STIGGER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Adrian Stigger was convicted of molesting his ex-girlfriend's 11-year-old daughter I.G. At his jury trial, Stigger strongly implied several times that I.G. had been coached into disclosing the molestation. In response, the State introduced evidence that I.G. did not exhibit signs of having been coached. Stigger now appeals, raising one issue for our review: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence at trial.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Prior to March 2021, Stigger was in a relationship with L.G., I.G.’s mother. I.G. considered Stigger to be a father figure, so after Stigger and L.G. ended their relationship, Stigger continued to see I.G. with L.G.’s permission. At the time, I.G. was 11 years old. During one visit, Stigger picked up I.G., claiming he planned to take her out to eat and shoe shopping. Stigger instead took I.G. to his residence in Speedway, Indiana; while there, he took I.G. into a bedroom, touched I.G.’s breasts and vagina, inserted his fingers into I.G.’s vagina, had I.G. perform oral sex on him, and had sexual intercourse with I.G. twice.

[4] I.G. disclosed the abuse to her cousin, and L.G. learned about it sometime later. When L.G. confronted I.G. about the allegation, I.G. initially denied that anything happened between her and Stigger. The abuse was eventually reported to law enforcement, and I.G. participated in a forensic interview with Kelly Hunckler. The State charged Stigger with three counts of child molesting as Level 1 felonies ¹ and two counts of child molesting as Level 4 felonies ² .

[5] During Stigger's opening statement at his jury trial, he strongly implied that L.G. had induced I.G.’s disclosure as payback for Stigger cheating on her: “It is only after this mess that [I.G.] comes out and says anything happened at all between her and [Stigger].” Tr. Vol. II at 191. Stigger told the jury that they would “hear plenty of evidence of talking” between L.G. and I.G., asserting that these discussions “actually led to full-blown tampering with this investigation. And just flat-out made-up stories.” Id. at 192.

[6] During the presentation of evidence, Stigger continued to suggest that L.G. persuaded I.G. to accuse Stigger of molesting her. While cross-examining L.G., Stigger asked L.G. three times about her “hounding” I.G. to disclose to her what occurred with Stigger after I.G. initially denied the abuse multiple times. Tr. Vol. III at 80. Some of Stigger's questions along this vein included the following: (1) “You were hounding her for months, right,” id.; (2) “You told her it was literally killing you,” id. at 81; (3) “And you just needed to hear her say yes,” id.; (4) “And after you have this first conversation with Detective Pratt, you sit her down, right? ․ And you tell her ․ you and I need to be on the same page, right,” id.; and (5) “We need[ ] to figure out what we [are] going to say to the detective, right?” id. at 82.

[7] While cross-examining I.G., Stigger engaged in the following line of questioning:

Q: And [L.G.] tells you that we need to get on the same page, meaning you and her, right?

A: Yes.

Q: And she says, you need to tell me, right?

A: Yes.

Q: You need to tell me that you guys had sex, right?

A: Yes.

Q: And then you do, right?

A: Yes.

Tr. Vol. III at 170.

[8] After arguing Stigger opened the door “as to coaching,” the State sought permission from the trial court to ask Hunckler if, during her forensic interview with I.G., she observed any signs that I.G. had been coached. Tr. Vol. III at 121. Stigger objected, claiming, “It's not a coaching thing. It's a, hey, we planted ․ this idea in this child's brain and made it ․ become what it is. So, it's not coaching.” Id. at 186. The trial court allowed the State to ask whether Hunckler observed signs of I.G. being coached over Stigger's objection.

[9] During her testimony, Hunckler testified that I.G. did not exhibit signs of coaching during the forensic interview. The jury found Stigger guilty as charged. Stigger now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Certain Evidence at Trial

[10] Stigger claims that the trial court erred by admitting certain evidence at trial. We review rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Russell v. State, 234 N.E.3d 829, 858 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012)), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 424 (2024). “[W]e may affirm the trial court's decision on any basis supported by the record,” Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind. 2023) (citing Ramirez v. State, 174 N.E.3d 181, 190 n.2 (Ind. 2021)), and we will reverse “only where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances,” Russell, 234 N.E.3d at 858 (quoting Smith v. State, 754 N.E.2d 502, 504 (Ind. 2001)).

[11] Stigger argues that the trial court erred by allowing Hunckler to testify that I.G. did not exhibit signs of coaching during the forensic interview because such testimony constituted impermissible vouching testimony. Indiana Evidence Rule 704(b) prohibits witnesses from testifying, among other things, to opinions concerning “the truth or falsity of allegations.” In Sampson v. State, our Supreme Court held that Rule 704(b) bars an expert from testifying “that [a] child did or did not exhibit any ‘signs or indicators’ of coaching” because such testimony is essentially “testimony that the child witness is telling the truth.” 38 N.E.3d 985, 991–92 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis removed). Nevertheless, such vouching testimony is permitted “provided the defendant has opened the door to such testimony.” Id. at 992. “Opening the door refers to the principle that where one party introduces evidence of a particular fact, the opposing party is entitled to introduce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof, even though the rebuttal evidence otherwise would have been inadmissible.” Id. at 992 n.4 (citing Clark v. State, 915 N.E.2d 126, 130, 131 (Ind. 2009)). A party opens the door to otherwise impermissible testimony if he has left “the trier of fact ․ with a false or misleading impression of the facts.” Clark, 915 N.E.2d at 130.

[12] Here, while Stigger did not expressly use the word “coaching” when making his opening statement or when cross-examining witnesses, he implied it. In his opening statement, Stigger referred to “plenty of evidence of talking” between I.G. and L.G. that “led to full-blown tampering” with the case and “flat-out made-up stories.” Tr. Vol. II at 192. When cross-examining L.G., Stigger asked L.G. about “hounding [I.G.] for months,” Tr. Vol. III at 80, and how L.G. “just needed to hear [I.G.] say yes” that the abuse occurred, id. at 81. Stigger then implied through his cross-examination of I.G. that she only disclosed that Stigger molested her because L.G. told her that I.G. “need[ed] to tell [L.G.] that [I.G. and Stigger] had sex.” Id. at 170.

[13] Stigger contends that his opening statement and cross-examination of witnesses “raised questions about credibility, not about coaching” and that they did not arise to the “specialized forensic concept of coaching.” Appellant's Br. at 10. In making this argument, Stigger points to portions of Hunckler's testimony wherein she describes the difference between influence and coaching. For instance, Stigger quotes Hunckler as saying that coaching is deliberate, like “when someone is telling someone—or telling that child not to talk about something.” Appellant's Br. at 9 (quoting Tr. Vol. III at 190). On the other hand, influence is unintentional and can come from “things they've seen online or conversations that they've ․ heard.” Id. Hunckler testified on cross-examination that coaching occurs when a person has “been instructed on what to say.” Tr. Vol. III at 207. Stigger's argument at trial was that L.G improperly elicited I.G.’s disclosure and testimony by pressuring her to falsely say that I.G. and Stigger had sex. Even though Stigger did not use the word “coaching” while making this argument, what he did say amounted to, if not an express claim of coaching, certainly a heavy implication thereof. This argument left the jury with a “false or misleading impression,” see Clark, 915 N.E.2d at 130, that I.G. was coached. Stigger therefore opened the door to the State asking its expert witness whether I.G. had exhibited any signs of coaching. Thus, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Hunckler's expert testimony. We therefore affirm Stigger's conviction.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.