MIDWEST MORTGAGE FUNDING LLC v. Timberland Home Center, Inc., Appellee-Defendant and Counterclaim Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In January 2024, Midwest Mortgage Funding, LLC (Midwest) filed a complaint to foreclose its mortgage lien against certain real property in Indianapolis and named Timberland Home Center, Inc. (Timberland) as a defendant. Timberland responded and filed a counterclaim against Midwest. In October 2024, the trial court denied Midwest's motion for summary judgment and entered final judgment in favor of Timberland. Midwest filed a belated motion to reconsider on January 8, 2025, alleging in part that it obtained actual knowledge of the court's order the same day and it had not previously received notice of the court's October 2024 order. On February 26, 2025, Midwest filed a Trial Rule 72(E) motion requesting that the trial court treat its motion to reconsider as a “Granted Belated Motion to Correct Error” and extend Midwest's deadline to file a motion to correct error. App. Vol. VI p. 137. The trial court denied both of Midwest's post-judgment motions.

[2] Midwest now appeals, raising two issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Midwest's Trial Rule 72(E) motion; and 2) if the motion to reconsider were deemed a timely-filed motion to correct error, whether the trial court erred in denying Midwest's motion to correct error and its underlying motion for summary judgment. Finding the first issue dispositive, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On August 4, 2022, Timberland Home Center, Inc. filed a complaint against Streamline Investments, LLC, Martin Reedus, and Matthew Kumalo (collectively, Streamline) under cause number 49D11-2208-PL-26557 (the Lis Pendens Case). Timberland alleged Streamline failed to pay the amount due on a “Commercial Charge Account” for construction materials advanced by Timberland to Streamline. App. Vol. IV p. 186. The complaint named seven real properties for which the construction materials were used, including one commonly known as 2267 North Dearborn Street (2267 Dearborn) in Indianapolis. On August 8, 2022, the clerk docketed Timberland's Notice of Lis Pendens asserting an interest in 2267 Dearborn. In December 2023, Timberland filed a motion for summary judgment in the Lis Pendens Case. On April 24, 2024, the trial court entered an “Agreed Judgment” in favor of Timberland in the Lis Pendens Case in the amount of $409,233.70. App. Vol. V pp. 57-61.

[4] Meanwhile, on February 17, 2023, Midwest Mortgage Funding, LLC executed a promissory note to Streamline in the principal amount of $190,000. The same day, Streamline executed a construction mortgage on 2267 Dearborn securing the promissory note. The mortgage was recorded on February 21, 2023.

[5] On January 15, 2024, Midwest filed a complaint to foreclose the mortgage due to Streamline's nonpayment (the Mortgage Case), from which the instant appeal stems. Midwest named Timberland as a defendant to answer for any interest Timberland had in 2267 Dearborn.¹ On February 7, 2024, Timberland filed its answer and counterclaim in the Mortgage Case, alleging in pertinent part that its interest in 2267 Dearborn was superior to Midwest's mortgage lien, established by its Notice of Lis Pendens filed in August 2022 under the Lis Pendens Case.

[6] On March 29, 2024, Midwest filed a motion for summary judgment against Timberland's counterclaim in the Mortgage Case requesting the trial court find that its mortgage had priority and to enter judgment in its favor as a matter of law. On May 10, 2024, Timberland responded to Midwest's motion for summary judgment again asserting priority of its interest in 2267 Dearborn; Timberland designated, among other things, its August 2022 Notice of Lis Pendens and the April 2024 judgment in Timberland's favor from the Lis Pendens Case.

[7] On October 10, 2024, the trial court issued an order (the Summary Judgment Order) and found that Timberland's interest had priority over Midwest's mortgage established by its August 2022 Notice of Lis Pendens, the value of which was determined by the April 2024 judgment in the Lis Pendens case. The court also concluded, “[t]here being no just reason for delay, this Order is deemed a final judgment on Timberland's Counterclaims against Midwest.” Id. at 85. The Chronological Case Summary (CCS) shows the Summary Judgment Order was docketed on October 10, 2024.

[8] Midwest filed a belated motion to reconsider on January 8, 2025, alleging in pertinent part that it obtained actual knowledge of the Summary Judgment Order the same day and it had not previously received notice from the court. On January 10, the court issued a notice allowing Timberland until February 10 to respond to Midwest's motion to reconsider. On February 10, Timberland responded, alleging that the Summary Judgment Order was a final judgment, Midwest's proper avenue for relief was to file a motion to correct error, and the deadline for filing a motion to correct error or notice of appeal had passed. The same day, Midwest filed its reply asserting the Summary Judgment Order was not a final judgment because it did not “ ‘expressly direct[ ]’ that ‘an appeal may be taken upon this or other issues resolved by the judgment’ ” and again requesting the court to reconsider the Summary Judgment Order in favor of Timberland. App. Vol. VI p. 135 (brackets in original).

[9] Then, on February 26, 2025, Midwest filed a “Motion Pursuant to [Indiana] Trial Rule 72(E), to Treat Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider as a Granted Belated Filed Motion to Correct Error if Court finds its Order on Summary Judgment to be a Final Judgment.” Id. at 137 (italicization removed). Therein, Midwest stated that its “[c]ounsel diligently and routinely checked” the CCS, counsel did not receive notice of the Summary Judgment Order, and the Summary Judgment Order did not appear on the docket until January 8, 2025. Id. at 139. Because it alleged it did not receive notice, Midwest requested that the court extend its deadline to file a motion to correct error pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 72(E).

[10] On March 3, 2025, the trial court scheduled a hearing on Midwest's motion to reconsider and its Trial Rule 72(E) motion, to occur on March 6. At the hearing, Midwest's counsel reiterated that the court's order was missing an explicit statement that the Summary Judgment Order was appealable; however, Midwest also stated that the Summary Judgment Order “could be interpreted ․ [as] a final order, which would require a motion to correct error to be filed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 17. Midwest ultimately argued that its motion to reconsider should be considered a motion to correct error if the Summary Judgment Order was a final judgment and asked that the court find Midwest timely requested additional time to file a motion to correct error pursuant to Trial Rule 72(E). Timberland requested that the court deny Midwest's motions, asserting Midwest sought exception from multiple trial rules regarding timeliness.

[11] On March 7, 2025, the court issued an order (the Post-Judgment Order) denying both of Midwest's post-judgment motions. Among other things, the court found: the Summary Judgment Order was a final judgment; the CCS lacked a notation indicating notice was sent to Midwest; relying on Midwest's counsel's representation, Midwest received actual knowledge of the Summary Judgment Order on January 8, 2025; and Midwest filed its Trial Rule 72(E) motion forty-nine days after it obtained actual knowledge of the Summary Judgment Order. In addition, the court stated the motion to reconsider was a “deemed denied motion to correct error — if converted[.]” App. Vol. VI p. 188.

[12] In part, the court concluded that Midwest's Trial Rule 72(E) motion was moot because no relief could be granted where the maximum time the court could have extended for Midwest to file a motion to correct error or notice of appeal was thirty days, which had already passed when Midwest filed its Rule 72(E) motion. The court further concluded that although there was good cause for delay resulting from lack of notice, Midwest failed to show good cause for filing its Rule 72(E) motion forty-nine days after receiving actual knowledge of the Summary Judgment Order. Midwest's Rule 72(E) motion was, thus, denied. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Midwest argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying its Trial Rule 72(E) motion and by failing to treat its motion to reconsider as a motion to correct error. “We review the trial court's ruling on a motion for relief under Indiana Trial Rule 72 for an abuse of discretion.” Atkins v. Veolia Water Indianapolis, LLC, 994 N.E.2d 1287, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Id.

[14] In total, the rule states:

Lack of notice, or the lack of the actual receipt of a copy of the entry from the Clerk shall not affect the time within which to contest the ruling, order or judgment, or authorize the Court to relieve a party of the failure to initiate proceedings to contest such ruling, order or judgment, except as provided in this section. When the service of a copy of the entry by the Clerk is not evidenced by a note made by the Clerk upon the Chronological Case Summary, the Court, upon application for good cause shown, may grant an extension of any time limitation within which to contest such ruling, order or judgment to any party who was without actual knowledge, or who relied upon incorrect representations by Court personnel. Such extension shall commence when the party first obtained actual knowledge and not exceed the original time limitation.

Ind. Trial Rule 72(E).

[15] Here, the court found the CCS lacked a Clerk's note that Midwest was served with a copy of the Summary Judgment Order and Midwest obtained actual knowledge of the Summary Judgment Order on January 8, 2025. The court correctly interpreted that any extension of time that it could grant to contest the Summary Judgment Order commenced on January 8, 2025. Therefore, a determination of whether the Summary Judgment Order was a final judgment is necessary to discern the original time limitation to contest the order.

[16] The Summary Judgment Order contained the “magic language” set forth in Trial Rule 56(C) to consider it a final order. Indy Auto Man, LLC v. Keown & Kratz, LLC, 84 N.E.3d 718, 721 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (a trial court's order that disposes of less than all the issues as to all the parties must contain the “magic language” to be considered final). Indiana Trial Rule 56(C) states in pertinent part:

A summary judgment upon less than all the issues involved in a claim or with respect to less than all the claims or parties shall be interlocutory unless the court in writing expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and in writing expressly directs entry of judgment as to less than all the issues, claims or parties.

In its Summary Judgment Order, the court concluded, “[t]here being no just reason for delay, this Order is deemed a final judgment on Timberland's Counterclaims against Midwest.” App. Vol. V. p. 85. Thus, the original timelines to contest the order were those that applied to a final order.

[17] “[A] final judgment can be modified only so far as the judgment itself, a statute, or court rules permit.” Automotive Finance Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025). The applicable rule, as noted by the parties, is Indiana Trial Rule 59(C), which provides that a motion to correct error “must be filed not later than thirty (30) days after the entry of a final judgment is noted in the [CCS].” Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that thirty days is the original time limitation within which the final Summary Judgment Order could be contested before the trial court. Because an extension granted under Trial Rule 72(E) “shall commence when the party first obtained actual knowledge and not exceed the original time limitation[,]” the trial court could not have extended Midwest's deadline to file a motion to correct error beyond February 7, 2025—thirty days after Midwest obtained actual knowledge of the Summary Judgment Order. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Midwest's Trial Rule 72(E) motion was moot because it was filed forty-nine days after Midwest received actual notice of the Summary Judgment Order.

[18] Further, the trial court concluded Midwest showed good cause for initially extending its timeline due to lack of notice but not for extending its deadlines beyond the original timelines. Midwest fails to demonstrate how the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Midwest did not show good cause for filing its Trial Rule 72(E) motion forty-nine days after it received actual notice of the Summary Judgment Order, and we find none. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Midwest's Rule 72(E) motion on the basis that Midwest failed to show good cause.

[19] As to Midwest's argument that the court failed to treat its motion to reconsider as a “Granted Belated Filed Motion to Correct Error[,]” we disagree. App. Vol. VI. P. 137. Midwest correctly notes that because we favor substance over form, a motion to reconsider “requesting the court to revisit its final judgment must be considered a motion to correct error.” Hubbard v. Hubbard, 690 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). But we cannot say that the court erroneously failed to treat Midwest's motion to reconsider as a motion to correct error here.

[20] First, in determining the applicable original timelines to contest the Summary Judgment Order, the court considered and applied the motion to correct error rules and timelines. The court found:

10. Timberland, by counsel, also argues that the time limitations for contesting the Order are established by Trial Rules 53.3., 59, and Appellate Rule 2(H)(2). These rules clearly establish a thirty (30) day time limit, which “the Court may not extend ․ to correct errors under Rule 59(C).

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13. Midwest again seeks an exception to the trial rules ․ Midwest's TR 72(E) Motion is moot, and no prospective relief can be granted where limited to “commenc[ing] when the party first obtained actual knowledge and not exceed the original time limitation [of 30 days].

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15. In effect, Midwest's TR 72(E) Motion seeks to extend the time for appeal of the Order after an apparent lack of notice, improper Motion to Reconsider, deemed denied motion to correct error — if converted, and untimely motion pursuant to TR 72 (E).

App. Vol. VI pp. 187-88 (brackets and missing quotations in original). The court clearly indicated in these findings that the motion to reconsider was “improper” and applied the thirty-day timelines for filing a motion to correct error in analyzing Midwest's Rule 72(E) argument. Id. Based on these findings, we cannot conclude that the trial court failed to treat Midwest's motion to reconsider as a motion to correct error.

[21] Further, the time limitation for ruling on a motion to correct error is as follows:

In the event a court fails for forty-five (45) days to set a Motion to Correct Error for hearing, or fails to rule on a Motion to Correct Error within thirty (30) days after it was heard or forty-five (45) days after it was filed, if no hearing is required, the pending Motion to Correct Error shall be deemed denied. Any appeal shall be initiated by filing the notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 9(A) within thirty (30) days after the Motion to Correct Error is deemed denied.

Ind. Trial Rule 53.3. Here, the trial court did not schedule a hearing on Midwest's motion to correct error until March 3, 2025—more than forty-five days after Midwest filed its motion on January 8. And the court did not rule on said motion until March 7. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining Midwest's motion to correct error was deemed denied forty-five days after it was filed and no hearing had been set.

[22] For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's Post-Judgment Order denying Midwest's Trial Rule 72(E) motion and deeming Midwest's motion to correct error denied.

[23] Affirmed.²

FOOTNOTES

1.   Midwest also names Streamline Investments, LLC, Martin Reedus, Marion County Department of Business & Neighborhood Services, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, and PML Bridge Fund, LLC as defendants. PML Bridge Fund, LLC answered and admitted that its interest was subordinate to Midwest's. None of these defendants participate in this appeal.

2.   Midwest also argues the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment in favor of Timberland. Specifically, Midwest argues Timberland's Notice of Lis Pendens under the Lis Pendens case was defective, rendering Timberland's judgment an inferior interest to Midwest's mortgage lien. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying post-judgment motions, we do not reach the merits of Midwest's arguments regarding the court's Summary Judgment Order.

Scheele, Judge.

Foley, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.