IN RE: the Civil Commitment of K.B. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] K.B. brings this expedited appeal challenging her involuntary temporary commitment to Community Fairbanks Behavioral Health (“Hospital”).¹ She claims the evidence is insufficient to show that she is gravely disabled. Concluding that the Hospital provided clear and convincing evidence to support K.B.’s involuntary temporary commitment, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] K.B. has a history of mental illness and has been prescribed medication in the past. According to her mother, K.B. will take medicine while in a hospital or at a clinic, but she stops taking it as soon as she is released. Earlier in 2025, K.B. was hospitalized and was prescribed medicine for her mental illness, but she stopped taking it upon her release.

[3] K.B. has displayed paranoia, telling her mother that “the FBI and the CIA [are] following her around[.]” Tr. p. 37. K.B. has also reported visual and auditory hallucinations, claiming that she sees and speaks with her deceased father and grandfather. K.B.’s mother is afraid of K.B., having been threatened by her during phone conversations in 2025.

[4] Just before the hospitalization that began this case, K.B. was living in an apartment. Her mother paid for it because K.B. has been unable to keep a job.

[5] On November 6, 2025, K.B. was admitted to the Hospital on an emergency basis. Police officers brought her there after visiting her apartment to check on her welfare. She had “punched out” all of her windows. Id. at 10. K.B. told Dr. Mason Mockobee, one of her treating physicians, that she believed a neighbor was “spying on her” and “masturbating watching her.” Id.

[6] K.B.’s mother visited her apartment after the hospitalization, where she saw food on the floor and other signs of disorder. She said, “it looked like a tornado had gone through there.” Id. at 40. K.B.’s mother learned that the landlord was evicting K.B.

[7] On November 10, the Hospital petitioned to take custody of K.B. on an emergency basis, claiming that she was gravely disabled and needed continued inpatient treatment. The trial court granted the petition, ordering that K.B. remain hospitalized for up to fourteen days.

[8] On November 12, the Hospital filed a Petition for Commitment Hearing, alleging that K.B. required continued treatment beyond the fourteen-day emergency period. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on November 17. During the hearing, Dr. Mockobee said that he had examined K.B. thirteen times since she was first hospitalized on November 6. He diagnosed her as having bipolar one disorder, which is characterized by “expansive, irritable, or euphoric mood that lasts for a week[.]” Id. at 12. A patient with that disorder displays impulsivity with a resulting tendency for “dangerous or risky behavior.” Id.

[9] In K.B.’s case, she consistently displayed irritability and became upset easily while hospitalized. And her mood fluctuated swiftly between being calm and becoming irritated. Dr. Mockobee also noted signs of paranoia, based on K.B.’s statements that she was afraid of being “kidnapped into sex trafficking” while being transported to court hearings. Id. at 12. She also claimed that she had brain cancer, despite having no diagnosis or history of that disease.

[10] During her hospitalization, K.B. often rejected prescribed medicines. She also displayed a lack of insight into her mental illness, which Dr. Mockobee stated would undermine her ability to follow a treatment plan. K.B. continued to express disordered beliefs. On the night before the evidentiary hearing, K.B. told her mother's roommate that she had two mothers, who had different appearances.

[11] Based upon his education about bipolar one disorder, Dr. Mockobee stated that unless K.B. complied with inpatient and outpatient treatment, she would be unable to manage her finances, keep a job, or maintain housing. K.B. told the doctor that she knew someone who would give her a ride from the hospital upon being released, but she did not share any concrete plans for where she would live. Dr. Mockobee's treatment plan consisted of additional inpatient treatment of up to a week, followed by outpatient treatment that included ongoing medication management and monitoring, as well as regular appointments for talk therapy.

[12] After the hearing, the court issued an order concluding that K.B. is suffering from bipolar one disorder, a mental illness, and that she is gravely disabled as defined by statute. Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 7 (Order of Temporary Commitment). The court also stated:

[K.B.] is gravely disabled by delusions of bi-polar disorder, including her paranoid belief others are spying on her and trying to traffic her for sex. She tells her mom she sees her dead father and grandfather but refuses to take medications when released from hospitalization. Her delusions and mood lability make conflict with others likely, preventing her from making safe decions [sic]. She has no income or safe place to live after breaking her apartment windows.

[13] Id. at 8. Accordingly, the court committed K.B. to the Hospital for a period of time not to exceed ninety days. K.B. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[14] “The purpose of civil commitment proceedings is to protect the public and to ensure the rights of the person whose liberty is at stake.” T.M. v. Cmty. Health Network, Inc., 261 N.E.3d 765, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. A petitioner seeking to have a person involuntarily committed must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that ․ the individual is mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and ․ detention or commitment of that individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e) (2007). Clear and convincing evidence is “an intermediate standard of proof greater than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 40 N.E.3d 507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[15] When reviewing a trial court's order of commitment, we neither reweigh evidence nor assess witness credibility. Matter of Commitment of M.C., 262 N.E.3d 836, 839 (Ind. 2025). “[W]e will affirm if, after considering the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the decision, a reasonable trier of fact could have found the necessary elements proven by clear and convincing evidence.” Matter of B.N., 137 N.E.3d 330, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

[16] K.B. does not contest the determination that she is mentally ill. She instead challenges the trial court's finding that she is gravely disabled. The General Assembly has defined “gravely disabled” as

a condition in which an individual, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of coming to harm because the individual:

(1) is unable to provide for that individual's food, clothing, shelter, or other essential human needs; or

(2) has a substantial impairment or an obvious deterioration of that individual's judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in the individual's inability to function independently.

Ind. Code § 12-7-2-96 (1992). Because this definition is written in the disjunctive, the evidence need support only one of the two factors to sustain a trial court's determination of grave disability. A.S. v. Ind. Univ. Health Bloomington Hosp., 148 N.E.3d 1135, 1140 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

[17] Ample evidence supports a determination that K.B. has a substantial impairment or obvious deterioration of her judgment, reasoning, or behavior that results in an inability to function independently. During her hospitalization, she displayed a lack of insight into her mental illness and often refused to take prescribed medicine. K.B.’s mother explained that K.B. had stopped taking her medicine after being released from previous hospitalizations, including in early 2025. Dr. Mockobee stated that K.B. needs to consistently take medicine as prescribed to control her symptoms. In addition, K.B. could not maintain employment, and her mother paid for her apartment.

[18] K.B. displayed uncontrolled symptoms of frequent irritability and poor impulse control, which, according to Dr. Mockobee, can lead to dangerous behavior. K.B.’s mother, who lives in another state, was afraid of K.B. because K.B. had threatened her during phone calls earlier in 2025. Just before being hospitalized, K.B. had smashed all of the windows in her apartment and had allowed it to become disordered and dirty, with food left on the floor.

[19] K.B. also displayed disordered thinking before and during her hospitalizations. She expressed paranoid thoughts to her mother and said that she was seeing and hearing deceased relatives. After being placed at the Hospital, K.B. expressed a fear of being trafficked for sexual purposes while being transported to court hearings. She also stated that she had brain cancer. And on the night before the evidentiary hearing, K.B. told her mother's roommate that her mother was actually two people with different appearances.

[20] Dr. Mockobee testified that unless K.B. was required to remain hospitalized for a week, and then further required to comply with an outpatient treatment program that included taking medications as prescribed, she would have a poor prognosis and would be unlikely to meet her needs for food and shelter. K.B. argues that Dr. Mockobee improperly focused on her agitated mood and “bad attitude.” Appellant's Br. p. 11. We disagree. The Hospital's evidence, including Dr. Mockobee's testimony, demonstrated more than mere irritability. Instead, K.B.’s untreated medical illness sharply hampered her ability to function independently. This evidence supports the trial court's determination that K.B. is gravely disabled. See T.M., 261 N.E.3d at 774 (petitioner presented sufficient evidence of grave disability; patient displayed “poor insight, judgment, and impulse control” that impaired ability to function, along with paranoid thoughts).

[21] K.B. next claims that the evidence showed that she was doing better at the time of the hearing. The evidence shows otherwise. She often refused to take her medicine during the week before the hearing, and she expressed delusional thinking in a phone call with her mother's roommate on the night before. In addition, evidence of her prior conduct was relevant. That is, evidence of a patient's prior conduct may establish a nexus to her current condition so as to be considered by the trial court in ordering a temporary commitment. J.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 256 N.E.3d 1260, 1271 (Ind. 2025). The evidence here established such a nexus.

[22] Next, K.B. argues that the court's decision was inappropriate because it was based on hearsay evidence. Dr. Mockobee discussed other Hospital employees’ statements about K.B.’s condition and behavior. And K.B.’s mother testified that other people told her why K.B. was being evicted from her apartment. But we presume “that a judge considers only the properly-admitted evidence when rendering a judgment.” A.S., 148 N.E.3d at 1139. During the evidentiary hearing, the trial court repeatedly acknowledged that some of the Hospital's evidence was hearsay and stated that the hearsay would not factor into its determination of whether K.B. is gravely disabled. And there is sufficient non-hearsay evidence to support the court's finding of grave disability. We find no error.

Conclusion

[23] Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[24] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   This expedited appeal is part of the two-year Marion County Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project established by the Indiana Supreme Court to examine the dilemma that the standard appellate timeline typically exceeds the duration of a temporary mental health commitment. In re Marion Cnty. Expedited Mental Health Appeals Pilot Project, No. 24S-MS-190, slip op. at 1 (Ind. July 16, 2024) (amended by Case No. 25S-MS-204 (Ind. Sept. 2, 2025)).

Robb, Senior Judge.

Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.