LJ MCCOIN v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Timothy LJ McCoin (“McCoin”) appeals his conviction, following a bench trial, for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy.¹ McCoin argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding that the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether there is sufficient evidence to support McCoin's conviction.

Facts

[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment reveal that McCoin married Jessica McCoin (“Jessica”) in 2011. In November 2022, Jessica moved out of their home and sought a protective order against McCoin. A trial court granted a protective order to Jessica based on domestic violence on November 14, 2022. The protective order prohibited McCoin from “harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting, or directly or indirectly communicating” with Jessica. (Ex. Vol. 2 at 4).

[4] Thereafter, in December 2022, the State charged McCoin with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy in cause 05D01-2212-CM-419 (“CM 419”). In that cause, the State alleged that McCoin had violated the protective order protecting Jessica.²

[5] On April 29, 2023, while CM 419 was pending, McCoin sent multiple text messages to his friend, William Morgan (“Morgan”), who was married to Jessica's best friend. In the first text, McCoin asked Morgan, “So why where you guys there? Gonna testify for her?” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 7) (grammar mistakes in original). Morgan responded, “No[,]” and McCoin texted, “That's not what her lawyer said[.]” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 7). McCoin then texted, “If I knew what the hell she wanted I'd just give it to her to go away” and told Morgan to “[f]ind out and ill make it worth your time[.]” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 8) (grammar mistake in original). When Morgan responded, “K[,]” McCoin told Morgan, “I'm serious bro, I have cash[.]” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 8). Morgan did not respond to McCoin's text. Eight minutes later, McCoin texted, “Well” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 9). Morgan again did not respond to McCoin's text. Twenty-nine minutes later, McCoin texted, “She's forgotten I know some very bad people who would happily make this go away. But I don't want that for her.” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 9). Morgan then went to Jessica to show her McCoin's texts. Jessica, who was “scared[,]” called the police. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 12).

[6] The State charged McCoin with Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. The trial court held a one-day bench trial in June 2025. At the time of trial, Jessica and McCoin were divorced.³

[7] During the bench trial, the State introduced the protective order and McCoin's texts as evidentiary exhibits. Jessica testified that, at some point before McCoin had texted Morgan, she had changed her phone number and had not given the new number to McCoin. During cross-examination, Jessica testified that McCoin had directly contacted her via email but then confirmed that “that was on a separate instance[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). Upon questioning by the trial court, Jessica explained that the contact at issue in this case was McCoin's contact with her via the texts to Morgan. Morgan testified that, when he received McCoin's text telling Morgan to “find out” and that McCoin would “make it worth” Morgan's time, he understood that McCoin was asking Morgan to contact Jessica on McCoin's behalf. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9).

[8] The trial court found McCoin guilty as charged. Thereafter, the trial court imposed a 365-day sentence and ordered McCoin to serve that sentence in the Blackford County Security Center.⁴

[9] McCoin now appeals.

Decision

[10] McCoin argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy. Specifically, he asserts that the State failed to show that he intended to have indirect communication with Jessica when he sent the text messages to Morgan. We disagree.⁵

[11] “Sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims trigger a deferential standard of review in which we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (cleaned up). “A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (cleaned up). “In conducting that review, we consider only the evidence that supports the jury's determination, not evidence that might undermine it.” Id. Additionally, our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that “when determining whether the elements of an offense are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, a fact-finder may consider both the evidence and the resulting reasonable inferences.” Thang v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1256, 1260 (Ind. 2014) (emphasis in original).

[12] To convict McCoin of Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that McCoin “knowingly ․ violate[d] ․ a protective order to prevent domestic or family violence or harassment issued under IC 34-26-5[.]” I.C. § 35-46-1-15.1(a)(1). “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b). “[A] defendant's intent can be proved by circumstantial evidence ․ and can be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.” Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195-96 (Ind. 2018).

[13] Here, there was sufficient evidence to show that McCoin knowingly violated the protective order when he indirectly communicated with Jessica. It is undisputed that there was a protective order in place that prohibited McCoin from “directly or indirectly communicating” with Jessica. (Ex. Vol. 2 at 4). “Communication occurs when a person makes something known or transmits information to another.” Kelly v. State, 13 N.E.3d 902, 905 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (cleaned up). Further, the evidence revealed that McCoin sent multiple texts to his friend, Morgan, who was married to Jessica's best friend. At that time, McCoin had another pending invasion of privacy case that involved Jessica, and McCoin texted Morgan to ask why he had been in court and whether he was going to testify on Jessica's behalf. In McCoin's texts, he expressed his desire to know what Jessica wanted and told Morgan to “[f]ind out[.]” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 8). Upon Morgan's agreement to do so, McCoin texted that he was “serious[.]” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 8). When Morgan did not respond to McCoin's text, McCoin texted, “Well” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 9). At trial, Morgan testified that, when he received McCoin's text telling Morgan to “find out” and that McCoin would “make it worth” Morgan's time, he understood that McCoin was asking Morgan to contact Jessica on McCoin's behalf. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 9). Morgan went to Jessica and showed her McCoin's texts.

[14] “Invasion-of-privacy cases are fact specific and such determinations are best made by the finder of fact rather than a reviewing court on appeal.” Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1197. McCoin's argument challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is nothing more than a request to reweigh the evidence and the trial court's credibility determination, which we will not do. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244. The evidence presented at the bench trial and the inferences drawn therefrom were sufficient for the trial court, as trier of fact, to conclude that McCoin knowingly violated the protective order when he indirectly communicated with Jessica. Accordingly, we affirm McCoin's Class A misdemeanor invasion of privacy conviction. See Phipps, 90 N.E.3d at 1197 (affirming the defendant's invasion of privacy conviction where the defendant had indirectly communicated with the victim via email); Kelly, 13 N.E.3d at 905 (affirming the defendant's invasion of privacy conviction where the defendant had indirectly communicated with the victim via text).

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-15.1.

2.   During McCoin's bench trial in this cause, the State questioned Jessica about CM 419. On appeal, the State requests that we take judicial notice, pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 201, of the state court records from that cause, and we will do so. See Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1160 (Ind. 2016) (explaining that Evidence Rule 201(b)(5) permits courts to take judicial notice of state court records).

3.   Also at the time of trial, McCoin had already pleaded guilty in CM 419, and the trial court had imposed a 365-day sentence suspended to probation. Thereafter, the State filed a petition to revoke McCoin's probation in CM 419 in November 2024 and an amended petition in April 2025.

4.   When the trial court sentenced McCoin in this cause, it also revoked McCoin's probation in CM 419 and ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence.

5.   The State asserts that the evidence was sufficient to support McCoin's invasion of privacy conviction because the State presented evidence that McCoin had both indirectly and directly contacted Jessica. The State contends that Jessica's testimony that McCoin had previously emailed her was evidence of direct contact sufficient to support his conviction in this appeal. However, our review of the evidence reveals that Jessica confirmed at trial that the email contact “was on a separate instance” and that the contact at issue in this case was McCoin's contact with her via the texts to Morgan. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 11). Thus, we will focus our review of this sufficiency issue based on the evidence of indirect contact with Jessica.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.