JONES v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] After a jury trial in the Marion Superior Court, Keith W. Jones, Jr. (“Jones”) was convicted of, among other things, Level 5 felony criminal confinement.¹ Jones challenges his Level 5 felony conviction, claiming the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Marion County was a proper venue. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On February 1, 2024, the State filed a criminal information in the Marion Superior Court, alleging Jones committed eight offenses against the same victim, Savannah Weber (“Weber”). Two counts related to events on December 24, 2023—a count of domestic battery and the instant count of Level 5 felony criminal confinement. As to the instant count, the State specifically alleged that “[o]n or about December 24, 2023, [Jones] did knowingly confine [Weber] without the consent of [Weber], said offense having been committed by using a vehicle[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 24.

[3] The matter progressed to a jury trial, where Weber testified that she and Jones had been in a romantic relationship. During this relationship, Weber started spending less time with her family. On December 24, 2023, Jones and Weber were living together in Marion County. While Jones was away from the residence, Weber was home alone, and her family left Christmas presents on the doorstep. When Jones returned, he was angry that Weber might have seen her family. Jones became physically violent, pulling Weber across the room by her hair, stomping on her stomach, and screaming in her face. At one point, Jones told Weber he was going to “hog tie [her] in a field and leave [her] there to die.” Tr. Vol. 3 p. 69. Jones said the only way out was to kill her.

[4] Jones retrieved a rope and a belt. The two then entered Weber's car, with Weber afraid “it was going to get worse” if she did not go with Jones. Id. at 70. Weber did not have her phone, and Jones “wouldn't allow” her to wear a coat. Id. While Weber sat in the passenger seat, Jones began driving west. Weber recognized that they were headed west because she used to live in Avon, which is in Hendricks County. Jones drove to a field, then the two exited the car. Jones asked what Weber “ha[d] planned” and told her, “[T]ell me the truth or you're going to die.” Id. at 72–73. When Weber did not answer, Jones struck her. Jones said he had “no choice” and she “was going to die.” Id. at 73. To make Jones stop, Weber lied, telling him that she and her mother had planned to get him arrested. Jones was paranoid they were being followed. They returned to the car. Jones wanted Weber to drive and was paranoid the police were at the residence. Weber was unsure what Jones wanted. Weber ended up driving for hours, getting lost. Eventually, they returned home.

[5] The jury found Jones guilty as charged and Jones admitted to prior domestic battery convictions that elevated certain offenses. The trial court held the sentencing hearing on April 9, 2025, imposing across all eight counts an aggregate executed sentence of seventeen and one-half years. Jones later received permission to file a belated notice of appeal, which he filed with this court on June 17, 2025.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Jones argues his conviction for Level 5 felony criminal confinement must be reversed because there was insufficient evidence that Marion County was a proper venue. “Venue is usually an issue for determination by the jury.” Alkhalidi v. State, 753 N.E.2d 625, 628 (Ind. 2001). “This is because venue typically turns on an issue of fact, i.e., where certain acts occurred.” Id. Notably, however, “[v]enue is not an element of the offense.” Cutter v. State, 725 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Ind. 2000). “Accordingly, although the State is required to prove venue, it may be established by a preponderance of the evidence and need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. A preponderance of the evidence means the pertinent facts “are more likely true than not.” Geels v. Flottemesch, 243 N.E.3d 1069, 1071 (Ind. 2024). As with any sufficiency challenge, “in examining the evidence proving venue, we will neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility.” Lusinger v. State, 153 N.E.3d 1162, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[7] As to the venue requirement, the Indiana Constitution specifies that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to a public trial, by an impartial jury, in the county in which the offense shall have been committed[.]” Ind. Const. art. 1, § 13(a) (emphasis added). This right is reflected in Indiana Code section 35-32-2-1(a), which provides that “[c]riminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by law.” Notably, however, the Indiana Constitution “does not contemplate exonerating criminals simply because the nature of the crime itself makes venue unknowable.” Cutter, 725 N.E.2d at 409. Thus, in subsequent statutory subsections, our legislature addressed the venue requirement in scenarios where the location of an offense is less clear, including where “an offense is committed in Indiana and it cannot readily be determined in which county the offense was committed[.]” Ind. Code § 35-32-2-1(d). In this scenario, “trial may be in any county in which an act was committed in furtherance of the offense.” Id.

[8] Our Supreme Court applied these constitutional and statutory provisions in Cutter, where witnesses saw the defendant and the victim enter a car together in Marion County and the victim's body was later discovered in Delaware County. 725 N.E.2d at 404. The Court determined Marion County was a proper venue for the charges, which were murder, felony murder, rape, and criminal confinement. See id. at 404, 408–10. This was due to evidence that, before the victim was reported missing, she was with the defendant in Marion County, where they exited a bar and the defendant helped the victim into his vehicle. Id. at 410. The Court stated: “As a matter of law, this step, which may itself have been innocent, but nonetheless in furtherance of the crime, satisfied the State's burden of proving venue by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.

[9] Here, Jones challenges his conviction for Level 5 felony criminal confinement. Indiana Code section 35-42-3-3(a) generally provides that “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent commits criminal confinement.” The offense is elevated to a Level 5 felony if “it is committed by using a vehicle[.]” I.C. § 35-42-3-3(b)(1)(B).

[10] Jones directs us to Weber's testimony about where they traveled after leaving the residence. Weber did not know where they were—whether in Hendricks County, Marion County, or somewhere else—but knew they traveled west because she had previously lived in Avon, which is in Hendricks County. Jones argues Marion County was not a proper venue for his criminal confinement conviction because pertinent events might have occurred in Hendricks County rather than Marion County. We note, however, that Jones and Weber entered the vehicle together in Marion County. Furthermore, they entered the vehicle after Jones had already yelled at Weber, dragged her by the hair, and stomped on her stomach—where Weber entered the vehicle because she was afraid “it was going to get worse” if she did not do so. Tr. Vol. 3 p. 70. This evidence was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that acts in furtherance of the offense occurred in Marion County such that, as was the case in Cutter, Marion County was a proper venue for the criminal offense. We, therefore, identify sufficient evidence that Marion County was a proper venue.

[11] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(1)(B).

Foley, Judge.

May, J. and Altice, J., concur.