DOTY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] John Matthew Doty, a former high school biology teacher, pled guilty to and was convicted of four counts of Level 5 felony child seduction for acts involving a former student. The trial court imposed an aggregate ten and one-half-year sentence, which we affirmed on direct appeal. Approximately three months after we affirmed his sentence, Doty moved to modify his sentence. He appeals the trial court's denial of this request. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts, as set forth in our memorandum decision affirming Doty's sentence on direct appeal, are as follows:

In December 2021 and January 2022, then thirty-five-year-old Doty was a high school biology teacher, and then sixteen-year-old L.H. was a student in Doty's class. On December 21, 2021, Doty picked up L.H. at her home and then drove her to a rural location in LaPorte County and parked his car. Doty told L.H., “that's where I'm going to throw your body after I murder you.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 90). While in the car with L.H., Doty then “digitally penetrat[ed] [L.H.’s] female sex organ[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 47).

The following day, Doty picked up L.H. at her home and then drove her to his own home. At that time, Doty's pregnant wife was not at home. Doty took L.H. to the “soon-to-be nursery” where he “digitally penetrated [L.H.’s] vagina” and “also penetrated her sex organ with [his] penis[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 48, 82). Doty then gave L.H. a “box of multiple condoms.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 82).

On January 4, 2022, Doty picked up L.H. at her home and then drove her to a location ten minutes away from her home and parked his car. While in the car, Doty pulled out a vibrator and “penetrated [L.H.’s] vagina” with the vibrator, and he also “digitally penetrated her[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 49). When L.H. got home, she told her grandmother what Doty had done. That same day, L.H. had a sexual assault examination at the hospital.

In February 2022, the State charged Doty with two counts of Level 3 felony rape, one count of Level 3 felony attempted rape, and six counts of Level 5 felony child seduction. Doty was then released on a cash bond.

In September 2023, Doty entered into a guilty plea agreement, in which he agreed to plead guilty to four counts of Level 5 felony child seduction in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining five offenses. The plea agreement left sentencing open to the trial court's discretion.

During the guilty plea hearing, Doty admitted that he had committed the four acts of child seduction set forth above. The trial court took Doty's plea under advisement and ordered Doty to undergo a psychosexual evaluation and to report to the probation department for the completion of a presentence investigation report (“PSI”).

When the probation department interviewed Doty for the PSI, Doty initially stated that he accepted responsibility for his offenses against L.H. However, he then stated that L.H. had initiated the events between them and that she had “claimed rape” only because she had gotten “caught in a lie” and was “afraid of her grandma[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 71).

Additionally, when Doty underwent the psychosexual evaluation, he took “minimal accountability” and told the evaluator that L.H. had been the one who had “initiated sexual things[.]” (App. Vol. 2 at 95). The evaluator noted that, when Doty discussed his current offenses, he had made it appear that he was the victim. When the evaluator asked Doty what he thought of people having sex with teens, Doty responded that it depended on the age of the teen and whether the teen was sexually mature. Doty also told the evaluator that he believed that he should get probation and that L.H. should also get the same punishment. Doty also denied that he had ever participated in exhibitionism or had sent any obscene material via phone or an online format. Additionally, Doty told the evaluator that he had used a vibrator only on his wife.

During Doty's December 2023 sentencing hearing, L.H. and L.H.’s grandmother read the victim impact statements that they had submitted to the probation department, and they described the impact that Doty's offenses had had on L.H. Specifically, L.H.’s grandmother told the trial court that, as a result of Doty's offenses against L.H., L.H. was “depressed, quiet, a shell of herself” and that L.H. “s[aw] no joy in anything.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 102-03). L.H.’s grandmother stated that L.H. had been in therapy during the two years since Doty had committed the offenses against L.H. and that L.H. had had “very little improvement.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 103). Additionally, L.H.’s grandmother told the trial court that Doty had taken L.H.’s “youth” and “her soul” and had stolen L.H.’s high school experience—including participating in homecoming, prom, and sports and having friendships—because L.H. had attended online school since the offenses had happened. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 103). L.H.’s grandmother stated that Doty had “committed the ultimate betrayal of ․ trust” because he had acted as “a predator” instead of being a teacher. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 103).

Additionally, L.H. told the trial court that during the “[w]inter break of 2021 [her] life [had] changed forever.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 104). L.H. explained how Doty's offenses, which had occurred two years prior, had affected her psychologically and physically․

The State also introduced L.H.’s sexual assault examination report into evidence. In that report, which was written on the day that Doty had penetrated L.H.’s vagina with a vibrator and his finger while in his car, the nurse noted that L.H.’s external genitalia were red and swollen and that L.H. had lacerations to her hymen. Additionally, the report noted that L.H. was unable to tolerate some parts of the examination due to pain. During L.H.’s examination, L.H. told the nurse that Doty had told her, “[Y]ou're my ride or die, unless this gets out, then I'm throwing you under the bus and it will be your fault.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 88).

Additionally, the State presented witnesses, including a nineteen-year-old female who was a former student of Doty's (“the former student”). The former student testified that she had been in Doty's biology class when he had taught at his previous high school. The former student explained that, when she had been lonely, Doty had started a friendship with her outside of the classroom, had frequently texted her during after-school hours, had followed her on social media, and had visited her at her work. Furthermore, the former student testified that, when she looked back at how Doty had acted “beyond” the scope of the normal teacher/student relationship, she felt that his actions “fit[ ] the characteristics of grooming[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66). Doty's counsel then cross-examined the former student about grooming.

The State also presented testimony from a sergeant from the LaPorte County Sheriff's Department (“the sergeant”), who had been the lead investigator in Doty's case. The sergeant pointed out that Doty had denied, during his psychosexual evaluation, that he had ever engaged in exhibitionism or had sent obscene messages but that the sergeant's investigation had shown otherwise. Specifically, the sergeant testified that, during the investigation of Doty's offenses, L.H. had told him that she and Doty had exchanged semi-nude and nude photographs and videos, including a video of Doty masturbating. The sergeant explained that he had verified the existence of the photographs when he had searched Doty's and L.H.’s phones and that, during a therapy session after Doty's arrest, Doty had admitted to sending the video. The sergeant also explained that his search of Doty's phone revealed two voice messages “describing very sexual things” that he had sent in August 2021 to a female. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 86).

In addition, the sergeant testified that, after Doty had been charged in this case, three female former students of Doty's had contacted the sergeant with information about Doty's prior interactions with them. For example, Doty had visited the students at their workplace, had communicated with them via text, email, or social media, had taken some students to his house and drank alcohol with them, had “asked some inappropriate questions, such as, hey, who's lost their virginity[,]” and had touched a student on her buttocks and on her bare back. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 75). The sergeant also testified that one of the students had contacted him after Doty had been charged in L.H.’s case because the student's reflection of Doty's past behavior had made her realize that Doty's behavior was “consistent with grooming behavior.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 77).

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When arguing about sentencing, Doty's counsel highlighted that Doty did not have a criminal history. Additionally, Doty's counsel addressed the “significance of the injury or harm” to L.H. and clarified that Doty was “not saying the injury or harm [wa]s not significant” and did “not at all question this victim, [L.H.’s] honesty and reality.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 119). Doty's counsel argued that this case did not involve grooming and that the trial court should impose a sentence of seven years or less because Doty's lack of criminal history was a significant mitigator.

Prior to imposing Doty's sentence, the trial court found Doty's lack of criminal history and his guilty plea to be mitigating circumstances. The trial court noted that Doty's lack of criminal history was a “substantial mitigator” and that his guilty plea was a “minimal mitigator in that it came in response to a substantial cutback in the level of crime” and the dismissal of three Level 3 felony charges and two Level 5 felony charges. (App. Vol. 2 at 123).

When discussing aggravating circumstances, the trial court noted that it was “informed” by the victim impact statements and that this case involved an “injury [that] [wa]s greater than necessary to prove the offense in terms of both the physical and psychological impairment the victim ha[d] gone through.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 124). The trial court also found Doty's lack of remorse to be an aggravating circumstance and addressed that aggravator as follows:

I'm used to people coming in here on eleventh-hour remorse. That's kind of funny because [Doty's] statement of remorse really wasn't remorseful, was it? I think the clearer statement [wa]s that people have different ways of perceiving things. And I know it was used as a backhanded way to get at [L.H.]. Oh, I failed her because I didn't -- I wasn't the adult. But people look at it like somehow, once again, you're going back to the victim impact statement that somehow this is her fault.

Here's what I read: I read that you don't even think you've really done anything wrong because you think maybe people that do this kind of crime should get a little bit [of] counseling, and then you specifically said that the victim should be the criminal here. But let's talk about your statement. The other statement you said – it's all about you. You led off with your embarrassment, your shame, your loss, your wife's loss, my loss of my son's respect. I'm remorseful to my friends you said, and right after that it's back to you again. You're remorseful that all these good things you've done for students, once again patting yourself on the back, might be mitigated in their eyes by you[ ] having committed this crime. You have shown no remorse. You've shown the opposite of remorse.

(Tr. Vol. 2 at 124-25). Before imposing Doty's sentence, the trial court also commented that it believed that this case had involved grooming, but it did not find it to be an aggravating circumstance.

The trial court imposed a sentence of three and one-half (31/212) years executed for each of Doty's four Level 5 felony child seduction convictions. The trial court ordered three of the sentences to be served consecutively, resulting in an aggregate sentence of ten and one-half (101/212) years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction.

Doty v. State, 2025 WL 484110 *1–5 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2025) (footnotes omitted, brackets in original). On appeal, Doty argued that the trial court had abused its discretion in sentencing him and that his sentence was inappropriate. Id. at *5–8. Concluding otherwise, we affirmed. Id. at *7–8.

[3] Approximately three months later, on May 13, 2025, Doty moved to modify his sentence. The trial court denied Doty's motion.

Discussion and Decision

[4] Doty contends that the trial court erred in refusing to modify his sentence. “We review a trial court's decision on a motion for sentence modification for abuse of discretion.” Newson v. State, 86 N.E.3d 173, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or it is a misinterpretation of the law.” Id.

[5] Indiana Code section 35-38-1-17(j) provides that

A convicted person who is not a violent criminal may file a petition for sentence modification under this section:

(1) not more than one (1) time in any three hundred sixty-five (365) day period; and

(2) a maximum of two (2) times during any consecutive period of incarceration;

without the consent of the prosecuting attorney.

The trial court “may deny a request to suspend or reduce a sentence ․ without making written findings and conclusions.” Ind. Code § 35-38-1-17(h).

[6] Doty first contends that because the State did not respond to his request, when it was pending before the trial court for “some ninety[-]nine days[,]” the State should be considered to have acquiesced to the request. Appellant's Br. p. 11. However, we have previously concluded that the State's lack of response to a motion to modify a sentence does not amount to acquiescence. See Coleman v. State, 248 N.E.3d 629, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (providing that the State's failure to respond to Coleman's request to modify his sentence cannot be read as an acquiescence to the request).

[7] Doty next contends that the trial court judge, Senior Judge Thomas Alevizos, was biased against him. “There is no question that the law presumes that a judge is unbiased and unprejudiced.” State v. Shackleford, 922 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. “A defendant asserting judicial bias must show that the trial judge's actions and demeanor showed partiality and prejudiced the case.” Woods v. State, 98 N.E.3d 656, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied. Furthermore, “[b]ias is not proven from judicial rulings alone.” Id.

[8] In support of his claim that Judge Alevizos was biased against him, Doty argues that (1) his ex-wife is a licensed attorney who had, at some prior point, appeared before Judge Alevizos and (2) Judge Alevizos did not rule on his motion until August 26, 2025, just over three months after he had filed it on May 13, 2025.¹ Doty claims that it “is apparent” that Judge Alevizos demonstrated a “hostile feeling or spirit of ill-will” towards him given Judge Alevizos's “inaction towards” ruling on his motion. Appellant's Br. p. 14. We agree with the State that Doty's self-serving and unfounded allegations of bias “fall well short of the requirement to show bias.” Appellee's Br. p. 10. Doty, therefore, has failed to convince us that Judge Alevizos abused his discretion in denying his request to modify his sentence.²

[9] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Doty argues that “Judge Alevizos's emotionally driven sentencing order stemmed from” bias against him, Appellant's Br. pp. 13–14, Doty has waived this issue for appellate review because he could have, but did not, raise this issue on direct appeal. See Allen v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2001) (“Issues available but not raised on direct appeal are waived[.]”).

2.   Doty also argues that Judge Alevizos should have been disqualified from considering his motion because of bias stemming from the fact that Doty's ex-wife had previously appeared before him.The Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct (Judicial Code) requires judges to perform all duties of that office “fairly and impartially” and without “bias or prejudice.” Ind. Judicial Conduct Canon 2(A), Rule 2.2, –2.3. In fact, a judge is required by the Judicial Code to disqualify himself from any proceeding in which his impartiality “might reasonably be questioned [.]” Id. Rule 2. The test for determining whether a judge should recuse himself is “whether an objective person, knowledgeable of all the circumstances, would have a reasonable basis for doubting the judge's impartiality.” James v. State, 716 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Ind. 1999).Shackleford, 922 N.E.2d at 707. Doty has pointed to nothing in the record that would lead an objective person to reasonably doubt Judge Alevizos's impartiality.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.