DAVIS v. DAVIS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jacqueline Davis (“Wife”) appeals the Marion Superior Court's order granting Gareth Davis's (“Husband's”) motion for reimbursement of expenses he incurred in repairing the parties’ marital residence after Wife had moved out. Wife presents seven issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as two issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred when it interpreted the parties’ property settlement agreement.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered Wife to pay some of Husband's attorney's fees.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] During the parties’ marriage, they bought an older home, which had been built in 1968, “as is.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 57. In October 2022, Wife filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage. In April 2023, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that was later incorporated by reference in the dissolution decree.¹ The parties agreed in relevant part that Husband would continue to live in the marital residence until it was sold; that the parties would list the residence for sale by March 1, 2024; that the net proceeds of the sale would be “evenly divided between the parties”; and that “Husband shall assume and pay any and all obligations and expenses relating to the Marital Residence, including, but not limited to, the mortgages, taxes, insurance, utilities, homeowner association fees, and reasonable maintenance and minor repairs from May l, 2023, through the date of its sale․” Id. at 15 (emphasis added). The parties subsequently agreed to postpone the date to list the house for sale until March 2025. In the interim, Husband attempted to obtain financing so that he could stay in the home, but his attempts were unsuccessful.

[4] After Wife had moved out, and while Husband was trying to refinance the loan on the marital residence, Husband made significant repairs to the home. Husband replaced the garage door, air conditioner, furnace, water heater, gutters, and three toilets, and he repaired the chimney. The total cost of those repairs was $42,326.99. Husband kept Wife informed about each of these projects, and they commiserated about how much everything cost. Wife agreed to help Husband pay for the air conditioner, which cost $17,000. When Wife refused to reimburse Husband for any of the other repairs, Husband filed a motion with the trial court seeking reimbursement.

[5] In his April 2025, motion, Husband alleged as follows:

4. [Husband] has continued to reside in the house and made substantial repairs that [Husband] believed were necessary to list the house for sale. [Wife] was kept informed of the repairs and upon information and belief, [Wife] agreed and recognized the need to make the repairs.

* * *

6. [Husband] has incurred approximately $42,326.99 in expenses for repairs to the former marital residence to bring it to a marketable condition.

7. [Wife] was aware that [Husband] was making these repairs and, for a period of time, even contributed to the replacement of the HVAC system.

8. [Wife] is now refusing to reimburse [Husband] for repairs he made on the home from the proceeds of the sale. Further, [Wife] is refusing to agree to allow [Husband] to remove the items that he paid for to repair the home. [Wife] claims that [Husband] was required to maintain the house and that the repairs he made were simply maintenance, even though the parties’ Agreement only required [Husband] to do “reasonable maintenance and minor repairs.”

9. [Husband] requests that the Court order that the first $42,326.99 from the sale of the former marital residence go to [Husband] to reimburse him for the above-mentioned expenses, or in the alternative that [Husband] be permitted to remove the items he replaced and/or repaired.

Id. at 43-44.

[6] During a hearing on Husband's motion, Wife acknowledged that she had agreed in a text message to “pay half” of the $17,000 to replace the air conditioner. Ex. pp. 12-13. But Wife denied that she had agreed to pay for any of the other repairs listed in Husband's motion. Husband testified that he and Wife “had discussed splitting all of these expenses at one point in time.” Tr. p. 21. Husband also submitted into evidence a text message exchange about how to pay for the repairs where Wife stated that they would “figure it out. Together.” Ex. p. 37.

[7] The trial court found in relevant part as follows:

6. [Husband] kept [Wife] apprised of the need for repairs and/or replacement of items in the residence. The former marital residence was constructed in 1968 and the parties purchased the home “as is.”

7. Both parties will benefit from the significant repairs/rep[la]cements made on the home by [Husband].

8. The Court does not find the expenses [claimed by Husband in his motion] to fall within the definition of “reasonable maintenance and minor repairs” contemplated as expenses [Husband] would be responsible to pay per the terms of the parties’ Agreement of Settlement.

9. The phrase “reasonable maintenance and minor repairs” falls under the precept “expressio unis est exlusio alterius” a legal maxim in contract interpretation that means “the expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other.” Applying this principle, the phrase “reasonable maintenance and minor repairs” would exclude significant and major repairs.

10. [Wife] alternatively argues that [Husband] is responsible for “any and all obligations and expenses” under the Settlement Agreement. Applying [Wife's] theory, [Husband] would be responsible for expenses associated with repairing/replacing the home if it completely collapses, which the Court does not believe is the parties’ intent.

11. The expenses outlined [by Husband] do not fall within the meaning of “reasonable maintenance and minor repairs.” Rather, they are significant and major repairs. As such, [Husband] should be reimbursed for the cost associated with such repairs/replacements.

12. Upon the sale of the former marital residence, after closing costs and fees, [Husband] shall receive the first $43,016.56[2] and thereafter, the parties shall equally divide the proceeds.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 57-58 (italics added). The trial court also ordered that Wife would pay $2,000 of Husband's attorney's fees. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Contract Interpretation

[8] Wife contends that the trial court erred when it interpreted the parties’ settlement agreement. Construction of the terms of a written contract is a pure question of law that we review de novo. See Layne v. Layne, 77 N.E.3d 1254, 1265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The goal of contract interpretation is to determine the intent of the parties when they made the agreement. Id. This court must examine the plain language of the contract, read it in context and, whenever possible, construe it so as to render every word, phrase, and term meaningful, unambiguous, and harmonious with the whole. Id. If contract language is unambiguous, this court must determine the parties’ intent from the four corners of the instrument. See id. If, however, a contract is ambiguous, the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence of its meaning, and the interpretation then becomes a question of fact. Broadbent v. Fifth Third Bank, 59 N.E.3d 305, 311 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “A word or a phrase is ambiguous if reasonable people could differ as to its meaning.” Id.

[9] Thus, our first question on appeal is whether the settlement agreement is unambiguous. Again, under subsection 2.01 of the agreement, Husband agreed to “assume and pay any and all obligations and expenses relating to the Marital Residence, including, but not limited to, the mortgages, taxes, insurance, utilities, homeowner association fees, and reasonable maintenance and minor repairs from May l, 2023, through the date of its sale ․” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 15 (emphasis added). Wife contends that

“[a]ny and all obligations and expenses” means any and all obligations and expenses. There are no two ways to interpret this phrase. The plain and ordinary meaning clearly provides that, after May 1, 2023, Husband was responsible for any and all of the obligations and expenses for the marital home until it sold.

Appellant's Br. at 14. Wife also argues that her interpretation of this provision is supported by harmonizing it with other provisions in the agreement, such as a hold harmless provision.

[10] We conclude that the contract requires Husband to bear sole responsibility only for minor upkeep and maintenance of the marital residence. The contract states that Husband is responsible to pay for “any and all” expenses related to “reasonable maintenance” and “minor repairs” pending the sale of the house. The contract further provides a non-exhaustive list of example costs, all of which demonstrate costs relating to minor repairs and maintenance. No reasonable reading of that language says that Husband will bear sole responsibility for all costs whatsoever relating to the marital residence. Thus, the contract unambiguously indicates the parties’ intent that Husband would be solely responsible for routine maintenance.

[11] Further, Wife's reading of the relevant language focuses on the “any and all” language in isolation from the rest of that sentence. When read in context, the “any and all” language refers to any and all minor repairs and maintenance, not any and all costs whatsoever. And Wife's contrary reading renders the language that follows “any and all obligations and expenses” meaningless, which we will not do. We therefore reject Wife's contention on appeal. Id. at 21.

[12] Accordingly, we agree with the trial court that the parties’ agreement requires them to continue to share in major repairs of the marital residence. Notably, Wife does not contest that the repairs for which Husband sought reimbursement constitute neither “reasonable maintenance” nor “minor repairs,” and the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Husband's claimed expenses should be shared by Wife under the terms of the agreement. To the extent Wife suggests that the repairs were not necessary to sell the house, Husband presented evidence to the contrary.

[13] In sum, the trial court did not err when it ordered Wife to reimburse Husband for her share of the cost of the major repairs to the marital residence.

Issue Two: Attorney's Fees

[14] Wife next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay $2,000 of Husband's attorney's fees. The trial court based this award solely on “the parties’ inability to reach a resolution” regarding Husband's demand for reimbursement from Wife. Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 59. When reviewing an award of attorney's fees in connection with a dissolution action, we reverse the trial court only for an abuse of discretion. Ehle v. Ehle, 737 N.E.2d 429, 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[15] Wife's sole contention on appeal is that, “[c]onsidering [that] Husband's motion for reimbursement was unfounded, Wife's unwillingness to settle out of court was not a justifiable reason to order fees.” Appellant's Br. at 28. Because we affirm the trial court's grant of Husband's motion, Wife has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered her to pay for some of Husband's attorney's fees.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The parties have children, but neither party raises child-related issues in this appeal.

2.   It is unclear why this amount differs from the amount claimed by Husband in his motion.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.