MOORE v. VILGAR PROPERTY MANAGEMENT (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Randle Moore appeals the trial court's orders to vacate the property located at 1948 Cleveland Street in Gary, Indiana, and to pay Vilgar Property Management's (“Vilgar”) attorney's fees and costs. He purports to raise four issues on appeal, but we address only the dispositive issue of whether he has waived his claims for failure to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. Finding that he has, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 27, 2024, Vilgar filed a Notice of Claim alleging breach of a lease agreement by Moore in the Small Claims Division of the Lake Superior Court. Vilgar attached a copy of the lease agreement (“the Lease”) to its Claim. The Lease, dated November 1, 2022, is between Moore, as “Lessee”, and Vilgar, as “Lessor”, and is for a term of one year. App. at 25, 33-35. The Lease provides, in relevant part, that Moore is to pay $900 monthly rent “on or before the first day of each month of the [t]erm” of the lease, and allows Vilgar to charge a late fee of $10 per day “after the 5th day of each month if any part of any monthly rent installment is unpaid” by Moore. Id. at 25. The Lease further provides that “[a]cceptance of late rent, or forgiveness of late fees, on one or more occasions, shall not act as a waiver of any of Owner's right[s] hereunder.” Id.

[3] The Lease defines a “default by Resident of th[e] Lease” to include “failure to pay rent as and when due[.]” Id. at 31 (emphasis added). The Lease further states, in relevant part, that “[i]n the event of default by Resident ․ Owner shall have the right, as [sic] its sole discretion, to re-enter and take possession of the Leased Premises.” Id. Under a provision entitled “Attorney's and Administrative Fees,” the Lease provides, in relevant part, “In the event of the employment of an attorney by Owner/Property Manager because of [a] violation [by] Resident of any term or condition of [the] Lease, Resident shall pay the fee of Owner's/Property Manager's attorney in an amount no less than $650.00, and all court costs Owner may incur.” Id. at 29. Each section of the Lease is initialed by Moore, and the Lease and its “Bug and Rodent Addendum” are signed by Moore.

[4] On April 24, 2024, Moore filed a counterclaim and motion to dismiss Vilgar's claim “for Lack of Competence, Standing, and Jurisdiction.” Id. at 4. On April 25, the trial court denied Moore's motion to dismiss and continued the “Eviction Hearing” to May 16. Id. On May 16, Moore filed a “Supplemental Motion to Dismiss” Vilgar's claim and a motion for a hearing, Trial Rule 52 findings and conclusions, and fees. Id. at 5. On that same day, the trial court denied Moore's motions and continued the eviction hearing to May 28. Moore failed to appear at the May 28 hearing, and it was continued to June 4.

[5] On June 4, Moore filed a Motion to Reconsider the May 16 order denying his motions, and the court issued an order continuing the eviction hearing and setting a hearing on Moore's motion to reconsider for June 6. On June 6, the trial court heard evidence and arguments of the parties, including evidence that Moore had, on multiple occasions, failed to pay his monthly rent by the first day of the month. The court denied Moore's June 4 motion to reconsider and took the claim for eviction and Moore's counterclaim under advisement.

[6] On June 17, the trial court issued an order finding that Moore had “breached the terms of the lease by failing to pay rent by the due date specified in the lease on multiple occasions,” that Moore had paid his rent “through the end of June 2024,” and that Moore “must vacate the property on or before June 30, 2024.” Id. at 20. The court ruled that Moore “takes nothing by way of [his] counterclaim,” and set Vilgar's cause for a damages hearing. Id.

[7] Following a damages hearing, on August 29 the trial court issued an order denying Vilgar's request for damages and granting Vilgar's request for attorney's fees in the amount of $650 and court costs. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Moore appeals a judgment of a small claims court. We generally review small claims judgments for clear error, giving considerable deference to the small claims court and its assessment of witness credibility. Piccadilly Mgmt. v. Abney, 215 N.E.3d 1078, 1079 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). However, this deferential standard of review does not apply to questions of law, which we review de novo. Id.

[9] Vilgar has not filed an Appellee's Brief. Under such circumstances, we will not develop an argument for the appellee but instead will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error. Salyer v. Wash. Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

[10] However, Moore has waived his claims on appeal by failing to comply with the Indiana Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that “[e]ach contention [ ] be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal.” When an appellant provides no citation to legal authority supporting his contentions, those contentions are waived. E.g., Shields v. Town of Perrysville, 136 N.E.3d 309, 312 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). Thus, under our Appellate Rules, “[i]t is not sufficient for the argument section that an appellant simply recites facts and makes conclusory statements without analysis or authoritative support.” Kishpaugh v. Odegard, 17 N.E.3d 363, 373 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). This rule “prevents the court from becoming an advocate when it is forced to search the entire record for evidence in support of [a party's] broad statements.” Lane Alan Schrader Tr. v. Gilbert, 974 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Keller v. State, 549 N.E.2d 372, 373 (Ind. 1990)).

[11] Here, Moore's argument section of his brief consists mainly of conclusory legal statements without analysis or citation to relevant legal authority. Moore's first assertion is that the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss Vilgar's claim because Vilgar “did not own the property” in question. Appellant's Br. at 8. He points to his admitted Exhibit 1, a certified 2022 warranty deed conveying the property located at 1948 Cleveland St. in Gary, Indiana to “JNW Rentals, LLC.” Ex. v. 4 at 4. His only legal argument in support of this claim is one sentence, stating “only the rented property's OWNER, or the Owner's agent, shown in writing, has the standing and authority to file an eviction claim in Court,” and an inaccurate citation to a century-old case that was based upon statutory construction of state laws from the 1800s. Appellant's Br. at 9. Moore does not assert—or point to any evidence establishing—that Vilgar is not the agent of the property owner. Moreover, the Lease itself shows that it is between Moore, as the renter, and Vilgar, as the property manager for the property in question.

[12] Moore's second contention—that the Lease is “legally defective”—also has no factual or legal support. Id. at 10. Contrary to Moore's bald assertion, the Lease does name Vilgar as the property manager and “Lessor.” App. at 33. And Moore's citation of two Indiana cases, without any coherent explanation of their applicability, and his bald assertions of law, without citation to any authority, are wholly insufficient under our appellate rules.

[13] Moore's third contention consists, in its entirety, of a heading and two sentences, none of which appear to relate to each other. And the contention itself is nothing more than a factually incorrect and legally unsupported statement that the court “erred in issuing a back rent eviction order.” Appellant's Br. at 11.

[14] Moore's final assertion is that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for Trial Rule 52 findings and conclusions. This assertion is followed by a series of one-sentence legal conclusions with no citations to the record or legal authority. Again, this is wholly insufficient briefing under Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A).

Conclusion

[15] Moore has waived his arguments on appeal by failing to cite supporting legal authorities and failing to make cogent arguments as required by Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order.

[16] Affirmed.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.