LLOYD JONES LLC v. MARA PROPERTIES LLC (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jeffrey O'Mara and Trevor Lloyd-Jones are commercial landlords of neighboring buildings in a strip mall. Lloyd-Jones sued O'Mara for trespass after O'Mara walked into two retail stores occupied by Lloyd-Jones's tenants to deliver a water shut-off notice. The trial court found that Lloyd-Jones failed to show a trespass occurred, and Lloyd-Jones appeals this determination. Finding Lloyd-Jones failed to show error in the trial court's determination that O'Mara had not unlawfully entered the public businesses, we affirm.

Facts

[2] In 2017, Lloyd-Jones owned a building in a strip mall that contained multiple rental units.¹ O'Mara owned the neighboring commercial building, having purchased it from Lloyd-Jones a few years prior. Lloyd-Jones rented the units in his building to two retail businesses: a women's clothing store and a vape shop. O'Mara also rented the units in his building to two commercial tenants.

[3] Both buildings received running water from an underground well located on O'Mara's property. However, this well water had documented safety problems, including E. coli contamination, and regularly failed water quality inspections. One of O'Mara's tenants, a fitness center, could not install a drinking fountain because the water was not safe for consumption. O'Mara's other tenant, a carry-out pizza restaurant, had to boil its water before using it. Additionally, one of Lloyd-Jones's tenants recognized that she could not drink the water in her rental unit.

[4] Because of these issues, O'Mara approached Lloyd-Jones in July 2017 about changing his building's water source to city water. He explained that doing so would shut down the well that served Lloyd-Jones's property. O'Mara offered to split the cost of connecting both buildings to city water, but Lloyd-Jones never responded to the offer. O'Mara proceeded with the plan to change his property's water source.

[5] In late November 2017, O'Mara delivered written notices to the two tenants in Lloyd-Jones's building, informing them that well water service would end in two weeks. O'Mara delivered these notices by hand, walking into each retail store and handing the notice to a staff member. The well was later decommissioned in December 2017.

[6] Around this same time, Lloyd-Jones and O'Mara were embroiled in a different dispute about their properties. Lloyd-Jones had obstructed a lane that provided access to the rear of O'Mara's building, and O'Mara sued Lloyd-Jones. O'Mara claimed he had an implied easement by use over the lane and sought an injunction to prevent Lloyd-Jones from blocking it.

[7] Lloyd-Jones then filed a counterclaim, asserting that O'Mara had trespassed on his property when O'Mara entered the retail businesses of Lloyd-Jones's tenants to deliver the water shut-off notices. Lloyd-Jones claimed that after those notices were delivered, he had to release his two tenants from their leases because their units no longer had access to running water. Lloyd-Jones sought damages for his lost rental income over the two years it took him to install a new well for water service.

[8] After a bench trial, conducted in four parts over the course of two years, the court found that O'Mara had an implied easement by use over the lane and enjoined Lloyd-Jones from blocking it. The court also found that Lloyd-Jones failed to establish his claim of trespass.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Lloyd-Jones appeals only the trial court's rejection of his trespass claim. In reaching its judgment, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to the parties’ request under Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). When reviewing such findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard. We first determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. Ind. Land Tr. Co. v. XL Inv. Props., LLC, 155 N.E.3d 1177, 1182 (Ind. 2020). “We will only set aside the findings or judgment of the trial court if they are clearly erroneous.” Id.

[10] Additionally, because Lloyd-Jones did not prevail on his counterclaim, he appeals from a negative judgment—“a judgment entered against the party who bore the burden of proof at trial.” Universal Auto, LLC v. Murray, 149 N.E.3d 639, 642 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). We reverse a negative judgment only if it is contrary to law. Id. “A party appealing a negative judgment must show that the evidence points unerringly to a conclusion different than that reached by the trial court.” Id. (citation omitted).

[11] Lloyd-Jones does not challenge any of the trial court's factual findings. He instead disputes the conclusion that he failed to demonstrate a trespass. The tort of trespass to land requires the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the plaintiff has possession of the land; and (2) the defendant entered the land without a legal right to do so. KB Home Ind. Inc. v. Rockville TBD Corp., 928 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We address Lloyd-Jones's argument as to the second element, finding it dispositive.

[12] The court concluded that Lloyd-Jones had not presented “any evidence to show that O'Mara entered [Lloyd-Jones's building] without legal right to do so.” App. Vol. II, p. 86. It found that Lloyd-Jones's tenants “operated businesses that were open to the public without any relevant restrictions” and that Lloyd-Jones “offered no evidence to show that it obtained any kind of court or police order prohibiting O'Mara from setting foot on the premises.” Id. Nor did Lloyd-Jones present any evidence that he “notified either his tenants or O'Mara that O'Mara was not allowed on the property.” Id.

[13] Without directly disputing these findings, Lloyd-Jones argues that O'Mara “had no legal relationship with the two tenants” and was not their landlord. Appellant's Br., p. 12. But he fails to cite any authority for his proposition that such relationship is necessary, especially when entering a business that is open to the public. He cites only Dow v. Hurst, 146 N.E.3d 990 (Ind. App. 2020), claiming O'Mara, like the defendant in Dow, did not have permission to enter the premises. But Lloyd-Jones fails to recognize that Dow dealt with entry onto residential property, which is distinguishable from O'Mara's entry into a public business. This Court has previously found that a business open to the public “tacitly authorized the public to step into [it] during business hours.” Jasionowski v. Town of Whitestown, 268 N.E.3d 288, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (finding no trespass when town official entered plaintiff's garage, which was held out as a public business).

[14] Given the foregoing, Lloyd-Jones has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in finding he did not show O'Mara entered the property unlawfully. Accordingly, he fails to show clear error in the trial court's rejection of his trespass claim.

[15] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Lloyd-Jones is the managing member of a number of entities involved in this litigation: New Palestine Plaza, Inc.; Plaza Utilities, LLC; Charlie's Lane Investment, LLC; and Credo Investments, LLC. The party that initiated the counterclaim of trespass was Credo Investments, LLC. However, throughout Lloyd-Jones's appellate brief, he uses “Lloyd-Jones” when discussing his appeal and his trespass claim. We follow suit.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.