IN RE: the Adoption of N.M.O. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.S. (“Aunt”) and A.S. (“Uncle”) appeal the trial court's order dismissing their petition to adopt N.M.O. (“Child”), their niece, and determining that it is in Child's best interests to be adopted by K.G. and J.G (“Foster Parents”) and not by Aunt and Uncle. Aunt and Uncle raise several arguments on appeal, which we restate as:

I.  Whether the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) invalidated the need for its consent to the adoption and unreasonably withheld its consent from Aunt and Uncle;

II.  Whether the trial court's order that adoption by Foster Parents was in Child's best interests was supported by sufficient evidence and did not reflect a class or cultural judgment; and

III. Whether the trial court properly applied the established law in Indiana in its determination that it was in Child's best interests to be adopted by Foster Parents.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Child was born August 7, 2017, and was seven years old at the time of the order at issue. Child is multi-racial and is of African American, Caucasian, and Latina descent. Child was removed from the care of her biological mother, R.O. (“Mother”), on August 23, 2019, shortly after Child turned two years old following a report alleging neglect. Mother had struggled with mental illness and substance abuse that rendered her unable to care for her children. After being removed from Mother's care, DCS placed Child with Aunt and Uncle on August 29, 2019. The next day, Aunt petitioned for guardianship of Child. Child resided with Aunt and Uncle and their children for three months; however, Aunt voluntarily relinquished placement of Child from her care on November 26, 2019. There had been conflict between Aunt and Mother, and Aunt was struggling with balancing her relationship with Mother and with performing what was required of a foster parent. As a result, Aunt did not believe that she could continue as placement for Child. Although Aunt no longer wished to serve as the placement for Child, she did not support reunification of Child and Mother, and her guardianship petition remained pending.

[4] Child was placed in her second placement in November 2019 and remained in that placement until February 2021. During this time, DCS's permanency plan in its child in need of services case (“CHINS”) for Child continued to be reunification with Mother. In March 2020, Aunt withdrew her petition to be appointed Child's guardian to honor the bond that had formed between Child and her new placement. While Child was in this placement, Aunt was granted visitation with Child once per month in a community setting. Uncle had no in-person contact with Child from November 27, 2019, until January 2023. Aunt visited Child in December 2019 and once in 2020 and had phone conversations with Child a few times during the COVID pandemic but thereafter ceased having contact with Child. During this time, Mother did not want her extended family, including Aunt, to have contact with Child. In late 2020 to March 2021, Mother's mental health deteriorated, and she accused Child's then-placement of mistreatment of Child. Child was thereafter removed from that placement to respite care for a short period of time and then Child was placed in a fourth placement. That placement lasted only a few days, and Child was then placed with K.G. on March 2, 2021.

[5] A few months later, J.G. moved into the home, and Foster Parents got married, with Child participating in the ceremony as their flower girl. Child has lived with Foster Parents since her placement in March 2021, which is the longest of any placement, and at the time of the hearings in this matter, she had lived with Foster Parents for nearly half her life. While Child was placed with Foster Parents, C.L., Child's college-aged brother (“Brother”), and A.L., Child's maternal grandmother (“Grandma”), continued to have contact with Child. Child's maternal uncle, M.L., and maternal aunt, H.L., also had contact with Child facilitated by Foster Parents. When Child's permanency plan was changed to termination of parental rights and adoption, with a concurrent plan for reunification, Foster Parents expressed interest in adopting Child.

[6] During the CHINS case, the court found that Child was doing excellent with Foster Parents and was bonded to them, enjoying a warm and loving relationship. When Child was first placed with Foster Parents, she was still potty training, still asked for a bottle at age three, struggled being by herself, was very shy, cried a lot, and had a limited diet. During her time living with Foster Parents, Child became more outgoing and secure. She was able to play by herself, no longer struggling with separation anxiety, and eating a more diverse diet. Foster Parents ensured that Child became involved in church, her community, and extracurricular activities. While in placement with Foster Parents, Child became a part of their family and viewed Foster Parents as her mom and dad. The structure and routine that Foster Parents provided Child allowed Child to thrive.

[7] In September 2021, Mother expressed to DCS that she wished for M.L. and H.L. to be considered as guardians of Child. Child's then court appointed special advocate, Coleen Sheppard (“CASA Sheppard”), spoke with Child's uncle, M.L., about guardianship, and in December, CASA Sheppard spoke with M.L.’s wife, H.L., about their interest in adopting Child. However, M.L. and H.L. did not believe they could adopt Child due to their other family obligations. H.L. agreed with CASA Sheppard that Child needed stability, that it was apparent that Child loved Foster Parents, and that the best situation for Child was to be adopted by Foster Parents. Brother was supportive of Child's placement with Foster Parents. At the time, Mother also supported Foster Parents adopting Child.

[8] On June 14, 2022, Grandma spoke with Child's new CASA, Gail Bridges-Rea (“CASA Bridges-Rea”), and told her that Aunt wanted to adopt Child. On June 27, 2022, CASA's Executive Director (“CASA Director”) spoke with Aunt, and CASA Director told her that Child was in a good placement that wished to adopt her. Aunt stated she was happy and that she did not want to disrupt Child's placement but “may” consider taking Child back “if the placement disrupts.” Ex. Vol. 2 p. 42.

[9] However, in September 2022, Aunt reached out to DCS to state that she and Uncle wanted to be considered for pre-adoptive placement, which may have been initiated by Mother asking Aunt to become placement. As a result of this request, DCS scheduled a provider meeting on September 28, 2022, to discuss the options for placement and adoption for Child. The providers discussed “the process of going through adoption interviews with both families to gain additional information needed to make a better decision about placement.” Id. at 31.

[10] On November 17, 2022, Mother executed Post-Adoption Agreements with both Foster Parents and Aunt and Uncle providing her consent to both Foster Parents and Aunt and Uncle to adopt Child. On November 23, 2022, Foster Parents filed their petition to adopt Child under Cause Number 53C07-2211-AD-105, and on November 29, 2022, Aunt and Uncle filed their petition to adopt Child under Cause Number 53C07-2211-AD-111.

[11] On January 16, 2023, Aunt and Uncle began having supervised visitation with Child. The visit supervisor, Stacia Kelly (“Kelly”), had worked with Child since March 2021 and had spent hundreds of hours with Child. Kelly noticed a “striking difference” in Child at Foster Parents’ home than at the home of Aunt and Uncle. Tr. Vol. 1 pp. 245–46. When she would first arrive at Aunt and Uncle's house, Kelly observed that Child would look around for what treats or special things were there for her. While Child had fun playing with her cousins, she was sometimes demanding or oppositional during her visits with Aunt and Uncle. On one occasion, Aunt informed Child that everyone pronounces her name wrong, which upset Child. When Kelly observed Child with Foster Parents, Child was comfortable and loving and showed no resistance to talking to them and showing affection.

[12] DCS completed home studies for both Foster Parents and Aunt and Uncle. At the conclusion of the home studies, DCS strongly recommended that Child be adopted by Foster Parents while Aunt and Uncle continued to “build and strengthen their existing familial bonds with her.” Ex. Vol. 5 p. 141. The trial court held eight days of hearings on the consolidated adoption petitions filed by the parties with the hearings being held on December 14, 2023, December 19, 2023, December 21, 2023, February 16, 2024, February 26, 2024, March 1, 2024, March 18, 2024, and June 5, 2024.

[13] At the hearings, testimony was heard from the two therapists that Child had worked with since June 2021. Child worked with Kelli Deckard (“Deckard”) from June 2021 until December 2021 and with Logan Pfeifer (“Pfeifer”) from June 2023 until the time of the hearings. Both therapists supported Child staying with Foster Parents. In her time working with Child, Deckard observed Child being affectionate with K.G., seeking out her attention, and wanting to be near her. Based on her observations, Deckard stated that she had no concerns about Foster Parents’ relationship with Child. Pfeifer too made observations regarding Child's relationship with Foster Parents and testified that Child interacted with them like parents and a child, with a very loving relationship. Pfeifer had no concerns with the interactions she witnessed between Foster Parents and Child.

[14] In her therapy sessions, Child “was kind of resistant” to discussing “difficult emotions,” her living situation, and spending more time with Aunt and Uncle. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 121. Pfeifer had concerns about Child's ability to process her emotions if she were to move homes and testified that Child required a lot of individual attention, and Pfeifer was worried about Child's needs being met if she was one of six children in Aunt and Uncle's home. Pfeifer testified that she had not seen any indication that Child's race was “impairing her functioning within [Foster Parents’] home.” Id. at 125. To aid in raising a multi-racial child, K.G. sought out resources, books, and other assistance and was open to learning more on how to best meet Child's needs as it relates to her race and cultural heritage. Additionally, J.G. has four adopted children who identify as black.

[15] A bonding assessment was conducted for Foster Parents and Child by Kate Creason (“Creason”), who is a therapist and an expert in attachment disorders specializing in “working with families to develop healthy relationships specifically surrounding attachment, trauma, violence and adoption.” Ex. Vol. 1 p. 6. Creason testified that she was particularly concerned with the attachment between Child and Foster Parents, which is of particular concern for young children in foster care because each change of placement is “a disruption to the attachment and security that young children need to have to develop secure attachment and positive relationships based on trust.” Id. at 19. Creason opined that a six-year-old like Child who has not yet formed a secure attachment has a risk of not forming healthy relationships and being able to trust people. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 46. Creason testified that, in the short amount of time that Child was placed with Aunt and Uncle, Child did not form a complete attachment to them. With respect to Foster Parents’ attachment with Child, Creason concluded that it was emerging and the bond was increasing over the time she observed them.

[16] Creason believed that, if Child was removed from Foster Parents’ home, it would take Child five to six years to form a new attachment. Creason expressed concerns about a child not forming a secure attachment until age eleven or twelve because at that age children begin the process of individuation. A child who fails to form a secure attachment prior to the process of individuation has a greater risk for substance abuse, poor school performance, difficulty in relationships, and mental health disorders. In her observations of Child and Foster Parents, Creason noted that Child exhibited a desire for control during the bonding assessment, which she believed was a trauma response. According to Creason, Foster Parents “navigated this easily” and were “both emotionally regulated, patient, and redirected [Child] as appropriate.” Ex. Vol. 1 p. 22. Creason concluded that Foster Parents and Child are developing an “emerging” attachment and that Foster Parents are “providing the atmosphere for which attachment will happen.” Id. at 25. Creason further stated that removing Child from the home of Foster Parents at this point in her life would be traumatic for her. Creason recommended that Child be adopted by Foster Parents because she deserved to “have permanency and not another attachment disruption.” Id. at 28.

[17] Aunt and Uncle offered the testimony of Victoria DiMartile (“DiMartile”) as an expert witness to testify as to the effect of transracial adoptions on adult transracial adoptees. She testified that, in her opinion, adoptive and racial identities form in childhood and that transracial adoptees’ needs are more fully met when the adoptive family exposes the adoptee to her race of origin on a systematic and integrated basis. She testified that adoptive parents need to provide consistent interaction with others who share the adoptee's racial identity. DiMartile did not observe Child in the households of either Foster Parents or Aunt and Uncle.

[18] Child's therapists testified and both identified stability and permanence as a need for Child. CASA Bridges-Rea testified that stability and permanence were necessary for Child and that she had concerns about the impact on Child if she was moved from the home of Foster Parents. CASA Bridges-Rea also testified that she did not believe it was in Child's best interests to be adopted by Aunt and Uncle because moving Child at that point would disrupt the bonding process that Child had begun with Foster Parents. Child's DCS family case manager Lindsay McDonald (“FCM McDonald”) testified that DCS was not able to consent to both parties’ adoption of Child, and at the time of the hearing, DCS was consenting to Foster Parents’ adoption of Child. In making this decision, FCM McDonald testified that DCS considered the amount of time that Child had been placed with Foster Parents, the bond she shared with them, the consistency of the services that Child had been involved with, the community involvement that Child had while in the care of Foster Parents, and Child's schooling. FCM McDonald also stated that permanency and stability were identified as something Child needs.

[19] On October 11, 2024, the trial court issued its order on best interests for the parties’ adoption petitions. In its order, the trial court concluded that Child's bond with Foster Parents provided the permanency and stability that Child needs and that it was not in Child's best interests to sever the attachments she has formed in her placement with Foster Parents in light of the high likelihood of detrimental effects. Therefore, the trial court concluded that it was in Child's best interests to be adopted by Foster Parents and that it was not in Child's best interests to be adopted by Aunt and Uncle. The trial court accordingly dismissed Aunt and Uncle's petition to adopt Child. Aunt and Uncle now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

[20] “A trial court's decision in matters of family law enjoys ‘considerable deference’ on review, given [the trial court's] ‘position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, get a feel for the family dynamics, and get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.’ ” In re the Adoption of P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2025) (quoting E.B.F. v. D.F., 93 N.E.3d 759, 762 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). In adoption cases specifically, the appellate court neither reweighs evidence nor assesses witness credibility and presumes that the decision of the trial court is correct. Id. at 578–79. The appellant bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. Id. at 579. Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(a)(1) provides that a court cannot grant an adoption petition unless it is in the child's best interests. “The primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child.” In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis added). We will not disturb the trial court's decision in an adoption proceeding unless the evidence at trial led to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite conclusion. In re Adoption of N.W.R., 971 N.E.2d 110, 112 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).

[21] When, as here, the trial court enters findings sua sponte, the findings control our review and judgment only as to those issues specifically referenced in the findings. R.M. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 203 N.E.3d 559, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). When the trial court does not make specific findings on an issue, we apply a general judgment standard, which permits us to affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial. Id. A two-tier standard of review is applied to the sua sponte findings and conclusions made, where we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will only set aside the findings and conclusions if they are clearly erroneous, that is, when the record contains no facts or inferences supporting them. In re the Adoption of C.J., 71 N.E.3d 436, 442 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). A judgment is clearly erroneous when a review of the record leaves us with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We also owe no deference to a trial court's legal conclusions. In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

I. DCS Consent for Adoption

[22] Aunt and Uncle argue that DCS's failure to comply with certain statutory or internal policy requirements during the CHINS case invalidated DCS's consent for adoption, which in turn, invalidated the trial court's order. A trial court deciding an adoption petition must find that “proper consent, if consent is necessary, to the adoption has been given.” Ind. Code § 31-19-11-1(a)(7). When DCS is the legal guardian of a child, as in the present case, its consent to an adoption is required except where the trial court finds the agency's failure to consent is not in the best interests of the child. I.C. § 31-19-9-1(a)(3); I.C. § 31-19-9-8(a)(10); In re Adoption of S.A., 918 N.E.2d 736, 742–43 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied. If DCS fails to consent for reasons that are not in the best interest of the Child, the trial court can grant adoption notwithstanding the lack of consent. S.A., 918 N.E.2d at 742–43. Here, Child was under the legal guardianship of DCS, and FCM McDonald testified at the hearing that DCS consented to the adoption of Child by Foster Parents. Tr. Vol. 4 p. 61.

[23] Aunt and Uncle specifically contend that DCS failed to notify them upon each of Child's placements or to consider placement with Aunt and Uncle upon the last three placements of Child, disregarded their desire to adopt Child, and demonstrated bias or prejudice against them. All of Child's placement decisions occurred during Child's CHINS case. Although Aunt and Uncle were allowed to intervene in the CHINS case on December 1, 2022, for the sole purpose of contesting placement, see Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 p. 180, they do not have standing. Standing is a legal question that is reviewed de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022). “Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury.” Id. (citation omitted). “An injury must be personal, direct, and one the plaintiff has suffered or is in imminent danger of suffering.” Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1286 (Ind. 2022). Aunt and Uncle's argument seems to be that because DCS violated its policies, Child was not placed with them and that if DCS had followed its policies, it would have placed Child with them and would have therefore consented to Aunt and Uncle adopting Child and not Foster Parents. Such assertions are simply “too remote and speculative” to constitute the “direct injury” necessary for standing. Solarize Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 220 (Ind. 2022).

[24] Aunt and Uncle cite to several cases to support their assertion that the alleged irregularities in the CHINS case taint the adoption proceedings. However, these cases are based upon the principle that a due process violation of a parent's fundamental rights in the CHINS case can taint a termination case. See In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. 2014) (finding that a due process violation in the CHINS case invalidated the termination judgment where mother was not provided counsel when requested in CHINS case); In re D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 591 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (reversing a termination of parental right determination where significant procedural irregularities in the CHINS case created risk of erroneous filing of termination petition), trans. denied; In re C.M.S.T., 111 N.E.3d 207, 213 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (reversing termination determination where DCS violated parents’ due process rights in the underlying CHINS case). In all of Aunt and Uncle's cited cases, the due process violations or procedural irregularities found in the underlying CHINS cases all concerned the parents of the children at issue, who therefore had standing in both the CHINS and termination cases. As a result, the parents in those cases suffered a direct injury as a consequence of the alleged errors in the CHINS cases. They are thus distinguishable from the present case where Aunt and Uncle were not parties in the CHINS case, do not possess the same fundamental rights as a parent, and have not shown any direct injury that they have suffered as a result of alleged DCS errors in placement of Child. We agree with the trial court that Aunt and Uncle did not have standing to challenge DCS's placements of Child during the CHINS case and, therefore, cannot collaterally attack those placement decisions in the instant adoption proceedings.

[25] Further, contrary to Aunt and Uncle's assertions, the evidence shows that DCS complied with their policies and Indiana law. In the event of a child's removal from the parent, DCS policy requires DCS to conduct a diligent search to locate all adult relatives/kin of the child in DCS custody and to consider the suitability of relatives when securing appropriate placement for the child. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Child Welfare Policy, Ch. 5, § 23, Diligent Search for Relatives/Care Participants (eff. Feb. 1, 2022), available at https://www.in.gov/dcs/files/5.23.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2025) [https://perma.cc/DW3P-4ST4]; Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Child Welfare Policy, Ch. 4, § 28, Removals from Parents, Guardians, or Custodians (eff. Jul. 3, 2024), available at https://www.in.gov/dcs/files/4.28.pdf (last visited Dec. 12, 2025) [https://perma.cc/BVW8-T49F]. DCS policy requires that this search occur when the child is removed from their “parent, guardian, or custodian.” Id. (emphasis added). Under DCS policy, the diligent search is conducted to notify the relatives of the child's removal, to gather information about the child and family for a thorough assessment, and to determine if the relatives/kin are possible supports for the child or a potential placement option, among other things. Under Indiana Code section 31-34-3-4.5, within thirty days of a child being removed from their parents, DCS is required to exercise due diligence to identify and provide notice of the removal to all adult relatives of the child, and this notice must “set forth the options the relative may have under federal, state, or local laws, including the care and placement of the child and other options that may be lost if the relative fails to respond to the notice.” I.C. § 31-34-3-4.5(a), (c)(2). Further, Indiana Code section 31-34-6-2(b), provides that when a child is alleged to be a CHINS, DCS “shall consider placing [such child] ․ with a relative related by blood, marriage, or adoption before considering any other placement of the child.” (emphasis added).

[26] Aunt and Uncle challenge only the subsequent placements of Child, and not the initial placement. They argue that they were entitled to notice every time that Child changed placements but provide no authority for their position. The plain language of the statute requires notice to Aunt and Uncle only as a result of the initial placement, when Child was removed from her parent. Under DCS policy and Indiana law, DCS is required to conduct a diligent search for family members and give them notice of the child's removal from a parent and to consider such relatives as placement for the child. However, neither DCS policy nor Indiana law require DCS to actually place the child with relatives; DCS must just consider the relatives as placement.

[27] Here, at the time Child was removed from Mother's care, it is undisputed that Aunt was notified and was considered as placement at that time. Indeed, after being removed from Mother's care in August 2019, Child was placed with Aunt and Uncle from August 2019 until Aunt and Uncle voluntarily terminated their placement in November 2019. Additionally, DCS considered placing Child with M.L. and H.L., another maternal uncle and aunt. The evidence does not support Aunt and Uncle's assertion that DCS violated its policies and Indiana law concerning placement of Child.

[28] Aunt and Uncle contend that DCS disregarded their repeated requests to adopt Child, which was evidence of bias towards them. However, the evidence demonstrates that although Aunt and Uncle may have expressed a desire to adopt Child in September 2022, they had previously terminated their placement of Child and failed to consistently remain a part of Child's life. In November 2019, Aunt and Uncle arranged for Child to be removed from their home so they would no longer be Child's placement. Aunt filed a letter with the court in December 2019, stating she had four children and “the demands of being a foster parent with a relative who was erratic and hateful was troubling” to her, so Child was transitioned to “a wonderful licensed foster family whom she already knew.” Ex. Vol. 3 p. 201. CASA Director was informed that Aunt requested Child move to foster care because she did not support reunification and did not want to jeopardize her long-term relationship with Mother by having Child placed with her. Tr. Vol. 4 p. 158. Further, there was evidence presented that Aunt told CASA Sheppard she could not handle being the placement for Child and felt guilty that she could not watch her own children while dealing with the needs of Child. Ex. Vol. 3 p. 129.

[29] Although Aunt requested to be guardian of Child, she subsequently withdrew her request in order to “honor th[e] bond” that had formed between Child and her new foster parents at the time. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 81. After voluntarily relinquishing placement of Child, Aunt and Uncle went a significant amount of time without seeing Child. Aunt stopped visiting with Child around March or April 2020, and Uncle had no in-person contact with Child after November 27, 2019, until supervised visits began on January 16, 2023. Aunt and Uncle claim that they did not know Child was pre-adoptive until September 2022. However, when Aunt and CASA Director spoke in June 2022, CASA Director told Aunt that Child's foster parents at the time wanted to adopt Child. In response, Aunt stated she was happy about it but that if the placement was disrupted, Aunt and Uncle may consider taking Child back. Ex. Vol. 2 p. 42. At that time, Aunt did not request custody of Child, nor did she request visits with Child. Aunt's next involvement in the case was in September 2022 when she indicated to DCS that she and Uncle now wanted to adopt Child. By that point, Foster Parents had already begun pursuing adoption of Child. Aunt and Uncle's actions prior to September 2022 are at odds with their contention that they wanted to be placement or were actively seeking to adopt Child. Aunt and Uncle's arguments to the contrary amount to requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d at 578.

[30] We next address Aunt and Uncle's allegations that DCS discriminated against them. Aunt and Uncle base their claim upon the request that Aunt and Uncle discontinue speaking a second language in the presence of Child. In November 2019, Mother asked for Aunt and Uncle to stop speaking a second language around Child, and at that time, Child's permanency plan was reunification, and DCS had to respect Mother's wishes. Tr. Vol. 4 p. 166. This concern was raised solely by Mother, and at the hearing, Aunt acknowledged that the concern regarding a second language being spoken in their home came from Mother. Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 34, 70–71. This was also confirmed by CASA Sheppard and other members of Mother's family. The directive regarding speaking a second language to Child was not made to discriminate against Aunt and Uncle but because Mother had requested it as an assertion of her parental authority while she was working towards reunification.

[31] Under both DCS policy and Indiana law, relatives have a statutory right to be considered and prioritized for placement in CHINS cases when a child is removed from a parent's care. Here, Aunt and Uncle were both considered and prioritized for placement. They were Child's first placement when Child was removed from Mother's care, and DCS therefore satisfied its policy and Indiana law. In the present case, DCS has lawful custody of Child, and accordingly its consent to Child's adoption is necessary. Aunt and Uncle have not shown that we should disregard DCS's consent to adoption by Foster Parents and DCS's decision to withhold their consent to adoption by Aunt and Uncle. We thus conclude that DCS's consent was valid.

II. Sufficient Evidence for Best Interests Determination

[32] Aunt and Uncle assert that the trial court's determination that it was not in Child's best interests to be adopted by them and instead that adoption by Foster Parents was in the best interests of Child was not supported by sufficient evidence and instead reflected a class or cultural bias. As previously stated, under Indiana Code section 31-19-11-1(a)(1), a trial court cannot grant an adoption petition unless it is in the child's best interests, and the “primary concern in every adoption proceeding is the best interests of the child.” In re M.S., 10 N.E.3d at 1281 (emphasis added). We will not disturb the trial court's decision in an adoption proceeding unless the evidence at trial led to but one conclusion and the trial court reached an opposite conclusion. In re N.W.R., Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 24A-AD-2722 | January 16, 2026 Page 20 of 28 971 N.E.2d at 112. Further, a two-tiered standard of review is applied to the sua sponte findings and conclusions made, where we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and whether the findings support the judgment. R.M., 203 N.E.3d at 564.

[33] The adoption statute does not provide guidance for the factors to consider when determining the best interests of a child in an adoption proceeding, but courts have noted that there are strong similarities between the adoption statute and the termination of parental rights statute in this respect. See In re Adoption of M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (stating that the adoption statutes and the termination statutes provide similar balances between parental rights and the best interests of the children). In termination cases, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence to determine the best interests of a child. In re Adoption of M.H., 15 N.E.3d 612, 627 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Aunt and Uncle have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the trial court's decision is correct, and we will reverse the trial court only if the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial court reached the opposite conclusion. Id.

[34] Here, the trial court was presented with evidence that Child lived with Foster Parents for over half of her life. She was placed with Foster Parents in March 2021 and continued to live with them up until the hearing dates. In contrast, Child had only lived with Aunt and Uncle for three months when she was two years old. Child considered Foster Parents to be her mom and dad, and she was developing a secure attachment with Foster Parents. Testimony was heard regarding how important this secure attachment is for foster children and the risks to Child if this attachment was severed and she was unable to fully form a secure attachment at this age. During the brief time that Child was with Aunt and Uncle, she had not formed a secure attachment to them. When Child was observed at Aunt and Uncle's home, she would have fun playing with her cousins but was sometimes demanding or oppositional, whereas when observed with Foster Parents, Child was comfortable and loving and showed no resistance in talking to them and showing affection. Stability and permanence were necessary for Child due to the trauma she experienced at an early age. DCS, the CASAs involved in the case, and Child's therapists all supported adoption by Foster Parents because Foster Parents had provided the primary source of stability for Child during her life. They all had concerns about the impact on Child if she were removed from the home of Foster Parents because of the disruption such removal would cause in the bonding process. This evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that it was in Child's best interests to be adopted by Foster Parents and that adoption by Aunt and Uncle was not in Child's best interests.

[35] In challenging the trial court's order, Aunt and Uncle point to several findings that they claim were inaccurate or not supported by the evidence. To the extent any of the challenged findings were not supported by the evidence, any error was harmless. The unchallenged findings were sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion, and thus the erroneous statements of which Aunt and Uncle complain are merely surplusage and not grounds for reversal. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“Because there is evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment” the erroneous finding was “merely harmless surplusage that did not prejudice [m]other and, consequently, is not grounds for reversal.”), trans. denied.

[36] Aunt and Uncle also assert that certain evidence concerning Foster Parents, including their past marriage histories, alleged financial instability, and their age and health, were not properly considered in the trial court's determination. These assertions are requests to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d at 578. Such evidence was presented to the trial court, and it was well within the trial court's discretion to weigh the evidence in a manner contrary to how Aunt and Uncle believe it should have been.

[37] Aunt and Uncle claim that actions and statements by the CASAs, DCS, and other service providers demonstrated bias and prejudice against Aunt and Uncle. Aunt and Uncle argue that “[t]he record in this case paints a troubling picture” of racial bias and discrimination by both CASA and DCS and a disregard for Child's best interests such that the trial court erred in its judgment. Appellants’ Br. p. 35. Aunt and Uncle maintain that the wrongdoing was so pervasive that the recommendations by the CASAs and DCS were not based on independent evidence of the best interests of Child but instead on bias and discrimination against Aunt and Uncle. Here, too, the trial court was presented with this alleged evidence of bias and discrimination and concluded that “any possibility” that DCS made a biased decision regarding its recommendation that Child should be adopted by Foster Parents that was “based on race is serious and inappropriate.” Appellees’ App. Vol. 2 p. 15. The trial court further explained that the statement made by an FCM wherein the FCM said that Uncle could not speak “Muslim” to Child when Uncle spoke Uzbek was because Mother had made this request as an assertion of her parenting authority while still working toward reunification and did not “indicate racial bias.” Id. Aunt and Uncle point out other statements and actions by DCS and CASAs that they claim demonstrated bias and discrimination. However, we note that all of this evidence of alleged bias and discrimination was part of the record and presented to the trial court, who was able to weigh the evidence and make credibility determination prior to making its findings and conclusions. Aunt and Uncle's arguments amount to impermissible requests to reweigh the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do on appeal. In re P.J.W., 248 N.E.3d at 578.

[38] Aunt and Uncle make many additional arguments and assertions regarding the trial court's findings that amount to nothing more than requests for this court to reweigh the evidence and make judgment calls on credibility, which we cannot do. Instead, our task is to determine whether the trial court's conclusion that it was in Child's best interests to be adopted by Foster Parents and not to be adopted by Aunt and Uncle was supported by the evidence. As stated above, the trial court considered the length of time that Child had spent with Foster Parents, that Child considered Foster Parents to be her mom and dad, the expert testimony that Child was developing a secure attachment with Foster Parents, and how important such an attachment is, and the associated risks if such an attachment is not allowed to fully form, and the importance of permanence and stability in Child's life, which Child has with Foster Parents. Further, DCS, CASAs, and Child's therapists all recommended that Child stay with Foster Parents. Considering the totality of the evidence, we conclude that the trial court's conclusion that it was not in the best interests of the Child to be adopted by Aunt and Uncle, but that adoption by Foster Parents was in Child's best interest, was supported by the evidence and was not clearly erroneous.

III. Established Indiana Law

[39] Aunt and Uncle invite us to consider modifying our long-standing precedent with respect to the rights of relatives in an adoption and our deference to trial court decisions. First, they argue that relatives should have a preferential right to adopt. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of a parent to establish a home and raise their child. In re D.P., 994 N.E.2d 1228, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). However, there is no corresponding constitutionally protected right for relatives to raise their extended family members. Although Indiana has granted certain other classes of relatives’ rights, such as providing grandparents with the right to seek visitation with their grandchildren, see I.C. § 31-17-5 et seq., there has not been an analogous right bestowed to aunts and uncles. Our court has previously stated that “while we have no doubt a child's knowledge and understanding of her biological heritage can be important for emotional and medical history reasons, we decline to hold that biology is more important” than a child's relationship and bond with non-relatives who have acted as parents to the child. In re Adoption of B.C.S., 793 N.E.2d 1054, 1062–63 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The paramount concern in an adoption case is the best interests of the child, S.A., 918 N.E.2d at 741, and a “[b]lood relationship, while a material factor, is not controlling” with “[r]elatives hav[ing] no preferential legal right to adopt.” In re Adoption of J.L.J., 4 N.E.3d 1189, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting In re Adoption of Childers, 441 N.E.2d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982)), trans. denied. We, therefore, decline Aunt and Uncle's request that we find that relatives should have a preferential right to adopt and, instead, follow our well-established precedent that the primary focus in adoption cases is the best interests of the child.

[40] Next, Aunt and Uncle argue that we should overturn our deferential standard of review in family law cases. They maintain that such a drastic change is necessary because “[t]he absence of meaningful appellate oversight enables systemic failures, including racial bias and procedural errors.” Appellants’ Br. p. 65. However, the “well-established preference in Indiana [is] ‘for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.’ ” Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 124 (Ind. 2016) (quoting In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993)). This is because appellate courts “are in a poor position to look at a cold transcript of the record, and conclude that the trial judge, who saw the witnesses, observed their demeanor, and scrutinized their testimony as it came from the witness stand, did not properly understand the significance of the evidence[.]” Kirk v. Kirk, 770 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. 2002) (quoting Brickley v. Brickley, 210 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ind. 1965)). This standard of review has been utilized in Indiana for at least seventy years, see Rhodes v. Shirley, 129 N.E.2d 60, 61–62 (Ind. 1955), and our Supreme Court precedent is binding upon us until it is changed either by that court or by legislative enactment. Dragon v. State, 774 N.E.2d 103, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). Nevertheless, Aunt and Uncle have not raised a compelling reason to disturb the court's longstanding deferential standard of review in family law cases.

Conclusion

[41] We conclude that any errors or omissions by DCS in the CHINS matter did not invalidate the need for its consent to the adoption, that DCS did not unreasonably withhold its consent from Aunt and Uncle, and the trial court's conclusion that adoption by Aunt and Uncle was not in Child's best interests but that adoption by Foster Parents was in Child's best interests was supported by sufficient evidence. Further, we decline Aunt and Uncle's request to modify Indiana law by creating a preference for relatives in adoption cases and altering our deferential standard of review in family law cases. The trial court here correctly applied the established law in Indiana and did not err in its conclusion regarding the best interests of Child.

[42] Affirmed.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.