IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of KE.B. and Ka.B. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] L.M. (Mother) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughters, Ke.B. and Ka.B. (collectively, the Children). She asserts that the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) failed to prove, and thus the trial court erred in concluding that: (1) the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside of Mother's home would not be remedied; (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the Children; and (3) termination was in the Children's best interests. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and K.B. (Father) (collectively, Parents) are the parents of Ke.B. and Ka.B. Ke.B. was born on March 28, 2019, and Ka.B. was born on January 27, 2022. In August 2023, DCS removed the Children from Parents’ custody after DCS received a report that Parents had engaged in illegal drug use and multiple incidents of domestic violence with the Children present. That same month, DCS filed petitions alleging the Children were Children in Need of Services (CHINS). The court adjudicated the Children CHINS in December, continued their removal from Parents, and instituted a permanency plan of reunification. Pursuant to a parental participation order, the court ordered Parents to complete and follow the recommendations of a substance abuse assessment and participate in therapy, home-based case management (HBCM), random drug screens, and domestic violence services.

[3] At a review hearing in March 2024, the Children were still removed from Parents and had been placed with their aunt. In its review hearing order, the court noted that Mother was “not participating in services, drug screens, nor parenting time” and did “not maintain contact with the [family case manager (FCM)] and service providers.” Exhibits Vol. 1 at 36. She had not completed the domestic violence assessment or shown progress toward her HBCM goals, and she tested positive for methamphetamine in November and refused to take anymore drug screens. She completed a substance abuse assessment but did not follow through with its recommendation for outpatient drug treatment.

[4] Another review hearing was held in June, at which the court noted that the Children were doing well in placement with their aunt, and Parents were still “inconsistent with parenting time and services.” Id. at 39. The court also learned of a domestic violence incident between Parents that had occurred in May, during which Father beat Mother with a baseball bat. Mother showed up to her visit with the Children with a broken arm, knot on her head, black eye, and bruised legs. She eventually told the supervisor what Father had done. Father was arrested, charged in relation to the incident, and later pled guilty to domestic battery by means of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to two years of home detention with electric monitoring and two years of probation. A few months later at a permanency hearing, DCS requested that the Children's permanency plan be changed to adoption given that “[M]other ha[d] not participated in services or parenting time, and [F]ather [was] incarcerated.” Id. at 43. The court granted DCS's request and changed the Children's permanency plan to adoption only. It was also around this time that Mother's visitation with the Children was suspended due to her habitual tardiness, domestic violence concerns, possible intoxication, and the aggressiveness of one of the Children towards Mother.

[5] In October, DCS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate Parents’ parental rights. At the CHINS review hearing in November, which occurred at the same time as the initial hearing on the termination petitions, Parents were still not participating in services. However, both expressed that they wished to re-engage in services and that they were addressing outstanding criminal matters. That same month, a no contact order was issued in Father's domestic battery case, which prohibited Father from having any contact with Mother until his sentence and probation ended. The court set the next review hearing for March 2025, which was little more than a month before the scheduled termination hearing in April.

[6] As of the March 2025 review hearing, Mother was still not participating in services. Around that same time, a warrant was issued for Mother's arrest for failing to appear in court for charges of possession of methamphetamine. Approximately two weeks after the review hearing, law enforcement tried to serve the warrant at Mother's address, but there was no answer at the door. Neighbors told the police that Mother lived there with her dad and her boyfriend, Father, who was still on home detention with an electric monitoring anklet. After police were unable to get Mother or anyone else to come outside, the police sounded an alarm on Father's electric monitoring anklet to confirm whether he was inside. They heard the alarm, and Mother's dad eventually opened the front door. When Father came to the door, he was arrested for violating the no contact order and charged with invasion of privacy. The officers entered the home when they heard someone yelling for help. They found Mother, heavily intoxicated, lying on the floor of a bedroom with an open bottle of alcohol next to her. She was arrested on the open warrant and taken to the hospital.

[7] The termination hearing occurred on April 10 and May 30,¹ at which Mother, law enforcement officers, service providers, the FCM, and the Children's Guardian ad Litem (GAL) testified to the facts above. Mother's first HBCM manager specifically testified that Mother was discharged from HBCM for noncompliance because her “engagement was inconsistent” in working toward her HBCM goals related to employment, housing, and visitation. Transcript at 12. Furthermore, she only engaged in HBCM for three or four weeks and was late to every visit with the Children. She was referred to another HBCM manager, and that manager testified that Mother never even followed up with him to complete the intake.

[8] The FCM testified that by the time of the termination hearing, aside from completing the substance abuse assessment, Mother had not completed any of the services she had been ordered to participate in. She had not adhered to the substance abuse assessment recommendation to enroll in treatment, had only taken one drug screen, and had participated in visitation only “a couple of times and [then] she stopped.” Id. at 62. The FCM further testified that the reasons that led to the Children's removal—domestic violence and substance use—had not been remedied and that termination was in the Children's best interests. The GAL testified the same. Mother testified that, as of May 2025, she had been accepted into two inpatient treatment facilities but had not yet told DCS about those services.

[9] In June, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law in its order terminating Mother's parental rights. Most relevant to this appeal, the court concluded that

[d]ue to [Mother's] incarceration, pending warrant for her arrest and failure to address substance abuse issues, and/or to otherwise engage in services provided by DCS, the [c]ourt finds that DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child[ren]’s removal and for continued placement outside [Mother's] home will not be remedied.

Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 102. For many of the same reasons, the court also determined that continuing the parent-child relationship between Mother and the Children posed a threat to the Children's well-being. The court also found that termination was in their best interests because

[the FCM] believed termination ․ is in the Child[ren]’s best interests. [Mother] has not completed any services or shown any willingness to work toward reunification. The Children need permanency and stability, which [Mother] has not provided and is not positioned to provide. The [GAL] agrees with [the FCM's] recommendation for termination.

Id. at 103. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Standard of Review

[10] Parents have a fundamental liberty interest “in the care, custody, and control” of their children. In re Z.B., 108 N.E.3d 895, 900 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)), trans. denied. Given that “the parent-child relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture[,]” the involuntary termination of parental rights is subject to a high bar. Id. (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 147). Nonetheless, “a trial court must subordinate the interest of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination.” In re K.T., 137 N.E.3d 317, 325 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[11] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS must allege and prove that termination is in the child's best interests, that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child, and, as relevant to this appeal, that one of the following is true:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3), (d)(3), (4). Given the fundamental interest at issue, DCS must prove these elements “upon clear and convincing evidence.” I.C. § 31-37-14-2.

[12] If the trial court finds DCS's allegations to be true, it must order the termination of the parent-child relationship and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(c). Owing significant deference to the trial court's “unique position to assess the evidence,” we review its findings and conclusions only for clear error. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). We must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and whether those findings support the judgment. Z.B., 108 N.E.3d at 900. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Id. Lastly, we accept any unchallenged findings of fact as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[13] Mother asserts that DCS failed to prove: (1) that the conditions that led to the Children's removal would not be remedied; (2) that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children; and (3) that termination was in the Children's best interests. Appellant's Brief at 4. Because she does not challenge any of the court's findings, we accept them as true.

2. Reasons for Removal/Placement Outside the Home Will Not be Remedied

[14] To determine whether it was unlikely that Mother would remedy the conditions that resulted in the Children's placement outside of her care, we first identify the conditions that led to the Children's removal and out-of-home placement. K.T., 137 N.E.3d at 326. Next, we consider “whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014)). The trial court was required to judge Mother's fitness to care for the Children at the time of the termination hearing as well as consider any “habitual patterns of conduct to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the” Children. In re A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. “The trial court may also consider services offered to the parent ․ and the parent's response to those services[ ] as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied.” Id. In this respect, DCS only had to prove “that there [was] a reasonable probability that [Mother's] behavior [would] not change.” Id. (quoting In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)).

[15] The trial court concluded as much, but Mother argues that this conclusion is clearly erroneous given her “undisputed testimony that she was accepted into [two] sober living treatment facilities[,]” which she frames as “dispositive testimony of changed conditions.” Appellant's Br. at 17. But the evidence presented at the termination hearing shows that the Children were removed due to domestic violence and substance abuse, and the following findings in the court's order—which Mother does not challenge—support the conclusion that those conditions were unlikely to be remedied:

15. Mother often failed to appear for hearings in the CHINS matter, she never consistently engaged in services and has not had contact with the Children since in or around June[ ] 2024 when her supervised visitation was suspended due to concerns that she was intoxicated during visits.

16. Mother had not completed and was in non-compliance with all services ordered by the court at disposition on December 18, 2023 including:

a. Substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations

b. Random Drug Screens

c. Domestic Violence assessment and follow all recommendations

d. Home Based Therapy

e. Home Based Case Management

17. Mother is currently incarcerated in Marion County Jail, awaiting trial on charges that include felony level 5 Possession of Methamphetamine[.]

* * *

19. There was a No Contact Order issued ․ that ordered no contact between Mother and Father.

20. On March 19, 2025 Marion County Sheriff[’s deputies] arrived at [Mother's address] in an attempt to arrest Mother for her open warrant. Father and Mother were found in the home in violation of the No Contact Order and Invasion of [P]rivacy and Father was arrested. Mother was found in the home highly intoxicated and yelling for assistance and she was arrested because of her open warrant.

21. The Children were originally removed due to concerns about Domestic Violence and since the matter has been opened there ha[s] been Domestic Violence between Father and Mother including an occurrence on or about May[ ] 2025 [sic] when Father hit Mother with a baseball bat and was arrested and charged[.]

* * *

23. Mother was staying with Father in January[ ] 2025 in violation of the No Contact Order[.]

* * *

25. As of the beginning of this hearing on April 9, 2025, Mother ha[d] not sought substance abuse assistance and had not checked herself into rehab.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 98-99.

[16] Not only were the reasons for the Children's removal not remedied in the two years of DCS involvement, but they were virtually unaddressed by Mother. It is clear from the findings and the evidence that Mother continued to contact and live with Father despite a no contact order which was precipitated by domestic violence. Mother showed up to a parenting visit with a broken arm, a black eye, and multiple bruises after Father beat her with a baseball bat. And despite Father's conviction for that instance of domestic battery, Mother remained in contact with him. She never completed a domestic violence assessment or engaged in domestic violence services. Similarly, Mother failed to engage in drug treatment and completed only one drug screen, for which she tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother did not engage in services despite multiple opportunities to do so, and she only informed DCS and the court of her acceptance into inpatient treatment at the termination hearing—without providing documentation to verify the details associated with her acceptance into the programs. By arguing that the court erroneously disregarded her testimony, Mother is asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. DCS presented clear and convincing evidence that the conditions that caused the Children to be removed and placed outside of Mother's care would not be remedied, and the trial court's conclusion as to the same was not clearly erroneous.

[17] Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) requires proof of only one of the scenarios listed in the statute, the clear and convincing evidence presented by DCS of the reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Children's placement outside of Mother's care would not be remedied was sufficient to support the trial court's decision. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158 n.6 (finding it unnecessary to address the trial court's “threat to the [Children's] well[-]being” conclusion because there was sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that the conditions causing the children's placement outside the home would not be remedied). Therefore, we do not address whether the trial court's conclusion regarding the threat to the Children's well-being was clearly erroneous.

3. Best Interests

[18] In determining whether termination of a parent's rights is in the child's best interests, the trial court must consider the totality of the evidence. In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. This requires subordinating the parent's interests to those of the child. Id. While DCS must prove best interests by clear and convincing evidence, such evidence “need not reveal that the continued custody of the parent [ ] is wholly inadequate for the child's very survival. Rather it is sufficient to show ․ that the child's emotional and physical development are threatened by the respondent parent's custody.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1234-35 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148). Many factors are considered when assessing a child's physical, emotional, and mental well-being. Id. at 1235. A central factor in that assessment is the child's need for permanency. Id. Furthermore, “the recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[19] Mother contends that, “[c]onsidering [ ] the totality of circumstances,” DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that termination of Mother's rights was in the Children's best interests. Appellant's Br. at 18. We note again that Mother does not challenge any of the court's findings of fact. In addition to the findings discussed above, the court also found:

27. The Children have been in relative care with their paternal aunt since their removal in August[ ] 2023. They are thriving in this pre-adoptive relative care and are bonded to their caregivers. The caregivers ensure that all the Children's needs are met and intend to adopt the Children.

28. DCS FCM and GAL agree that (1) the placement is satisfactory and appropriate; (2) Adoption is in the Children's best interest; and (3) Mother's rights should be involuntarily terminated.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 99.

[20] Mother asserts that DCS failed to show that her drug use posed a danger to the Children and that her incarceration cannot serve as a basis for terminating her parental rights. However, Mother makes no mention of the other critical considerations noted by the court throughout its order, including repeated instances of domestic violence, her non-participation in services, and the testimony of the FCM and GAL, all of which support the court's conclusion that termination was in the Children's best interests. The Children had been removed from Mother's care since the inception of the CHINS case almost two years before the termination hearing, and Mother's visits with them were suspended in the summer of 2024 due to her chronic lateness, domestic violence, and intoxication. She never asked for visitation to be reinstated and had not seen the Children for almost a year by the time of the termination hearing. In contrast, the evidence showed that the Children were thriving and bonding in their pre-adoptive placement with their aunt. Additionally, both the FCM and the GAL recommended that termination was in the children's best interest. Those recommendations, coupled with evidence that the conditions that led to removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to serve as clear and convincing evidence that termination was in the Children's best interests. See In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), reh'g denied. Considering the court's unchallenged findings and the totality of the evidence, the court's conclusion that termination was in the Children's best interests was not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[21] Mother has failed to prove that the court's conclusions were clearly erroneous. Therefore, we affirm.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Two days before the hearing, Father filed a motion to dismiss the termination petitions against him in light of his executed consents to the Children's adoptions. The court granted his motion and dismissed Father from the proceedings. Thus, Father does not participate in this appeal.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.