MENKE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Kyle M. Menke appeals the costs and fees imposed for his domestic-battery and strangulation convictions, arguing the court abused its discretion by imposing the same without conducting an indigency hearing. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In December 2023, during an argument over cigarettes, Menke physically attacked his mother—strangling her and throwing her to the ground. The attack left his mother with multiple broken ribs and significant bruising. The State charged Menke with Level 1 felony attempted murder, Level 3 felony aggravated battery, Level 5 felony domestic battery, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime. In April 2025, Menke was tried to a jury and convicted of Level 5 felony domestic battery and Level 6 felony strangulation but acquitted of the other charges.

[3] On May 2, 2025, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of seven years, with five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC), one year executed on work release, and one year suspended to probation. The court then stated:

I am going to assess Court Costs of $189.00, a fine of $115.00 which will be suspended upon payment of a like sum to the Knox County Public Defender Board. I am going to order the payment of the $200.00 Public Defender Fund Fee, a $250.00 Victims Assistance Fund Fee. There will be costs associated with your probation to include a $100.00 initial administration fee, a $50.00 initial user fee, a monthly user fee of $25.00 for the duration of your probation, and any transfer fees.

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I am going to order that you have six months from your initial transfer from IDOC to Work Release to pay your fines, costs, and fees.

Tr. Vol. III pp. 199-200. The court did not conduct an indigency hearing. Menke now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Menke asserts the trial court erred in imposing various costs and fees without conducting an indigency hearing. “Sentencing decisions include decisions to impose fees and costs.” Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The decision to impose restitution, fines, costs, or fees is generally left to the trial court's discretion. Holder v. State, 119 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “Sentencing decisions, including decisions to impose costs and fees are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the sentencing decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions drawn therefrom. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). If the fees imposed fall within the parameters of the statute, we will not find an abuse of discretion. Holder, 119 N.E.3d at 624.

[5] Although a trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of the defendant's sentence, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as it is held before the sentence is completed. Coleman, 61 N.E.3d at 393. Indiana Code section 33-37-2-3 details the trial court's imposition of costs and provides in part:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), when the court imposes costs, it shall conduct a hearing to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. If the person is not indigent, the court shall order the person to pay:

(1) the entire amount of the costs at the time sentence is pronounced;

(2) the entire amount of the costs at some later date;

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(b) A court may impose costs and suspend payment of all or part of the costs until the convicted person has completed all or part of the sentence. If the court suspends payment of the costs, the court shall conduct a hearing at the time the costs are due to determine whether the convicted person is indigent. If the convicted person is not indigent, the court shall order the convicted person to pay the costs:

(1) at the time the costs are due; or

(2) in a manner set forth in subsection (a)(2) through (a)(4).

(Emphasis added); see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-18 (2007) (language substantively same applying to the imposition of fines).

[6] Citing Section 33-37-2-3(b), this Court has held trial courts are “under no obligation to make a determination of [a defendant's] ability to pay” where that defendant “has yet to complete his executed sentence.” Owens v. State, 947 N.E.2d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied; see also Rich v. State, 890 N.E.2d 44, 48 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[U]nder section 33-37-2-3(b), the trial court was not required to hold [an indigency] hearing until Rich has completed the executed portion of his sentence.”), trans. denied. This is because “a defendant's financial resources are more appropriately determined not at the time of initial sentencing but at the conclusion of incarceration[.]” Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[7] Here, the trial court imposed fines and court costs but specifically ordered that these would not be due until six months after Menke completes his five-year IDOC sentence. As such, it is not until that time that the court needs to determine whether Menke is indigent. See Ind. Code §§ 33-37-2-3(b) (2019); 35-38-1-18(b). Thus, the sentence here falls within the parameters of the statutes, and we find no abuse of discretion.

[8] Affirmed.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.