d 225, 228 (Ind. 2015) (quoting King v. State, 894 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)) (emphasis omitted). Whether we regard a sentence as inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us a revised sentence is warranted. Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 698 (Ind. 2024).

[11] The sentencing range for a Level 5 felony is between one and six years, with an advisory sentence of three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b) (2014). Under the firearm enhancement statute, the trial court may sentence a person to an additional term of between five and twenty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g). The statute provides no advisory term for the firearm enhancement. See id.; Lenoir v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1113, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 contains no language about an advisory sentence for the firearm sentencing enhancement[.]”). Sanders therefore received an above-advisory sentence for his reckless homicide conviction, enhanced by the maximum term for committing the offense with a firearm. In aggregate, Sanders received a near-maximum sentence, all executed.

[12] Nature of the offense – As to the nature of the offense, Sanders instigated the argument with Yakim on the night of the shooting. As the trial court observed, Sanders’ prior convictions for armed robbery and domestic battery precluded him from carrying or possessing a handgun.³ Yet he brought a stolen gun with him as he approached Yakim's front door. After Yakim disengaged from the argument, went inside the house, and closed the door behind him, Sanders fired the gun three times into the door at close range. Nothing about the offense suggests Sanders acted with “restraint, regard, [or] lack of brutality” as would portray the offense in a positive light. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122. Sanders then fled the scene and left the state. See McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (holding on 7(B) review that fleeing after a homicide helps support an enhanced sentence). The nature of the offense does not merit relief.

[13] As to his use of a firearm when committing the offense, Sanders observes the trial court enhanced his sentence by twenty years primarily because he was prohibited from possessing a handgun at the time he killed Yakim. He argues the trial court's imposition of the maximum term was inappropriate because it exceeds the maximum sentence he would have received had he been convicted of the (uncharged) criminal offense of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. That crime is a Level 4 felony, I.C. § 35-47-4-5(c) (2020), which carries a sentencing range of between two and twelve years, with an advisory sentence of six years, I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). He therefore suggests we revise the firearm enhancement to a term of twelve years, with six years executed and the other six suspended to probation.

[14] The criminal offense of possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon differs from the circumstances supporting a firearm sentencing enhancement. In the possession offense, the “legal status of the offender is an essential element of the crime, and the act—the possession—is illegal only if performed by one occupying that status.” Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Put differently, a serious violent offender commits a criminal offense by merely possessing a firearm, regardless of whether the offender uses it to commit a crime. In contrast, the firearm enhancement statute provides for an enhanced sentence when the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant—regardless of their legal status—knowingly or intentionally used a firearm in the commission of an offense. I.C. § 35-50-2-11. That is, the State need not prove the defendant is also a serious violent felon to support a firearm enhancement.

[15] Although the State in this case could have charged Sanders with possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon, it did not. Instead, the State sought the firearm enhancement, for which the General Assembly has prescribed a different sentencing range. The difference in sentencing ranges does not alone render Sanders’ sentence inappropriate, because such a determination demands a holistic review of the nature of the offense and requires us to consider “myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224. Here, in fashioning Sanders’ sentence, the trial court found it significant that Sanders had no right to possess the gun he recklessly used to shoot into the door that resulted in Yakim's death. And because the enhancement statute and the possession statute address different concerns, we are not persuaded in this instance that the sentencing range for unlawful possession is relevant to our analysis under Appellate Rule 7(B).⁴

[16] Character of the offender – Sanders has not offered compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offense in a positive light; therefore, to prevail he must make an even stronger showing regarding his character. See Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 127. Sanders has a prior criminal history that includes at least two felony convictions and six misdemeanor convictions.⁵ His felony convictions are for crimes of violence. Even a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a defendant's character, Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 700 (Ind. 2024), and Sanders’ record is not minor. Additionally, he was on probation in the domestic battery case at the time of the instant offense, showing disregard for the trial court's prior grant of grace and leniency. See, e.g., Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (observing probation “is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled”); Jones v. State, 250 N.E.3d 1062, 1091 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (considering the fact the defendant was on probation at the time of the offense when conducting sentencing review and observing the defendant's prior criminal history and probation violations “shows a continuing disregard for the rule of law”), trans. denied.

[17] In support of his character, Sanders notes the Indiana Risk Assessment Tool determined his criminal history domain level was “moderate,” suggesting he is not the “worst of the worst” offenders for which a near-maximum sentence is typically reserved. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 159; Appellant's Br. at 10. But his overall risk assessment score placed him in the “very high” risk category to reoffend. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 162. He also points to his expressions of remorse made throughout the case and at sentencing as evidence of his good character. Sanders apologized to Yakim's family at the sentencing hearing and explained he “never intended to hurt [Yakim]” when he fired through the door. Tr. Vol. 3 at 62. Yet we cannot say Sanders’ self-serving statements demonstrate “substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character” sufficient to overcome the deference we owe the trial court in sentencing matters, especially in light of Sanders’ criminal history and the nature of his offense. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[18] In sum, Sanders’ sentence is not an outlier that warrants revision. See Malone, 191 N.E.3d at 877 (holding the defendant's six-year sentence for reckless homicide, enhanced by fifteen years for his use of a gun, was not inappropriate where the defendant got in a fight at a busy location, fired a gun killing an innocent bystander, had several prior criminal convictions, and was on probation at the time of the offense).

Conclusion

[19] Sanders’ sentence is not inappropriate.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5 (2014).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-11(b)(1) & (d) (2022) (firearm enhancement statute).

3.   See generally I.C. § 35-47-2-1.5 (persons who may not knowingly or intentionally carry a handgun); I.C. § 35-47-4-5 (unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon); I.C. § 35-47-4-6 (unlawful possession of a firearm by a domestic batterer).

4.   Sanders also argues the trial court impermissibly imposed the maximum term for the firearm enhancement “to compensate for what [it] saw as an erroneous verdict on the murder charge[.]” Appellant's Br. at 9. Sanders points to some of the trial court's statements at sentencing, which he claims “strongly suggest” the court believed Sanders’ actions were intentional rather than reckless. Id. A claim on appeal that the trial court improperly exhibited bias and imposed its own beliefs during sentencing is an allegation the trial court abused its discretion. See McCain, 148 N.E.3d at 981–82 (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the trial court's comments at sentencing that the evidence presented “the cleanest cut video I have ever seen of my impression of murder” and the jury's verdict was “a gift” after the jury convicted him of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder); Malone v. State, 191 N.E.3d 870, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the trial court's comment that the defendant “dodged a bullet in not being convicted of [m]urder” and instead being convicted of reckless homicide) (alteration in original). Sanders presents no independent argument that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him and cites no applicable case law to that effect. Accordingly, any such argument is waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8) (providing the argument section of the appellant's brief “must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented” and “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities [and] statutes ․ relied on”).

5.   The summary in the presentence investigation report (“PSI”) states Sanders has two prior felony convictions, and the trial court said the same at sentencing. But the PSI lists three prior felony convictions: armed robbery in Michigan in 2008; and separate convictions for strangulation and domestic battery in the same Indiana case in 2019. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 157.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.