CHRISTY v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Between October 2018 and January 2024, Mark Alan Christy sexually exploited, explicitly photographed, and molested his granddaughter, A.S. After a jury trial, he was found guilty on twenty-four counts of child molesting, child exploitation, and possession of child pornography. On the first three counts, Christy was sentenced to an aggregate term of 120 years. He now appeals his convictions and his sentence, arguing: (1) the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence; and (2) his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character. Finding no error in the admission of evidence and that he failed to demonstrate his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and his character, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In the fall of 2018, five-year-old A.S. and her family moved to Westfield to live with her grandmother and step-grandfather, Christy. Everyone had their own bedrooms, with Christy's on the first floor and everyone else's—including grandmother's—on the second. Christy and A.S. spent a lot of time together camping, riding bikes, and during his work trips. On weekends, they stayed up late together watching movies. At some point, Christy began to molest and take explicit photographs of A.S. In his bedroom, he used his tablet to photograph A.S.’s breasts, vagina, and anus. He positioned her on a wedge pillow and told her to do certain things, such as push her breasts together with her arms and pull apart her buttocks and labia.

[3] Both at home and on camping trips, Christy touched A.S.’s breasts, vagina, and anus multiple times, and he had A.S. touch his penis and perform oral sex on him more than once. He also used lubricant and various sex toys on A.S. which he kept in a black medicine bag. The toys included butt plugs, dildos, nipple clamps, and a vibrator he inserted into her underwear. Christy would use snacks and money as bribes to get A.S. to engage in these acts—paying her ten dollars for ten minutes, fifteen dollars for fifteen minutes, etc.

[4] In January 2024, when A.S. was ten years old, her class taught a body safety program which taught the students three body safety rules: that it is not okay for someone to look at, touch, or take pictures of their private parts, especially without clothes on. At the end of the program, the students were given papers which asked if they felt safe in their home environment, and A.S. indicated that she did not. Her response prompted school officials to talk to her further at which time she disclosed what Christy had done to her. The school reported the information to the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) and a forensic interview was scheduled that same day.

[5] A.S.’s grandmother picked her up from school and took her to the Cherish Center for the forensic interview, and A.S. again disclosed the abuse. The Westfield Police Department (WPD) obtained a warrant to search the Westfield house, Christy's person, and his semi-truck.¹ Christy was in Ohio at the time, so WPD coordinated the execution of the warrant on Christy and for his truck with Ohio law enforcement. Ohio officers found Christy at a truck stop and searched his truck. They seized his phone, tablet, and a black bag containing multiple sex toys. Christy was not arrested at that time.

[6] A few days later, Christy came to the police department to talk with two WPD detectives. During that conversation, Christy admitted using his tablet to take photographs of A.S.’s genitals, and he explained that he did it because A.S. wanted to see what she looked like. He denied touching A.S. or having her perform oral sex on him. He also said that A.S. was known to lie.

[7] In February, Christy was charged with twenty-four counts: Counts 1-3: Child Molesting, as Level 1 felonies;² Counts 4 & 5: Child Molesting, as Level 4 felonies;³ Counts 6-14: Child Exploitation, as Level 4 felonies;⁴ and Counts 15-24: Possession of Child Pornography, as Level 5 felonies.⁵ At Christy's jury trial, A.S., her mother, her grandmother, the body safety instructor, the forensic interviewer, and multiple detectives—including two from Ohio—testified to the facts set out above. The forensic interviewer testified immediately after A.S. and explained where the interview took place, the Cherish Center's credentials, interview protocols, and the concept of delayed disclosure by child sex abuse victims. The State also admitted ten of the photographs found on Christy's tablet as well as the bodycam videos of Christy's WPD interview during which he admitted photographing A.S.’s genitals.

[8] The jury found Christy guilty of all twenty-four counts. At sentencing, the trial court granted Christy's motion to vacate his convictions on Counts 15-18 and 20-24 on double jeopardy grounds. The court heard the parties’ sentencing arguments and identified his lack of criminal history as a mitigating factor. As aggravating factors, the trial court considered A.S.’s young age, the fact that Christy was in a position of trust, that the State had not charged every possible offense, and the horrific nature of Christy's actions. The court sentenced Christy to consecutive terms of forty years each on Counts 1, 2, and 3 for an aggregate term of 120 years executed in the Department of Correction. For each of the remaining counts, it sentenced him to ten years to be served concurrently with one another and with Count 1. Christy appeals.

Discussion and Decision

1. Admission of Evidence

[9] Christy first argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence at trial. He claims it was an abuse of discretion for the court to admit “vouching testimony from the forensic interviewer[ ] in contravention of Indiana Rules of Evidence 401 and 704[.]” Appellant's Brief at 9. He also asserts the court abused its discretion by “admitting inflammatory testimony and photographs of sex toys,” claiming they were “highly prejudicial[ ] in violation of ․Rules 401, 403, and 404(b).” Id. at 13.

[10] The admission or exclusion of evidence is left to the broad discretion of the trial court, “and we will disturb its ruling only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion.” Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670, 675 (Ind. 2013) (quoting Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d. 1039, 1045 (Ind. 2011)). We find an abuse of discretion only where the court's decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. (quoting Turner, 953 N.E.2d at 1045). The State argues that Christy has waived most, if not all, of the arguments he asserts because he failed to object at trial—either at all, or on the same grounds upon which he now claims error. We agree.

[11] Arguments as to evidentiary errors cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Hunter v. State, 72 N.E.3d 928, 932 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. “The failure to make a contemporaneous objection to the admission of evidence at trial, so as to provide the trial court an opportunity to make a final ruling on the matter in the context in which the evidence is introduced, results in waiver of the error on appeal.” Brown v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1121, 1125 (Ind. 2003). Furthermore, a party may not assert new grounds on appeal when the objection at trial was based on other grounds. Hunter, 72 N.E.3d at 932.

[12] Christy claims that “[t]he testimony elicited from [the forensic interviewer] regarding the Cherish Center's accreditation, forensic interview protocols, and ․ that interviews are conducted in a ‘neutral’ and ‘nonleading’ manner [was] irrelevant under” Evidence Rule 401. Appellant's Brief at 10. However, Christy did not object to the testimony regarding the Center's accreditation. Tr. Vol. 2 at 224. Additionally, he also failed to preserve his argument related to the testimony about the Center's protocols and the neutral manner in which the interviews were conducted. His relevancy objections came only after the following questions: (1) “And why don't you allow [ ] siblings or parents [ ] in the interview room?” and (2) “Can you give an example of an open-ended, nonleading question?” Id. at 226, 228. Because Christy failed to object to the testimony he now challenges, his arguments are waived. See McDowell v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1260, 1262 (Ind. 2008) (“To preserve an error for appeal, a party must specifically identify the grounds for the objection at trial.”).

[13] Even if Christy properly preserved some of his arguments with the objections he did make, the trial court was within its discretion to find the testimony was relevant.⁶ Relevant evidence is that which “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence[,]” and the fact must be “of consequence in determining the action.” Ind. Evidence Rule 401. The court found the testimony about the forensic interview process was relevant to show what the investigation into the alleged crimes entailed. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 227-28. The forensic interview provided the basis for WPD's search warrants and further investigation into A.S.’s allegations. The testimony was also foundational as to how the forensic interviewer carried out her role in the case. As such, Christy has failed to show that the court abused its discretion by finding that the interviewer's testimony was relevant and admissible.

[14] Christy also claims the forensic interviewer's testimony was improperly admitted in violation of Evidence Rule 704. However, at trial Christy did not object to the forensic interviewer's testimony on the basis that it violated Rule 704 or that it constituted vouching. Christy's only two objections were based on relevancy under Rule 401. While defense counsel raised the issue of vouching prior to the parties’ opening statements, she specifically acknowledged that “the appropriate time to object to [that] is whenever [the State] present[s] that testimony[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 164. But when the time came, no such vouching objection was raised. Christy therefore failed to preserve any argument for appeal regarding whether the testimony was admitted in violation of Rule 704.

[15] Waiver notwithstanding, the forensic interviewer's testimony did not constitute improper vouching testimony.⁷ Christy claims that the interviewer's testimony about accreditation and protocols, and “framing A.S.’s demeanor as ‘normal’ for victims of sexual abuse,” improperly invited the jury to draw the inference that A.S. was abused. Appellant's Br. at 12. But as we stated before, Christy did not object to testimony about the Center's accreditation, nor did he object to the testimony regarding A.S.’s demeanor during the interview or the interviewer's testimony about child disclosures generally. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 230-31. And contrary to Christy's assertions, the testimony did not characterize A.S.’s demeanor as “normal” when compared to other victims of sexual abuse. Instead, the interviewer described A.S. as “very matter of fact.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 230. Then she testified generally about delayed disclosure and explained that “there's no standard or expectation for how a child will behave or respond” in a forensic interview. Id. Her testimony described behaviors of child sex abuse victims in general terms and was not specific to A.S. which is permissible under Rule 704. See Henson v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1160, 1168 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (finding there was no vouching when the “testimony was about children generally rather than [the victim] specifically”), trans. denied.

[16] Christy's next argument meets the same fate. He claims the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony about and photographs of the sex toys found in his semi-truck and described by A.S. at trial, claiming they were inadmissible under Evidence Rules 401 (relevance), 403 (prejudice), and 404(b) (character evidence). At trial, Christy's only objection to the admission of Detective Yeager's ⁸ testimony “describ[ing] the sex toys” was on the basis that the testimony was not the best evidence, stating “[i]f we're going to see the photos, I think that's better than a description of [them].” Tr. Vol. 3 at 13. Indiana's best evidence rule is codified in Evidence Rule 1002. Christy never objected to admission of the testimony based on Rules 401, 403, or 404(b), and therefore waived appellate review of these arguments.

[17] As for the photographs of the sex toys, not only did Christy fail to object to their admission, thereby failing to preserve the issue for appeal, but he stipulated to their admissibility. See Tr. Vol. 3 at 13, 19, 62-63; Exhibits Vol. 4 at 23, 24-45. Our Supreme Court has found that a defendant who stipulated to the admission of evidence but then challenged such evidence on appeal “invited the very error he now claims is reversible.” Ellis v. State, 707 N.E.2d 797, 803 (Ind. 1999). Invited error “forbids a party to ‘take advantage of an error that [he] commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of [his] own neglect or misconduct.’ ” Brewington v. State, 7 N.E.3d 946, 975 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Wright v. State, 828 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Ind. 2005)), reh'g denied, cert. denied. Based upon his failure to object and stipulation to the admissibility of the photographs, Christy waived any argument that they were admitted in error.

2. Appellate Rule 7(B)

[18] Finally, Christy argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. Appellate Rule 7(B) permits us to revise a sentence if it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We give the trial court “considerable deference” when reviewing a sentence under Rule 7(B). Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). We will not revise a sentencing decision absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard[,] and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). We also note that “we conduct our Rule 7(B) analysis independent from the trial court's sentencing considerations[.]” Barbee v. State, 269 N.E.3d 888, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Lastly, it is the defendant's burden to “persuade the appellate court that his ․ sentence has met this inappropriateness standard of review.” Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).

[19] Turning first to the nature of Christy's offense, we acknowledge that “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Pierce v. State, 949 N.E.2d 349, 352 (Ind. 2011). “The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the offenses and the defendant's participation therein.” Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). When a sentence deviates from the advisory term, “we consider whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense as committed by the defendant that distinguishes it from the typical offense accounted for by our legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Id. Here, counts 1, 2, and 3 are all convictions for Level 1 felony child molesting. Under Indiana Code section 35-50-2-4(c), Level 1 felony child molesting carries a minimum term of twenty years, a maximum of fifty years, and an advisory sentence of thirty years. Christy was sentenced to forty years on each count, ten years above the advisory term.

[20] Christy fails to direct our attention to any “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of [his] offense[.]” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093. He offers no evidence of any restraint, regard, or lack of brutality in his commission of these crimes.⁹ Rather, the evidence shows that the nature of Christy's offense is as follows: he took pictures of his granddaughter's breasts, vagina, and anus; forced her to perform oral sex on him; used sex toys on her; and paid her to do these things with money and snacks. A.S. was between five and ten years old while Christy carried out this abuse which spanned approximately five years, and he used his position of trust to perpetrate it. The circumstances show that Christy's offenses were more egregious than the typical offenses contemplated by the legislature when setting the advisory sentence.¹⁰ Christy has failed to persuade us that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses.

[21] As for Christy's character, we consider his “qualities, life, and conduct.” Id. (quoting Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024)). He asserts that his “history of military service, lack of criminal record, and overall low-risk assessment reflect a character inconsistent with the sentence imposed.” Appellant's Br. at 18. Although such facts are true, “to the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024). We do not find his veteran status, lack of criminal history, or his low risk assessment to be evidence “all the stronger to justify” revising Christy's sentence given the heinousness of his offenses. Id. Thus, Christy has failed to persuade us that his sentence is otherwise inappropriate in light of his character.

Conclusion

[22] Christy has failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence or that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offenses and character. Therefore, we affirm.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Christy worked as a semi-truck driver for J.B. Hunt.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-3(a)(1).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-4-3(b).

4.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4(b)(1), (c)(2).

5.   I.C. § 35-42-4-4(d)(2), (e)(2).

6.   While counsel's stated objection was to the relevancy of the questioning, her argument at the time focused on her concern that the State was laying the foundation for admission of a prior consistent statement by A.S. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 226, 228. On appeal, we construe counsel's objections as ones based on relevancy. Nonetheless, even if the objection is more accurately framed as one pertaining to the admission of any prior consistent statements, Christy has not argued these grounds on appeal and thus, his arguments on the new grounds would be waived. See Hunter, 72 N.E.3d at 932 (noting that a party may not assert new grounds on appeal when the objection at trial was based on other grounds).

7.   Under Rule 704(b), a witness “may not testify to opinions concerning intent, guilt, or innocence in a criminal case; the truth or falsity of allegations; [or] whether a witness has testified truthfully[.]” “This rule prohibits ‘[v]ouching’ for another witness because ‘[s]uch testimony invades the province of the jury in determining what weight to give a witness's testimony.’ ” Salinas v. State, 257 N.E.3d 17, 28 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. Improper vouching testimony is that which goes to the credibility and truthfulness of the particular victim in the case. See Sampson v. State, 38 N.E.3d 985, 991-92 (Ind. 2015) (holding testimony that a specific child victim was coached or showed signed of coaching constitutes impermissible vouching); cf. Henson v. State, 237 N.E.3d 1160, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (finding no impermissible vouching where a witness testified about how child sexual abuse victims behave generally without discussing the victim in the case), trans. denied.

8.   In his brief, Christy claims Detective Carter testified about the sex toys. However, the record shows Detective Yeager is the only one who did so and answered a juror's question to “describe the sex toys[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 14.

9.   Christy's only argument as to the nature of his offenses conflates that prong with the trial court's consideration of aggravating factors at his sentencing. Christy argues that in explaining the aggravating factors it considered, the court “failed to specify what [ ] non-statutory factors” it relied on. Appellant's Br. at 16. However, a review of the transcript shows that the court was referencing the non-statutory factors discussed by the deputy prosecutor only moments before: (1) how “horrific” Christy's actions were, and (2) that Christy also engaged in “uncharged misconduct.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 194-95. In explaining its sentence, the court said:[T]he deputy prosecutor in this matter has suggested that the Court also take into consideration other factors not enumerated in the statute which defines aggravating factors. And the Court without specific reference to those will find that those factors should be taken into consideration as well.Id. at 198. Christy also asserts that the other aggravating factors “carry limited weight” because the factors considered by the court, namely A.S.’s “age and Christy's role in a position of care[,] are circumstances already inherent in the charged offenses[.]” Appellant's Br. at 17. While A.S.’s age may be an element of his offenses, it was also an aggravating statutory factor the court could consider. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(3). Additionally, Christy's position of care was not an element of his offenses and was a specific statutory aggravating factor the court could consider. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(8).

10.   To the extent Christy challenges the consecutive nature of his sentence, under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c), the court was permitted to order that he serve his terms on Counts 1-3 consecutively. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a)(12), (c) (permitting consecutive sentences without limitation for crimes of violence, which includes child molesting under I.C. § 35-42-4-3); Smith v. State, 889 N.E.2d 261, 264 (Ind. 2008) (permitting consecutive sentences for multiple child molesting convictions involving the same victim because defendant repeatedly molested his victim and violated his position of trust with her); Serino v. State, 798 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. 2003) (same).

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.