KASPRZYK v. MORROW CONSTRUCTION LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jami and Nick Kasprzyk appeal from the trial court's denial of their motion to withdraw deemed admissions and grant of summary judgment in favor of Bart Spencer. The Kasprzyks argue that their attorney's illness excused their failure to timely respond to requests for admission and that the trial court erred in denying their request for an extension of time in which to respond to the Spencer's summary-judgment and in entering summary judgment in favor of Spencer. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 10, 2024, the Kasprzyks sued J. Morrow Construction, LLC, Jeremiah Morrow, Spencer, and Hendricks County Planning and Building, alleging actual fraud and violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act ² against Spencer. The Kasprzyks alleged that Spencer, as an employee of J. Morrow Construction, had made material misrepresentations that had fraudulently induced them to enter into a construction contract for their residence. On August 16, 2024, Spencer served discovery requests on the Kasprzyks, including requests for admission. Spencer requested admissions that, inter alia, the Kasprzyks had never executed any agreements with Spencer, that they had no evidence that he had ever acted fraudulently “with regard to the Project and/or the Real Estate that is the subject of the Complaint in this matter[,]” and that both counts against Spencer failed as a matter of law. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 148. Pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 36(A), the Kasprzyks had until September 16, 2024, to respond to the requests for admission. The Kasprzyks did not respond the requests for admissions by the deadline, and the admission were therefore deemed admitted by operation of Trial Rule 36(A).

[3] On September 17, 2024, the day after the missed deadline, the Kasprzyks’ attorney emailed Spencer's counsel requesting a thirty-day extension to respond to Spencer's discovery requests. According to the email, the Kasprzyks’ attorney had been on sick leave caring for her three-year-old twin daughters and herself during the week of September 13 through 20, 2024, including on September 16, the deadline for responding to Spencer's requests for admission. Spencer's attorney agreed to extend the time for interrogatories and requests for production but refused to extend the time for the requests for admission, noting that they had already been deemed admitted. The Kasprzyks’ attorney responded that she intended to file a motion to withdraw the deemed admissions given the circumstances surrounding her sick leave. The Kasprzyks’ attorney did not, in fact, file such a motion at that time.

[4] On September 27, 2024, Spencer moved for summary judgment, designating as evidence the Kasprzyks’ verified complaint, the construction contract, Spencer's answer, and the deemed admissions. The Kasprzyks failed to file either a timely response to Spencer's summary-judgment motion or a timely motion for an extension of time to respond. On November 4, 2024, the Kasprzyks moved to withdraw their admissions and for an extension of time to respond to Spencer's summary-judgment motion. On November 27, 2024, the trial court denied the Kasprzyks’ motions to withdraw their admissions and for an extension of time and granted Spencer's summary-judgment motion.

Discussion and Decision

I. Motion to Withdraw Deemed Admissions

[5] The Kasprzyks first argue that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion to withdraw their deemed admissions. We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw deemed admissions for an abuse of discretion. Esposito v. Eppley, 238 N.E.3d 680, 690 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is “against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Garrett v. Nissan of Lafayette, LLC, 216 N.E.3d 496, 502 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Trial Rule 36(B) provides the mechanism for withdrawal of deemed admissions and permits withdrawal only if two conditions are met: “(1) withdrawal or amendment will subserve the presentation of the merits, and (2) prejudice in maintaining the action or defense will not result to the party that obtained the admission.” Esposito, 238 N.E.3d at 689–90. The party seeking withdrawal bears the burden of demonstrating that withdrawal will subserve the presentation of the merits, while the party who obtained the admissions bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice. Id. at 690. Trial Rule 36(B) does not incorporate the “excusable neglect” standard from Indiana Trial Rule 6(B)(2): “Excusable neglect [․] has no bearing on whether [a party] should be permitted to withdraw or amend the admissions it made by operation of law.” Hanchar Indus. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Wayne Reclamation & Recycling, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).

[6] We conclude that the trial court's denial of the Kasprzyks’ motion to withdraw was well within its discretion based on the extended delay and lack of diligence demonstrated by the Kasprzyks and resulting prejudice to Spencer. While the Kasprzyks’ attorney may have been ill on the deadline for responding to the requests for admission, she was well enough the next day to email opposing counsel acknowledging the missed deadline and expressing her intent to file a motion to withdraw the admissions. Despite this stated intent, the Kasprzyks’ attorney failed to file any such motion for forty-eight days, until November 4, 2024.

[7] This extended delay undermines any claim that withdrawal would subserve the presentation of the merits and demonstrates a lack of diligence rather than a single oversight. The Kasprzyks had a full thirty-day window during which they could have sought an extension if they had anticipated problems with meeting the deadline for responding to the requests for admissions. Their failure to do so, followed by the extensive delay in seeking relief after acknowledging the problem, supports the trial court's exercise of discretion. Moreover, during this forty-eight-day period, the Kasprzyks also failed to respond to Spencer's summary-judgment motion, which response was due October 28, 2024. The motion to withdraw admissions was filed seven days after this additional missed deadline.

[8] Moreover, we have held that merely asserting that admissions go to the core issues in dispute is insufficient. See Bryant v. Cnty. Council of Lake Cnty., 720 N.E.2d 1, 6 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“[A] party moving for the withdrawal of admissions established by operation of T.R. 36 does not meet its burden of showing that withdrawal will subserve the presentation of the merits simply by demonstrating that the admissions go to the core issues to be litigated.”), trans. denied. Here, the Kasprzyks have failed to offer any substantive indication on how they intend to contest the issues, further undercutting any claim that denying their request to withdraw the deemed admissions would subserve the presentation of the merits. See Royalty Vans, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 605 N.E.2d 1217, 1221 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (in deciding that deemed admissions would not subserve the presentation of the merits, considering, inter alia, that the party seeking withdrawal “did not indicate [․] how [it] planned to contest the issues in question”).

[9] As for the prejudice to Spencer should the admissions be withdrawn, he relied on the deemed admissions in preparing and filing his summary-judgment motion on September 27, 2024, which addressed both the liability and the damages at issue in this lawsuit. Had the Kasprzyks acted promptly and shown merit to their request to withdraw the admissions, Spencer could have been saved the trouble and expense of preparing a summary-judgment motion that relied upon them. Spencer should not have to bear the cost of the Kasprzyks’ delays.

[10] The Kasprzyks’ pattern of multiple missed deadlines distinguishes this case from situations like that in Garrett, in which the response had filed only one day late, and the attorney had been experiencing an ongoing personal crisis that had “drastically limited his ability to work.” 216 N.E.3d at 502–03. This case is also different from Thor Industries, Inc. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, in which Thor Industries had missed the deadline because it had reasonably believed that opposing counsel had agreed to suspend all deadlines for settlement negotiations and the party had acted promptly upon discovering the misunderstanding. 60 N.E.3d 308, 312–13 (Ind. Tax. Ct. 2016). Here, because there was no reasonable misunderstanding, and the Kasprzyks did not act promptly, to say the least, the Kasprzyks’ reliance on Garret and Thor Industries is unavailing, and they have failed to establish an abuse of discretion in this regard.

II. Extension of Time to Respond to Spencer's Summary-Judgment Motion

[11] The Kasprzyks argue that the trial court erred in denying them an extension of time to respond to Spencer's summary-judgment motion pursuant to Trial Rule 6(B)(2).³ Trial Rule 6(B)(2), however, does not apply in this case. When trial rules conflict, “the more specific rule prevails.” DeLage Landen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., Inc., 965 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Indiana Trial Rule 56(I) contains its own enlargement-of-time provision, which “applies only to Trial Rule 56 and is therefore the more specific of the two rules” compared to the general provisions of Trial Rule 6(B)(2) and therefore prevails over it. DeLage Landen, 965 N.E.2d at 698.

[12] Trial Rule 56(I) permits the trial court to alter deadlines only “upon motion made within the applicable time limit.” As the Indiana Supreme Court has held,

when a nonmoving party fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment within 30 days by either filing a response, requesting a continuance under Trial Rule 56(I), or filing an affidavit under Trial Rule 56(F), the trial court cannot consider summary judgment filings of that party subsequent to the 30-day period.

HomEq Servicing Corp. v. Baker, 883 N.E.2d 95, 98–99 (Ind. 2008). This bright-line rule applies “even where the summary judgment nonmovant is ‘merely one day late’ in serving a response.” State ex rel. Hill v. Jones-Elliott, 141 N.E.3d 1264, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citation omitted). Because the Kasprzyks made no such motion before the October 28, 2024, deadline, the trial court was not at liberty to entertain their motion to extend it.

[13] The Kasprzyks’ reliance on Boyd v. WHTIV, Inc., 997 N.E.2d 1108 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), is also misplaced. In Boyd, we concluded that Trial Rule 6(E)’s ⁴ three-day mailing extension applied to summary judgment responses when the motion was served via certified mail. Id. at 1112–13. Spencer, however, served his motion for summary judgment electronically through Indiana's E-Filing System, not by certified mail. Trial Rule 6(E) therefore does not apply to extend any deadlines in this case. Even if it did apply, the Kasprzyks would still have been four days late in filing their November 4 motion.

III. Summary Judgment

[14] The Kasprzyks also challenge the trial court's entry of summary judgment in Spencer's favor. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Esposito, 238 N.E.3d at 686. Summary judgment is appropriate “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “When this Court reviews a grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, we stand in the shoes of the trial court.” Burton v. Benner, 140 N.E.3d 848, 851 (Ind. 2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “If the moving party meets these two requirements, the burden shifts to the non-movant to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Weber v. Costin, 654 N.E.2d 1130, 1133 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 56(C)).

[15] To the extent that the Kasprzyks argue that Spencer's summary-judgment motion was somehow defective because it was unverified, Indiana Trial Rule 11(A) provides that an attorney's signature on pleadings is sufficient certification that the attorney “has read the pleadings; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.” Moreover, Trial Rule 56(C) expressly permits designation of “pleadings” as evidence, which includes answers under Indiana Trial Rule 7, and does not require that designated pleadings be sworn or verified.

[16] That said, we have little hesitation in concluding that the trial court did not err in entering summary judgment in favor of Spencer. The deemed admissions included with Spencer's summary-judgment motion conclusively established that both counts of the Kasprzyks’ complaint against Spencer failed as a matter of law. The trial court properly determined that Spencer's designated evidence was sufficient to support the entry of judgment as a matter of law.

[17] We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FOOTNOTES

2.   The Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act consists of Indiana Code chapter 24-5-0.5.

3.   Until January 1, 2025, Trial Rule 6(B) provided as follows:(B) Enlargement. When an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specific time by these rules, the court may at any time for cause shown:[․](2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specific period, permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but, the court may not extend the time for taking any action for judgment on the evidence under Rule 50(A), amendment of findings and judgment under Rule 52(B), to correct errors under Rule 59(C), statement in opposition to motion to correct error under Rule 59(E), or to obtain relief from final judgment under Rule 60(B), except to the extent and under the conditions stated in those rules.The provisions regarding enlargements of time are now found in Trial Rule 6(C) and specifically provide that “the court may not extend the time under Rule[ ] 56[.]”

4.   As of January 1, 2025, the provision regarding the three-day extension is now found in Trial Rule 6(G).

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Mathias, J., concur.