A.S., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In these juvenile delinquency proceedings, A.S. appeals the juvenile court's modification of its dispositional decree and argues the court abused its discretion when it placed him at the Indiana Department of Correction (the DOC). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2024, A.S., who was then sixteen, broke into a Dollar General store in Indianapolis but fled after setting off an alarm. Less than an hour later, he was arrested when police found him using a crowbar to pry open the door of a nearby gun shop. The State filed a delinquency petition alleging A.S. had committed acts that, if they had been committed by an adult, would constitute burglary and attempted burglary. At the initial hearing, the juvenile court placed A.S. with his mother on supervised release and ordered him to participate in a day reporting program.

[3] The following month, A.S. was temporarily suspended from the day reporting program because he violated its zero-tolerance policy against participants having cell phones. The probation department filed a petition alleging A.S.’s suspension from the program was a violation of the terms of his supervised release. Shortly after that petition was filed, A.S. got into “a domestic situation” with his mother and left home after she called the police. Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 65. Probation filed an amended petition informing the juvenile court that neither it, his mother, nor the police were able to locate A.S. or get in contact with him. That petition prompted the court to issue a warrant for A.S.’s arrest. A.S. was eventually located and arrested, and at a detention hearing held a few days later, the court again released him to his mother on supervised release. It further admonished him “that there[ ] [would] be no [more] violent or harassing contact with [his] mother” and the court “probably would not let [him] go home if there[ ] [was] any further problem.” Transcript at 17-18.

[4] Approximately one week later, A.S. left his mother's home ostensibly to check in with the day reporting program. However, he never arrived at the program and did not return home that day. The next day, A.S. was arrested, alleged to have committed acts constituting auto theft and intimidation, and was released back to his mother with a GPS monitor. Thereafter, A.S. entered into an admission agreement where he admitted to having committed attempted burglary and auto theft and the State dismissed the allegations of burglary and intimidation. The juvenile court took that agreement under advisement pending a dispositional hearing and ordered A.S. to remain on GPS monitoring and continue with the terms of his supervised release.

[5] On numerous occasions in the weeks before the dispositional hearing, A.S. left his home without permission, tampered with his GPS monitor, and violated the rules of the day reporting program by having vapes, which were confiscated from him on more than one occasion. Additionally, he admitted to probation that he was smoking marijuana daily despite his mother asking him to stop. Even in light of these issues, probation recommended in its predispositional report that “[c]ommunity-based services [were] a good option for [A.S.] ․ as he ha[d] been successful with day reporting” and was continuing to work with probation to comply with GPS monitoring. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 111. Probation further recommended that A.S. remain with his mother because she was “providing appropriate guidance and support[.]” Id.

[6] At the dispositional hearing in September 2024, the juvenile court accepted the admission agreement, placed A.S. on probation with a suspended commitment to the DOC, continued his placement with his mother on a GPS monitor, and ordered him to participate in home-based case work and other services. But one month later, the probation department filed a motion to modify the dispositional decree and alleged that A.S. had been tampering with his GPS monitor, leaving home without permission, and at one point his whereabouts were unknown for four days.

[7] In early November, before the juvenile court took action on the motion to modify, A.S. had locked himself out of his mother's house and tried to gain entry by cutting the screen out of a window with a knife. When his mother caught him and attempted to discipline him for damaging the window, he punched her multiple times on the back of her head, chin, and forehead, and swung his knife at her. A.S. was arrested for these actions, and he was alleged to have committed domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, criminal recklessness committed with a deadly weapon, and criminal mischief.¹ The probation department then filed an amended petition to modify A.S.’s dispositional order based in part on those actions and allegations that he had tested positive for marijuana and had not logged onto his virtual schooling since September.

[8] After his November arrest, A.S. entered into a second admission agreement in which he admitted to testing positive for marijuana and failing to attend school, and the State dismissed the remaining allegations. During a December hearing, the juvenile court, among other things, approved the admission agreement, released A.S. to his father's custody pending the dispositional hearing, and ordered him to complete a psychological evaluation.

[9] Throughout the next two months, Dr. Jim Dalton, a child/adolescent psychologist, completed a psychological evaluation of A.S. and finalized a written report summarizing that evaluation in mid-February 2025. He concluded, among other things, that A.S. had exhibited “antisocial interests and impulses” and has an “ongoing need for support and treatment” because he is “at high risk for maladjustment, negative behavioral responses to stress, drug abuse, and antisocial recidivism.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 171-72. Even so, according to Dr. Dalton's initial evaluation, A.S. “could be supported safe[l]y in the community – as long as his providers [were] active in his treatment needs and supports and that his father [was] strong in his supervision, support[,] and accountability[.]” Id. at 173. However, in March, Dr. Dalton supplemented his evaluation after “becom[ing] aware of additional charges and behaviors in the community of significant concern.” Id. at 179. Based on this additional information, Dr. Dalton recommended that A.S. be placed in a “more restrictive [environment] to keep him and others safe[ ] and to get a better chance for him to respond to interventions.” Id.

[10] Among the additional facts that caused Dr. Dalton to change his evaluation was that in January, the State filed another delinquency petition alleging that A.S. had committed acts constituting battery and disorderly conduct. That petition stemmed from allegations that the previous month, A.S. and two other teenagers had gotten into a physical fight with another boy. Additionally, in February, A.S. was pulled over while driving a stolen vehicle. The police officer who performed the initial stop gave A.S. instructions to place the vehicle in park and turn off the engine. Instead, A.S. sped away. After being chased by the police down several streets on the west side of Indianapolis, A.S. collided with another motorist, briefly lost control of his vehicle, and started driving off-road. Undeterred, he managed to regain control of the car and continued to lead the police on a chase. Eventually, A.S. jumped from the vehicle while it was still moving and fled on foot. A.S. tried to evade the pursuing officers by jumping into Eagle Creek, but police were able to place him in custody as he left the water and attempted to climb an embankment. After his February arrest, the State filed yet another delinquency petition alleging that A.S. had committed acts constituting resisting law enforcement, auto theft, criminal recklessness, and leaving the scene of an accident.

[11] A.S. was placed in juvenile detention, where he remained while awaiting a hearing on the pending delinquency petitions and the motion to modify his dispositional order. While in juvenile detention, A.S. committed several acts of violence against staff members and other residents. On one occasion, he punched another resident in the mouth, knocking out one of his teeth. On another, he became aggressive with staff after they told him he was not complying with the facility's rules, resisted their efforts to place him in restraints, and, after staff placed him on the floor to restrain him, struck one of the detention officers in the face with his knee. A.S. also repeatedly threatened acts of violence against the staff, at one point telling staff members “that he would beat their a**[es]” when they tried to discipline him for being disruptive during class. Id. at 192.

[12] In April, A.S. entered into a third admission agreement, in which he admitted committing auto theft and leaving the scene of an accident, and the State agreed to dismiss the remaining pending allegations. On April 29, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing at which the probation department recommended that A.S. be placed in the DOC based on Dr. Dalton's supplemented evaluation. The State made the same recommendation, arguing “it [was] in the best interests of [A.S.] and [the] community that he be placed in an environment capable of providing the structure, supervision[,] and intensive services he currently needs.” Tr. at 83.

[13] A.S. argued that he should be placed on probation and released back to his father with a GPS monitor. In support of that argument, he presented testimony from his behavioral therapist, home-based case manager, and social worker. The therapist testified that since January, A.S. had become more engaged in therapy and demonstrated an ability to comply with services in the community despite being in detention since February. The case manager similarly testified that while A.S. was previously unwilling to participate in services, he had recently shown an increased level of engagement. In his opinion, placement in the DOC was not warranted because A.S. was still capable of receiving services in a less restrictive placement. Finally, the social worker testified that if the court was unwilling to release A.S. to his father, he was on a waiting list for a residential facility that was willing to work with him, and a bed would be available within three to four weeks after the hearing.

[14] After A.S. finished his presentation of evidence, the juvenile court gave his parents the opportunity to provide their input as to where A.S. should be placed. His father explained that he believed A.S. had gotten involved with “bad people” who had “ushered him their way.” Id. at 101. However, he thought detention had given A.S. a “reality check” and that A.S. was ready to start engaging in community-based services. Id. at 103. His mother disagreed and said that A.S. was not “fully ready” to “do better[.]” Id. at 104. In her opinion, if A.S. were put back into the community, it would “just be ․ the same” as his previous failed stints on probation. Id.

[15] Ultimately, the juvenile court reasoned from the bench that A.S. was “an all or nothing kind of person” who needed the rigid structure available at the DOC to ensure he attended school, engaged in services, and remained safe. Following the hearing, the court issued a written order placing A.S. in the DOC, reasoning:

• [A.S.] is not a candidate for community-based services due to his recent demonstrated noncompliance, involving dangerous behaviors while under community-based supervision.

• [A.S.] is not a candidate for residential placement as evidenced by his prior noncompliance with the Court's orders while on community-based supervision and while in the Marion County Youth Services Center, he demonstrated aggressive behavior that would be counter-intuitive to his rehabilitative efforts, as well as the rehabilitative efforts of the other residents.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 200-01. A.S. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[16] It is well-settled that “[t]he disposition of a juvenile adjudicated a delinquent is a matter committed to the juvenile court's discretion, subject to the statutory considerations of the child's welfare, community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition.” A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). We will reverse only if the juvenile court abused its discretion, meaning “its decision [was] clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from them.” Q.H., 216 N.E.3d at 1200. In reviewing the court's decision, “we neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Id. (quoting J.S. v. State, 110 N.E.3d 1173, 1175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied).

[17] When issuing or modifying a dispositional decree, a juvenile court must balance several statutory factors so that the juvenile's placement is “consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child” and

(1) is:

(A) in the least restrictive (most family like) and most appropriate setting available; and

(B) close to the parents’ home, consistent with the best interest and special needs of the child;

(2) least interferes with family autonomy;

(3) is least disruptive of family life;

(4) imposes the least restraint on the freedom of the child and the child's parent, guardian, or custodian; and

(5) provides a reasonable opportunity for participation by the child's parent, guardian, or custodian.

Ind. Code § 31-37-18-6.

[18] On appeal, A.S. focuses his arguments on factor 1(A), asserting the juvenile court abused its discretion because “alternative, less-restrictive placements were available and supported by the evidence[.]” Appellant's Brief at 7. However, A.S. is incorrect that section 31-37-18-6 “mandate[s] that a juvenile be placed in the least restrictive setting available.” Id. Instead, the statute requires “the least restrictive disposition that is ‘consistent with the safety of the community and the best interest of the child.’ ” J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (quoting D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)), trans. denied. Under the present circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that both considerations—i.e., the safety of the community and A.S.’s best interest—are best served by placement in the DOC.

[19] Starting with A.S.’s best interest, he contends that he was placed in the DOC “just as he began to experience meaningful rehabilitation outside of prison.” Appellant's Br. at 10. He cites E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 686 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh'g denied, trans. denied, for the proposition that the juvenile court must consider a juvenile's “recent engagement with services in the crafting of a disposition.” Appellant's Br. at 10. In E.H., a panel of this Court vacated a juvenile's one-year commitment to the DOC after finding that “[h]e was making considerable progress in” family reunification and home-based counseling. 764 N.E.2d at 686. But here, A.S.’s claim that he started making progress in January is undercut by the fact that in mid-February, he led the police on a chase in a stolen car and then engaged in violent and disruptive behaviors while in detention. Thus, unlike E.H., the record here reveals little, if any, meaningful progress by A.S. to curb his delinquent behavior. And though Dr. Dalton initially believed A.S. could benefit from community-based services, after learning of his February arrest and subsequent violent actions in detention, he concluded that A.S. needed to be in a highly restrictive environment. Similarly, A.S.’s mother told the juvenile court that A.S. was not ready to be released into the community and if he was, he would continue to commit violent criminal acts. The court was well within its discretion to credit the opinions of Dr. Dalton and A.S.’s mother and conclude that A.S. needed to be placed in the regimented environment of the DOC to ensure he gets the services and education he needs.

[20] Furthermore, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the safety of the community is best served by A.S.’s placement in the DOC, given his demonstrated inability to stop committing acts of violence and other criminal acts. Indeed, E.H. is further distinguishable because there, the juvenile had no “violent criminal record[.]” Id. In contrast, A.S. committed a litany of violent acts against his mother, peers, and detention staff. As such, A.S.’s circumstances are more comparable to J.T., where a juvenile was initially placed on home detention with electronic monitoring after he committed a series of offenses. 111 N.E.3d at 1026. He was later placed in a residential facility after violating several terms of his probation. Id. While in the residential facility, the juvenile had numerous behavioral issues, including incidents of violence. Id. Eventually, the juvenile court ordered him to be placed in the DOC. Id. at 1023. On appeal, a panel of this Court found that the court had not abused its discretion “[g]iven the nature of [the juvenile's] acts of delinquency and the failure of less-restrictive alternatives[.]” Id. at 1026. The panel reasoned that

over the course of approximately one-and-one-half years, [the juvenile] was found delinquent four times and was offered many more less-restrictive options than commitment to the DOC, to no avail. [He] [ ] consistently failed to take advantage of the leniency shown him, including placement on home detention, problem-solving court, and [residential treatment] and the provision of services such as counseling and therapy. Despite all of these opportunities, the record indicate[d] that [the juvenile] never went more than a few weeks without violating the conditions of these less-restrictive options.

Id. at 1027.

[21] Like the juvenile in J.T., A.S. continued to engage in acts of misconduct despite being placed on probation multiple times. He repeatedly failed to comply with court-ordered services and had been admonished by the juvenile court more than once that continued non-compliance would result in placement at the DOC. Only after A.S. committed repeated acts of violence against his mother, community members, and juvenile detention residents and staff did the probation department, Dr. Dalton, and ultimately the court, conclude that he would continue to commit criminal acts if released back into the community. Because A.S. showed no meaningful progress toward curbing delinquent behavior that threatened the safety of the community, this conclusion was not an abuse of discretion.

[22] In sum, given A.S.’s repeated delinquent behaviors, need for intensive and regimented rehabilitative services, and demonstrated inability to comply with the terms of less-restrictive placements, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in placing him at the DOC.

Conclusion

[23] For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A.S.’s appendix does not contain a copy of the delinquency petition filed by the State on November 6, 2024, or copies of several other documents pertaining to A.S.’s delinquent behavior that were filed in late 2024 and early 2025. We have accessed those documents, which are part of the record on appeal, using our Odyssey Case Management System. See Ind. Appellate Rule 27 (“The Record on Appeal shall consist of the Clerk's Record and all proceedings before the trial court ․, whether or not transcribed or transmitted to the Court on Appeal.”).

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.