BRYANT v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Iesha Bryant appeals her conviction for Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death.¹ She raises the sole issue of: Did the State present sufficient evidence to support her conviction? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Bryant and Tanayrie Perez-Dingui met sometime in 2021 while working together at Walmart. At the time, Perez-Dingui had a one-year-old daughter, E.D., nicknamed “Cookie.” Bryant and Perez-Dingui began a romantic relationship and quickly moved in together at Perez-Dingui's mother's house in Indianapolis. They lived there for a few months but left because of tension with Perez-Dingui's mother. After that, the family did not have a permanent home and sometimes stayed in hotels.

[3] In April 2022, Bryant and Perez-Dingui were both working at Burger King. Bryant also drove for the ride sharing service Lyft. For childcare, Bryant enrolled E.D. in a home daycare run by Lisa Goldstein. On April 22, Bryant dropped off now twenty-two-month-old E.D. at daycare. Goldstein noticed E.D. had bruises on her leg and around her eyes and “[did]n't look well.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 160. Goldstein called Bryant after just a few minutes and asked her to pick up E.D. When Bryant came back, Goldstein asked if Bryant had taken E.D. to the doctor because E.D. was “so bruised up” and didn't “seem to be herself” and was acting “like she's in pain.” Id. at 168, 169. Bryant said E.D. had fallen off a swing at the park. Bryant left with E.D.

[4] On April 30, Bryant called Perez-Dingui and said she had been driving for Lyft and got into an accident while E.D. was in the car. E.D. was taken to Riley Hospital for Children, where Dr. Anne Whitehead conducted a full body exam typically given when a child is involved in a car accident. E.D. had some bruising on her temple and thigh and a subconjunctival hemorrhage (broken blood vessel) in one eye. A CT scan showed she had a mild right orbital roof fracture (a fracture in the bone around the eye) but no hemorrhaging or intercranial injuries on the brain. E.D.’s external abdominal exam was normal, and an ultrasound of her abdomen was negative. Overall, her injuries were not serious. But because the multiple visible bruises and the broken blood vessel were concerning for abusive trauma, Dr. Whitehead requested a skeletal survey to look for injuries not obvious from the exam. The skeletal survey was negative, and E.D. was discharged that day.

[5] For the next few days, E.D. “seemed fine” to Perez-Dingui. Id. at 90. E.D. ate and slept normally. When E.D. was at daycare that week, Goldstein noticed nothing unusual or concerning about E.D.’s health or behavior.

[6] On May 5, 2022, E.D. was at daycare while Bryant and Perez-Dingui were at work. Goldstein described E.D.’s behavior as “[t]ypical.” Id. at 161. After work, Bryant and Perez-Dingui got a ride to the daycare to pick up E.D. Around 6:30 p.m., the couple's boss at Burger King, Paula Stidom, met them there in her car. Stidom had been helping the couple since Bryant's car accident by giving them rides to and from work, doing laundry for them, and “just doing whatever [she] could.” Id. at 57. That evening, Stidom took them to get food and rented them a hotel room at a La Quinta Inn. There was a problem with the reservation, so it took Stidom some time to get them checked in. While they were together, Stidom interacted and played with E.D. and “she was okay.” Id. Around 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., Bryant and Perez-Dingui gathered their things from Stidom's car. Stidom carried E.D. to the elevator, set her down, and the family went upstairs. In Stidom's view, E.D. “was fine” and acting like her normal self. Id. at 62.

[7] Around midnight, Indianapolis EMS was dispatched to the La Quinta to respond to a report of a sick child in Bryant's room. When paramedic Nicole Smith arrived, she discovered E.D. in cardiac arrest. Smith also noticed a hematoma (lump) and bruising on E.D.’s forehead. Smith began administering CPR and called for assistance because E.D.’s condition was more severe than indicated by dispatch. Smith asked Bryant to greet and let in the additional responders, but Bryant refused, saying, “I think it's better if I just stay here.” Id. at 26. Reinforcements arrived and took over attempts to resuscitate E.D. She was transported by ambulance to Riley. E.D.’s condition never improved, and a Riley physician pronounced her deceased around 1:00 a.m. on May 6. A CT scan of E.D.’s head taken at the hospital showed what was most likely an acute hemorrhage that was not present on the April 30 scan. E.D. also had a visible bump on her forehead and healing laceration under her chin.

[8] Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Detective Jamie Hoch interviewed Bryant and Perez-Dingui at the hospital. The women said they were the only people with E.D. that night after Stidom dropped them off. Bryant told the detective she “woke up to the sounds of [E.D.] whining, wheezing and unable to lift her head up.” Id. at 209. But neither woman offered any explanation for E.D.’s injuries. Detective Hoch initially thought E.D.’s injuries from the April 30 car accident might have caused her death.

[9] Dr. Christopher Poulos, chief forensic pathologist at the Marion County Coroner's Office, performed an autopsy on May 9. Dr. Poulos observed multiple external bruises of varying ages on E.D.’s head, torso, and back. In addition to the fracture to the right orbital plate observed at Riley, his internal exam showed a hemorrhage under E.D.’s scalp and bleeding around the brain (although no injury to the brain's structure). Dr. Poulos found blood in E.D.’s abdominal cavity and observed two lacerations of the liver: one on the front and one on the rear. Although the front liver injury appeared older, Dr. Poulos believed the rear liver injury was suffered within “a short amount of time” of death but could not say precisely when. Id. at 200. Dr. Poulos also saw E.D.’s pancreas had been transected, meaning, “cut ․ or torn in two.” Id. at 186. The pancreatic transection would require “a significant amount of force” and would typically “happen when something comes in the front of the abdomen and basically ․ compresses the pancreas against the spinal column.” Id. at 201.

[10] In Dr. Poulos’ opinion, the combination of a transected pancreas and liver injuries without prompt medical intervention—and perhaps even with—would be fatal. Based on the timing of the injuries, the fact some showed no healing, and his review of the Riley medical records, Dr. Poulos did not believe the April 30 car accident caused all the injuries. Also, they “aren't injuries that would result from minor trauma.” Id. at 189. Dr. Poulos determined the cause of death was multiple blunt force injuries to the head and torso and the manner of death was homicide.

[11] After receiving the autopsy report indicating E.D.’s injuries “would have been sustained just a few hours before her death,” Detective Hoch interviewed the women again on August 11, 2022. Id. at 215. According to Perez-Dingui, when the family got to the hotel room that night, Bryant gave E.D. a bath. Perez-Dingui went downstairs to get more towels. When Perez-Dingui returned, she got in the shower. Bryant took E.D. downstairs to reheat the food they purchased earlier. When they came back to the room, Bryant put E.D. down to sleep on some blankets on the floor on Bryant's side of the bed, and Perez-Dingui went to sleep without checking on E.D. Perez-Dingui woke up around midnight to the sound of Bryant calling E.D. by her given name, rather than Cookie, which Perez-Dingui thought was “unusual.” Id. at 100. She saw Bryant shaking E.D. as though to wake her up. E.D. was not responding. Perez-Dingui took E.D. from Bryant, splashed water on E.D.’s face, and tried playing videos and songs on her phone to get E.D. to respond. When that didn't work, Perez-Dingui called 9-1-1.

[12] During Detective Hoch's interview with Bryant, she was adamant Perez-Dingui was never alone with E.D. that night. She said there were no accidents or falls and she never dropped E.D.

[13] In April 2023, Perez-Dingui contacted Detective Hoch and said she had more information to provide. During an interview on April 5, Perez-Dingui told the detective she heard a loud noise when she was in the shower the night of E.D.’s death. Two days later, Perez-Dingui gave another statement to Detective Hoch, telling him she also saw Bryant strike E.D. in the stomach while Bryant was giving E.D. a bath.

[14] The State charged Bryant with murder, Level 1 felony aggravated battery, and Level 1 felony neglect of a dependent resulting in death. Bryant waived her right to a jury trial. At the November 2024 bench trial, Perez-Dingui testified in more detail to the events in the hotel room on the night of E.D.’s death. She stated E.D. was crying and cold when Bryant was bathing E.D., and she saw Bryant “backhand” E.D. in the stomach, causing E.D. to fall and hit her head. Id. at 94. Bryant and Perez-Dingui then argued before Perez-Dingui left to get towels. When she returned, E.D. was standing in the bathroom, and Bryant shoved E.D. in the back to get her to walk out of the bathroom. Perez-Dingui then took what she estimated to be a forty-five-minute shower, which is when she heard a “big loud noise, like a ball bouncing against the wall.” Id. at 96. Perez-Dingui asked Bryant if everything was all right, and Bryant responded that it was. When Perez-Dingui got out of the shower, Bryant and E.D. were still gone heating up the food. E.D. was asleep on Bryant's shoulder when they returned, and Perez-Dingui could not see E.D.’s face before Bryant put her down to sleep.

[15] Dr. Poulos testified E.D.’s pancreatic and liver injuries, in his medical opinion, “would be painful.” Id. at 189. He explained a person with such injuries would “not just be acting their normal selves if they had [them]. [T]hey would potentially be bleeding, they'd potentially be in a deal of pain[.]” Id.

[16] At the close of the evidence, the trial court took the matter under advisement pending its review of the recording of Bryant's August 11 interview with Detective Hoch. Three days later, the trial court found Bryant guilty of neglect of a dependent and not guilty of murder or aggravated battery. The trial court explained its findings, credibility determinations, and verdict as follows:

After E.D. was left at the hotel in the care of her mother and the Defendant, she suffered multiple horrible injuries that were inflicted on her. Those injuries would have caused her to be sick and in excruciating pain. Her behavior could not have seemed normal and could not have seemed normal to the adults that had her in their care.

* * *

Both Ms. Perez Dingui and Ms. Bryant have lied about what they know about E.D.’s death. One of these two women, or both of them, savagely injured a small child causing her death.

Because of Ms. Perez Dingui's credibility issues, it's impossible for me to say who struck the blows to the child's body. I have to resolve any doubt in the Defendant's favor.

I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that E.D. was a dependent in the Defendant's care at the La Quinta Inn where she suffered horrific injuries, her life was endangered, and the defendant did nothing to help a child who would have been in extreme pain and distress. 911 was eventually called but not until after the child was no longer breathing and no longer had a pulse. All of the injuries happened to this child when the Defendant was in close proximity to the child. The [Defendant] could have obtained prompt medical care for this child and did not.

Because of the daycare owner, the Defendant's employer, the evidence presented by law enforcement, other first responders and medical personnel, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the State has proven ․ neglect of a dependent resulting in death[.]

* * *

I cannot find Defendant guilty of [murder] and [aggravated battery]. Probably isn't enough and because of the Defendant and Ms. Perez Dingui's lack of candor, I cannot get to beyond a reasonable doubt as to those two charges.

Tr. Vol. 4 at 33–35. The trial court sentenced Bryant to twenty-five years, with twenty years executed and five years suspended (two to probation).

The State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Bryant's conviction.

[17] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)). Evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 147 (Ind. 2007). “A reasonable inference of guilt must be more than a mere suspicion, conjecture, conclusion, guess, opportunity, or scintilla.” Meehan v. State, 7 N.E.3d 255, 257 (Ind. 2014) (quotation and citation omitted).

[18] To convict Bryant of neglect of a dependent as charged, the State was required to prove Bryant, being at least eighteen years of age and having care of E.D., a dependent less than fourteen years of age, did knowingly place E.D. in a situation that endangered E.D.’s life or health and which resulted in E.D.’s death. I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1) & (b)(3); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 151 (amended charging information).

[19] Bryant does not dispute E.D. was less than two years old, a dependent in her care at the time of death, and the fatal injuries were inflicted the night of May 5. Bryant instead focuses on the required mens rea, arguing the State failed to prove she knowingly placed E.D. in a dangerous situation which resulted in E.D.’s death.

[20] A person engages in conduct “knowingly” if, when she engages in the conduct, she is aware of a high probability she is doing so. I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b) (1977). When a charge under the child neglect statute requires knowing behavior, “the accused must have been subjectively aware of a high probability that [she] placed the dependent in a dangerous situation.” Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1297 (Ind. 1985). Proof of subjective awareness typically requires resort to inferential reasoning to determine the defendant's mental state. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1240 (Ind. 2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643 (Ind. 2010). Because the factfinder must have inferred the defendant's mental state, we look to all the surrounding circumstances of a case to determine whether a guilty verdict is proper. Villagrana v. State, 954 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). When there are symptoms from which the average layperson would have detected a serious problem requiring medical attention, it is reasonable for a factfinder to infer the defendant knowingly neglected the dependent. Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1240. Also, in this context, neglect is the want of reasonable care—that is, the omission of such steps as a reasonable caregiver would take and are usually taken in ordinary experience. Id.

[21] On May 5, 2022, E.D. was not suffering from obvious or serious injuries when she was at daycare or when Stidom dropped the family off at the hotel. But sometime after 8:30 or 9:00 p.m., while E.D. was in Bryant's care, E.D. suffered blunt force trauma to her head and torso. A minor trauma would not have caused her injuries. The liver laceration and transected pancreas were not immediately fatal, and according to Dr. Poulos, E.D. would have been bleeding internally, in a “deal of pain,” and acting abnormally. Tr. Vol. 3 at 189. Bryant was in proximity to E.D. all night in a shared hotel room. By Bryant's own account, she never left E.D. alone with Perez-Dingui. Even if Bryant did not inflict the injuries upon E.D., she would have witnessed Perez-Dingui do so. Dr. Poulos’ testimony establishes the child would have shown signs of trauma.

[22] The facts support the reasonable inference that Bryant was aware E.D. suffered severe injury requiring prompt medical attention and was subjectively aware of a high probability she placed E.D. in danger by failing to get E.D. that medical care. See, e.g., Patel v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1041, 1052 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (holding there was sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding a defendant knowingly placed her baby in danger by failing to obtain medical care where the infant was born at home, significantly premature, weighed less than two pounds, and was bleeding from the severed umbilical cord); Sample v. State, 601 N.E.2d 457, 459 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding the State presented sufficient evidence a mother knowingly placed her baby in danger by failing to seek prompt medical treatment for a skull fracture where the baby fell and struck her head, mother did not seek care, and two days later, upon dropping child off at the babysitter's house, the sitter immediately observed the baby crying and stiffening in pain and saw the baby had an obviously swollen skull).

[23] Still, Bryant points to her recorded interview with Detective Hoch, arguing “her extreme response to the detective's insistence that she had fatally injured E.D ․ belies any inference that she had the requisite mens rea to do harm to [the child].” Appellant's Br. at 19. Bryant claims she is not asking this Court to reweigh the evidence. See id. (“Bryant is not asking to reweigh the evidence but is pointing to the absence of evidence that she knowingly placed her dependent in dangerous places.”). But that is precisely what she requests when she suggests the trial court should have found her statement to Detective Hoch credible and given more weight to the “raw [e]motion” and “shock” she expressed during the detective's interview. Id. at 18, 19. We cannot reweigh evidence in a sufficiency claim. Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 570.

[24] Bryant also argues the trial court found Perez-Dingui's testimony not credible and therefore she was convicted “on the word of a liar.” Appellant's Br. at 18. But the trial court did not convict Bryant on Perez-Dingui's testimony alone. In fact, the trial court explicitly relied on all testimony except Perez-Dingui's in rendering its verdict. “It is for the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to decide which witnesses to believe or disbelieve.” Ferrell v. State, 746 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. 2001). If the testimony believed by the factfinder is enough to support the verdict, then we will not disturb it. Id. Even without Perez-Dingui's testimony that Bryant struck E.D., there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Bryant knowingly placed E.D. in a situation that endangered E.D.’s life or health and which resulted in E.D.’s death.

Conclusion

[25] Sufficient evidence supports Bryant's conviction for neglect of a dependent resulting in death.

[26] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-46-1-4(a)(1) & (b)(3) (2021).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.