RAMSEY v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Brent Ramsey pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony, and was sentenced to 910 days, with 578 days suspended to probation. As part of his probation, Ramsey was ordered to participate in treatment at Unity House. Ramsey subsequently admitted to violating the terms of his probation by twice possessing an unauthorized cellphone and by displaying a disrespectful attitude toward Unity House staff. The trial court revoked 500 days of Ramsey's previously suspended sentence. Ramsey appeals and claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking 500 days of his previously suspended sentence. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Ramsey presents one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking 500 days of Ramsey's previously suspended sentence.

Facts

[3] On September 30, 2024, the State charged Ramsey with seven counts: Count I, possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony; Count II, possession of cocaine, a Level 6 felony; Count III, possession of marijuana with a prior conviction, a Class A misdemeanor; Count IV, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; Count V, possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor; Count VI, possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor; and Count VII, possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor.

[4] On February 3, 2025, the parties entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Ramsey pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine, a Level 6 felony. The State dismissed the remaining six counts, and the parties agreed to a sentence of 910 days, with 578 days suspended to probation. Among the conditions of probation, Ramsey was required to complete treatment at Unity House.

[5] Sometime before March 18, 2025, and shortly after Ramsey was placed on probation, Ramsey violated the rules of Unity House by sneaking a cellphone into the facility. After the first cellphone was confiscated by staff, Ramsey proceeded to sneak in another cellphone. Ramsey also displayed a disrespectful attitude toward the staff at Unity House. As a result, Ramsey was “removed from Unity House ․ due to failing to abide by rules.” Tr. Vol. II p. 4.

[6] On March 18, 2025, the State filed a notice of probation violation. The trial court held a hearing on the State's petition on March 19, 2025. Ramsey admitted to violating the terms of his probation. Crediting Ramsey for admitting the violations and taking responsibility, the trial court ordered him to serve 500 of the 578 days of his previously suspended sentence and listed the reason for revocation on the abstract of judgment as “Technical Violations: Non-Compliance with Court Ordered Programs.” App. Vol. II p. 64. Ramsey now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Ramsey argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve 500 days of his previously suspended sentence. We review a trial court's sanction for probation violations under the abuse of discretion standard. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances or when the trial court misinterprets the law. Id. “ ‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.’ ” Id. (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)).

[8] When a probation violation is alleged, the trial court engages in two functions. Id. “First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred.” Id. “Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id. Indiana Code Section 35-38-2-3(h) governs such sanctions and provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the [probationary] period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[9] “ ‘Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.’ ” Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied), reh'g denied, trans. denied. “While it is correct that probation may be revoked on evidence of violation of a single condition, the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation ․” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618. “ ‘[S]o long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing ․, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence.’ ” Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)), trans. denied.

[10] Here, Ramsey admitted that he sneaked two cellphones into Unity House and that he had a disrespectful attitude while he was there. Ramsey, however, argues that his violations were “technical in nature” and, thus, do not warrant the trial court's decision to order him to serve 500 days of his previously suspended sentence. Appellant's Br. p. 9. Ramsey relies on Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614 (Ind. 2013), and Brown v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), to argue that his technical violations cannot support the revocation of his previously suspended sentence. We find Ramsey's argument unpersuasive and, accordingly, disagree.

[11] Although the trial court labeled Ramsey's violation as “technical” in the abstract of judgment, this label does not mean that Ramsey's violations were not serious, that Ramsey's violations did not warrant the revocation of his probation, or that the imposition of a large part of his previously suspended sentence was unwarranted.¹ The label on the abstract of judgment as a “technical” violation merely means that the violation was not a new criminal offense.

[12] In Heaton, our Supreme Court found that the trial court erred as to one probation violation by applying an incorrect standard and remanded because the remaining three violations were “technical in nature.” 984 N.E.2d at 615. The Court remanded for the trial court to determine whether the probationer violated her probation based upon the remaining violations. In Brown, this Court determined that missing probation appointments was a “technical violation[ ]” that warranted a revocation but did not warrant the imposition of the probationer's more than sixteen-year previously suspended sentence. 162 N.E.2d at 1184. Neither Heaton nor Brown held that a technical violation cannot result in the imposition of a previously-suspended sentence. Rather, the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend on the severity of the violation, and the selection of that sanction is within the trial court's discretion. Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618; Brown, 162 N.E.3d at 1184.

[13] Here, Ramsey admitted that he violated Unity House rules. Ramsey characterizes his conduct as “technical in nature” in an effort to minimize its seriousness. Appellant's Br. p. 9. Ramsey, however, actively and deliberately smuggled two cellphones into Unity House in direct violation of its rules. He also displayed a disrespectful attitude toward the staff. Although Ramsey's violations may fall within the category of “technical violations” for purposes of the abstract of judgment, that classification does not render the violations insufficiently severe to warrant revocation of his probation.

[14] Ramsey entered into the plea agreement in exchange for the State's dismissal of six criminal charges on the condition that Ramsey comply with treatment at Unity House, but Ramsey failed to hold up his end of the bargain. See App. Vol. II pp. 38-42. Next, the no-cellphone rule that Ramsey admittedly violated is not merely an administrative requirement; rather, it serves the essential purpose of limiting access to illegal substances and supporting efforts to end substance-abuse behaviors. Allowing cellphones in rehabilitation facilities such as Unity House would provide individuals with a means to contact the outside world, including potential suppliers of illegal substances. Thus, although sneaking a cellphone into a rehabilitation facility may be categorized as “technical” for abstract-of-judgment purposes, that label does not diminish the seriousness of the violation, as Ramsey claims.

[15] Even in the case of a technical violation, the trial court has the discretion to determine the appropriate sanction based upon the seriousness of the offense. Given Ramsey's conduct, which impeded his rehabilitation, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Ramsey to serve 500 days of his previously suspended sentence.

Conclusion

[16] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Ramsey to serve 500 days of his previously suspended sentence. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's judgment.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The term “technical violations” is used in the abstract of judgment required by Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-31, which provides that:If a person convicted of a felony is committed to the department of correction by a court as a result of a violation of the terms of probation or other community placement, the court shall state in the abstract of judgment the specific reasons for revocation [of] probation, parole, or a community corrections placement has been revoked.(emphasis added). In the electronic system used to enter an abstract of judgment, the trial court must select one of three options as the reason for revocation: “Escape/Failure to Return,” “Technical Violations,” or “New Offense.” Indiana Office of Court Services, Trial Court Electronic Abstract of Judgment (rev. 2023), https://www.in.gov/courts/iocs/files/pubs-trial-court-electronic-abstract-of-judgment.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJC2-S9HN]. Here, the trial court selected option two, “Technical Violations.” App. Vol. II p. 64. Because the trial court is required to complete the abstract of judgment using these categories, the label does not reflect a determination regarding the seriousness of Ramsey's violations but merely places his behavior in the closest available category.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.