K.J., Appellant-Respondent v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] K.J. appeals his adjudication as a delinquent for dangerous possession of a firearm, as a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. K.J. raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his adjudication. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Shortly after midnight on January 2, 2025, Speedway Police Department Officer Carter Pell initiated a traffic stop of a Jeep that had an expired license plate and no license-plate light. Officer Pell approached the passenger's side of the vehicle and observed a driver, a passenger in the front passenger seat, three individuals in the back seat, and another person in the cargo area of the Jeep. All but one of the occupants were juveniles. K.J. was seated in the front passenger seat.

[3] Officer Pell began speaking with K.J. and the driver of the Jeep. He then observed what he knew to be a rifle cartridge in the area of the glove box. He also noticed that K.J. had two backpacks at his feet and, further, that the odor of marijuana was emanating from the vehicle. As Officer Pell spoke with the occupants, he observed K.J. reach into his pockets. Officer Pell directed K.J. to “keep his hands out of his pockets.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 33-34. However, K.J. “continued to make ․ nervous[,] furtive movements towards the floorboard of the vehicle,” and Officer Pell had to again ask K.J. to “stop reaching around” inside the Jeep. Id.

[4] Officer Pell collected the driver's information and returned to his vehicle. There, he called for backup. After other officers arrived, the team of them asked all the Jeep's occupants to exit the vehicle so officers could conduct a vehicle search. One of the assisting officers, Officer Chris Ristuccia, stood near the rear passenger's side door, and he observed the passenger in that seat lean forward and down with both of his hands. The passenger grabbed “the pistol grip of a rifle” and started to “bring the rifle up,” at which point Officer Ristuccia unholstered his sidearm and instructed the passenger to drop the rifle. Id. at 54. The passenger complied, and the remaining occupants of the Jeep were removed without incident.

[5] The officers searched the vehicle's occupants and found multiple firearms on the rear- and cargo-area passengers as well as the AR-15-style rifle on the rear-passenger floorboard. Officers also located a Glock 19 firearm under K.J.’s seat. The muzzle of the Glock 19 was pointing toward the front of the vehicle and the grip was pointing toward the rear of the vehicle. Inside the backpacks that were by K.J.’s feet, officers found marijuana, baggies, and scales.

[6] The State alleged K.J. to be a delinquent in relevant part for the dangerous possession of a firearm, the Glock 19, as a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. After an evidentiary hearing at which Officers Pell and Ristuccia, among others, testified, the trial court adjudicated K.J. to be a delinquent.

[7] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] On appeal, K.J. asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his adjudication as a delinquent child for dangerous possession of a firearm, as a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. As our Supreme Court has made clear:

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile adjudication, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 543 (Ind. 2006) (citation omitted). We consider only the evidence favorable to the judgment and the reasonable inferences supporting it. Id. We will affirm a juvenile-delinquency adjudication if a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the [juvenile committed the offense] beyond a reasonable doubt. Moran v. State, 622 N.E.2d 157, 159 (Ind. 1993) (citations omitted).

B.T.E. v. State, 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018).

[9] To demonstrate that K.J. committed Level 5 felony dangerous possession of a firearm, the State was required to show, in relevant part, that K.J. “knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly possesse[d] a firearm” with a prior juvenile adjudication for an act that would be a relevant offense. Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5(a) (2024). K.J. argues only that the State failed to show that he possessed the Glock 19. Possession can be actual or constructive; the State does not suggest that it supported K.J.’s adjudication under a theory of actual possession. A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item, and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it. Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011).

[10] K.J. first contends that the State failed to show that he had the capability to control the Glock 19. But our case law has long recognized that, if a passenger in a vehicle has the contraband within his reach, the capability element of constructive possession is satisfied. E.g., Holmes v. State, 785 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind.), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698, 699 (Ind. 1997)). The record here readily demonstrates that the Glock 19 was within K.J.’s reach as it was under his seat. Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence to show that K.J. had the capability to reduce the Glock 19 to his personal possession. See id.

[11] We thus turn to whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude on these facts that K.J. had the intent to possess the Glock 19. Where, as here, contraband is found in a location that is accessible by multiple people, any inference of a juvenile's intent to maintain dominion and control over that contraband must be supported by circumstances that demonstrate his knowledge of the nature of the contraband and its presence. See Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ind. 2004). We have previously enumerated several nonexhaustive facts that the fact-finder might consider where the location in which the contraband is found is not under one person's exclusive control, namely:

(1) incriminating statements made by the [juvenile], (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures, (3) location of substances like drugs in settings that suggest manufacturing, (4) proximity of the contraband to the [juvenile], (5) location of the contraband within the [juvenile's] plain view, and (6) the mingling of the contraband with other items owned by the [juvenile].

Wilkerson v. State, 918 N.E.2d 458, 462 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).

[12] We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to show K.J.’s knowledge of the nature of the Glock 19 and its presence. K.J. was in a vehicle full of armed people with rifle cartridges in plain view. There was an AR-15-style weapon on the floorboard behind K.J.’s seat. K.J. had two backpacks containing marijuana, baggies, and scales by his feet and between him and the Glock 19, and the vehicle smelled of marijuana. The Glock 19 was directly under K.J.’s seat and readily accessible by him. And when Officer Pell was at K.J.’s window following the initiation of the traffic stop, he had to tell K.J. multiple times to stop reaching around the Jeep, which, while not dispositive, suggests more than simple nervousness by K.J. in the moment. A reasonable fact-finder could readily conclude that K.J. and his cohort were involved in a drug-related operation and carrying firearms in conjunction with that operation.

[13] Still, K.J. asserts that the orientation of the Glock 19—which had the muzzle pointing toward the front of the Jeep and the grip pointing toward the rear of the Jeep—suggests that the weapon was shoved under K.J.’s seat from behind. That question was for the fact-finder; we cannot say as a matter of law that the only conclusion from the orientation of the weapon was that it was shoved under K.J.’s seat from behind. K.J. also argues that his movements within the vehicle could have an innocent explanation, e.g., a teenager looking for his phone to call his parents following a traffic stop. Again, that possibility was for the fact-finder, and we will not reweigh that evidence on appeal.

[14] For all of these reasons, the State presented sufficient evidence to support K.J.’s juvenile delinquency adjudication.

[15] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.