GIBBONS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Anthony Gibbons was convicted of domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. Gibbons appeals and claims that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for domestic battery because the State failed to establish that Gibbons and the victim had a dating relationship. We disagree and affirm.

Issue

[2] Gibbons presents one issue: whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Gibbons’ conviction for domestic battery.

Facts

[3] On September 6, 2023, South Bend Police Officer Alan Wiegand was dispatched to a residence in South Bend in response to a report of a domestic disturbance. Upon arriving at the residence, S.S., the reporting party, told Officer Wiegand that she wanted Gibbons removed from the property. S.S. then led the officers to a bedroom, where Gibbons was packing a bag on the bed. While packing, Gibbons called S.S. a “fake-as* bi**h” and stated, “I am on the lease.” State's Ex. 1 at 0:25-0:38.

[4] Officer Wiegand's body-camera footage shows that, a few seconds later, S.S. walked over to the bed and began going through Gibbons’ bag. Gibbons became visibly angry, slapped S.S.’s wrist, and slammed her into the wall with force. Officers at the scene pulled Gibbons away from S.S., forced him onto the bed, and handcuffed him. As officers were pulling Gibbons away from S.S., he yelled, “Babe, what the f**k you did?” and “See what you done, boo?” Id. at 0:40-0:45.

[5] Gibbons was removed from the residence and taken to a police vehicle. While in the vehicle, Gibbons muttered, “Babe, [ ], why you get me locked up?” and “Why you do that, boo?” State's Ex. 2 at 0:01-0:12. Officers later asked Gibbons, “What's your girlfriend's name?” and he replied without hesitation, “[S.S.].” State's Ex. 3 at 0:25-0:31.

[6] On September 7, 2023, the State charged Gibbons with domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor. On January 29, 2024, the State filed an additional charge of battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor. A jury trial was held on May 30, 2025. The jury found Gibbons guilty of Count I, domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and Count II, battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class B misdemeanor, as a lesser included offense. The trial court entered judgment of conviction for domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced Gibbons to sixty days in jail. The trial court did not enter judgment of conviction on Count II and explained, “Count I overrides everything” and “I'm not sentencing him to the B or Count II.” Tr. Vol. IV p. 91. Gibbons now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Gibbons challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for domestic battery. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[8] Indiana Code Section 35-42-2-1.3(a) provides, “a person who knowingly or intentionally: (1) touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; or (2) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner places any bodily fluid or waste on a family or household member; commits domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.” (emphasis added). Indiana Code Section 35-31.5-2-128 defines, “An individual is a ‘family or household member’ of another person if the individual: ․ (2) is dating or has dated the other person ․” (emphasis added). Accordingly, to convict Gibbons of domestic battery, the State was required to prove that Gibbons was dating or had dated S.S. at the time of the incident.

[9] Gibbons’ sole argument is that the State failed to prove that Gibbons and S.S. were dating or had dated. Our Court has addressed whether the phrase “dating or has dated” is unconstitutionally vague and falls within the relationships encompassed by the domestic battery statute's definition of a “family or household member.” Jackson v. State, 165 N.E.3d 641, 648 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). “ ‘[D]ating or has dated’ as used in the statute is among several enumerated relationships of the type and conduct involving more than meeting a friend or colleague for a cup of coffee.” Id. This phrase refers to “a social engagement between two persons that often has a romantic character.” Id. We acknowledged that dating may encompass “the most mundane activities” or “intimate occasions and sexual contact”; however, given the totality of the facts and circumstances, a trier of fact can reasonably decide whether a defendant was dating or had dated the victim. Id.

[10] Here, Gibbons argues that the State presented “no evidence” at trial to show that he was in a dating relationship with the victim. Appellant's Br. p. 5. The evidence presented at trial indicates otherwise. First, Gibbons’ personal belongings were at S.S.’s residence, and the body-camera footage shows that he was packing when officers arrived. Gibbons also yelled that “I am on the lease,” which supports a reasonable inference that the two lived together. State's Ex. 1 at 0:25-0:38. Second, Gibbons repeatedly referred to S.S. as “babe” and “boo,” terms commonly used between romantic partners, and the habitual and repetitive use of those terms supported an inference that their relationship was romantic in nature. State's Ex. 2 at 0:01-0:12. Finally, when an officer asked Gibbons, “What's your girlfriend's name?” he answered with S.S.’s full name without hesitation and without correcting the officer's characterization.¹ State's Ex. 3 at 0:25-0:31. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Gibbons was dating or had dated S.S. Gibbons’ arguments merely invite us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244; Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146 (“It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction.”).

Conclusion

[11] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Gibbons’ conviction for domestic battery. Accordingly, we affirm.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Gibbons argues that “girlfriend” is open to multiple interpretations and does not necessarily indicate a romantic relationship. Appellant's Br. p. 5. We are not persuaded by this strained argument. As a matter of common usage, “girlfriend” means “[a] female companion or friend with whom one has a sexual or romantic relationship.” American Heritage Dictionary, https://www.ahdictionary.com [https://perma.cc/V84F-9P6K] (last visited Jan. 14, 2026).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.