DICKERSON v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Ryant Darrnell Dickerson appeals the trial court's order directing him to serve the remainder of his sentence in the Department of Correction (DOC) following the revocation of his placement in community corrections.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] On August 23, 2023, the State charged Dickerson with seven different offenses, including Level 2, Level 3, Level 4, Level 5, and Level 6 felonies. After the charges were filed, but before resolution of the case, the trial court ordered Dickerson to undergo three competency evaluations. Two of the three evaluations concluded that Dickerson was competent to stand trial.

[4] Thereafter, on February 27, 2025, Dickerson entered into a plea agreement, agreeing to plead guilty to Level 3 felony possession of cocaine and Level 4 felony unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious violent felon. The State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges and to not file a habitual offender enhancement. The plea agreement provided for a total sentence of six years, with two years executed in the DOC followed by two years in community corrections work release and then two years on home detention.

[5] Dickerson began work release on March 20, 2025. Two days later, the State filed a notice of community corrections violation alleging that Dickerson committed escape after he left work release on an approved pass but failed to return. The trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. Dickerson's whereabouts were unknown until June 2, 2025, when the arrest warrant was served.

[6] Two days later, Dickerson appeared for an initial hearing on the violation petition. At the start of the hearing, Dickerson told the court that he wanted to represent himself. As the trial court here tried to advise Dickerson of his rights, Dickerson repeatedly asked, “What if I don't wanna be in this movie no more?” and stated several times that “they been shooting at me at the work release.” Transcript Vol. II at 18. Because Dickerson was unresponsive to questions about whether he understood his rights, the court appointed a public defender to represent him and set a violation hearing for June 27, 2025.

[7] At the June 27 hearing, Dickerson informed the court that he wanted to resolve the case that day. After being advised of his rights, Dickerson admitted to the alleged violation.¹ The court then moved to the matter of the sanction to be imposed for the violation. Dickerson testified that he left work release for a dental appointment but went to his mother's house and “put my own self on work release” claiming he was being shot at and sexually abused at work release. Id. at 26. Thereafter, community corrections requested full revocation of his placement on work release and home detention; Dickerson asked to be given a second chance to comply with his sentence, arguing that he left work release “because he was in fear for his life.” Id. at 28. The trial court revoked Dickerson's placement in community corrections and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence at the DOC. Dickerson now appeals. Additional information will be provided below as needed.

Discussion & Decision

[8] A petition to revoke placement in a community corrections program is reviewed in the same manner as an appeal from revocation of probation. Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 549 (Ind. 1999). Indeed, both are alternatives to placement in the DOC and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. Million v. State, 646 N.E.2d 998, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections program. Rather, placement in either is “a matter of grace and not a right.” Johnson v. State, 62 N.E.3d 1224, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016); see State v. Vanderkolk, 32 N.E.3d 775, 777 (Ind. 2015) (“The similarities between the two programs have led to common treatment in appellate review of a trial court's decision to revoke either ․”).

[9] When a trial court finds a probationer has violated the conditions of his probation, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h). “We review a trial court's sentencing decision in a probation revocation proceeding for an abuse of discretion.” Puckett v. State, 956 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Abernathy v. State, 852 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court. Id.

[10] Dickerson challenges the trial court's order that he serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not adequately considering his mental state. Dickerson points out that his competency to understand legal proceedings and participate in his defense was questioned in the underlying criminal action. He also points out that during the violation proceedings he repeatedly stated that he was being shot at and sexually abused at work release and rambled about not wanting to be in a movie anymore. Dickerson asserts that, considering these circumstances, the trial court should have recognized that his compromised mental health was affecting his decision-making and either ordered a competency evaluation or explored alternatives to commitment to the DOC.

[11] We first address Dickerson's claim that the trial court should have ordered a competency evaluation. In Donald v. State, 930 N.E.2d 76, 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), this court held that a defendant has a due process right to a competency evaluation prior to a probation revocation hearing if it is warranted. Whether reasonable grounds exist for a competency evaluation is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Id.

[12] Evidence of Dickerson's mental state consisted of his comments during the initial violation hearing about being shot at and sexually abused at work release and his ramblings about being in a movie. While such comments may suggest some impairment of Dickerson's mental state, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in not finding that such rose to the level of warranting a competency evaluation prior to the revocation hearing. The trial court appointed counsel for Dickerson and then Dickerson appeared at the violation hearing, acknowledged that he understood his rights, and then admitted to the violation. Dickerson's counsel did not draw attention to Dickerson's mental state or argue that the trial court should take such into account. Furthermore, we note that when evaluated for the underlying criminal case, two of three evaluators found Dickerson to be competent, despite evidence of paranoia and Dickerson making statements similar to those he made during the current violation hearings. Thus, to the extent Dickerson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not ordering a competency evaluation, his argument fails.

[13] In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering that he serve the remainder of his sentence in the DOC, Dickerson directs us to Patterson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 220, 222-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). Dickerson, however, suggests an overbroad interpretation of Patterson. As we explained in Gaddis v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1227, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), under Patterson, consideration of a probationer's mental health is only required where: (1) the State alleges the probationer has violated probation by committing a new crime and (2) the probationer's mental health issues affect the probationer's degree of culpability with regard to that new crime. Here, Dickerson's alleged violation was not a new crime, but rather, a violation of the rules of work release. Under these circumstances, the court was not required to consider his mental health.²

[14] Here, Dickerson pled guilty to two of seven charged felony offenses. Seemingly in recognition of his mental health status, the plea agreement provided for a step-down type of sentence in that Dickerson was to serve two years in the DOC followed by two years in work release and then two years on home detention. However, within two days of starting the work release portion of his sentence, Dickerson violated the rules by absconding. Clearly, a less restrictive setting is not conducive to his rehabilitation. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Dickerson to serve the balance of his sentence in the DOC.

[15] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   It was also noted during the hearing, that between the time he absconded from work release and his June arrest in this case, Dickerson had acquired an outstanding warrant in one county and a pending case in another county.

2.   We also observe that while Dickerson's competency was questioned in the underlying proceedings, Dickerson was found to be competent by two of three competency evaluators.

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.