SHELTON v. BLATCHLEY (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Diana Shelton, Garry Shelton, and Rachelle Shelton (collectively, “Maternal Relatives”) appeal the trial court's orders dismissing their petitions for guardianship over minor children Z.B. and A.B. (collectively, “the Children”) and enforcing an order issued by the State of Oklahoma that granted David Blatchley (“Father”) immediate physical custody of the Children. Maternal Relatives raise three issues for our review, but we find the following issue to be dispositive: whether the trial court erred when it determined that Oklahoma had jurisdiction without allowing Maternal Relatives the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments on that question. We reverse and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Father and Chanelle Blatchley (“Mother”) married on June 11, 2011, and the Children were born during the marriage. Father and Mother were married in Indiana, but they subsequently moved to Oklahoma. Maternal Relatives are Mother's parents and sister who reside in Indiana. At some point, Mother was diagnosed with cancer.

[3] On October 27, 2023, Mother filed a petition for a protective order against Father in Oklahoma. Mother alleged that she had been hospitalized on October 18 and that, upon her admission, Father “began altering medication orders, messing with the medical equipment, and interfe[ring] with the agreed upon testing.” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 39. Mother also alleged that hospital staff had observed Father “exhibiting psychotic behavior” and that he had caused her “extensive distress” such that hospital staff removed him from the hospital. Id. And Mother reported that Father had been observed with “guns strapped to him[.]” Id. at 44. The Oklahoma court issued an emergency protective order as to Mother and the Children. In November, upon Mother's release from the hospital, she moved with the Children from Oklahoma to Indiana and placed the Children in the care of Maternal Relatives.

[4] On November 3, Garry and Diana filed a petition in the Oklahoma court seeking a temporary guardianship over the Children. On November 6, the Oklahoma court issued an order appointing Garry and Diana as temporary guardians based on the “incapacity of the mother” and the “erratic behavior of the father.” Id. at 80. Then, on January 30, 2024, Mother filed a petition in the Oklahoma court to dissolve her marriage to Father.

[5] Following an evidentiary hearing on May 16 on the pending dissolution, temporary guardianship, and protective order cases, the Oklahoma court issued a temporary order. In that order, the court found that the temporary guardianship had been “voluntarily dismissed” and awarded temporary physical custody of the Children to Mother, with Father having one week of visitation per month. Id. at 47. And the court ordered Father to attend a batterer's intervention program. The court also ordered the protective order to “remain in full force and effect” except it allowed for email communication to schedule Father's visits with the Children. Id. at 48. Then, on November 1, the Oklahoma court entered an order modifying the temporary order. The court again ordered Father to immediately enroll in the batterer's intervention program and suspended his visitation until he completed the intake and five weeks of treatment.

[6] On March 3, 2025, Maternal Relatives filed petitions in the Shelby Circuit Court (“the trial court”) seeking to be appointed temporary guardians over the Children. In the petitions, Maternal Relatives alleged that Mother had been hospitalized with a terminal cancer diagnosis and that there is “an active protective order” against Father. Id. at 34.¹ The trial court scheduled a hearing for March 25. On March 6, Maternal Relatives moved to expedite the hearing due to the severity of Mother's condition and the protective order against Father. The trial court denied the motion on March 11.

[7] Maternal Relatives then filed a notice informing the trial court that Mother had died on March 8, that the dissolution proceeding in Oklahoma had ended upon her passing, and that Indiana was now the home state of the Children under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”) since the Children had been living in Indiana since November 2023. Maternal Relatives also asserted that Father had failed to take the batterer's intervention program as ordered by the Oklahoma court and again asked to be named the Children's guardians.

[8] On March 31, the Oklahoma court issued an amended Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Assistance ordering Maternal Relatives to deliver the Children to Father. On May 8, Father filed his responses to Maternal Relatives’ motion for guardianship in the trial court and asked the court to dismiss the pending matters. In that response, Father asserted that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over the Children and that he was the Children's lawful legal guardian following Mother's death. In support, Father attached the Oklahoma writ. Following the receipt of Father's response, the court converted a previously scheduled guardianship hearing into an attorney conference to address the matter of jurisdiction.

[9] The next day, Father initiated a new proceeding in the trial court and filed a petition to patriate the writ that the Oklahoma court had issued. Father again asserted that Oklahoma “is the home state in which custody was litigated” and that, pursuant to the Oklahoma order, he was the lawful custodian of the Children. Id. at 167. Father further alleged that he had unsuccessfully attempted to recover the Children with the Oklahoma writ and, as such, he asked the trial court to instruct law enforcement officers to help him retrieve the Children. Father again attached the Writ of Habeas Corpus and Writ of Assistance that had been issued by the Oklahoma court.

[10] Maternal Relatives filed a reply in the Indiana guardianship cases and asserted that Oklahoma was not the proper home state for the Children because “no final hearing nor a decree of dissolution of marriage had been entered” and that the dissolution action had terminated “immediately” upon Mother's death. Id. at 180. As such, they contended that Oklahoma had “no continuing jurisdiction at this time.” Id. at 182. Maternal Relatives also asserted that, in the alternative, Indiana could “exercise emergency jurisdiction” under the UCCJA. Id. The trial court, by way of a minute entry in the CCS, consolidated the guardianship cases with the petition to patriate so that all three cases could be heard at a previously scheduled hearing. However, that hearing never occurred.

[11] On May 16, the trial court held a UCCJA teleconference with the judge in the Oklahoma cases. After that conference, the trial court made a notation in the CCS that “it was determined by both judges” that Oklahoma “is the proper jurisdiction regarding” the Children. Id. at 227. On May 21, the court dismissed Maternal Relatives’ guardianship petitions. The court then set a hearing on Father's petition to patriate the Oklahoma order for June 10.

[12] On June 9, Maternal Relatives filed an emergency motion to stay the May 21 dismissal pending appeal. In support, Maternal Relatives asserted that enforcing the Oklahoma orders would place the Children “in peril” and that the UCCJA's “emergency exception for domestic violence was designed for situations like this[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. 3 at 34-35. They maintained that, “[g]iven the verified allegations of abuse” by Father toward the Children, the trial court “was required to allow [them] to present evidence and argument to support their claim that Indiana has proper jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 35. The same day, Maternal Relatives filed an emergency petition for temporary custody and argued that “immediate action” was necessary “to prevent serious harm to the Children.” Id. at 55. In support, Maternal Relatives attached numerous documents, including Mother's medical records that outlined Father's behavior while Mother was hospitalized, the petition for the protective order, the protective order, a letter from the Children's school discussing their improvements, a letter from the Children's counselor, and a letter from the Children's healthcare provider.

[13] The court held a hearing on Father's petition on June 10. During the hearing, the parties mostly presented oral argument on the question of jurisdiction. However, Father testified briefly in order to “clarify” his arguments. Tr. Vol. 2 at 14. In particular, Father testified that he resided in Oklahoma, that the Children had been residents of Oklahoma prior to Mother relocating, that a dissolution proceeding was pending in Oklahoma prior to Mother's death, and that the Oklahoma court had issued the writ stating that he is to “receive” his children. Id. Maternal Relatives cross-examined Father and asked about his last contact with the Children and his attempts to retrieve the Children from Maternal Relatives. Maternal Relatives then attempted to ask about the Oklahoma court's order that he participate in a batterer's intervention program, but Father objected on relevance grounds. Maternal Relatives argued for the “opportunity to put on evidence on [their] emergency petition[.]” Id. at 18. And Maternal Relatives asked the court to continue the hearing so that they could present evidence. The court took the matters under advisement, informed the parties that it was “just going to have to research” the issues, and concluded the hearing. Id. at 22.

[14] On June 20, the trial court issued an order in which it found that the Oklahoma court had “heard cases dealing with these children and parties since 2023,” including a protective order, a guardianship, and the dissolution action, and that, under the dissolution action, the judge had “ordered the children to be returned to the Father[.]” Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 28. The court also found that it had “repeatedly declined” to find that an emergency exists because the allegations against Father “date back to 2023 and largely involve incidents with Mother and not the minor children.” Id. at 29. The court then “register[ed]” the Oklahoma orders and concluded that Father was entitled to immediate physical custody of the Children. Id. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Maternal Relatives contend that the trial court erred when it dismissed their guardianship petitions and patriated the Oklahoma custody order based on its determination that it lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA. The UCCJA, which is codified at Indiana Code Article 31-21, governs situations where an interstate custody determination is at issue. Gard-Holm v. Holm, 258 N.E.3d 289, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Indiana adopted the UCCJA “to address important considerations, including: avoiding competition and conflict among courts of different jurisdictions in matters of child custody; promoting interstate cooperation in rendering custody decrees; and deterring abductions and other unilateral removals of children undertaken to obtain custody awards.” Novatny v. Novatny, 872 N.E.2d 673, 678 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). It provides a procedural framework to avoid having courts from different states or countries issuing contradictory child custody orders. Matter of A.R., 110 N.E.3d 387, 398 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).

[16] On appeal, Maternal Relatives raise several issues related to the court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction. However, we find one issue to be dispositive, namely, whether the court erred when it made its decision regarding jurisdiction without complying with certain procedural provisions of the UCCJA. In particular, Maternal Relatives contend that the court erred when it made a determination on jurisdiction without allowing them to participate in the hearing with the Oklahoma court or otherwise present facts or legal arguments and without making a record of the communication. We must agree.

[17] The UCCJA outlines specific procedures an Indiana court must take in circumstances where multiple states could exert jurisdiction over a child. Specifically, when an Indiana court becomes aware of a child custody proceeding in another state, Indiana Code Section 31-21-4-1 allows the Indiana court to “communicate with a court in another state concerning a proceeding arising under” the UCCJA. The court “may allow the parties to participate in the communication.” Ind. Code § 31-21-4-2. However, if the parties are not able to participate in the communication, “the parties must be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made.” Id. In addition, a “record must be made” of the communication and the parties must be “promptly informed” of the communication and “granted access” to the record. I.C. § 31-21-4-4.

[18] Here, the trial court held a teleconference with the Oklahoma court as permitted by statute. However, as Maternal Relatives point out, “[n]either party received advance notice, a copy of the agenda, or the statutory opportunity to participate” in the teleconference. Appellants’ Br. at 41. Rather, on May 21, the court simply made a notation in the CCS to state that it had “held a UCCJA teleconference” with the Oklahoma court on May 16 and that, after the hearing, “it was determined by both judges” that Oklahoma was the proper jurisdiction. Appellants’ App. Vol. 2 at 227. Nothing about that entry indicates that Maternal Relatives were notified of the hearing in advance or afforded any opportunity to participate in that hearing, that a recording of the communication was made, or that the parties were granted access to that record. And we reject Father's contrary arguments that a CCS entry was sufficient to provide notice to the parties or to “memorialize[ ] the outcome” of the conference.² Appellee's Br. at 23.

[19] Further, the record does not provide any indication that Maternal Relatives were given an opportunity to present facts and legal arguments “before a decision on jurisdiction” was made. I.C. § 31-21-4-2 (emphasis added). On the contrary, after the court held the UCCJA teleconference with the Oklahoma court, the trial court simply made an entry saying that Oklahoma was the proper jurisdiction and then dismissed the guardianship petitions. And while the court held a hearing on June 10 on Father's petition to patriate the Oklahoma writ, that hearing consisted mostly of oral argument by the attorneys. Father presented brief testimony related to his residence to support his argument that Oklahoma was the proper jurisdiction. But despite requests by Maternal Relatives to present evidence, the court did not allow it.

[20] Contrary to Father's arguments, the court did not comply with the procedural requirements of the UCCJA. Rather, the court failed to comply with the UCCJA's requirements to allow the parties to participate in the teleconference between the trial court and the Oklahoma court, to allow the parties the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision is made, or to have access to a record of the communication. This was reversible error. See Harris v. Harris, 922 N.E.2d 626, 640 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (finding reversible error where the trial court did not afford the husband an opportunity to present facts or arguments on the question of jurisdiction).

[21] It was especially important for the trial court here to follow the requirements of the UCCJA and allow Maternal Relatives the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments since Maternal Relatives repeatedly alleged that the Children had been harmed by Father, that they had improved in multiple aspects since leaving Oklahoma, and that communication or continued contact between Father and the Children “would severely harm the Children's psychological well-being.” Appellants’ Br. at 35.³

[22] Based on the errors, we reverse the court's orders dismissing the guardianship petitions and patriating the Oklahoma custody order ⁴ and remand with instructions for the court to reinstate Maternal Relatives’ guardianship petition, make a determination regarding temporary guardianship, hold a conference pursuant to the UCCJA with the Oklahoma court on the record regarding jurisdiction and either allow the parties to participate or provide a copy of the record to the parties, and allow the parties to present facts and evidence ⁵ prior to making a decision on jurisdiction.

[23] Reversed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Maternal Relatives filed separate motions for each of the Children, but the motions contained identical language.

2.   A record of communications may include “notes or transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum or an electronic record made by a court after the communication.” Harris v. Harris, 922 N.E.2d 626, 641 n.12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

3.   Even if Indiana does not have home-state jurisdiction under the UCCJA, it can assume temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in Indiana and has been abandoned or it is necessary to protect the child because the child is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. See Ind. Code § 31-21-5-4(a).

4.   Father briefly asserts that Maternal Relatives lacked standing to challenge the Oklahoma writs because they are not persons acting as parents under the UCCJA. However, the relevant question presented here is not whether Maternal Relatives had standing to challenge those orders. Rather, the relevant question is whether the trial court followed the proper procedure under the UCCJA when it was faced with a guardianship petition filed by Maternal Relatives while a competing custody order had been issued by another state. Whether or not Maternal Relatives could challenge the Oklahoma order, there is no dispute that they had standing to file the guardianship petitions in Indiana, which are the petitions that invoked the UCCJA and required the trial court to follow the procedural mandates prior to determining which court had jurisdiction.

5.   Father asked this Court to supplement the record with a copy of a transcript from one hearing that took place in Oklahoma. Maternal Relatives asked us to deny the motion or, in the alternative, to consider the transcripts from all of the hearings that took place in Oklahoma. Maternal Relatives submitted the transcripts in their supplemental appendices. In a separate order, we denied Father's motion and struck Maternal Relatives’ supplemental appendices because those transcripts had not been presented to our trial court for review. Should the parties want to present those transcripts to the trial court on remand, it will be for the trial court to consider the admissibility and weight of those documents.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.