IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of I.V.-R. and B.R. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Mother appeals the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to I.V.-R. and B.R., arguing the trial court clearly erred in determining that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the children's best interests. Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] A.R. is the mother of I.V.-R. (born December 16, 2019) and B.R. (born March 27, 2021). The children were fathered by different men, each of whom voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to his respective child.

[3] In August and September 2022, the Department of Child Services (DCS) received multiple reports concerning the children's safety.¹ Their babysitter reported that, among other medical concerns for both children, she had taken them to the hospital for diaper rash—I.V.-R.’s rash was so “severe” that it involved “open wounds and sores on his scrotum and butt[.]” Exhibits Vol. 1 at 103. On a different occasion, Mother got into a physical altercation with her roommate at Walmart. Mother showed signs of impairment when the police arrived, such as slow and slurred speech and repeatedly falling asleep. She submitted to an instant drug screen that returned positive for methamphetamine. Although B.R. was with Mother during the incident, she did not know where I.V.-R. was. She reported that she and the children were living with a drug dealer, and at that point in her life, Mother was reportedly “partying every weekend” and using methamphetamine daily. Ex. Vol. 2 at 119.

[4] DCS removed the children from Mother's home and then filed petitions on September 8, alleging the children were victims of neglect and children in need of services (CHINS). The children were briefly placed with I.V.-R.’s father, but in October they were placed in foster care due to father's unstable housing situation. In February 2023, following a fact-finding hearing, the trial court adjudicated the children as CHINS and continued their placement in foster care. The court noted that Mother reported that she had found employment but did not provide any verification. She had also lived in four different places and had been in four different relationships since the onset of the CHINS cases.

[5] Later that month, the trial court conducted a hearing and entered a dispositional order requiring Mother to complete many standard dispositional services, including parenting and substance use assessments, psychological testing, random drug screening, and home-based case management.

[6] Mother had multiple positive drug screens early in the proceedings. In September 2022, she tested positive for THC twice. Then in February 2023, she tested positive for THC and methamphetamine. She completed a substance use assessment, but it did not indicate any disorders or recommend treatment. After her early positive screens, Mother did not test positive for any illegal drugs for the remainder of the proceedings. However, her compliance with drug screening was “very irregular[,]” so her service providers did not “know if she[ ] [was] actually using.” Transcript at 101, 106. Specifically, Mother often failed to call in to see if she needed to screen, and she missed approximately half of her scheduled drug screens in 2024 even though the provider performed them at her home. In 2025, she missed six out of seven screens.

[7] Although Mother consistently participated in case management services in 2023 and 2024, she was slow to make “any progress” with her case management goals of obtaining stable housing, employment, and transportation, as well as improving her parenting skills. Id. at 15. Over the course of the proceedings, Mother lived in over ten homes, frequently relocating after having arguments with the homeowners or boyfriends she lived with. She struggled to maintain employment and often completed odd jobs to get by. She was briefly employed by a motel and then a meat packing plant, but she did not hold either job for more than a month.

[8] Mother has participated in therapeutic services since July 2023 and was diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder. Her counselor employed various therapeutic techniques to address Mother's “constant worry,” inability to control that worry, and her tendency to place herself in environments that induced her anxiety. Id. at 46. Mother showed “[m]oderate progress” in working through her anxiety but still “bec[ame] easily overwhelmed” and exhibited “a lot of symptoms.” Id. at 47, 49. Her therapy attendance was inconsistent, and she did not “understand that she need[ed] to go to therapy[.]” Id. at 101.

[9] Throughout the proceedings, Mother sporadically participated in weekly supervised visitation with the children: she canceled some visits, missed some due to lack of transportation, was late to others, and her visits were temporarily paused when she tested positive for methamphetamine and marijuana early in the proceedings. In July 2024, Mother's visits increased to two per week, but her attendance declined in December.

[10] The children and Mother demonstrated a strong bond during their visits, and she was “very nurturing” and tried to ensure their safety. Id. at 63-64. However, she required “quite a bit of guidance” during visitations, particularly with diapering, and got “very defensive or frustrated” when supervisors provided advice. Id. at 71-72. Early on, her visitation supervisor believed she was not trying to improve her parenting skills and “just did what she wanted to do.” Id. at 16. She continued to have “a hard time [ ] redirecting [the children and] managing both of their behaviors.” Id. at 80. The children were “very defiant towards” Mother, who became “frustrated very quickly” and had a hard time effectively and appropriately disciplining them. Id. at 72, 99. The children often showed signs of trauma and had spikes in problematic behaviors around the time of their visits with Mother. Mother was provided with parenting education beginning in June 2023 but did not put the strategies into practice. She never progressed past fully supervised visits.

[11] In the spring of 2023, Mother completed a psychological evaluation. As part of the exam, she took an IQ test which showed she had “Extremely Low” intellectual abilities and a potential “Mild Intellectual Disability[.]” Ex. Vol. 2 at 125, 130. In his conclusions, the psychologist noted that Mother had exhibited various “borderline and antisocial personality traits[,]” including “a failure to conform to social norms, deceitfulness, impulsivity, irritability, consistency [sic] irresponsibility, distrust and suspiciousness of others, susp[icion] she is being harmed by others, insatiability of interpersonal relationships, affective instability, and difficulty controlling her anger.” Id. at 130. As such, Mother was diagnosed with “Other Specified Personality Disorder with Antisocial, Borderline, and Paranoid Personality Features.” Id.

[12] The psychologist also identified “significant concerns regarding [Mother's] parenting skills” that “need[ed] to be addressed ․ before any consideration of reunification with her children.” Id. His report noted that Mother's “reluctance to accept feedback from providers, comply with DCS expectations, and/or follow the law suggest[ed] a general disregard for authority.” Id. at 130-31. If her risk factors were not addressed, Mother would continue to be “at an increased risk of engaging in future child abuse and neglect.” Id. at 130. The report recommended individual therapy, parenting education with skills training, case management, medication management, and drug screening. He also recommended that “[s]upervised visitations should not resume until [Mother] [ ] demonstrated some willingness to comply with identified expectations and progress in treatment.” Id. at 131.

[13] In November 2023, the trial court changed the children's permanency plan from reunification with Mother and a concurrent plan of adoption to adoption only. In January 2024, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights, but those petitions were later dismissed due to DCS's concerns that Mother “ha[d] not received all the services that would help her reunify with her children.” Ex. Vol. 9 at 43. After further reunification efforts, DCS filed for termination again in November 2024 and as later amended. By that time, Mother still did not have a reliable source of income and was repeatedly missing drug screens. Her residence was infested with cockroaches and littered with animal waste and trash. While at one point Mother had been able to do supervised visits at her home, her visits had been moved back into the community because of the sanitation issues. Moreover, in October 2024, she had been charged with misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person. This charge was the most recent in Mother's lengthy involvement with the criminal justice system.²

[14] On February 7, 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing and heard testimony from multiple witnesses, including Mother, the DCS family case manager (FCM), the children's court appointed special advocate (CASA), and various service providers. Mother testified that she was facing eviction and would be moving soon. She described herself as “self-employed[,]” doing “odd jobs” such as giving rides and cleaning and painting houses. Tr. at 127. Her recent efforts to find steady employment had been unsuccessful. While she admitted noncompliance with drug screening and therapy appointments, Mother chalked these failures up to “phone issues” and forgetfulness due to having a lot on her plate. Id. at 131. Mother also denied ever using methamphetamine despite her positive screens early in the case.

[15] Although Mother testified that she had benefited from “every service” she had participated in and was ready to have the children in her care, her most recent FCM testified that she had not seen Mother make any progress in recent months. Id. at 126. The FCM also testified that termination of the parent-child relationship was in the children's best interests because they had been removed from the home for about two and a half years and “need[ed] stability and permanency ․ to be able to grow and develop[.]” Id. at 105. Likewise, the CASA recommended termination of parental rights due to Mother's ongoing “housing instability, employment instability,” failure to progress past supervised visitation, inconsistent participation in services, and the children's need for permanency. Id. at 118. She did not believe additional services would help Mother progress toward reunification.

[16] As to the children, the evidence at the fact-finding hearing showed that they quickly settled in and began to thrive in their pre-adoptive foster placement. In this placement, B.R. grew into an active young boy who loves to try new things, and he overcame his need for speech therapy. I.V.-R. was diagnosed with developmental delay and language impairment in 2023, though his speech had improved. He attended a developmental preschool on an individual education plan. Shortly before the fact-finding hearing, I.V.-R.’s therapist recommended that he be evaluated for autism a second time, as he had not qualified for a diagnosis when he was initially tested.

[17] While I.V.-R. was delayed in potty training, he progressed in this area during the proceedings. Specifically, when Mother failed to visit the children for six weeks between June and July 2024, I.V.-R. showed significant improvement in his potty training, emotional regulation, and communication. After visits resumed, I.V.-R. regressed in these areas and began experiencing night terrors. At the time, I.V-R.’s therapist noted that “consistency and structure [were] key factors for [his] wellbeing” and that Mother's inconsistent visits were “negative[ly] impact[ing]” him. Ex. Vol. 9 at 43. In May 2024, a visit supervisor observed that he was “showing signs of the toll this long case [had] taken on him.” Id. at 47. He seemed confused about Mother's role in his life and was “clearly bonding with his foster mom and s[aw] her as his mom[.]” Id. Just before the fact-finding hearing, I.V.-R. exhibited behavioral backsliding when Mother visited.

[18] In May 2025, the court entered orders terminating Mother's parental rights to the children. In these orders, the court made many findings of fact consistent with the above recitation of facts. It also concluded there was a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the children's removal from Mother's care would not be remedied, that DCS had a satisfactory plan for the children's care and treatment, and that termination of Mother's parental rights was in their best interests. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[19] Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to I.V.-R. and B.R. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). “A parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)).

[20] When reviewing a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Where the trial court has issued findings of fact and conclusions of law, we generally apply a deferential, two-tiered standard of review. Id. We first “determine whether the evidence supports the findings” and then “determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). “We affirm a trial court's termination decision unless it is clearly erroneous; a termination decision is clearly erroneous when the court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied.

[21] Reflecting the importance of the parent-child relationship, our General Assembly has provided that before a parent's parental rights can be terminated, DCS must allege and prove (1) “that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child;” (2) “that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests[;]” and (3) one or more additional enumerated circumstance.³ Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024) (amended 2025).⁴ If the trial court finds that DCS proved these allegations by clear and convincing evidence, it must terminate the parent-child relationship. See I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (burden of proof); I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a) (termination required if elements proven).

[22] Mother does not challenge that elements (1) or (3) were proven and focuses her argument on element (2). Specifically, she contends that DCS failed to prove “that termination of the [children's] relationship with their mother [was] in [their] best interest[s].” Appellant's Brief at 12. Moreover, she does not argue that any of the trial court's factual findings were not supported by the evidence, so we accept those findings as true. See In re De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 772 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Any unchallenged findings stand as proven.”).

[23] To support her argument that termination was not in the children's best interests, Mother contends that she has a “deep bond” with them, she demonstrated “real improvement” in her parenting skills, and termination “would be premature.” Appellant's Br. at 16, 17, 18. However, in determining the best interests of a child, the trial court must “subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children” and consider the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. “A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability[,] and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied), trans. dismissed. In other words, termination is appropriate when parents are “unable or unwilling to meet[ ] their responsibility as parents.” Id. (quoting Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 374).

[24] Here, the trial court found that “Mother has an extensive history of instability related to unemployment, lack of suitable housing, chaotic interpersonal relationships, limited insight, poor judgment, and lack of accountability.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 39, 48. These issues began well before these proceedings but continued throughout the children's CHINS and termination cases without meaningful improvement. At the time of the termination hearing, Mother was not consistently participating in supervised visitation, therapy, or drug screening, which demonstrated a lack of commitment to preserving her relationship with her children. See Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting that the failure to visit one's children shows a lack of commitment to preserving the parent-child relationship), trans. denied. She was about to be evicted from her home, which was not in a clean and safe condition, and she did not have stable employment. While the most recent FCM testified that Mother had shown progress in services “[h]ere and there[,]” she also testified that Mother had not progressed in recent months. Tr. at 104. She and the CASA testified that they did not believe further services would help Mother advance toward reunification. Id. at 106, 120; see also In re J.S., 906 N.E.2d 226, 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding sufficient evidence that termination was in the child's best interests in part because the parents failed to complete or benefit from services). What's more, both testified that termination was in the children's best interests. Such testimony, when paired with evidence showing “the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re P.B., 199 N.E.3d 790, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[25] A child's need for permanency is also central to the best-interests analysis. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children cannot be made to “wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental[,] and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1235 (Ind. 2013)). Here, the evidence showed that the children progressed positively in their pre-adoptive foster placement but were often set back when Mother visited, especially when she did so inconsistently. The proceedings took a particular toll on I.V.-R. At the termination hearing, the recent FCM and CASA emphasized the children's need to experience stability and permanency. The CASA testified that making the children continue to “sit in the unknown ․ is more trauma.” Tr. at 119. While Mother argues that she loves her children and should be afforded more time to work toward reunifying with them, the trial court did not have to wait until the children were “irreversibly harmed ․ before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[26] For all these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in determining that termination of Mother's parental rights was in the children's best interests. That conclusion, together with the trial court's remaining unchallenged conclusions, supports its judgment, so we affirm.

Conclusion

[27] We affirm the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights to I.V.-R. and B.R.

[28] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Notably, prior to these proceedings, Mother had been involved with DCS for over a decade. In short, DCS's assessments resulted in multiple substantiations for neglect, and Mother eventually lost her parental rights to four other children.

2.   The trial court's unchallenged finding No. 31 states:Mother was convicted of Theft (Level 6 Felony) in August 2020 and again in September 2020. Various petitions to revoke probation were filed. Mother was charged with Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated on 10/13/2024 and said charge remained pending as of March 2025. Mother admits being in jail a few times but was unwilling to provide details during her psychological evaluation. Records reveal a lengthy criminal history including arrests for Conversion (2010/2014), False Informing (2012/2022), Operating a Vehicle Without a License (2012/2013/2020/2021/2022), Domestic Battery (2013), Theft (2015/2016/2017/2019/2020), Fraud (2015), Leaving the Scene of an Accident (2021), and Operating Without Financial Responsibility (2021/2022). Mother admitted violating probation twice. Mother continues to drive without a driver's license.Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 37; see also Ex. Vol. 2 at 88-95, 97-100, 102-15.

3.   In this case, the trial court found that DCS had proven the additional circumstance that “[t]here [was] a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in removal of [I.V.-R. and B.R.] from the care of the parents or the reasons for continued placement outside the home [would] not be remedied.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 48; see also Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3) (2024) (amended 2025).

4.   Although the amendment does not apply in this case, we note that the General Assembly amended Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.