LAWRENCE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Reontre Lawrence appeals following his convictions of murder, a felony,¹ and Level 5 felony reckless homicide ² and his sentence enhancement for use of a firearm in the commission of his crime.³ Lawrence argues the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction of murder. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On the morning of October 19, 2023, Lawrence borrowed a car from a friend who was staying at the Quality Inn in South Bend. In the early afternoon, Lawrence returned to the hotel, parked the borrowed car in the side parking lot, and waited for his friend to exit the hotel to drive Lawrence home. To park, Lawrence backed the car into the parking space just left of a hotel exit door. While waiting for his friend, Lawrence sat in the car smoking a cigar with the driver's door open.

[3] As Lawrence waited, a black Nissan Sentra with tinted windows pulled into the parking lot and, although the side lot was otherwise empty, the Sentra parked near Lawrence. Jasani Taylor was driving the Sentra, Amarion Kirk was in the front passenger seat, and Jamarion Watson was in the back seat behind the driver. The three men had driven to Quality Inn to pick up a friend who was staying there. Taylor parked the Sentra over the dividing line separating the two parking spaces positioned to Lawrence's left, which meant that the Sentra's driver's door was three-quarters of a parking space from Lawrence's driver's door, and the Sentra was just to the right of the same hotel exit door.

[4] The manner in which Taylor parked the Sentra made Lawrence nervous. Thirty seconds after parking, Taylor rolled his window down, asked Lawrence if he had a light, and made a motion with his left hand as if he were lighting a lighter. Lawrence did not answer Taylor, but he moved an assault rifle from the back seat to the front seat. Lawrence then asked Taylor, “What are you up to?” (Tr. Vol. 4 at 159.) When Taylor did not answer immediately, Lawrence grabbed the AR-15, opened fire, and continued firing as he stepped out of the vehicle and backed toward the hotel. Lawrence shot fourteen times through the driver's door and windshield of the Sentra, and then he fled the scene on foot. Multiple bullets hit Taylor and Kirk, and both men were pronounced dead at the scene.

[5] The State charged Lawrence with the murder of both Kirk and Taylor. The State also alleged Lawrence was subject to a sentencing enhancement because he “knowingly used a firearm in the commission of the crime.” (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 18.) A jury found Lawrence guilty of the murder of Taylor and of reckless homicide with regard to Kirk. Lawrence waived his right to have the jury adjudicate the firearm enhancement, and the trial court determined Lawrence used a firearm when he committed the murder of Taylor. Following preparation of the presentence investigation report, the trial court found multiple aggravators and mitigators, determined the aggravators outweighed the mitigators, and imposed consecutive sentences of five years for reckless homicide and fifty-five years for murder, which was enhanced another twenty years for the use of a firearm. Thus, Lawrence's cumulative sentence is eighty years, which the court ordered served executed.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Lawrence argues the State presented insufficient evidence to convict him of the murder of Taylor. As our Indiana Supreme Court recently reiterated:

It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. Therefore, the reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses, and it leaves those determinations to the fact-finder. We consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling and will affirm a defendant's conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

[7] Murder occurs when a person “knowingly or intentionally kills another human being[.]” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b).

[8] Lawrence argues the State failed to prove he “intended to kill Jasani Taylor.” (Appellant's Br. at 9.) However, the State did not allege Lawrence intentionally killed Taylor. Instead, in its charging information, the State alleged Lawrence “did knowingly kill” Taylor. (Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 16.) This distinction matters because “intentionally” is the “highest degree of culpability[.]” Palmer v. State, 654 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Trevino v. State, 428 N.E.2d 263, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)). For conduct to be intentionally performed, it must also be performed knowingly. Id. However, the inverse is not true – behavior can be knowingly performed without being intentional. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (defining crimes requiring only “a lesser kind of culpability” as an “[i]ncluded offense”). Thus, the State had no obligation to prove Lawrence “intended” to kill Taylor, and we assess whether the State presented sufficient evidence to prove Lawrence knowingly killed Taylor.

[9] As we stated earlier, a person acts knowingly if “he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(b). “Knowledge may be proven by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the facts and circumstances presented” to the jury. Cole v. State, 69 N.E.3d 552, 559 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “[U]se of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily harm is sufficient to show” knowing behavior. Harper v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1389, 1391 (Ind. 1988).

[10] Lawrence was eight to ten feet from Taylor, who was in the driver's seat of the Sentra, when Lawrence opened fire on the Sentra's driver door with an AR-15 assault rifle. Lawrence stepped out of his vehicle, which would have momentarily moved him closer to the Sentra's door, before he started backing toward the front of the Sentra as he continued to fire. Lawrence shot fourteen times, and thirteen of them hit the Sentra. The jury could determine from these facts that Lawrence was aware of a high probability of likelihood that he would kill Taylor. We therefore affirm his conviction of murder.⁴

Conclusion

[11] Because the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury finding Lawrence knowingly killed Taylor when Lawrence fired fourteen shots from an AR-15 at Taylor from a relatively short distance, we affirm Lawrence's conviction of murder.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5.

3.   Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11.

4.   Lawrence also asks that, if we reverse or reduce his murder conviction, we remand for the trial court to re-sentence Lawrence on his sentencing enhancement. As we affirm Lawrence's conviction of murder, this second argument is moot.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Felix, J., concur.