IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.L. (Minor Child); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A.M. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental relationship with her twenty-three-month-old son, J.L. (“J.L.”). Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with J.L. is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationship with J.L. is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Twenty-three-year-old Mother, who is the parent of three children, has a four-year history with the Department of Child Services (“DCS”). At some point, Mother signed consents for the adoption of her two oldest children. This appeal concerns Mother's youngest child, J.L., who was born in June 2023. At birth, J.L. tested positive for methadone, which is a controlled substance, and Mother did not have a prescription for it. Based on J.L.’s positive drug test, DCS removed J.L. from Mother when the infant was two days old and placed him in foster care with his paternal grandparents (“foster parents”).

[4] Also, in June 2023, DCS filed a petition alleging that J.L. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Mother admitted that J.L. was a CHINS. In July 2023, Mother entered into a stipulated dispositional decree. Pursuant to the terms of that decree, Mother agreed to: (1) abstain from the use of illegal controlled substances; (2) obtain safe and stable housing; (3) complete a parenting assessment and successfully complete the assessor's recommendations; (4) complete a substance abuse assessment and successfully complete the assessor's recommendations; (5) submit to random drug screens; and (6) attend scheduled visits with J.L.

[5] Mother tested positive for methamphetamine and THC in August 2023 and initially failed to complete parenting and substance abuse assessments. She continued to test positive for methamphetamine and THC in January, February, March, and May 2024. Although Mother completed a substance abuse assessment, she failed to follow the assessor's recommendations. In addition, she refused to complete a parenting assessment.

[6] In June 2024, Mother participated in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. However, she was discharged from the program after she relapsed at the end of August 2024. Mother then tested positive for methamphetamine and THC in September 2024. Her last visit with J.L. was in October 2024.

[7] One month later, in November 2024, Mother stated that she intended to sign a consent to J.L.’s adoption. Also, in November 2024, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with J.L.

[8] The trial court heard the facts as set forth above at the May 2025 termination hearing. The DCS family case manager (“the FCM”) testified that she recommended the termination of Mother's parental relationship with J.L. because Mother “ha[d] been inconsistent for the entire duration of [J.L.’s] case, as well as her other children's cases.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 30). According to the FCM, Mother had only visited J.L. twelve times in the previous eighteen months. The FCM further testified that the plan for J.L. was foster parent adoption.

[9] The court-appointed special advocate (“the CASA”) also testified at the hearing and recommended the termination of Mother's parental relationship with J.L. Specifically, the CASA testified that “23 months [was] a long time for a child to be in care, and not have the cause for removal remedied.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 41-42). The CASA further testified that Mother did not have a bond with J.L. and that J.L. had a bond with foster parents.

[10] In addition, J.L.’s paternal grandmother (“foster mother”) testified that during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, doctors had diagnosed J.L. with Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and Tuberous Sclerosis Type II, which is a rare genetic condition that causes benign tumors to grow throughout the body. According to foster mother, at the time of the hearing, J.L had eight brain tumors and four heart tumors. Foster mother testified that she did not work because J.L.’s medical issues required numerous medical appointments. Specifically, foster mother explained that J.L. sees three different specialists, including a pediatric neurologist and a pediatric cardiologist. According to foster mother, any missed appointments could have serious consequences for J.L.’s health. Foster mother further testified that J.L. suffers from behavioral problems, including outbursts of anger. Specifically, according to foster mother, J.L. needs to be watched constantly because he bashes his head and face on the ground and “on stuff.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 36). Foster mother also testified that she wanted to adopt J.L.

[11] Mother testified that she had been sober for forty days. Specifically, Mother explained that she had just completed a thirty-day inpatient drug treatment program and that she had been residing in a sober living facility for ten days. According to Mother, J.L. could reside at the sober living facility with her. In addition, Mother acknowledged that she had not visited J.L. for seven months and that she did not know much about his medical issues.

[12] During Mother's closing argument, her counsel asked the trial court to “simply please choose to allow [Mother] more time to show that she c[ould] maintain [her] sobriety.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 46). According to Mother's counsel, Mother was “in a good place” and was simply asking that “today not be the day that her right[s] be terminated[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 46).

[13] In June 2025, the trial court issued a detailed order terminating Mother's parental relationship with J.L. The trial court's order specifically provides, in relevant part, as follows:

11. Mother indicated that she recently completed a drug rehabilitation program and has been sober for forty days. Despite this step in the right direction (continuation of which the court would certainly encourage), the court also heard testimony that Mother has had previous periods of sobriety that have resulted in substance use relapse. Testimony indicated that Mother was last sober in July/August of 2024 for approximately one and one-half (11/212) months; however, she was removed from a treatment facility at that time after a relapse. The court finds that Mother's history of substance use outweighs Mother's relatively short period of sobriety just prior to the termination hearing.

(App. Vol. 2 at 81). Thereafter, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in J.L.’s removal or the reasons for his placement outside the home would not be remedied and that there was a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to J.L.’s well-being.

[14] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[15] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with J.L. is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[16] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where a child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own child should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[17] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.² DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[18] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[19] Where, as here, the trial court's order contains specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, we engage in a two-tiered review. In re A.G., 6 N.E.3d 952, 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and then, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences to be drawn therefrom that support them. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the juvenile court's conclusions or the conclusions do not support the resulting judgment. Id.

[20] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[21] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationship with J.L. is clearly erroneous. Specifically, her sole contention is that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in J.L.’s removal or the reasons for his placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied. According to Mother, J.L. had been removed from her because of her drug use, and she had remedied the reason for his removal by participating in a thirty-day substance treatment program and remaining sober for forty days.

[22] However, we note that the trial court also found that clear and convincing evidence established that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to J.L.’s well-being. Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive. The trial court, therefore, needs only to find one of the requirements of this subsection by clear and convincing evidence. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (interpreting a previous version of the statute), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied. “Standing alone, the finding that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the child[ ] satisfies the requirement listed in subsection ([d]).” Id. (interpreting a previous version of the statute). In other words, we need not reach Mother's argument related to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

[23] Nevertheless, in light of Mother's constitutional right to raise her child, we choose to address her argument that the evidence is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in J.L.’s removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In determining this statutory factor, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include parents’ prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. Id.

[24] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that J.L. was removed from Mother in June 2023 because of Mother's drug use. Mother continued to use drugs until June 2024, when she entered an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. However, she was discharged from that program after she relapsed. Thereafter, she began using drugs again and stopped visiting J.L. Mother completed a second substance abuse treatment program for thirty days in the spring of 2025 and had been sober for forty days at the time of the termination hearing. However, after hearing the evidence, the trial court determined that Mother's history of substance use outweighed her relatively short period of sobriety just prior to the termination hearing and concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in J.L.’s removal or the reasons for his placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion, and the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationship with J.L. is not clearly erroneous. Mother's argument that “J.L. could have remained in his [foster mother]’s home for longer so that Mother could continue to show that she had indeed remedied her substance abuse issues[,]” (Mother's Br. 10), is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See R.S., 56 N.E.3d at 628.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.L.’s father signed a consent to J.L.’s adoption and is not participating in this appeal.

2.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in November 2024, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.