DEETZ v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Matthew L. Deetz appeals following his convictions of Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine ¹ and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia.² Deetz raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence found in Deetz's vehicle following a traffic stop; and

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Deetz's motion to exclude the testimony of a lab technician that the State had not specifically identified on its witness list until the morning of trial.

Because the officer had reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence collected during the traffic stop. Nor can we say the trial court abused its discretion by denying Deetz's motion to exclude the State's witness when discovery sent to Deetz seven months before trial had clarified the name and contact information for the lab technician who determined the substance possessed by Deetz was methamphetamine and when reasons Deetz cited for exclusion could have been resolved by a continuance, which Deetz did not request. We accordingly affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 4, 2023, Martinsville Police Department Officer Bransom Lee was conducting surveillance near a suspected drug house. About 4:00 p.m., Officer Lee saw a green Chevrolet Avalanche pull onto the property. Five minutes later, the vehicle left the property, and Officer Lee followed it. Officer Lee used his patrol car's speedometer to pace the Avalanche, and determined the Avalanche was traveling at least 36 miles per hour in a 30-mile-per-hour zone. As soon as the road provided a safe location for stopping, Officer Lee initiated a traffic stop.

[3] The Avalanche stopped, and Officer Lee approached and determined the car was driven by Deetz, whose wife was in the passenger seat. A second officer, Josh Brown, arrived to assist Officer Lee with the stop. Officer Brown checked Deetz's license, registration, and insurance information, while Officer Lee walked his canine, which was trained for drug detection, around the outside of Deetz's vehicle for a free air sniff. The canine alerted to the presence of drugs on the driver's side of the vehicle, so Deetz and his wife were asked to exit the vehicle. Officer Lee searched the vehicle and found a clear plastic bag containing a crystalline substance that field tested as methamphetamine, jars of green leafy substance that appeared to be some form of marijuana, and a glass smoking pipe with white residue. Deetz admitted at the scene that these items were his. Officer Lee sent the crystalline substance to the Indiana State Police Laboratory (“ISP Lab”) for testing, and it later tested positive for methamphetamine.

[4] On October 3, 2023, the State charged Deetz with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana,³ Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia, and Class C infraction speeding.⁴ On August 13, 2024, Deetz filed a motion to suppress all of the State's evidence based on the traffic stop not being supported by reasonable suspicion. The trial court held a hearing on Deetz's motion to suppress and denied that motion on October 20, 2024. On April 8, 2025, the State moved to dismiss the speeding and marijuana charges, and the trial court granted that motion. A jury then heard evidence and found Deetz guilty as charged. The trial court imposed 730 days for possession of methamphetamine, with 640 of those days suspended to probation, and imposed no additional jail time for possession of paraphernalia.

Discussion and Decision

1. Motion to Suppress

[5] Deetz argues the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress all the evidence collected by police because the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion.

When ruling on the admission of evidence at trial following denial of a motion to suppress, a trial court must consider the foundational evidence presented at trial. It also considers evidence from the suppression hearing that is favorable to the defendant only to the extent it is uncontradicted at trial. A trial court is in the best position to weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, and we review its rulings on admissibility for an abuse of discretion and reverse only if a ruling is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights. However, the ultimate determination of the constitutionality of a search or seizure is a question of law that we review de novo.

Ramsey v. State, 222 N.E.3d 1038, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Gerth v. State, 51 N.E.3d 368, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal citations omitted in Ramsey)), trans. denied.

[6] Deetz argues Officer Lee's stop of his Avalanche violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.⁵ A traffic stop is similar to a “Terry Stop” and, therefore, may not occur without reasonable suspicion. Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1259 (Ind 2019). Reasonable suspicion must be based on more than a “mere ‘hunch[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 397 (2014)). “Reasonable suspicion requires more than an officer's own subjective belief a person might be violating the law. In other words, the stopping officer must be able to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for believing a traffic violation occurred.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

[7] Officer Lee paced Deetz's vehicle on a flat section of road, using the certified calibrated speedometer in his patrol vehicle. Officer Lee intentionally did not use his radar detector because “radar doesn't work well when a vehicle is moving in the same direction as you.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 69.) When Officer Lee's vehicle was going thirty-six miles per hour, Deetz's Avalanche began to pull away from him. Based on that road's speed limit being thirty miles per hour, Officer Lee had reasonable suspicion to pull over Deetz's Avalanche for speeding. See, e.g., State v. Voit, 679 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (pulling over defendant's car based on pacing by police officers “comported with the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution”).

[8] Nevertheless, Deetz argues Officer Lee's inability to testify to when his speedometer was last calibrated renders Officer Lee's testimony incapable of creating reasonable suspicion.⁶ We disagree. Deetz cites Denton v. State, 398 N.E.2d 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979), for the proposition that, when the State's case relies on proof collected via scientific or mechanical measurements, “to establish a prima facie case of guilt, the State must show that the apparatus was properly set up and regularly tested.” Id. at 1289. We acknowledge the importance of mechanical measurements being reliable and valid if those measurements will be used by the State to sanction its citizens, but we also acknowledge that more than forty-five years of technological advancements have occurred since Denton was decided. When police officers are issued vehicles that are certified as containing speedometers calibrated to be accurate, we doubt the necessity of the frequent testing that would have been required on cars built half a century ago. We accordingly hold that, when Officer Lee's certified calibrated speedometer led him to believe the Avalanche was exceeding the speed limit by more than five miles per hour, Officer Lee had reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of Deetz's vehicle. See Marshall, 117 N.E.3d at 1261 (“Reasonable suspicion does not require that an officer know a crime occurred beyond a reasonable doubt or even by a preponderance of the evidence. [T]o execute a constitutional traffic stop, officers need only ․ a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the driver violated the law.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

2. Motion to Exclude Witness

[9] Deetz also argues the trial court should have excluded the testimony of ISP Lab Technician Gozel Berkeliyeva, who was called by the State to testify that the crystalline substance found in a plastic bag in Deetz's vehicle was methamphetamine, because the State did not name Technician Berkeliyeva on its witness list until the morning of trial. Deetz contends the late disclosure violated Indiana Rule Criminal Procedure 2.5 ⁷ and the trial court's Final Pretrial Order, which required final witness lists to be filed at least seven days before trial.

[10] “A trial court has broad discretion to manage discovery, and we presume that the court acted fairly and equitably.” Smith v. State, 247 N.E.3d 1285, 1288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). We review the trial court's denial of a motion to exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion. Howard v. State, 122 N.E.3d 1007, 1017 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. As abuse of discretion requires reversal if the trial court's decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances and the error affects a party's substantial rights.” Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied. Evidence exclusion is an “extreme remedy and is to be used only if the State's actions were deliberate and the conduct prevented a fair trial.” Smith, 247 N.E.3d at 1288 (quoting Berry v. State, 715 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Ind. 1999)).

[11] After Deetz asked the trial court to exclude Technician Berkeliyeva, the State explained that it provided initial discovery to Deetz on January 4, 2024, and that witness list included “any ISP lab personnel” as a potential witnesses. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 40.) Then, on August 20, 2024, the State supplemented that discovery by providing the certificate of analysis from the ISP lab that confirmed the crystalline substance contained methamphetamine. That certificate of analysis, which was sent to Officer Lee on August 16, 2024, was signed by Gozel Berkeliyeva and included her typewritten name, along with the address and phone number of the ISP lab. The trial court confirmed that Deetz had received the certificate of analysis containing Technician Berkeliyeva's name and contact information. (Id. at 42.) Deetz nevertheless contended the lab report was not notice that Technician Berkeliyeva would be the expert called at trial, because “[t]hey can call any expert[.]” (Id. at 43.) The trial court then ruled: “We're going to have to agree to disagree then, if you know who the lab tech is that did the work, then you know who to talk to. Motion to exclude is denied.” (Id.)

[12] We see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of the motion to exclude. Deetz's trial was in April 2025, and he received the lab report in August 2024 identifying Technician Berkeliyeva as the scientist who analyzed the crystalline substance and determined it was methamphetamine. Thus, Deetz had nearly eight months to investigate Technician Berkeliyeva's qualifications so that he could “prepare proper cross-examine, do depositions, go over their credentials, ask any other attorneys what they feel about this expert witness and pick brains[.]” (Id. at 41.) We note Deetz's stated concerns could have been remedied by a continuance, which is the preferred remedy for alleged late disclosure, see S.T. v. State, 764 N.e.2d 632, 636 (Ind. 2002) (“Where a party fails to disclose a witness timely, courts generally remedy the situation by providing a continuance rather than disallowing the testimony.”), but Deetz did not request a continuance. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Deetz's motion for exclusion of Technician Berkeliyeva. See Lindsey v. State, 877 N.E.2d 190, 196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (where part of State's discovery put defendant on notice, defendant cannot claim prejudice from late disclosure of full information), trans. denied.

Conclusion

[13] The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Deetz's motion to suppress or his motion to exclude the State's witness. Because his arguments fail, we affirm.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-8.3(b)(1).

3.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).

4.   Ind. Code § 9-21-5-2.

5.   Deetz's argument cites both the Fourth Amendment “and Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution[.]” (Appellant's Br. at 9.) However, Deetz provides no separate argument under the Indiana Constitution, which prompts the State to argue Deetz waived any such argument. (Appellee's Br. at 13.) In response, Deetz cites State v. Bouye, 118 N.E.3d 22, 25 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), for the proposition that: “The same reasonable suspicion standard exists under Ind. Const. art. I, § 11.” (Reply Br. at 6.) As Deetz notes, Bouye cited Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind. 2008), for the idea that many search and seizure issues are resolved by similar analysis under the federal and state constitutions. Deetz has accurately represented the law as it was stated in Bouye and Campos, but almost seven weeks after Bouye was decided, our Indiana Supreme Court handed down Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254 (Ind. 2019), in which that Court separately analyzed a traffic stop for reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment and for reasonableness under the Indiana Constitution. Id. at 1258-1262 (applying three-part Litchfield test to determine reasonableness under Article 1, Section 11). Because Deetz did not provide any argument based on the Litchfield analysis, he has waived any argument he could have made under the Indiana Constitution. See, e.g., Perryman v. State, 80 N.E.3d 234, 243 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (“By his failure to provide independent authority and analysis, Perryman has waived his state constitutional claim.’ ”).

6.   Deetz also argues the trial court should have ruled in his favor because Deetz and his wife both testified at the suppression hearing about the Avalanche's mechanical problems, which Deetz claims would have prevented the Avalanche from exceeding thirty miles per hour. Deetz notes that Officer Lee testified the Avalanche sounded like it needed work. (Appellant's Br. at 7, 8.) However, the trial court is allowed to assess the credibility of the witnesses and weigh the evidence, Ramsey, 222 N.E.3d at 1044, and the trial court concluded Deetz was exceeding the speed limit. We will not reassess credibility or reweigh evidence.

7.   Indiana Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.5, in relevant part, requires the State to disclose “[t]he names and last known addresses of persons whom the state intends to call as witnesses, with their relevant written or recorded statements.”

May, Judge.

Altice, C.J., and Scheele, J., concur.