JONES v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Devon Jones appeals his conviction for Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. Jones raises two issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of certain evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 22, 2021, emergency responders found Camron Griffis deceased inside his apartment in Anderson. Following an autopsy and toxicology, Dr. Latanja Watkins concluded that Griffis's cause of death was carfentanil toxicity. Carfentanil is a fentanyl derivative (“a fentanyl molecule with something else added to it”) that is sometimes “used as a sedative in large animal settings.” Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 99-100. Specifically, carfentanil is “[one] hundred times” stronger than fentanyl and has been called “an elephant tranquilizer.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 12.

[3] One or two days after Griffis's death, his mother provided Anderson Police Department investigators with his phone, which she was able to unlock. “[A] couple [of] weeks after” Griffis's mother provided his phone to officers, Anderson Police Department Officer Lance Blossom had messages that he saw on the phone “forensically extracted” by the FBI. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 231-32. Those messages showed communications between Griffis and a contact labeled “Moneyman” in which the two discussed, on multiple occasions, Griffis purchasing marijuana from Moneyman in December 2021 but prior to December 21. Id. at 232-33. Those messages also included a December 21 transaction in which Griffis purchased “percs” from Moneyman, which are pills that frequently contain carfentanil. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 15-16. The December 21 messages were Griffis's last messages.

[4] Officer Blossom learned that the phone number associated with Moneyman on Griffis's phone was serviced by Verizon Wireless, and he obtained certified records from Verizon that showed that that phone number was associated with a person named Tanna Britt. Officer Blossom called the phone number, and Lanya Britt answered. Lanya informed Officer Blossom that Tanna was her mother. And Tanna later informed officers that Jones was Lanya's boyfriend.

[5] The December 2021 text exchanges between Griffis and Moneyman also made references to Moneyman being paid via an app called the Cash App. Officer Blossom obtained certified records from the operator of the Cash App that showed an iCloud email address associated with the same phone number that was associated with Moneyman in Griffis's phone. Officer Blossom then obtained certified records from Apple, Inc. that showed that Jones was the owner of that iCloud account and email address. Other data submitted by Apple from the iCloud account showed pictures and videos of Jones with drug references and contraband. Griffis's roommate also identified Jones to officers as a person who had sold drugs to Griffis.

[6] The State charged Jones with Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. Prior to his jury trial, Jones requested the trial court to exclude the text messages from Griffis's phone as well as the Cash App and Apple records for alleged improper foundations.¹ Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 78-79. The trial court overruled Jones's objections during the pretrial hearing.

[7] Thereafter, and also during the pretrial hearing, Jones expressly sought to allow the parties to discuss Griffis's use of marijuana prior to his December 21 overdose. The trial court inquired with Jones if he was sure that he wanted to allow prior marijuana use to come into evidence, and Jones responded:

Marijuana's listed in [Griffis's] toxicology report ․ and I believe that I'll be able to elicit testimony from at least two (2) witnesses ․ of the potential effects, and the potential of marijuana being laced with fentanyl at other times, and that that's part of how individuals ingest marijuana at times.

Id. at 101-02. In other words, in addition to challenging the State's identity evidence, Jones sought to challenge the State's theory that the percs sold to Griffis on December 21 caused Griffis's death. The trial court permitted Jones to proceed with his defenses.

[8] At his ensuing trial, Jones solicited testimony from Griffis's mother that she knew Griffis to have used marijuana but was unaware of him using narcotics. Id. at 167-68. Thereafter, the State called Officer Blossom. Officer Blossom testified to the data obtained from Griffis's cell phone. Jones objected to that evidence for the same reasons he had objected prior to trial, which the trial court recognized and overruled. Id. at 234. Officer Blossom also testified to his investigation of the identity of Moneyman through the Verizon, Cash App, and Apple records. Jones did not lodge any new objections to that evidence during his trial. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 43-44, 47-49, 51.

[9] At the beginning of the second day of Jones's trial on January 15, 2025, Jones argued that the State had belatedly disclosed two jailhouse phone calls he had made in which he appeared to discuss possible witness tampering. Thus, Jones sought to exclude the State from using those phone calls as substantive evidence during trial. The trial court heard testimony from Officer Blossom regarding those phone calls; he testified that the calls occurred on January 8 and 9 and that he had discovered the phone calls on January 14. The parties also informed the court that they were in plea negotiations through January 10. The trial court concluded that the State reasonably discovered and disclosed the phone calls given the circumstances and denied Jones's motion to exclude them. Jones did not request a continuance to consider the phone calls further.

[10] Thereafter, the jury found Jones guilty of Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. The court then entered its judgment of conviction and sentenced Jones to thirty-five years in the Department of Correction.

[11] This appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

[12] On appeal, Jones argues that the trial court erred in the admission of certain evidence. We review the trial court's decision to admit or to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Wilson v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (Ind. 2002). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision either clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before it, or the court “misinterprets the law.” Nardi v. King, 253 N.E.3d 1098, 1103 (Ind. 2025) (quotation marks omitted).

Discussion and Decision

Foundation for Griffis's cell-phone messages and the business records

[13] We first address Jones's argument that Griffis's cell-phone messages with Moneyman and the records from the Cash App operator and from Apple should not have been admitted because the State failed to establish a proper foundation to authenticate that data. “The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Thomas v. State, 734 N.E.2d 572, 573 (Ind. 2000) (quoting Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a)). When evidence establishes a reasonable probability that an item is what it is claimed to be, the item is admissible. Id.

[14] According to Jones, Griffis's December 2021 text messages with Moneyman were inadmissible because “no witness could link ‘[M]oneyman’ to Jones,” which, in turn, made the State's “authentication [of the messages] insufficient.” Appellant's Br. at 14. Jones adds that the messages were inadmissible because “[i]t is simply unreasonable to conclude that the messages were what the State claimed them to be when there were multiple layers used in order to purportedly identify Jones as ‘Moneyman[.]’ ” Id.

[15] Jones's argument is not well taken. Griffis's mother testified that she provided Griffis's phone to Anderson police officers following his death. Officer Blossom testified that the phone then came into his possession,² and he had the relevant messages forensically extracted from the phone by the FBI. That is sufficient evidence to establish that the messages between Griffis and Moneyman were what they were claimed to be, namely, messages between Griffis and his dealer.

[16] The State also sufficiently authenticated the connections between the phone number associated with Moneyman on Griffis's phone to Jones. Officer Blossom obtained certified records from Verizon that identified the owner of the phone number associated with Moneyman on Griffis's phone. Griffis's messages with Moneyman also referred to paying Moneyman via the Cash App, and Officer Blossom obtained certified records from the operator of that app that identified an iCloud email address associated with that same phone number. Officer Blossom then obtained certified records from Apple that showed that Jones was the owner of that iCloud email address. Those records were sufficient to show that the State's evidence was what the State claimed it to be. That the State had to take more than one step to connect the phone number on Griffis's phone to Jones is of no moment.

Jones's arguments on appeal under Indiana Evidence Rules 401, 403, and 404

[17] Jones next argues that the text messages between Griffis and Moneyman relating to the marijuana transactions, which were in early December 2021 and prior to the December 21 transaction for percs, were not relevant and were inadmissible even if they were relevant.³ Indiana Evidence Rule 401 defines relevant evidence. Relevant evidence is generally admissible. Evid. R. 402. However, Evidence Rule 403 permits a trial court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ․ unfair prejudice ․” And Evidence Rule 404(b)(1) prohibits the use of a prior wrong act “to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.”

[18] Jones's arguments on appeal that the text messages were not relevant or were admitted in violation of Evidence Rules 403 or 404 have not been preserved for our review. He cites no part of the record that shows he preserved any such errors, and our review of the record shows that he objected to the text messages only on foundation grounds in the trial court. Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 79, 234. Not only did Jones not object to that evidence under Rules 401 through 404, he also affirmatively sought to have Griffis's prior use of marijuana raised to the jury in order to challenge the State's theory that the percs caused Griffis's death. Thus, in addition to not preserving his arguments for our review, he appears to have invited any alleged error with regard to Griffis's prior marijuana use. We therefore reject Jones's relevance arguments.

Late-disclosed evidence

[19] Jones's last argument on appeal is that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to exclude the January 8-9 phone calls as late-disclosed evidence. As we have previously summarized:

“[E]vidence revealed at the time it is sought to be introduced will be excluded if there is evidence of bad faith [on the part of the proponent] or substantial prejudice [to the opponent].” Cook v. State, 675 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Ind. 1996). Continuance, rather than exclusion, is usually the appropriate remedy. Id. at 690; Barber v. State, 911 N.E.2d 641, 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (discretion to exclude “limited to instances” of bad faith or substantial prejudice). Five factors guide the trial court's choice of remedy: when the parties first knew of the evidence; the importance of the evidence; the prejudice resulting to the opposing party; the appropriateness of a less severe remedy such as continuance; and whether the opposing party would be unduly surprised and prejudiced by admission. Vasquez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 473, 476 (Ind. 2007).

Perryman v. State, 80 N.E.3d 234, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (alterations original to Perryman).

[20] There is no evidence of bad faith on the State's part, and the prejudice due to the late disclosure was not substantial. The State and Jones were in plea negotiations at the time Jones made the relevant phone calls, and it was only after those negotiations failed on January 10 that the State resumed its trial preparation. Officer Blossom then discovered the phone calls on January 14, and the State promptly disclosed the phone calls to Jones. Moreover, if Jones needed more time to consider a strategy for how to handle his own statements in those phone calls, he could have asked for a reasonable continuance notwithstanding the fact that the jury had already been selected. See id. at 249. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jones's motion to exclude the phone calls.

Conclusion

[21] For all of these reasons, we affirm Jones's conviction for Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Jones had “[n]o objection” to the Verizon records. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 36.

2.   Insofar as Jones's argument on appeal might suggest an issue regarding the chain of custody over Griffis's phone between his mother turning it in to Anderson police officers and Officer Blossom obtaining it, he does not identify where in the record he preserved any such issue for our review. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). We therefore do not consider that possibility.

3.   Jones makes a passing reference to certain “photos” also being irrelevant, but he does not support that reference with cogent reasoning or with citations to the record as to which of the numerous items of photographic evidence are supposed to be at issue. Appellant's Br. at 14-17. We are therefore unable to consider any such proposition, and it is waived. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Further, insofar as Jones's relevance arguments on appeal relate to the use of Moneyman's phone number or the Cash App and Apple records as identity evidence, Jones's arguments are not supported by cogent reasoning, and we do not consider them either. See id.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.