LANDES v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Julie Ann Landes was convicted of Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as a habitual traffic violator (HTV). She appeals, asserting that the trial court erred when it refused her request to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity.

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] In October 2023, Landes lived in Lafayette, and her twenty-year-old daughter Jenna Kelter lived with her boyfriend, Ryan, in a residence in Battle Ground, located on the outskirts of Lafayette. On the evening of October 28, Jenna and Ryan went to a party at a friend's house, located one or two miles from them in a rural area. Both of them became intoxicated.

[4] Jenna called Landes around 1:00 a.m. and asked Landes to pick her up because she and Ryan had had a disagreement. Landes, who had a suspended license, waited thirty to forty-five minutes, “hoping they resolved it,” but then loaded up bags of items that she wanted to give to Jenna, drove to the party, and picked up Jenna.¹ Transcript at 128. Landes then drove back to Jenna's residence, where she and Jenna got into an argument.

[5] Jenna called 911 around 2:50 a.m. and told the dispatcher that Landes was damaging property at her house and would not leave. Tippecanoe Sheriff's Department Detective Conner LeFever responded, and while driving to Jenna's home, learned from dispatch that Landes was an HTV, which he confirmed through a BMV records search. After Detective LeFever arrived at Jenna's residence, Landes shared with him that she had driven Jenna home from a party. Jenna also told Detective LeFever that Landes had driven her home. Detective LeFever placed Landes under arrest for driving as an HTV, after which Landes denied driving that night.

[6] On December 5, 2023, the State charged Landes with Level 6 felony operating a vehicle as an HTV. A jury trial was held in March 2025. After jury selection, the trial court confirmed the parties’ agreement with the preliminary instructions and then noted that Landes “has submitted a proposed order, we have to see where the evidence takes us on the defense of necessity, and we'll deal with that during the course of trial.” Id. at 55.

[7] Detective LeFever testified consistent with the above, and his body camera footage at the residence was admitted into evidence. During his testimony, Landes's BMV records were also admitted, showing that she was an HTV and that her license was under a ten-year suspension through April 2027.

[8] Landes testified and acknowledged driving to the party for Jenna and then back to Jenna's residence. She also admitted to being an HTV and to being aware of her status and suspended license. She explained that she picked up Jenna because she was concerned Jenna would try to walk home, which was unsafe at that time and location, or that Ryan, who was intoxicated, would drive her. Landes testified that she called Jenna's father but could not reach him. Landes also stated that she offered to pay for a ride service, but Jenna told her that drivers would not come out to the location of the party. The trial court asked Landes about the alternative of ordering an Uber to her own house, and taking it to the party, getting Jenna, and riding back together, and she replied that she would not have been able to afford that. Ryan and Jenna each testified that ride service was not available to get them from the party, either because of the location and/or the time of night.

[9] After the presentation of evidence and outside the jury's presence, the trial court advised counsel that they needed to address “the possibility ․ of [a] necessity defense[.]” Id. at 136. The State objected to the inclusion of a necessity instruction, arguing that Landes had not presented adequate evidence “to get that to the jury,” while Landes maintained that it was the jury's role to make the determination of “whether she fits within that defense.” Id. Finding that Landes had not shown either the existence of an emergency or the absence of adequate alternatives, the court declined to provide the jury with an instruction on the defense of necessity.

[10] The State urged in closing argument that the facts of this case were very “cut and dry” and established that Landes drove as an HTV and violated the statute. Id. at 150. Landes's counsel argued that Landes drove because “her daughter's safety and wellbeing was at risk and this was an emergency, at least ․ in their eyes” and that her conduct that night was “justified.” Id. at 149. The jury found Landes guilty as charged.

[11] On April 9, 2025, the trial court sentenced Landes to an aggregate sentence of two years, with one year suspended and one year executed in community corrections. The court also imposed a one-year license suspension to run consecutively with the current HTV suspension. Landes now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[12] Landes argues that the trial court erroneously denied her request for a final jury instruction on the defense of necessity. It is unclear as to whether Landes tendered a proposed necessity instruction in writing. Indeed, Landes's counsel acknowledges that he “is unable to locate a specific instruction tendered by [trial] counsel ․ regarding the necessity defense.” Appellant's Brief at 12. Regardless, the record is clear that the trial court was aware of Landes's desire for a necessity defense instruction, addressing the matter both before trial and after the presentation of evidence. While the record lacks the precise content of any proposed instruction, the issue was not the propriety of her proposed language; it was whether the evidence supported giving an instruction on that defense. On this record, we decline the State's invitation to find that Landes waived her claim of instructional error.

[13] Turning to the merits, Landes maintains that she was entitled to a necessity instruction because she presented evidence that her intoxicated adult daughter was “stranded at a remote party ․ and had no practical transportation options,” the situation was “an emergency posing potential harm” to Jenna, and Landes acted out of necessity when she drove to the party to get her. Id. at 8. The trial court determined that the evidence did not support giving a necessity instruction, and we agree.

[14] Jury instruction is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Rochefort v. State, 177 N.E.3d 113, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. A trial court enjoys broad discretion in the decision to instruct the jury, and the decision will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Patton v. State, 760 N.E.2d 672, 674 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).

[15] A criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on any theory or defense which has some foundation in the evidence as long as the evidence has some probative value to support it. Hernandez v. State, 45 N.E.3d 373, 376 (Ind. 2015). That is, a trial court may refuse a jury instruction only when none of the facts in the record would support the legal theory offered in the instruction. McBride v. State, 261 N.E.3d 274, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). Our courts have recognized that the defense of necessity may apply where

(1) the act charged as criminal was the result of an emergency and was done to prevent a significant harm;

(2) there was no adequate alternative to the commission of the act;

(3) the harm caused by the act was not disproportionate to the harm avoided;

(4) the Defendant had a good-faith belief that his/her act was necessary to prevent greater harm;

(5) the Defendant's belief was objectively reasonable under all the circumstances of the case; and

(6) the Defendant did not substantially contribute to the creation of the emergency.

Rochefort, 177 N.E.3d at 120. “These six factors must be present in order to establish a necessity defense.” Hernandez, 45 N.E.3d at 377. To be entitled to a necessity instruction, Landes was required to present some evidence supporting each of the factors. See McBride, 261 N.E.3d at 280 (recognizing that defendant seeking instruction needs to produce some evidence, even a scintilla, “of each element of the underlying claim or defense”). She did not do so.

[16] First, the evidence did not show that Landes drove her vehicle “as a result of an emergency” and “to prevent significant harm.” Our court has explained that, for the defense of necessity to apply, the defendant must be faced with “a true emergency, meaning a situation which is then occurring in his presence and requires an immediate response.” Rochefort, 177 N.E.3d at 121. Here, Landes was not faced with a situation that required an immediate response. Jenna was twenty years old on the date of the incident, living on her own, and chose to attend a party with her boyfriend. There was no evidence that she was in any immediate danger at the party. Indeed, as the State points out, Landes's actions do not reflect someone facing a true emergency as she waited thirty to forty-five minutes to leave her house. While Landes testified that Jenna sounded very upset on the phone and wanted to leave and that Landes was afraid that she would try to walk home or get a ride from her intoxicated boyfriend, there was no evidence presented that Jenna intended to do either of those things. We agree with the State that the situation “was, at most, a possible emergency,” and not one that required an immediate response. Appellee's Brief at 11.

[17] Second, as the trial court found, there were adequate alternatives to Landes driving as an HTV to retrieve her daughter. As mentioned, Jenna was an adult who chose to attend a party where she became intoxicated. Ryan testified that he was always welcome to stay overnight at his friend's house and felt safe there. There was no evidence that Jenna could not have stayed the night at the house.² Nor was there any evidence that Jenna asked anyone else at the party for a ride home. We further observe that, while Landes testified that she attempted to arrange ride services, her testimony was inconsistent. At one point, Landes testified that she told Jenna that she would pay for an Uber but later told the trial court that she could not afford one and testified she “couldn't figure out” how to order one to Jenna's location. Transcript at 122. The record thus shows multiple alternatives existed that did not require Landes to commit a felony by driving with a suspended license.

[18] Third, we agree with the State that Landes did not have an objectively reasonable belief that she had to drive to pick up her daughter to prevent greater harm. That is, even if Landes subjectively feared that her daughter would request her intoxicated boyfriend to drive her home or would walk alone on a highway from a remote area, “that fear was based purely on speculation” as there was no evidence that Jenna told Landes that she intended to do those things. Appellee's Brief at 12.

[19] On this record, the evidence did not support giving a necessity instruction and, accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to do so. See e.g., Rochefort, 177 N.E.3d at 122 (trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting proposed necessity instruction, where defendant claimed that his escape from work release was necessary in part because he had no way back to work release after attending outside appointment, but there was no evidence presented that defendant was in immediate danger).

[20] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ryan remained at the party and spent the night there.

2.   As persuasive authority, we note that, if Jenna in fact did not feel safe there, calling the police was an option. See e.g., Smith v. State, No. 23A-CR-692, at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2023) (mem.) (defendant who drove while a HTV to pick up a friend, whose boyfriend had thrown her out of his car onto a rural road, was not entitled to necessity instruction as calling the police for assistance was an adequate alternative to defendant driving the friend).

Altice, Chief Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.