IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.N.K. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] L.S. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to T.K., C.S., and M.S. (“Children”). Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is sufficient to support the termination of her parental rights.

Facts

[3] Mother has several children, including T.K., born in October 2014; and C.S., born in August 2020.¹ The Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report that Mother “was at different homes basically asking for drugs” and that Mother was “selling her body for drugs.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 88-89. Mother tested positive for cocaine on September 22, 2020, September 29, 2020, and October 5, 2020. On November 19, 2020, DCS learned that the residence did not have electricity and removed T.K. and C.S. from Mother's care.

[4] DCS filed a petition alleging that T.K. and C.S. were children in need of services (“CHINS”) pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (general neglect) on November 23, 2020. Mother admitted that she used cocaine in the home with the Children; that the Children had not seen a pediatrician since 2017-2018; that she submitted positive drug screens; that the home did not have electricity; and that Mother had been “unable or unwilling to provide her children with a safe and stable home without illegal drug use.” Ex. Vol. I p. 106. The trial court found that the Children were CHINS and entered a dispositional order, which ordered Mother, in part, to maintain clean, safe, and appropriate housing; obtain a drug and alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations; participate in home-based services; submit to random drug screens; refrain from the use of alcohol and illegal drugs; and appropriately participate in all visits with the Children.

[5] Mother struggled to comply with the dispositional order. Mother completed a drug and alcohol assessment in 2021, and it was recommended that Mother participate in a substance abuse program, individual and group therapy, and regular drug screens. Mother refused to participate in group therapy. She twice participated in a substance abuse program at Amani Family Services (“Amani”), which has interpretation services ² , but Mother was unsuccessful in completing the program.

[6] M.S. was born in October 2021 to Mother and K.L., and his meconium tested positive for cocaine. DCS removed M.S. from Mother's care, and on October 27, 2021, DCS filed a CHINS petition regarding M.S. pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1 (general neglect) and Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-10 (born with a controlled substance in the body). The trial court found M.S. to be a CHINS, and in the dispositional order, ordered Mother, in part, to “[m]aintain clean, safe, and appropriate sustainable housing”; “[o]btain a drug and alcohol assessment at an approved licensed agency by December 27, 2021, and follow all recommendations of the assessment”; “[e]nroll in drug and alcohol counseling at an approved licensed agency by December 27, 2021, attend all sessions, and successfully complete the counseling program”; participate in home-based services; and submit to random drug testing. Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 187. M.S. was placed with his siblings.

[7] During the CHINS proceedings, Mother participated in random drug screens and later received non-random drug screens in the DCS office on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays because Mother claimed that she did not understand how Cordant's drug testing services worked. Mother, however, often tested positive for cocaine or its metabolites.³ Although Mother would sometimes test negative for substances for weeks or a month, she would then test positive for cocaine again. Stress was a “catalyst” for Mother's drug usage along with “feeling alone” and “feeling unappreciated.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 51, 55. Mother's participation in substance abuse services was inconsistent until April 2024. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had entered the “termination phase” of her substance abuse program and had started receiving counseling biweekly instead of weekly. Id. at 28. The counselor expected Mother's services to end in February 2025 and then Mother would be expected to attend Narcotics Anonymous meetings. Mother's last positive drug screen was July 15, 2024.

[8] Amani provided additional services to Mother, including supervised visitation and home-based casework, which included parenting, employment, and self-esteem skills and community resources. In the summer of 2023, Mother requested unsupervised visitation, and the trial court agreed as long as Mother did not have any positive drug screens. In July 2023, Mother, however, repeatedly tested positive for cocaine, and supervised visits resumed. Mother never regained unsupervised visitation. Mother struggled with disciplining and supervising the Children. At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother still had parenting skills that needed improvement, and services were still needed. The family case manager noted that she was required to intervene during supervised visits because “the children [were] running astray, not being attended to.” Id. at 113.

[9] Other than for a few weeks during the CHINS proceedings, Mother was not employed and relied upon K.L. for housing and support. Mother lived in a one-bedroom apartment leased by K.L. Mother often told DCS that she was going to get a bigger home suitable for all of the Children, but she did not do so. Amani helped Mother get on a waiting list for housing and to apply for Habitat for Humanity in 2023. Mother was accepted into the Habitat for Humanity program, but she failed to comply with the volunteer requirements.

[10] Mother commented to her caseworker that K.L. treated her poorly and verbally abused her. Despite the issues between Mother and K.L., Mother had another baby with K.L. in September 2024. Mother testified that K.L.’s lease on the one-bedroom apartment ended in May 2025, that they had been saving money to rent a larger apartment, and that K.L. was looking for their new home. K.L., however, testified that he had not rented a larger apartment or house because his job was unstable.

[11] On July 23, 2024, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother's parental rights to the Children. The trial court held fact-finding hearings in January, February, and March 2025. On June 16, 2025, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions thereon and terminated Mother's parental rights. The trial court found:

The Court finds and concludes that despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the children with Mother and Father they have been unable and unwilling to remedy the circumstances that results in the [Children] being placed outside the Mother and Father's home.

* * * * *

The Court finds and concludes that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied. Neither parent has benefitted from reunification efforts and have not availed themselves of services to assist them with any underlying barrier to providing a safe and stable home for their children.

* * * * *

The Court finds and concludes that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the [Children]. [These Children] require[ ] care and supervision for [their] well-being, safety, life and physical health. All three of the children are at risk if they were to return to their parents.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 235-36. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother challenges the termination of her parental rights. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[13] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.⁴ Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[14] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS is required to allege and prove:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024). Subsection (d) requires the existence of one or more circumstances, including:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

* * * * *

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024).⁵

[15] DCS “is required to prove that termination is appropriate by a showing of clear and convincing evidence.” In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260 (Ind. 2009)). If the trial court finds that the allegations in the termination petition are true, it “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and enter findings supporting its conclusions. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8.

[16] Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.”⁶ Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Children's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. and Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005)). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[17] T.K. and C.S. were initially removed from Mother's care in November 2020 because of Mother's substance abuse and lack of electricity at her residence. M.S. was removed from Mother's care when he was born in October 2021 because he had been exposed to cocaine. Over the course of more than four years, Mother made little, if any, progress in addressing the issues that caused the Children's removal.

[18] In April 2024, Mother began a new substance abuse counseling program, but she consistently tested positive for cocaine until July 2024. She asserts that she has been sober since that time, but at the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother had not completed her treatment program. Despite Mother's newly-claimed sobriety, she still struggles with disciplining and supervising Children at supervised visitations. Mother is not employed and relies upon K.L. for housing and support. Mother, K.L., and their new baby live in a one-bedroom apartment that is unsuitable for Children. Although Mother has had more than four years to obtain suitable housing and has had the assistance of Amani, Mother has failed to obtain such housing. Mother also seems to argue that the termination of parental rights resulted from a cultural bias. Mother, however, was provided services at Amani, which serves refugees and has interpretation services.

[19] Mother's recent progress, while laudable, is far too little and too late. The trial court acted within its discretion to weigh Mother's prior lengthy history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination of her parental rights. Mother's argument to the contrary is a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that the conditions resulting in Children's removal would not be remedied.

Conclusion

[20] The trial court did not clearly err in terminating Mother's parental rights to the Children. We, accordingly, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   An older child, J.S., was also involved in the initial CHINS proceeding, but the trial court granted J.S.’s father custody and did not terminate Mother's parental rights as to J.S. Additionally, Mother has another child, who was born in September 2024, and is not a subject of this proceeding.N.N. is the father of C.S. and T.K., and he voluntarily terminated his parental rights to C.S. and T.K. K.L. is the father of M.S., and the trial court terminated his parental rights. K.L. does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Mother is a refugee from Burma and speaks a Karen dialect.

3.   Drug testing records were admitted at the fact-finding hearing and demonstrated that Mother tested positive for cocaine or its metabolites on the following dates: 8/24/21, 9/10/21, 9/15/21, 9/22/21, 9/23/21, 9/24/21, 9/27/21, 10/1/21, 10/4/21, 10/6/21, 10/8/21, 10/14/21, 10/15/21, 10/18/21, 2/1/22, 2/17/22, 2/21/22, 3/2/22, 3/9/22, 3/21/22, 4/11/22, 4/12/22, 5/2/22, 5/9/22, 5/23/22, 6/7/22, 6/22/22, 7/7/22, 8/1/22, 11/9/22, 1/31/23, 3/6/23, 3/13/23, 3/17/23, 3/20/23, 3/27/23, 5/5/23, 5/8/23, 6/21/23, 6/23/23, 6/26/23, 7/10/23, 7/12/23, 7/14/23, 7/17/23, 7/21/23, 7/31/23, 8/2/23, 8/7/23, 8/9/23, 8/14/23, 8/16/23, 8/28/23, 8/30/23, 9/1/23, 9/6/23, 9/13/23, 9/20/23, 9/24/23, 9/25/23, 10/16/23, 10/20/23, 11/13/23, 12/1/23, 12/8/23, 12/11/23, 2/2/24, 2/7/24, 2/19/24, 3/18/24, 3/27/24, 4/1/24, 4/5/24, 4/12/24, 4/15/24, 4/17/24, 4/19/24, 4/22/24, 4/26/24, 5/3/24, 5/10/24, 5/17/24, 5/20/24, 5/22/24, 6/7/24, 6/10/24, 6/17/24, 6/21/24, 6/24/24, 6/28/24.

4.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

5.   This statute was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petitions in July 2024. Accordingly, we apply the version of the statute in effect at that time.

6.   Mother also appears to argue that: (1) there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of Children; and (2) DCS failed to prove that Mother had been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the Children being placed outside Mother's home. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). DCS was only required to prove the existence of one of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(1). The trial court here, however, found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address Mother's other arguments.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur