JONES v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Michael Chad Jones (“Jones”) appeals the revocation of his probation, presenting the following restated issues for our review:

I.  Whether the hearing procedures offended due process;

II.  Whether the trial court committed fundamental error in admitting certain evidence;

III. Whether the written revocation order lacked sufficient detail such that Jones was deprived of due process;

IV.  Whether there was sufficient evidence of a violation; and

V.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in revoking a portion of Jones's previously suspended sentence.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2023, Jones pleaded guilty to Level 4 felony arson. He was initially sentenced to six years in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”) where 156 days would be executed in the DOC, the remainder would be suspended, and he would be on probation for three years with the first year on work release. In January 2024, the court modified the sentence to 2,034 days where ninety-five days would be executed on work release, the remainder would be suspended, and Jones would be on probation for three years.

[4] The conditions of Jones's probation included requirements that he (1) refrain from consuming or possessing “any alcoholic beverage,” (2) “[f]ollow all laws and notify Court Services staff immediately of any contact with law enforcement,” (3) “[b]e employed or be actively seeking employment,” and (4) “[m]aintain one, verifiable residence.” Appellee's App. Vol. 2 p. 8. Jones signed a form that contained these conditions along with the following acknowledgment: “I have read, or have had read to me, the above conditions of court services and received a written copy. I understand these conditions and the rights I am waiving. I agree to accept these conditions and abide by them.” Id. (changed from all capital letters to sentence case).

[5] On July 18, 2024, the probation department filed a petition to revoke Jones's probation. The petition alleged that Jones violated the conditions of his probation because (1) “[o]n or about July 9, 2024, [Jones] tested positive for alcohol on a lab confirmed urine drug screen” and (2) Jones “failed to notify [his probation officer] of police contact allegedly occurring on July 9, 2024.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 32. The trial court ordered Jones to appear at an “Admit[/]Deny Hearing” on August 14, 2024. Id. at 20. However, notice of the hearing was returned to sender as “Not Deliverable as Addressed,” and Jones failed to appear. Id. The trial court issued an arrest warrant. The next day, Jones appeared in person, pro se, and the trial court held the hearing. The CCS reflects that the petition to revoke was “read” and Jones was “advised of rights and possible penalties.” Id.¹ The court entered a denial, appointed Jones counsel, and scheduled a fact-finding hearing for September 18, 2024. Jones sought a continuance, and the hearing was continued to October 16, 2024.

[6] On September 23, 2024, the State filed an amended petition to revoke. In addition to the previous allegations, the State alleged Jones violated the conditions of his probation because he (1) was charged with Class A misdemeanor trespass in Johnson County where the alleged offense occurred on September 10, 2024; (2) failed to immediately notify court services staff of an encounter with law enforcement on September 9, 2024, related to a traffic citation; (3) failed to immediately notify court services staff of a similar encounter with law enforcement on September 10, 2024; (4) failed to obtain employment; and (5) failed to establish a verifiable residence. See id. at 34. The allegations were re-ordered such that the first allegation related to the new criminal case. There were a total of seven alleged violations. The probation department sought a warrant for Jones's arrest, which the court issued. The warrant was served on September 28, 2024, and Jones was held without bond.

[7] On October 16, 2024, the trial court held an initial hearing in the new criminal cause where it also addressed the revocation matter. Jones and his counsel attended the hearing. The trial court asked counsel whether he had conversed with the State regarding the petition to revoke, and counsel confirmed he had. The trial court explained to Jones that the State had alleged seven separate probation violations. The trial court listed the allegations for Jones, then scheduled a consolidated hearing for October 30, 2024. At that hearing, the probation matter was set for a fact-finding hearing on November 6, 2024.

[8] At the fact-finding hearing, there was testimony from Jones's probation officer, Jordy Jackson (“Jackson”). Jackson testified that, on three occasions, Jones did not immediately contact him about interactions with law enforcement. That is, Jackson learned that a police officer confronted Jones at a rest stop in Hendricks County on July 9, 2024, for having an open container in his vehicle. Jackson called Jones, and for the first time on the call, Jones disclosed that he had an encounter with law enforcement. See Tr. Vol. II p. 8. Jones had two additional encounters with law enforcement in September 2024 that led to traffic citations—unsafe lane movement on September 9 and speeding on September 10. Thereafter, Jones was charged with criminal trespass in connection with “police contact that he had at Walmart” on September 19, 2024. Id. at 9. Jackson testified that Jones contacted him about the new criminal charge, but not the other encounters with law enforcement.

[9] Jackson also testified that Jones was called in for a drug screen on July 9, 2024, after the contact with law enforcement at the rest stop in Hendricks County. Jones's urine sample tested presumptively “positive for alcohol” and the probation department “decided to send the screen off” for laboratory testing. Id. at 11. The State asked Jackson to identify an exhibit marked as State's Exhibit 1, which was a document confirming the department's request for laboratory testing. The document stated that Jackson performed the initial test that was presumptively positive for “ETG,” which the document defined as Ethyl Glucuronide. Ex. Vol. II p. 3. The document also stated that Jones “admitted to use[.]” Id. When the State sought to admit the exhibit, Jones's counsel stated, “No objection.” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. The exhibit was admitted. Jackson then testified that, after seeing the presumptively positive test result, he spoke with Jones about the test: “I'd asked him if he'd consumed alcohol prior to the test and he did inform me that he consumed, I think, three beers is what he said.” Id. Thereafter, without objection, the trial court admitted State's Exhibit 2, which was a document containing the laboratory results from the urine screen. The document indicated that the urine tested positive for Ethyl Glucuronide and Ethyl Sulfate.

[10] Jackson further testified that Jones received disability benefits and was not employed while on probation. Jackson “thought part time work might be necessary” after “confirmation of [the] disability that [Jones] receives[.]” Id. at 15. Jackson said he started to “assist [Jones] with part time work,” but “this was right around the time of getting the violations filed[.]” Id. Thereafter, the State asked Jackson about the address Jones provided. When placed on probation, Jones was living with his sister. About two months later, Jones “had his own address.” Id. at 16. Jones then “started camping for some time” without a “verifiable address” where mail could be sent. Id. Jackson said that, at one point, Jones was living at a Walmart and that Jones “hasn't lived in a place at a time for a very consistent basis[.]” Id.

[11] Jones testified in his defense, explaining that he was always welcome to stay at his sister's house. Jones asserted that he promptly returned Jackson's call regarding the police contact “with the alcohol” in Hendricks County and failed to contact Jackson after the “traffic situations” because he “simply just didn't have a phone[.]” Id. at 19. Jones said he returned to Walmart to buy a phone, which resulted in the charge of trespass. As to the “alcohol charge,” Jones said he was “more than willing” to “call every day” for drug screening. Id. at 18. Jones said his goal was to go “back out on [his] own” and eventually “figure out what's goin[g] on with [his] wife that[ ] [was] in Oklahoma[.]” Id. at 19.

[12] Following argument, the trial court made its decision. The trial court stated it was “going to find that the State ha[d] met [its] burden of proof with regards to allegation[s] two, three, four, five, six[,] and seven” on the amended petition to revoke, “but not with regards to allegation one, which [was] the new arrest[.]” Id. at 20. The court remarked that, in the underlying presentence investigation report, the probation department had recommended “a split sentence with some time in the [DOC],” but the court “didn't do that” and instead “put [Jones] on work release,” which “didn't work.” Id. The trial court added that Jones's violations were “not the biggest violations in the world,” but explained that the court had “tried ․ a number of service[s] to try to assist [Jones] and at this point [it] w[as] just not able to.” Id. The court then stated that Jones was facing 1,939 days on his sentence, and it was “[f]ind[ing] [Jones] in violation, terminat[ing] and revok[ing] his probation,” and ordering him to serve 1,300 days of the previously suspended sentence in the DOC. Id. The trial court later entered a written order reflecting its determination that the State failed to prove that Jones committed a new criminal offense but otherwise proved that Jones committed the remaining six alleged violations. Jones now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] At the outset, we note that a revocation hearing is civil in nature and “is not to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding.” Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 550 (Ind. 1999). Rather, probation procedures “are to be more flexible.” Id. To promote flexibility, our Rules of Evidence generally do not apply. Ind. Evidence Rule 101(d). Furthermore, the State need only prove an alleged violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(f); Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012). This requires proof the probationer “more likely than not” engaged in the conduct. Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., Inc., 73 N.E.3d 663, 670 (Ind. 2017). As our Supreme Court has explained: “If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation.” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112 (emphasis added).

I. Pre-trial Hearing Procedures

[14] Jones claims he was deprived of due process because, although the trial court held an initial hearing on the petition to revoke, no such hearing was held after the State amended its petition. “Before an individual is deprived of any liberty interest, they are entitled to due process of law.” Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 857 (Ind. 2024) (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1). In general, due process requires fair notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. Moreover, “[d]ue process is a flexible concept which calls for such procedural protections as the time, place, and circumstances demand.” Id. (quoting Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 114 (Ind. 1995)). Whether a given procedure satisfies the requirements of due process is a question of law, which we review de novo. Id.

[15] Jones claims he was entitled to an initial hearing on the amended petition. Critically, however, Jones “never made a due process argument below, so he forfeited it.” Id. “A claim that otherwise has been waived by a defendant can be reviewed on appeal if the reviewing court determines that fundamental error occurred.” Addison v. State, 962 N.E.2d 1202, 1213 (Ind. 2012). “The fundamental error exception is ‘extremely narrow, and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles, the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the defendant fundamental due process.’ ” Id. (quoting Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578, 587 (Ind. 2006)).

[16] Jones does not argue that the trial court committed fundamental error. Further, Jones does not identify any law requiring an initial hearing on an amended petition to revoke. Nor does Jones identify any prejudice from the procedures involved in this case, where (1) the court held an initial hearing on the original petition where it read the petition, appointed Jones counsel, and advised him of his rights and the potential penalties; and (2) following the amendment, the court held a hearing where it confirmed Jones's counsel was in discussion with the State regarding the alleged violations and advised Jones of the number of alleged probation violations against him and the nature of those allegations.

[17] Jones waived his challenge to the hearing procedures. However, even if Jones had not waived the issue, he has fallen short of establishing fundamental error.

II. Admission of Evidence

[18] Jones challenges the admission of (1) State's Exhibit 1, the document identifying a presumptively positive urine screen and requesting lab testing and (2) State's Exhibit 2, the document containing the laboratory results. Jones did not object to the admission of these exhibits at trial, and therefore, our review is limited to whether the trial court committed fundamental error in admitting these exhibits. See, e.g., Goodwin v. State, 783 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 2003).

[19] Jones argues that the documents contain “highly prejudicial information that assert unsubstantiated conclusions of Jones testing positive for alcohol on the date-in-question.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. With regard to State's Exhibit 2, Jones argues the document “is silent as to [the laboratory's] qualifications for forensic chemical testing and whether [its] facilities, equipment, analyses, methods, and procedures could adequately ensure the accuracy of the test results [it] issued in [the] report.” Id. Jones further argues that the document “fails to identify the names of [laboratory] analysts” and “fails to include any certification and signatures of [laboratory] certifying analysts.” Id. Jones also points out that State's Exhibit 2 “states that the specimen tested positive for EtG and ethyl sulfate, but lacks information explaining what these chemicals are or how they reflect the presence of alcohol.” Id. at 17. Directing us to dictionary definitions for “ethyl sulfate,” “ethyl,” and “glucuronide,” Jones argues “[t]hese natural substances ․ do not appear to be drugs as defined.” Id.

[20] A finding of fundamental error “essentially means that the trial judge erred ․ by not acting when he or she should have[.]” Whiting v. State, 969 N.E.2d 24, 34 (Ind. 2012). Indeed, “[f]undamental error is meant to permit appellate courts a means to correct the most egregious and blatant trial errors that otherwise would have been procedurally barred, not to provide a second bite at the apple[.]” Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 668 (Ind. 2014), abrogated on other grounds by Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068 (Ind. 2025). In this case, even if we assumed the trial court erred in admitting the exhibits where, as here, our Rules of Evidence did not apply, Jones has not explained how the proceeding was rendered fundamentally unfair by the admission of this type of evidence.

[21] Notably, there was independent evidence that Jones consumed alcohol in violation of the conditions of his probation. Indeed, Jackson testified about seeing the presumptively positive test result, at which point he asked Jones “if he'd consumed alcohol prior to the test[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 12. Jones responded that he had consumed three beers. Id. Considering (1) the “flexible” evidentiary procedures involved in probation revocation proceedings, Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550, (2) Jackson's testimony regarding the presumptively positive test, and (3) Jones's admission to consuming alcohol, we cannot say the admission of the urine screen documents amounted to an egregious, blatant error the trial court should have addressed sua sponte.

[22] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Jones did not establish fundamental error in the admission of challenged evidence.

III. Adequacy of Order

[23] Jones claims the trial court's written revocation order lacked adequate detail such that he was deprived of due process. “[B]ecause probation revocation does not deprive a defendant of his absolute liberty, but only his conditional liberty, he is not entitled to the full due process rights afforded a defendant in a criminal proceeding.” Parker v. State, 676 N.E.2d 1083, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). The United States Supreme Court has discussed the “minimum requirements of due process” in proceedings to revoke probation, explaining that—among other things—due process requires “a written statement by the factfinder[ ] as to the evidence relied on and [the] reasons for revoking [probation].” Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). This requirement “helps to [e]nsure accurate factfinding with respect to any alleged violation and provides an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.” Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613–14 (1985).

[24] In pertinent part, the written order stated as follows: “[T]he Court finds that the State has met its burden, and [Jones] is found in violation of allegations 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 24. This was consistent with the trial court's oral remarks at the hearing, where the court said “[it was] going to find that the State ha[d] met [its] burden of proof with regards to allegation[s] two, three, four, five, six[,] and seven” on the amended petition to revoke, “but not with regards to allegation one, which [was] the new arrest[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 20.

[25] Jones claims that the written order “d[id] not state any of the trial court's reasons or identify the evidence upon which the trial court relied to revoke [his] probation.” Appellant's Br. p. 26. He argues “[r]emand ․ is proper to allow the trial court to provide in writing the reasons and supporting evidence of record upon which it relied to support revocation of Jones’[s] probation to satisfy [his] due process rights.” Id. We disagree. The written order identified the grounds for revocation. Further, Jackson and Jones were the only witnesses who testified. It is apparent the court found Jackson to be credible and relied on his testimony about Jones's conduct, such that no elaboration was necessary to inform Jones and this court of the grounds for revocation. In other words, the current order allows us to review the court's “factfinding with respect to any alleged violation” and “determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.” Black, 471 U.S. at 613–14. This is sufficient.

[26] For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Jones has not established a deprivation of due process due to alleged inadequacies in the written revocation order.

IV. Sufficiency of Evidence

[27] Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that he violated a condition of his probation. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. T.W. v. State, 864 N.E.2d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “We look only to the evidence [that] supports the judgment and any reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” Id. Moreover, “[e]vidence of a single probation violation is sufficient to sustain the revocation of probation.” Smith v. State, 727 N.E.2d 763, 766 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Thus, we need not identify evidentiary support for every allegation. See id. Rather, “[i]f there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's conclusion that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, we will affirm its decision to revoke probation.” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112 (emphasis added); Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 551; Menifee v. State, 600 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (“[R]evocation is appropriate if the State proves any violation.”); cf. Jaynes v. State, 437 N.E.2d 137, 140 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (noting the State “alleged and proved” the probationer committed an additional crime while on probation, and thus, “revocation [could] be sustained on that ground alone,” with additional, improper findings amounting to “surplusage”).

[28] Here, the State alleged Jones violated his probation by, among other things, consuming alcohol and failing to immediately notify court services staff of encounters with law enforcement on three separate occasions. At the hearing, Jackson testified that Jones admitted to consuming alcohol and failed to immediately report encounters with law enforcement that occurred on July 9, September 9, and September 10, 2024. This was substantial evidence of probative value that Jones violated the conditions of his probation on more than one occasion. To the extent Jones claims there was insufficient evidence he also violated his probation by failing to obtain employment and failing to maintain a single, verifiable residence, we need not address these additional grounds, as they amount to mere surplusage. See Jaynes, 437 N.E.2d at 140 n.3.

[29] We conclude there was sufficient evidence of multiple probation violations.

V. Sanction Imposed

[30] Jones claims the trial court abused its discretion in revoking his probation. It is well-established that “[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Smith, 963 N.E.2d at 1112 (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)). We review probation decisions for an abuse of the trial court's discretion, which occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. Deference in these matters is particularly important because, as our Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “obstacles to revoking an alternative sentence may diminish the likelihood of community corrections placements being made in the first place.” Cox, 706 N.E.2d at 550. Thus, “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed.” Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188.

[31] Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h) generally authorizes the revocation of probation “[i]f the court finds that the person has violated a condition[.]” Upon identifying a violation, the trial court has three options. See I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h). That is, the court may (1) “[c]ontinue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions,” (2) “[e]xtend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period,” or (3) “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” Id. Here, the trial court chose the third option, ultimately electing to revoke a portion of the previously suspended sentence. Indeed, having identified multiple violations, the court decided to revoke 1,300 out of the remaining 1,939 days, ordering Jones to serve that time in the DOC.

[32] Jones claims the trial court abused its discretion in revoking a portion of his previously suspended sentence. We disagree. The record indicated that Jones violated the conditions of probation on more than one occasion. As earlier explained, “[e]vidence of a single probation violation is sufficient to sustain the revocation of probation.” Smith, 727 N.E.2d at 766. In light of the trial court's authority to revoke a suspended sentence upon a finding that the probationer “violated a condition” of probation, see I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h), we cannot say the decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Put differently, for the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking part of the previously suspended sentence.²

Conclusion

[33] Jones has not identified a defect—procedural, evidentiary, or otherwise—that would support disturbing the trial court's decision to revoke a portion of his previously suspended sentence.

[34] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A transcript of the hearing was not provided.

2.   Resolving the issue on this basis, we do not address other arguments regarding the propriety of the sanction.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.