STAATS v. STAATS (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Jennifer Staats (“Mother”) petitioned to end her marriage to Adam Staats (“Father”) on February 14, 2023. At some point during the divorce proceedings, the parties allegedly came to a mediated settlement agreement but, after Father, Father's counsel, and Mother's counsel had signed the agreement, Mother refused to sign it. On June 3, 2025, Mother's counsel moved to withdraw his appearance, citing a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. The trial court granted counsel's request on June 16, 2025. On July 7, 2025, at the beginning of the final hearing, Mother moved for a continuance. The trial court denied Mother's request and the hearing proceeded, with Mother fully participating. After the trial court issued its order dissolving the parties’ marriage, Mother appealed, arguing that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying her request for a continuance. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and Father (collectively, “Parents”) were married on June 12, 2015. They are the parents of M.S., born November 30, 2015. Mother petitioned to dissolve the parties’ marriage on February 14, 2023. At the time, the family resided in St. Joseph County.

[3] On June 22, 2023, Mother's first attorney, Geoffrey L. Blazi, moved to withdraw his appearance as Mother's counsel. Blazi cited “a breakdown of the attorney-client relationship” and indicated that “professional considerations require termination of the representation.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 19. Mother agreed to Blazi's withdraw of representation. The trial court granted Blazi's motion on June 23, 2023.

[4] Attorney George T. Catanzarite appeared as Mother's attorney on June 29, 2023. At some point during Catanzarite's representation of Mother, Parents, with counsel present, engaged in mediation. Parents appeared to have come to an agreement on all issues, with Father, Father's counsel, and Catanzarite all signing the mediation agreement. Mother, however, refused to sign the mediation agreement.

[5] On June 3, 2025, Catanzarite moved to withdraw his appearance as Mother's counsel. Catanzarite's motion alleged that there had “been a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship” and that a “Consent to Withdraw Appearance as Counsel [had been] emailed to [Mother] on May 28, 2025.” Appellee's App. Vol. II p. 25. The trial court granted Catanzarite's motion to withdraw his appearance on June 16, 2025.

[6] The final hearing was scheduled for July 7, 2025. At the beginning of the final hearing, Mother made an oral request for a continuance, claiming that her “attorney quit a week ago.” Tr. Vol. II p. 4. Mother claimed to have found unnamed new counsel “in Indianapolis[,]” asserting that she had “looked through all the attorneys in St. Joe County and there's conflicts of interest.” Tr. Vol. II p. 4. When the trial court pointed out that Catanzarite had filed his motion to withdraw more than a month before the final hearing, Mother claimed that she had not been aware of Catanzarite's motion to withdraw his appearance because she “didn't have access to [her] email.” Tr. Vol. II p. 5.

[7] Father opposed the continuance with his counsel pointing out that Father and paternal aunt had traveled from Texas for the hearing, which had only become necessary after Mother had refused to sign the parties’ negotiated mediation agreement. Father's counsel argued that the hearing had “been on the calendar forever” and counsel, at Father's expense, had taken the time necessary to prepare for the hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Father's counsel further argued, “[r]espectfully, Your Honor, again this seems to be just another ploy to push this out further.” Tr. Vol. II p. 6. The trial court denied Mother's request, and the hearing proceeded as scheduled.

[8] During the hearing, Mother testified; objected to the admission of some of the evidence proffered by Father; was given the opportunity to cross-examine Father, ultimately choosing not to do so; cross-examined Father's sister; and presented rehabilitative evidence after Father's testimony. Mother also presented arguments relating to the division of the parties’ assets and custody.

[9] Mother testified that she had recently moved to Arkansas to live with her parents and, beyond assisting with her parents’ horse farm, she was unemployed. Prior to Arkansas, Mother had lived with her sister in Ohio for a period of “[a]bout six months.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. At some point after the parties’ divorce, Father had moved to Texas. Mother acknowledged that she had been charged with a battery against Father ¹ and that he had never been charged with committing any violent act against her.

[10] Father alleged that Mother “was often violent, she would hit [him] often, she would throw things at [him], she would curse.” Tr. Vol. II p. 40. He further alleged that Mother had “had a very bad alcohol addiction most of [the] marriage, and then she was smoking THC during [the] marriage.” Tr. Vol. II p. 39. Father claimed that his daily contact with M.S. had stopped after Mother had taken M.S. “out of school and disappeared.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36. At the time of the final hearing, Father was employed at the Austin Independent School District in Austin, Texas.

[11] At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On July 16, 2025, the trial court entered an order dissolving the parties’ marriage. With respect to custody of M.S., the trial court concluded as follows:

The Court has considered the statutory factors, the parties’ testimony and their demeanor during their testimony and in general during the trial and concludes that Father is the parent who will provide the parties’ child with the greater degree of stability. Mother removed the child from the State of Indiana without consultation with Father, and then relocated the child again from Ohio to Arkansas. In each location, she has relied upon family to shelter her and the child. Mother has shown the exercise of poor judgment or poor emotional regulation in her use of alcohol and her physical abuse of Father. She desires sole legal custody rather than sharing decision making about the child with Father. Father is less likely than Mother to attempt to restrict or minimize the other parent's active engagement in the life of the child. Finally, Father would be well-supported by extended family who live near him in Austin, and the child would be well-connected to the school district from the standpoint that Father is an employee of the district and that [paternal aunt] works as an education professional at the specific school the child would attend in the upcoming school year. The Court determines it is in the best interest of the child that Father be awarded primary physical custody.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 25.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her oral motion to continue the final hearing, which again, was made at the beginning of the final hearing.

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. We will reverse the trial court only for an abuse of that discretion. An abuse of discretion may be found in the denial of a motion for a continuance when the moving party has shown good cause for granting the motion. However, no abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial.

Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied. A denial of a request for a continuance that is based on the withdrawal of counsel may constitute an abuse of discretion when the moving party is free from fault and her rights are likely to be prejudiced by the denial. Hess v. Hess, 679 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). However, the withdrawal of counsel alone is not sufficient to prove prejudice. See Matter of L.C., 659 N.E.2d 593, 597 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (providing that the parties were not prejudiced by the withdrawal of counsel when the parties proceeded pro se and presented cogent and well-reasoned arguments to the trial court, raised timely and appropriate objections, and effectively cross-examined the witnesses), trans. denied.

[13] Mother claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to continue the final hearing, arguing that her counsel had withdrawn his appearance a week before the final hearing. The record, however, establishes that her counsel had withdrawn his appearance more than a month before the hearing. While Mother claimed that she had been unaware of counsel's withdrawal because she “didn't have access to [her] email[,]” Tr. Vol. II p. 5, the trial court was not obligated to credit Mother's self-serving testimony regarding her alleged lack of notice of counsel's withdraw, and it apparently did not. See Randolph v. State, 755 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ind. 2001) (providing that the factfinder “was free to disbelieve Randolph's self-serving testimony, which it apparently did.”).

[14] The record suggests that counsel had moved to withdraw his appearance after Mother had refused to sign the parties’ mediated agreement, necessitating further proceedings. Notably, this was the second attorney to withdraw an appearance on Mother's behalf due to a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Mother has failed to explain the reason for her refusal to sign the negotiated settlement agreement, which necessitated further proceedings, beyond claiming that her counsel had been “limited by [her] attorney's performance” because he had been “in and out of the room” during mediation. Tr. Vol. II p. 33. Even assuming that counsel had, at times, left the room during mediation, Mother has not established that she was prejudiced or negatively affected by counsel's representation, merely stating her self-serving belief that counsel could have performed better on her behalf. Again, the trial court was not required to credit Mother's self-serving testimony and apparently did not. See Randolph, 755 N.E.2d at 576.

[15] For his part, Father argued that “[r]espectfully, Your Honor, again this seems to be just another ploy to push this out further.” Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Father and paternal aunt had traveled from Texas for the hearing, which had only become necessary after Mother had refused to sign the mediation agreement. Furthermore, Father's counsel argued that the hearing had “been on the calendar forever” and counsel, at Father's expense, had taken the time necessary to prepare for the hearing. Tr. Vol. II p. 6.

[16] The record also establishes that Mother fully participated in the final hearing, presenting arguments relating to the division of the parties’ assets and custody. Again, Mother testified; objected to the admission of some of the evidence proffered by Father; was given the opportunity to cross-examine Father, ultimately choosing not to do so; cross-examined Father's sister; and presented rehabilitative evidence after Father's testimony. Given her full participation in the final hearing, Mother has failed to convince us that she suffered any prejudice from the denial of her request for a continuance. See In re Paternity of A.M., 189 N.E.3d 619, 626–27 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (providing that Mother had failed to establish that she had been prejudiced by the denial of her request for a continuance, noting that she had been able to present her arguments; cross-examine witnesses, sometimes with the assistance of the judge; raise objections to exhibits, some of which the trial court sustained; and make closing arguments), trans. denied.

[17] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother indicated that the charge had been dropped after she had completed a pre-trial diversion program.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.