BENZIGER v. RADABAUGH (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After his divorce, Lane Benziger repeatedly accused his ex-wife, Katherine Radabaugh, of lying during their child-custody proceedings. He pursued those accusations across multiple forums, including this civil defamation action. The trial court entered summary judgment in Radabaugh's favor on Benziger's defamation claims, and Benziger appealed. But while his appeal was pending, Benziger filed in the trial court a Complaint-Affidavit Demonstrating Multiple Acts of Perjury and Contempt of Court, reiterating the issues raised in his appeal.

[2] The trial court struck Benziger's new filing and awarded attorney's fees to Radabaugh. Acting pro se, Benziger now appeals the fee award while inappropriately asking this Court to issue an arrest warrant for Radabaugh. We affirm the grant of attorney's fees, and we also award Radabaugh appellate attorney's fees due to the frivolous nature of this appeal.

Facts

[3] The parties divorced in 2023, entering into a mediated settlement agreement in which they released all claims against one another. Despite this release, Benziger spent the next two years pursuing civil defamation actions against Radabaugh and seeking her arrest based on statements she allegedly made during the dissolution and custody proceedings.

[4] The present action began in September 2024, when Benziger filed a civil defamation complaint against Radabaugh. The trial court entered summary judgment in Radabaugh's favor, and Benziger appealed in April 2025. In August of that year, a different panel of this Court affirmed the summary judgment, finding Benziger's defamation claims failed as a matter of law. Benziger v. Radabaugh, 267 N.E.3d 1149, 1153-56 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Based on the frivolous and repetitive nature of Benziger's filings, the Court sua sponte awarded Radabaugh appellate attorney's fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E). See id. at 1158-59.

[5] Meanwhile, Benziger continued to litigate his defamation claim in the trial court. In April 2025, he filed his Complaint-Affidavit Demonstrating Multiple Acts of Perjury and Contempt of Court, reiterating the issues raised in his appeal. In May 2025, after the trial court struck Benziger's new filing, he reiterated those issues again in a motion to reconsider. And in July 2025, at a hearing on Radabaugh's request for attorney's fees, Benziger reiterated the issues yet again. Following the July hearing, the court awarded Radabaugh attorney's fees under Indiana Code § 34-52-1-1. Benziger appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Indiana Code § 34-52-1-1 authorizes a trial court to award attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action if the court finds the opposing party:

(1) brought the action or defense on a claim or defense that is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless;

(2) continued to litigate the action or defense after the party's claim or defense clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or

(3) litigated the action in bad faith.

Ind. Code § 34-52-1-1(b).

[7] We review both a trial court's decision to award attorney's fees and the amount thereof for an abuse of discretion. Williams v. Kirch, 268 N.E.3d 284, 287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or if the court has misinterpreted the law. Brademas v. S. Bend Cmty. Sch. Corp., 783 N.E.2d 745, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion

[8] Although neither party raises jurisdiction as an issue, the jurisdictional posture of this case underscores the impropriety of Benziger's continued litigation and supports the trial court's finding of bad faith. Jurisdictional questions can be raised sua sponte and are reviewed de novo. Gerth v. Est. of Bloemer, 240 N.E.3d 702, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[9] Benziger's actions that led to the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Radabaugh occurred while his first appeal under this same lower cause number was pending. Our Supreme Court has made clear that appeals erect “a jurisdictional fence between the trial court and the appellate court—preventing parties from pursuing similar relief in different courts at the same time.” Conroad Assocs., L.P. v. Castleton Corner Owners Ass'n, Inc., 205 N.E.3d 1001, 1003 (Ind. 2023). When the clerk files the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record, appellate jurisdiction vests, stripping the trial court of authority to act on any matter that intrudes upon or interferes with the subject matter of the appeal. See id. With the exception of collateral matters, orders entered by a trial court after entry of the Notice of Completion of Clerk's Record are void, not merely voidable. Id. at 1006-07.

[10] Here, appellate jurisdiction in Benziger's prior appeal vested on April 25, 2025, when the clerk filed its notice of completion. Despite the fact that the trial court no longer possessed jurisdiction over Benziger's claims, he continued to litigate them in his Complaint-Affidavit Demonstrating Multiple Acts of Perjury and Contempt of Court, in his motion to reconsider the trial court's order striking that filing, and at the hearing on Radabaugh's request for attorney's fees. These arguments were repetitious of the defamation claims for which the trial court had already entered summary judgment and which were before this Court on appeal. In deciding that Radabaugh was entitled to attorney's fees, the trial court relied on Benziger's repeated attempts to relitigate claims that had already been adjudicated.¹

II. Radabaugh Is Entitled to Appellate Attorney's Fees

[11] Radabaugh requests appellate attorney's fees under Indiana Appellate Rule 66(E), which authorizes this Court to award such fees “if an appeal, petition, or motion, or response, is frivolous or in bad faith.” We exercise this authority with restraint, mindful of the right to appeal, but we will award fees when an appeal is frivolous or taken in bad faith. Wagler v. W. Boggs Sewer Dist., Inc., 29 N.E.3d 170, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Benziger's appeal meets that standard.

[12] Benziger's Appellant's Brief does not meaningfully challenge the trial court's discretionary fee award. Instead, he devotes substantial portions of his brief to asserting that the trial court—and now this Court—“had the obligation to issue an arrest warrant” for Radabaugh based on alleged perjury. Appellant's Br., pp. 11-13. Those assertions rely on criminal statutes not applicable here, reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of civil proceedings, and are unsupported by cogent reasoning or relevant legal authority.²

[13] Moreover, in a decision issued less than six months ago, this Court sua sponte awarded Radabaugh appellate attorney's fees after concluding Benziger's defamation claims were meritless, procedurally improper, and advanced in bad faith. Benziger, 267 N.E.3d at 1153-56. He also asked the prior panel to issue an arrest warrant, which this Court explained was an inappropriate request. Id. at 1160. Yet merely twenty-one days after our Court issued its caution, Benziger filed another appellate brief again asking this Court “to immediately issue an arrest warrant for Radabaugh.” Appellant's Br., p. 13.

[14] Despite clear guidance from our Court, Benziger continues his same bad-faith behavior. He challenges a fee award premised not only on findings that he continued to litigate but also on the exact issue that had already been resolved. His brief fails to meaningfully engage with the law. And, consequently, Radabaugh incurred additional expenses to defend a judgment supported by settled law and upheld on appeal.

[15] Considering Benziger's litigation history—including the prior award of appellate attorney's fees—this appeal reflects a continuation of the same bad-faith litigation strategy that we have already cautioned Benziger against. We therefore grant Radabaugh's request for appellate attorney's fees and remand to the trial court for the limited purpose of determining the reasonable amount of attorney's fees incurred on appeal.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court acted within its authority in awarding attorney's fees based on Benziger's continued litigation of matters already resolved and pending on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's order and additionally grant Radabaugh's request for appellate attorney's fees. This case is remanded for a determination of the appropriate amount of those fees.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Though the trial court lacked jurisdiction over Benziger's defamation claims, the trial court was not divested of all authority. See Conroad, 205 N.E.3d at 1003-05. The trial court retained jurisdiction over collateral matters, including addressing Benziger's litigation misconduct on matters outside the merits of his appealed claims. See id. Accordingly, while the trial court lacked authority to entertain Benziger's repetitive litigation, it retained authority to strike his abusive filings and to award attorney's fees based on his bad-faith conduct.

2.   Though he proceeds pro se on appeal, Benziger is held to the same standards as a licensed attorney and must comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Among them is Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a), which provides that “the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented” must be “supported by cogent reasoning.” “We will not ․ address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984. Such arguments are waived. Id.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.