JUSTICE v. OAK HAVEN STABLES (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Tia Justice appeals the trial court's judgment in favor of Oak Haven Stables following a bench trial on Oak Haven's complaint for breach of contract and Justice's counterclaims. Finding no error, we affirm the court's judgment.

Issues

[2] Justice presents twelve issues for our review, which we restate as:

I.    Whether Oak Haven Stables has standing to maintain this action.

II.   Whether counsel for Oak Haven committed fraud upon the court.

III.   Whether the trial court erred in failing to recognize and enforce an oral agreement between the parties.

IV.  Whether the trial court erred in not applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

V.   Whether the trial court erred by not applying the doctrine of laches.

VI.  Whether the trial court erred by holding Justice partially responsible for the condition of her horses.

VII.  Whether the trial court failed to properly apply bailment law.

VIII. Whether the trial court erred in ruling on evidentiary questions.

IX.  Whether the trial court judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

X.   Whether the trial court abused its discretion by adopting Oak Haven's proposed order.

XI.  Whether the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sanction Oak Haven's counsel.

XII.  Whether there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In November 2016, Tia Justice signed a contract to board her horse at Oak Haven Stables. Justice signed another contract in August 2019 for the boarding of a second horse. The parties agree that boarding fees were $250 per month per horse. Justice made sporadic payments toward the boarding fees, but by June 2020 she was in arrears $11,322.

[4] Oak Haven filed suit, and Justice counterclaimed. A bench trial was held on May 30 and November 20, 2024, after which the court entered judgment for Oak Haven in the amount of $11,322 and denied Justice's counterclaims. Justice now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] The trial court's findings control only as to the issues they address, and a general judgment will control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Miller v. Lucas, 264 N.E.3d 651, 655 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). “ ‘A general judgment entered with findings will be affirmed if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence.’ ” Id. (quoting Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. 1997)). We will not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. Miller, 264 N.E.3d at 655. “We will affirm a judgment where we find substantial supporting evidence, unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id.

[6] We note that Oak Haven did not file a brief. When the appellee fails to submit a brief, we will not develop an argument on its behalf; rather, we may reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Perez v. Mounce, 110 N.E.3d 404, 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Prima facie error is error “ ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006) (quoting Santana v. Santana, 708 N.E.2d 886, 887 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)). But even under the prima facie error rule, we are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required. Simek v. Nolan, 64 N.E.3d 1237, 1241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

[7] Additionally, we observe that Justice is proceeding pro se, just as she did at trial. We have long held that a litigant who proceeds pro se will be held to the same rules of procedure as trained legal counsel and must be prepared to accept the consequences of her action. Thacker v. Wentzel, 797 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 487 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

I. Standing

[8] Justice first contends that Oak Haven Stables lacks standing to maintain this lawsuit. “Standing is a legal question we review de novo.” City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022).

[9] Justice asserts that Oak Haven is not registered “as any form of corporation or as a DBA (Doing Business As)” and that “Indiana law is clear that unregistered business entities lack standing to pursue legal claims.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. The legal authority Justice cites in support of her contention is either inapplicable or non-existent. See id. at 21.

[10] As Justice acknowledges, the evidence shows that Oak Haven is a sole proprietorship. Sole proprietorships are recognized as business entities under Indiana law. See Indiana Code subsection 2-2.2-1-2(1). As such, Oak Haven has standing to sue, and Justice's assertion fails.

II. Fraud

[11] In a related argument, Justice claims that Oak Haven's counsel committed fraud on the trial court by “knowingly prosecuting a lawsuit without standing and repeatedly misrepresenting the law and [Oak Haven]’s legal status[.]” Appellant's Br. pp. 24-25. Counsel for Oak Haven represented to the court that Oak Haven operates as a sole proprietorship. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 118 (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Amended Argument Supporting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Initial Pleading). And Christina Kreutzer, the barn manager and daughter of the owner of Oak Haven, testified at trial that Oak Haven is a sole proprietorship. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 15. Given this testimony as well as our resolution of Justice's challenge to Oak Haven's standing in Issue I, we conclude that this claim fails.

III. Oral Agreement

[12] Next, Justice alleges that the trial court erred by failing to recognize and enforce a verbal agreement between the parties. Justice states that in 2018 the dog of Oak Haven's owner attacked her child. She suggests that she and the owner of Oak Haven subsequently entered into a verbal agreement in which she agreed to forgo legal action for injuries sustained by her child in exchange for free boarding services. To support her argument, Justice highlights her statements at trial regarding the incident and the alleged agreement as well as her husband's corroborating testimony, and she points to Oak Haven's acknowledgement of a dog bite incident. Appellant's Br. pp. 26-29.

[13] The trial court also heard from Kreutzer, who testified that a dog bite incident occurred in April 2018 but that she knew nothing about an agreement. And Kreutzer testified that Justice did not stop making boarding payments to Oak Haven. As shown by the billing statement, marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and admitted without objection, Justice continued to make payments for boarding throughout 2018, 2019, and into 2020. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 23, 36-37; Ex. Vol. 5, pp. 10-11 (Plaintiff's Ex. 3). Kreutzer further testified that Justice sued Oak Haven over the dog bite incident and that the suit was settled. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 37. Counsel for Oak Haven requested the court take judicial notice of that lawsuit entitled E.J., a minor, b/n/f Eric Justice v. Raymond Maggard and Nancy Maggard d/b/a Oak Haven Stables under cause number 52D02-2004-CT-268. Justice specifically stated she had no objection to the court doing so, and the court granted the request. Id. at 38.

[14] Our standard of review directs us to consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court's judgment. Miller, 264 N.E.3d at 655. Here, the evidence favorable to the judgment is Kreutzer's testimony and documentary evidence. Contrary to Justice's assertions of a verbal agreement to forgo litigation concerning her son's injuries in exchange for free boarding, Justice continued paying boarding fees, and her husband brought suit against Oak Haven for their son's injuries. Justice's argument is merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id. Therefore, Justice has failed to establish prima facie error in the trial court's failure to enforce an alleged verbal agreement between the parties.

IV. Equitable Estoppel

[15] Justice also claims that the trial court erred in failing to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent Oak Haven from asserting its right to payment for the boarding of her horses. Specifically, she argues that Oak Haven's conduct of boarding her horses without payment for two years constituted partial performance of the verbal agreement and induced her to believe the agreement was valid.

[16] As discussed in our analysis of Issue III, above, the evidence favorable to the court's judgment shows that Oak Haven did not forgo the boarding fees but rather continued to bill Justice for the boarding of her horses. Ex. Vol. 5, pp. 10-11 (Plaintiff's Ex. 3). The evidence further shows that Justice continued making payments for such boarding. See id. In addition, the court took judicial notice of a tort case brought by Justice's husband on behalf of their son against Oak Haven. Thus, there was no credible evidence of conduct by Oak Haven that induced Justice to believe that it had agreed to board her horses for two years without payment. Justice has not established that the court's failure to apply equitable estoppel was prima facie error.

V. Laches

[17] Justice additionally contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply the doctrine of laches to bar Oak Haven's claim because it unreasonably delayed asserting its rights under the contract. To demonstrate that Oak Haven's alleged delay in filing suit was unreasonable, Justice cites the term of the contract that allows Oak Haven to take action once the account balance is delinquent for forty-five days and the testimony of her expert witness that she would never allow a boarder to go sixty days without paying fees.

[18] “Laches is a doctrine that, when applicable, bars a plaintiff from seeking equitable relief.” Foster v. First Merchants Bank, N.A., 235 N.E.3d 1251, 1256 (Ind. 2024). “The doctrine's ‘principal application was, and remains, to claims of an equitable cast[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 572 U.S. 663, 678 (2014)).

[19] Because Oak Haven is seeking legal relief in the form of a money judgment, laches does not apply. Oak Haven seeks payment for services rendered under a contract—a claim for legal, not equitable, relief. We therefore follow the ruling of our Supreme Court in Foster where, finding no precedent in which laches barred an otherwise timely legal claim for money damages, the Court heeded the caution of the U.S. Supreme Court against invoking laches to bar legal relief and concluded the doctrine of laches did not apply to a legal claim for money damages. 235 N.E.3d at 1256. As Justice has not suggested that Oak Haven's claim is otherwise untimely, we see no reason for us to disregard binding precedent. Thus, we find that prima facie error has not been established as to this allegation of error.

VI. Condition of Horses

[20] As her sixth claim of error, Justice argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that she bore some responsibility for the condition of her horses when she removed them from Oak Haven in June 2020. As part of her argument, she claims she was prohibited from accessing the Oak Haven property due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

[21] In its final order, the court included this statement and conclusion:

The evidence revealed that [Justice] was not present to check on her horses at the stables for extended periods of time. The Court finds [Justice] also bore some responsibility for the care of her horses.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 140.

[22] We are called to consider the evidence favorable to the judgment, and, in doing so, we are not to reweigh the evidence. Miller, 264 N.E.3d at 655. The evidence favorable to the judgment reveals that Oak Haven's boarding included housing and feeding the horses, cleaning out their stalls, and “turning them out” to exercise. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 17. It did not include veterinary care, bathing, hoof care, or brushing; rather the owners were responsible for these items as well as for vaccinations. Id. at 17-18. In addition, Oak Haven did not change their business practices due to the COVID-19 pandemic because the barns are open to fresh air and there are fans and lots of space. Id. at 35. Kreutzer testified that from January to June 2020 she noticed no problems with Justice's horses. Id. at 39, 42, 43.

[23] To support her argument, Justice ignores this evidence and points to portions of trial testimony from her, her husband, and her expert who had viewed the horses by video calls but had never seen them in person. This argument amounts to another request for us to reweigh the evidence. Justice has failed to establish prima facie error in this instance.

VII. Bailment Law

[24] Next, in asserting that the trial court failed to properly apply bailment law, Justice makes the same argument she made in Issue VI. She also cites cases from North Carolina and Alabama as well as Indiana Code section 32-17-3-1, which does not concern bailment but rather deals with the purchase or lease of real estate. In addition, Justice neither claims any damages nor produced any evidence at trial to support an award for costs she incurred treating the horses. There has been no showing of prima facie error.

VIII. Evidentiary Error

[25] Justice further claims that the trial court made several critical errors in its evidentiary rulings that violated her due process rights. She lists several errors, which we will address in turn.

A.

[26] First, Justice states that the court erroneously allowed Oak Haven's counsel to question her concerning text messages that were not properly authenticated, produced in discovery, or admitted into evidence. Appellant's Br. pp. 45-46, 47. Justice does not direct us to the location of this alleged error in the transcript. But our review of the record discloses that on cross-examination Oak Haven's counsel asked Justice about her receipt of text messages from Kreutzer requesting payment on her account. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 176. Although Justice asked counsel if she was going to use the messages as an exhibit and whether she could prove that Justice was the recipient of the messages, Justice posed no objection. Failure to object at trial waives the issue for appeal. J.S. v. W.K., 62 N.E.3d 1, 10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

B.

[27] Next, Justice alleges that the court improperly “permitted references to dismissed cases ․ without requiring proper submission of the[ ] materials as evidence, violating Indiana Rules of Evidence 201 and 401, 402, and 403.” Appellant's Br. p. 46. Again, Justice provides no particulars; however, the record reveals that Justice objected to being questioned about a dismissed case in which she was charged with neglect of her pets. The basis for her objection was that referencing the case was prejudicial to her. Tr. Vol. 4, p. 171. Oak Haven's counsel responded that the topic was proper because it was cross-examination and she was attempting to impeach Justice's credibility. Id. at 172. The court allowed Oak Haven's counsel to ask three additional questions on the matter, and counsel then moved on. Id. at 173.

[28] Although Justice objected to the subject matter of the questions at trial, on appeal she claims violations of our rules of evidence. A party cannot rely on one reason for an objection at trial and then assert a different argument for objection on appeal. Gladstone v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 166 N.E.3d 362, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Furthermore, an objection based solely on the fact that a party does not like the question or the subject matter is not a sufficient objection. Evidence Rule 103(a)(1)(B) provides that a party may claim error in a ruling to admit evidence only if the error affects a substantial right and the party states specific grounds. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ind. 2008) (claim of error in admitting evidence may not be presented on appeal unless there is objection stating specific ground; mere general objection does not preserve issue for appeal). Thus, Justice's objection fails to preserve this issue for appellate review not only because she objected on grounds other than those that she now raises on appeal but also because a general objection based merely on her dislike of the topic is not sufficiently specific and does not affect a substantial right.

C.

[29] Justice also contends the court's order completely fails to address or acknowledge her evidence concerning the horses’ physical condition, her allegation of fraud on the court, and her affirmative defenses. Appellant's Br. pp. 46, 51. These are merely prior arguments repackaged, and we confirm our earlier conclusions. See Issues VI, VII, II, IV, and V, supra.

D.

[30] Justice claims the court was prejudiced against her expert witness because it attempted to strike the witness. However, the evidence Justice cites to support her argument is an objection to the witness filed by Oak Haven not the court. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 123 (Objection to Defendant's Motion to Allow Expert to Testify by Video Conference). Furthermore, the court overruled Oak Haven's objection and allowed Justice's expert to testify by video conference. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 100.

E.

[31] As an additional claim, Justice argues that she “was denied timely and meaningful access to discovery materials, impairing her ability to prepare a defense” and that the court failed to enforce its discovery orders. Appellant's Br. pp. 47, 48. She points to her statement at a pre-trial hearing where she discussed her motion to compel. See Tr. Vol. 2, p. 55. At the hearing, the court heard argument from both parties, ordered Justice to submit new discovery requests within twenty days, and gave Oak Haven twenty days to respond. Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 79-80. That appears to have resolved the matter; Justice neither suggests that there were outstanding discovery requests at the time of trial nor did she request a continuance. See Andrade v. City of Hammond, 114 N.E.3d 507, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (stating that generally proper remedy for discovery violation is continuance and failure to request one constitutes waiver of any alleged error regarding noncompliance with court's discovery order), trans. denied.

[32] Moreover, a trial court's ruling on discovery matters “ ‘is cloaked with a strong presumption of correctness on appeal.’ ” Doherty v. Purdue Props. I, LLC, 153 N.E.3d 228, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan, 851 N.E.2d 317, 323 (Ind. App. Ct. 2006)), trans. denied. “ ‘Absent clear error and resulting prejudice, the trial court's determination with respect to violations and sanctions should not be overturned.’ ” Doherty, 153 N.E.3d at 240 (quoting Carter v. Robinson, 977 N.E.2d 448, 455 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). Justice has failed to establish any error much less clear error.

F.

[33] Justice further asserts that the court's adoption of Oak Haven's proposed order demonstrates that the court disregarded witness statements and failed to perform an independent analysis of her evidence and defenses. However, Justice does not support her claim with citations to the record. In addition, Trial Rule 52(C) allows trial courts to request that parties submit proposed findings and conclusions, and the trial court is not prohibited from adopting verbatim a party's proposed order. In re Marriage of Nickels, 834 N.E.2d 1091, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). There has been no showing of prima facie error.

[34] We find that Justice has established neither error nor a violation of her due process rights regarding her evidentiary claims.

IX. Judicial Impropriety

[35] Justice suggests that there is an appearance of impropriety in violation of Judicial Conduct Rule 1.2 because Elizabeth Price, who is Oak Haven's counsel and also serves as Peru City Court Judge, and Judge Grund, who presided over this case, “preside[ ] in the same courthouse and share[ ] professional housing[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 52. Without any further explanation, she also states that Judge Grund's failure to address serious ethical violations by Price implicates Judicial Conduct Rule 2.11. Id. at 53.

[36] “The Code [of Judicial Conduct] is not designed or intended as a basis for civil or criminal liability. Neither is it intended to be the basis for litigants to seek collateral remedies against each other or to obtain tactical advantages in proceedings before a court.” Ind. Judicial Conduct, Scope [7]. Furthermore, this Court does not take up allegations of judicial misconduct. The Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications operates under the auspices of the Indiana Supreme Court and receives and investigates complaints against all judicial officers of the state. See Ind. Admission and Discipline Rule 25.

X. Adoption of Proposed Order

[37] Justice again advances an allegation that the trial court abused its discretion by engaging in the prohibited practice of adopting Oak Haven's proposed order. Appellant's Br. p. 53. We have already addressed this issue and confirm our earlier conclusion. See Issue VIII, supra.

XI. Sanctions

[38] The next claim posed by Justice concerns the trial court's failure to sanction Oak Haven's counsel. First, Justice alleges that counsel knowingly used an incorrect address for Justice, resulting in a default judgment being entered against her. She points to no evidence to prove counsel's action was intentional, and the CCS shows that Justice was later successful in vacating the default judgment. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 8.

[39] Second, she revives her prior argument concerning sanctions for discovery violations and an improper attempt to exclude her expert testimony. We have already evaluated these claims and concluded that Justice has not demonstrated error. See Issue VIII, supra.

XII. Insufficient Evidence

[40] Finally, Justice contends the court's judgment was not supported by sufficient evidence. She argues that because the owner of Oak Haven did not testify, the evidence concerning the contracts or fees constituted inadmissible hearsay under Evidence Rule 802. Justice also claims that Oak Haven provided no records or witnesses to substantiate any alleged arrearages.

[41] In a breach of contract claim, the plaintiff bears the burden of proving: (1) that a contract existed; (2) that the defendant breached the contract; and (3) that the plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the breach. Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 374-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The contracts signed by Justice and admitted at trial state that the board payment is due the first of each month. If the account balance is delinquent for a period of forty-five days, the horse and tack will be sold and the proceeds applied to the balance due on the account. Justice further agreed to be responsible for any remaining balance. Ex. Vol. 5, pp. 8, 9 (Plaintiff's Exs. 1 and 2).

[42] As Justice sets out in her brief, Oak Haven's evidence included the two boarding contracts signed by Justice and Oak Haven's billing statement for Justice's account, all of which were admitted without objection by Justice. Id. at 8, 9, 10-11 (Plaintiff's Exs. 1, 2, 3). Justice agreed that Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 are the boarding contracts and that they contain her signature. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 50, 75; Tr. Vol. 4, p. 169. Kreutzer and Justice both testified that monthly boarding fees for a horse at Oak Haven were $250. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 21, 22; Tr. Vol. 4, p. 181. And Kreutzer, as manager of the stables, prepared and issued the billing invoice admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 3. Justice did not dispute making payments to Oak Haven as reflected in Exhibit 3.

[43] Justice's argument is a request for us to disregard our standard of review and give credence to her version of the events, namely that she had an oral agreement with the owner of Oak Haven to receive free boarding for her horses. This we will not do. We find that there is sufficient evidence to support the court's judgment that a contract existed, that Justice breached the contract by failing to pay boarding fees, and that Oak Haven was damaged as a result.

Conclusion

[44] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Justice has not demonstrated prima facie error. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of Oak Haven Stables.

[45] Affirmed.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Bailey, J., and Pyle, J., concur.