IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.K. (Minor Child); (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.K. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to J.K. (“Child”). Father claims that the trial court clearly erred in concluding that: (1) the conditions resulting in Child being placed outside Father's home have not been remedied; (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being; and (3) the termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Father presents three issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court clearly erred in terminating Father's parental rights.

Facts

[3] Child was born in September 2014 to Ca.K. (“Mother”)¹ and Father. On February 12, 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). The petition alleged domestic violence, substance abuse, and educational neglect. Child and her three half-siblings lived in the home with Mother and Father. The allegations stemmed from Father's and Mother's history of severe domestic violence and substance abuse.

[4] On May 25, 2021, the trial court found Child to be a CHINS. The trial court ordered Father to complete domestic violence services, individual therapy, couples therapy, home-based casework services, random drug screens, therapeutic visits, and an inpatient drug program. The trial court further followed DCS's recommendation to place Child in home care with her parents and to adopt a permanency plan of reunifying Child with Father and Mother.

[5] Father completed several assessments but did not follow through with the dispositional order. Father was never successfully discharged from any of the services. Mother received a protection order against Father due to ongoing domestic violence, but on July 4, 2021, Father came to the home and physically harmed Mother, despite the protection order. Child was harmed during one of the domestic violence encounters between Mother and Father. On July 9, 2021, DCS removed Child from the home on an emergency basis and placed her in foster care.

[6] Through the end of 2022, Father was partially compliant with his services, though he was less active in domestic violence services and did not consistently submit to drug screens. During the entire case, in nearly four years, Father submitted five drug screens and missed hundreds of drug screens. Out of the five screens he submitted, four tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.²

[7] Father stopped all services except sporadic individual therapy in 2023. He became non-compliant with domestic violence services, home-based casework, parenting education, and drug screens. Father stated that he started an outpatient substance abuse program, but the case manager told him it would not count toward his case plan requirements, so he quit after approximately three weeks. Father did not have any record of the program or recall its name. Father has not been admitted to any inpatient program for substance abuse.

[8] On July 31, 2024, Father was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and possession of paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. Father reached a pre-trial diversion agreement with the State providing that the case would be dismissed after twelve months if Father complied with all terms of the agreement and if the representations he made were true. In September 2024, Child was placed with her great-aunt in relative care in Alabama.

[9] On March 17, 2025, DCS filed a verified petition to terminate Father's and Mother's parental rights. On June 4, 2025, the trial court held a fact-finding hearing. At the hearing, Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Ausencia Sanchez testified that Father's compliance with DCS's services deteriorated over time. She testified that Father did not successfully address his substance abuse issues and that neither parent demonstrated any attempt to do so. Furthermore, FCM Sanchez testified that Father's domestic violence concerns had not been addressed, noting that Mother left her a voicemail and sent her photographs, alleging that Father caused injuries to Mother. Additionally, on May 23, 2025, Father was charged with domestic battery, a Class A misdemeanor.

[10] Father testified that he was “pleading the Fifth” on all questions regarding his substance abuse. Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Father also stated that he had been living at Mother's parents’ house since his release from the county jail. Father additionally testified that he had ADHD and that he was prescribed Adderall and other medications for that condition, which he indicated might affect the screening results. Father, however, did not explain why he stopped participating in services, even though his ADHD was not a new diagnosis.

[11] On June 17, 2025, the trial court entered its findings of fact and conclusions thereon and terminated Father's parental rights. Father now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Standard of Review

[12] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[13] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.³ Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[14] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

* * * * *

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024).⁴

[15] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(c). Here, the trial court entered such findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Father's parental rights.

[16] We will affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence, and reasonable inferences that can be drawn from this evidence, that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

A. The trial court's conclusion that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

[17] Father challenges the trial court's finding that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.”⁵ Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[18] Here, the CHINS proceeding was initiated due to domestic violence, substance abuse, and educational neglect. Child was removed from Father's care in July 2021 on an emergency basis due to domestic violence; Child was injured during a dispute between Father and Mother. It has been more than four years since the CHINS proceeding was initiated, and Father has made little progress, if any, in rectifying the issues that led to Child's removal.

[19] Father claims that he engaged in many of the services, participated in visits, completed substance abuse assessments, and continued with his individual therapy. Father also argues that he had been arrested only once and that soon after the fact-finding hearing he would no longer reside with Mother, which would alleviate the domestic violence concerns. We find this argument unpersuasive.

[20] The trial court acknowledged and entered a specific finding that Father was involved in the services at the beginning of the case. Father, however, stopped participating in services in 2023, except that he sporadically participated in individual therapy. Father has never been in full compliance with drug screens. During nearly four years of DCS involvement, Father submitted only five drug screens; four were positive, and he missed hundreds of screens. His last drug screen was in May 2023, and it was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. Father also refused to answer whether he was still abusing substances, and at the time of the termination hearing, his charges of possession of methamphetamine and paraphernalia were still pending.

[21] Additionally, Father never successfully completed domestic violence services. Even after DCS filed a petition to terminate Father's parental rights, Father was charged with domestic battery, and that case remained pending at the time of the termination hearing. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding regarding the remediation of the conditions is not clearly erroneous. Father's arguments to the contrary are merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

B. The trial court's conclusion that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

[22] Father also argues that DCS failed to prove that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interest. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[23] The FCM testified that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. Although Father had been consistent with visitation and participated in services at the beginning of the case, he has been unable to demonstrate sobriety, consistency, or an ability to manage his emotions and physical actions. Under the relative care of Child's great-aunt, Child was developing well in school and exhibited no behavioral issues. Given Father's continued substance abuse, ongoing domestic violence, and lack of stable housing, the trial court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[24] The trial court's termination of Father's parental rights to Child is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not challenge the termination of her parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.

2.   The most recent screen Father submitted was on May 18, 2023. Father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine in that screen.

3.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

4.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again amended effective on July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition on March 17, 2025, under the 2024 version of the statute.

5.   Father also argues that the trial court clearly erred in determining that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child. DCS was only required to prove the existence of one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or reasons for placement outside Father's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.