DAVIS v. REAGLE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Terry Davis, an inmate at the Pendleton Correctional Facility (the “Prison”), was awarded a judgment against a prison officer, and Davis requested that the proceeds be sent to a residence in Indianapolis. Instead, the proceeds were sent to the Prison, where the funds were applied to Davis's prison trust account. Davis's prison trust account had a negative balance, so the proceeds were used to reduce the negative balance. Davis then sued the warden and other Prison staff (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging that they unlawfully converted his judgment. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings, which the trial court granted. Davis challenges this ruling, raising two issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion; and

2. Whether the trial court's ruling violated the Open Courts clause of the Indiana Constitution.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Davis is an inmate at the Prison. In January 2014, Davis was involved in a physical altercation with prison officers. The Prison filed a disciplinary report against Davis and assessed more than $44,000 as restitution for the officers’ injuries. Davis later sued the officers in federal court for use of excessive force, and the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana awarded Davis a $35,000 judgment against one of the officers.¹

[4] After the judgment was awarded, Davis filed a motion requesting the judgment proceeds be sent to a residence in Indianapolis and “not deposit[ed] ․ into his prison trust account.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 69. The funds, however, were deposited into Davis's prison trust account and then withdrawn by the Prison to be paid toward the restitution assessed by the Prison.

[5] After Davis learned that the judgment had been applied toward his prison balance, he filed a motion in the federal court to “amend the judgment and vacate the restitution charges, and award him an additional $35,000.00 in damages.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 70. In August 2021, the federal court denied that motion on the grounds that (1) pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “compensatory damages awarded to a prisoner must be paid directly to satisfy any outstanding restitution orders pending against the prisoner before the plaintiff receives the balance”;² and (2) the restitution assessed by the Prison “was not at issue in th[e] lawsuit”³ . Id.

[6] In June 2023, Davis filed his complaint in the instant case. Davis alleged that, when the judgment proceeds arrived at the Prison, mailroom officer Chambers ⁴ “signed for it,” and the Prison “unlawfully converted the $35000 judgment” by applying it toward the restitution assessed by the Prison. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 12. Davis also alleged that prison staff “signed his name to a W-9 form without his consent.” Id. at 13.

[7] After filing an answer, Defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, in which they asserted four arguments: (1) Davis's claim was barred because he failed to provide sufficient notice pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act; (2) Defendants were immune under the Indiana Tort Claims Act because prison staff “act[ed] within the scope of their employment,” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 36; (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act required that the judgment be applied to Davis's outstanding restitution assessment; and (4) Davis failed to state a claim for tortious conversion because he did not allege that any Defendant “appropriated [Davis's] personal property for their own use and benefit,” id. at 38. Defendants attached to this motion an affidavit from the Director of Investigations of the Office of the Indiana Attorney General, stating that the Attorney General's Office had not received any notice of tort claim regarding conversion of Davis's judgment proceeds. On March 11, 2025, the trial court granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed Davis's complaint. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

1. The Trial Court Did Not Err by Granting Defendants’ Motion

[8] Davis argues that the trial court erred by granting Defendants’ motion and dismissing his complaint. We first explain that Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings converted into a summary judgment motion, which required Defendants to show the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. We then explain that, because Davis fails to address any of Defendants’ legal arguments raised in their motion, his challenge to the trial court's ruling is waived. We conclude by explaining that, waiver notwithstanding, Davis's claim is barred because he did not provide sufficient notice pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act.

[9] Beginning with the proper classification of Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings, Davis argues that this motion should have been treated as a motion for summary judgment because Defendants designated evidence in support of the motion. Trial Rule 12(C) provides that, “[i]f, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56.” “A trial court converts a Rule 12 motion to a motion for summary judgment ‘by its consideration of extraneous matters’ regardless of whether the court converts the motion to one for summary judgment expressly.” Davidson v. State, 211 N.E.3d 914, 925 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Milestone Contractors, L.P. v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 739 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. dismissed). Nothing indicates that the trial court failed to consider Defendants’ affidavit attached to their motion for judgment on the pleadings, so the motion was properly considered a motion for summary judgment.

[10] Turning to the second part of Davis's argument, the grant of summary judgment is proper only “if the designated evidentiary matter shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). “A fact is ‘material’ if its resolution would affect the outcome of the case, and an issue is ‘genuine’ if a trier of fact is required to resolve the parties’ differing accounts of the truth, or if the undisputed material facts support conflicting reasonable inferences.” Abbott v. State, 183 N.E.3d 1074, 1079 (Ind. 2022) (quoting Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014)). We review summary judgment decisions de novo, Gierek v. Anonymous 1, 250 N.E.3d 378, 384 (Ind. 2025) (citing Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003), which means we apply the same standard as the trial court, Wohlt v. Wohlt, 245 N.E.3d 611, 615 (Ind. 2024) (citing Red Lobster Rests. LLC v. Fricke, 234 N.E.3d 159, 165 (Ind. 2024)).

[11] Davis argues that Defendants failed to “refut[e]” the factual assertions in his complaint that (1) he “directed his monetary judgment to be sen[t] to” the Indianapolis address, Appellant's Br. at 11, and (2) prison staff “signed his name on a W-9 form without his consent,” id. at 12.⁵ Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, however, did not depend on these factual assertions. Rather, Defendants made legal arguments that (1) Davis's claim was barred because he failed to provide sufficient notice pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act; (2) Defendants were immune under the Indiana Tort Claims Act; (3) the Prison Litigation Reform Act required that the judgment be applied to Davis's outstanding restitution assessment; and (4) Davis failed to state a claim for tortious conversion.

[12] Davis fails to acknowledge, let alone address, in his Appellant's Brief any of these legal arguments. Davis thus fails to present a cogent argument that summary judgment was improperly granted, and his challenge is therefore waived. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring that appellate arguments be “supported by cogent reasoning” and “by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on.”); Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (holding substantial noncompliance with Appellate Rules may result in waiver).

[13] Moreover, Defendants are correct that Davis failed to provide sufficient notice pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. The Indiana Tort Claims Act provides that a claim is “barred unless notice is filed with the attorney general or the state agency involved within two hundred seventy (270) days after the loss occurs.” Ind. Code § 34-13-3-6(a). Notice must be provided in compliance with a form designated by the attorney general. Id. § 34-13-3-6(b); Myers v. Maxson, 51 N.E.3d 1267, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied.

[14] There is no dispute that Davis failed to submit the statutory notice form to either the attorney general's office or the Prison. Davis, however, argues in his Reply Brief that he “substantially complied” with the statutory notice provision. Appellant's Reply Br. at 13. “Substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements is sufficient when the purpose of the notice requirement is satisfied.” Murphy v. Ind. State Univ., 153 N.E.3d 311, 318 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Schoettmer v. Wright, 992 N.E.2d 702, 707 (Ind. 2013)). The “purpose” of the statutory notice requirements is “to provide the political subdivision the opportunity to investigate the facts surrounding an accident so that it may determine its liability and prepare a defense.” Id. (quoting Town of Knightstown v. Wainscott, 70 N.E.3d 450, 456 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied). Substantial compliance with the statutory notice requirements requires the claimant to “inform[ ] the governmental entity of the claimant's intent to make a claim” within the relevant statutory time period and provide “sufficient information which reasonably affords the governmental entity an opportunity to promptly investigate the claim.” Id. (citing Knightstown, 70 N.E.3d at 456).

[15] Davis argues in his Reply Brief that he “filed two motions with the federal district court and explained his claim regarding the illegal taking.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 14. Neither of these motions were included in Davis's response to Defendants’ summary judgment motion below or in the record on appeal. We are thus unable to determine whether these motions substantially complied with the Indiana Tort Claims Act notice provision. Specifically, we cannot determine whether Davis informed the appropriate authorities of his “intent to make a claim.”⁶ Murphy, 153 N.E.3d 318 (citation omitted).

[16] Davis thus failed to provide sufficient notice pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. This means his claim is barred notwithstanding his factual assertions that (1) he “directed his monetary judgment to be sen[t] to” the Indianapolis address, Appellant's Br. at 11, and (2) prison staff “signed his name on a W-9 form without his consent,” id. at 12. In other words, these factual issues are not “material” issues Defendants were required to rebut. Abbott, 183 N.E.3d at 1079. The trial court therefore did not err by granting summary judgment to Defendants.

2. The Trial Court's Ruling Did Not Violate the Open Courts Clause of the Indiana Constitution

[17] Davis also argues that the trial court's ruling violated the Open Courts clause of the Indiana Constitution. The Open Courts clause provides: “All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay.” Ind. Const. Art. 1, § 12. This clause “ ‘guarantees access to the courts to redress injuries to the extent the substantive law recognizes an actionable wrong.’ ” Escamilla v. Shiel Sexton Co., Inc., 73 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2017) (quoting Smith v. Ind. Dep't of Correction, 883 N.E.2d 802, 807 (Ind. 2008)).

[18] Davis argues that the trial court violated the Open Courts clause by “grant[ing] the [Defendants’] motion for summary judgment without explanation and without a single hearing.” Appellant's Br. at 15–16. Trial Rule 56(C), which governs summary judgment motions, provides that a trial court “may” hold a hearing on the motion. T.R. 56(C). A hearing is only required if requested by one of the parties. See Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. No hearing was requested here. Nor are trial courts required to enter findings and conclusions when granting a motion for summary judgment. See Dishman v. Henry Cnty. Redev. Comm'n, 265 N.E.3d 1023, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. not sought. We are not persuaded that the trial court violated the Open Courts clause when nothing required the trial court to do the things of which Davis complains.

Conclusion

[19] Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings converted into a motion for summary judgment, but because Davis fails to address the legal arguments supporting the grant of that motion, his challenge is waived. Moreover, Davis failed to provide sufficient notice pursuant to the Indiana Tort Claims Act. We therefore cannot say that the trial court erred by granting the motion. Moreover, the trial court's ruling does not violate the Open Courts clause of the Indiana Constitution. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Davis v. Thrasher, No. 1:15-cv-01206-TWP-TAB (S.D. Ind. Mar. 31, 2021), Dkt. No. 214.

2.   See 18 U.S.C. 3626 note, Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (“Any compensatory damages awarded to a prisoner in connection with a civil action brought against any Federal, State, or local jail, prison, or correctional facility or against any official or agent of such jail, prison, or correctional facility, shall be paid directly to satisfy any outstanding restitution orders pending against the prisoner.”).

3.   Davis challenged the restitution assessment in the federal court case, but the court dismissed that claim as improperly joined to the excessive force claim.

4.   Officer Chambers's first name is listed as “unknown” in Davis's complaint and is not specified in the record. Appellant's App. Vol. II at 12.

5.   Davis also argues that Defendants failed to “refute” the allegation that Prison staff “caused [Davis's] monetary judgment to be unlawfully converted.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Whether conduct amounts to conversion is an issue of law not fact. See Harkins v. Westmeyer, 116 N.E.3d 461, 472 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (listing the elements for the tort of “tortious conversion”), trans. not sought. Defendants therefore were not required to rebut the allegation of conversion in their summary judgment motion. See Speaks v. Vishnuvardhan Rao, 117 N.E.3d 661, 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (emphasizing that, to defeat a summary judgment motion, “material facts” rather than “an issue of law” must be in dispute).

6.   We note that the appellate record also includes a letter Davis wrote to the Prison warden regarding the application of Davis's judgment proceeds to his prison balance. See Appellant's App. Vol. II at 58–62. Davis does not argue in his briefing that this letter constituted substantial compliance, so any such argument is waived. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a); Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1267. Moreover, in the letter, Davis did not inform the warden of his “intent to make a claim.” Murphy, 153 N.E.3d 318 (citation omitted).

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.