TURNER v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Ryan Turner pled guilty to rape, sexual misconduct with a minor, and strangulation. In the plea agreement, Turner waived his right to appellate review of his sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B). After Turner was sentenced, he filed a motion to withdraw the plea agreement, which the trial court denied. Turner now appeals, raising three issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by denying Turner's motion to withdraw the plea agreement;

2. Whether Turner has waived his argument that his convictions for rape and sexual misconduct with a minor violate Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy; and

3. Whether Turner has waived his argument that his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B).

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On November 14, 2023, Turner and the State entered into a plea agreement whereby Turner pled guilty to rape as a Level 3 felony, sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony, and strangulation as a Level 6 felony. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss additional charges pending against Turner. The plea agreement provided that Turner “knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to ․ have appellate review of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7B.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 16. On January 4, 2024, the trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Turner to an aggregate sentence of 30.5 years in prison, with 2.5 of those years suspended to probation.

[4] More than a year later, on March 11, 2025, Turner filed an unverified motion to withdraw the plea agreement. Turner argued that his plea agreement was not “knowingly, intelligently, and/or voluntarily made” because he was “never advised that his conviction for [rape] carried with it an automatic [sexually violent predator] designation[,] which mandated a term of lifetime parole.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 18. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal ensued.¹

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Turner's Motion to Withdraw the Plea Agreement

[5] Turner first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to withdraw the plea agreement. Turner argues that the plea agreement was not knowingly and voluntarily made because he was not advised that a rape conviction would render him a sexually violent predator and subject to lifetime parole upon completion of his prison sentence.²

[6] The withdrawal of a guilty plea after imposition of a defendant's sentence is governed by Indiana Code section 35-35-1-4(c). This statute provides that withdrawal of the plea agreement is “not ․ a matter of right.” Id. However, “upon motion of the convicted person, the court shall vacate the judgment and allow the withdrawal [of the plea agreement] whenever the convicted person proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” Id.

[7] A properly made post-sentencing motion to withdraw a guilty plea “shall be treated by the court as a petition for postconviction relief under the Indiana Rules of Procedure for Postconviction Remedies.” I.C. 35-35-1-4(c). The motion must be “written and verified.” See Kinman v. State, 152 N.E.3d 160, 160–61 (Ind. 2020) (citing Ind. Code § 35-35-1-4(b)); see also P.C.R. 1(2) (providing that petitions for post-conviction relief must be “verified”).

[8] In Marshall v. State, a panel of this court held that the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's pre-sentencing motion to withdraw his guilty plea because the motion was not verified. 590 N.E.2d 627, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. Here, because Turner's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was likewise unverified, the trial court did not err by dismissing the motion.

2. Turner Has Waived His Argument That His Convictions for Rape and Sexual Misconduct with a Minor Violate Indiana's Protection Against Substantive Double Jeopardy

[9] Turner next argues his convictions for rape as a Level 3 felony and sexual misconduct with a minor as a Level 4 felony are contrary to Indiana's protections against double jeopardy. First, this issue is waived because Turner did not file his notice of appeal until more than thirty days after his convictions and sentence were entered. See App. R. 9(A)(1). The appeal is therefore “forfeited.” Id. 9(A)(5). Turner does not point out any “extraordinarily compelling reasons why this forfeited right should be restored.” In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 971 (Ind. 2014).

[10] Moreover, Turner pled guilty to the rape and sexual misconduct with a minor offenses. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that “[d]efendants who plead guilty to achieve favorable outcomes give up a plethora of substantive claims and procedural rights,” including “challenges to convictions that would otherwise constitute double jeopardy.” Crider v. State, 984 N.E.2d 618, 623 (Ind. 2013) (citing Lee v. State, 816 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. 2004)); see also Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1134–35 (Ind. 2001) (holding defendant waived double jeopardy claim by pleading guilty to the offenses).

[11] There are “legitimate reasons for this proposition.” Crider, 984 N.E.2d at 623. First, “[b]ecause plea agreements are contracts, contract law principles generally apply.” Anderson, ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2025 WL 3170636, *5 (Ind. 2025) (citing Davis v. State, 217 N.E.3d 1229, 1232 (Ind. 2023)). “[A] defendant with adequate counsel who enters a plea agreement to achieve an advantageous position must keep the bargain.” Games, 743 N.E.2d at 1135 (citing Lutes v. State, 401 N.E2d 671, 674 (Ind. 1980)). A defendant therefore generally cannot challenge convictions to which he or she has freely agreed. Id. Second, double jeopardy claims involve “factual” disputes. Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Ind. 2002). An appellate court is unequipped to resolve such disputes absent an evidentiary record, which a plea agreement obviates by definition. See id.

[12] Here, because Turner pled guilty to rape and sexual misconduct with a minor, he cannot now challenge his convictions thereon on double jeopardy grounds. Turner's double jeopardy claim is therefore waived. See Games, 743 N.E.2d at 1132.

3. Turner Has Waived His Argument That His Sentence Is Inappropriate Under Appellate Rule 7(B)

[13] Last, Turner argues his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B) and should be revised. This issue is waived because, as discussed above, Turner did not appeal his sentence within thirty days of its imposition. Moreover, it is well-settled that a defendant waives appellate review of his or her sentence under Rule 7(B) when the defendant's plea agreement provides an “unambiguous” waiver of such right and the defendant is sentenced “within the terms of the plea agreement.” Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1232 (citing Creech v. State, 887 N.E.2d 73, 74–75 (Ind. 2008)).

[14] Here, Turner's plea agreement provided that, “by pleading guilty under this agreement, [Turner] knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily ․ waives his right to have appellate review of his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7B.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 16. This waiver is unambiguous. Turner's challenge to his sentence under Appellate Rule 7(B) is thus waived. See Davis, 217 N.E.3d at 1232–33.

Conclusion

[15] The trial court did not err by denying Turner's motion to withdraw the plea agreement, Turner's double jeopardy claim is waived, and Turner's Appellate Rule 7(B) claim is also waived. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues presented.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Turner appeals pro se. We note that pro se litigants are “ ‘held to the same standards as a trained attorney’ and ‘afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 410 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)).

2.   Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.5(b)(1)(A) provides that a person who commits rape is, subject to certain statutory exceptions, classified as a “sexually violent predator.” Indiana Code section 35-50-6-1(e)(1) provides that, when a person who is classified as a sexually violent predator “completes the person's fixed term of imprisonment, less credit time earned with respect to that term, the person shall be placed on parole for the remainder of the person's life.”

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.