HOLMAN v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Justin A. Holman (“Holman”) challenges his conviction for Level 5 felony reckless homicide ¹ entered on remand following a prior appeal, arguing the law of the case—as held in that appeal—is that the State presented insufficient evidence to rebut his claim of defense of property. Concluding the law of the case controls, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the conviction.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2021, the State charged Holman with kidnapping, as a Level 3 felony, and reckless homicide, as a Level 5 felony. The State also sought a habitual offender enhancement. A jury trial was held in 2023 where Holman claimed his actions were justified under the defense of property to protect his vehicle.

[3] At trial, there was evidence Holman drove to a liquor store around 4:00 p.m. on February 18, 2021. Holman had been drinking alcohol that day and was intoxicated. Shanel Smith (“Smith”), an intoxicated woman, was outside the liquor store when Holman arrived. While Holman was parked, Smith entered Holman's vehicle. Several minutes later, Holman drove out of the parking lot with Smith and stopped in a nearby alley where he “leaned over the passenger seat and opened the passenger side door from the inside.” Holman v. State (Holman I), No. 24A-CR-13, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2024) (mem.). “Holman then exited the vehicle from the driver's side, walked around to the passenger side, pulled Smith out of the vehicle, and laid her on the ground in the snow alongside the alley.” Id. Tragically, “[d]uring the next seven hours, Smith remained in the snow where Holman had left her.” Id. “During that time, Smith periodically sat up, looked around, repositioned herself and her jacket, and grabbed a nearby beer can.” Id. “Also during th[at] time, a number of people walked or drove by Smith but did not touch, move, or otherwise help her.” Id. Around midnight, someone saw Smith and called 911. Emergency personnel arrived and pronounced Smith dead at approximately 1:50 a.m. The main cause of death was environmental cold exposure.

[4] The jury found Holman guilty of both counts, and Holman admitted to being a habitual offender. After merging the reckless homicide count into the lead count of kidnapping, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of twenty years. Holman appealed, arguing that—among other things—there was insufficient evidence to rebut the defense of property. In a memorandum decision, this court reversed the kidnapping conviction. Although the Holman I Court identified multiple grounds for reversal, the opinion specifically addressed the defense of property and the State's obligation to disprove that Holman used reasonably necessary force under the circumstances to terminate an unlawful trespass in his occupied vehicle. See id. at *4–5. In a footnote, the court stated that its analysis was “relevant not only to Holman's Level 3 [felony] kidnapping charge, but also to the charge of reckless homicide, of which the jury also found Holman guilty[.]” Id. at *4 n.7. The Holman I Court ultimately determined there was insufficient evidence rebutting the defense of property and insufficient evidence Holman's actions proximately caused the death. See id. at *4–5. Despite these determinations, the court “reverse[d] and remand[ed] for sentencing on the reckless homicide verdict,” which was premised on the same acts and the same defense of property. Id. at *5.

[5] On remand, Holman moved for a directed verdict, arguing Holman I was controlling on the issue of the defense of property, and the count of reckless homicide necessarily failed for the same reason the kidnapping count failed, i.e., the State did not present sufficient evidence to rebut the defense. Holman also referred to the proximate cause analysis in Holman I. The State opposed the motion, and the parties briefed the issue. At an ensuing hearing, the State emphasized that Holman I directed the court to sentence Holman on the count of reckless homicide. The court ultimately adhered to the remand instructions and imposed a sentence for reckless homicide. Holman now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] The parties ask us to apply the law of the case, but they offer competing interpretations of Holman I. Whereas the State claims the law of the case is found in the remand instructions, Holman relies on the logic of the opinion.

[7] “The law of the case doctrine mandates that an appellate court's determination of a legal issue binds the trial court and ordinarily restricts the court on appeal in any subsequent appeal involving the same case and relevantly similar facts.” Hopkins v. State, 782 N.E.2d 988, 990 (Ind. 2003). This doctrine does not restrict a court's broad authority to “revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance[.]” Id. (quoting State v. Huffman, 643 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ind. 1994)). However, “as a rule,” courts should be “loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances[.]” Id. (quoting Huffman, 643 N.E.2d at 901). Extraordinary circumstances exist when the initial decision was clearly erroneous and would work manifest injustice. Id. For example, in State v. Lewis, our Supreme Court declined to apply the law of the case when it conflicted with the prevailing interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause in the United States Constitution. 543 N.E.2d 1116, 1117–19 (Ind. 1989).

[8] For the doctrine to apply, “the matters decided in the earlier appeal must clearly appear to be the only possible construction of an opinion.” Sw. Allen Cnty. Fire Protection Dist. v. City of Fort Wayne, 142 N.E.3d 946, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. “Thus, questions not conclusively decided in the earlier appeal do not become law of the case.” Id. Moreover, “statements that are not necessary in the determination of the issues presented are dicta, are not binding, and do not become the law of the case.” Id. Further, as we have explained, “it should be remembered” that this court “do[es] not decide issues in footnotes.” Id.

[9] The instant case involves the defense of property, which is codified in Indiana Code section 35-41-3-2(d). In pertinent part, this statute provides that a person “is justified in using reasonable force, including deadly force, against any other person” and “does not have a duty to retreat,” if “the person reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other person's unlawful entry of or attack on the person's dwelling, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicle.” Ind. Code § 35-41-3-2(d). As explained in Holman I, a person is justified in using “reasonable force” to terminate a trespass. No. 24A-CR-13, at *4. “[T]he State may disprove defense of property by showing that the defendant used ‘more force than is reasonably necessary under the circumstances.’ ” Id. (quoting Mateo v. State, 981 N.E.2d 59, 72 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied).

[10] In Holman I, this court stated it was addressing the defense of property issue “because it is relevant not only to Holman's Level 3 kidnapping charge, but also to the charge of reckless homicide, of which the jury also found Holman guilty.” Id. at *4 n.7. The court held that the State failed to rebut the defense of property, concluding the evidence established as a matter of law that Holman used “minimal, reasonable force to place Smith back into the situation she was in before her entry and subsequent trespass in the vehicle.” Id. at *5. In short, then, the court reversed Holman's kidnapping conviction because it was premised on use of lawful force. See I.C. § 35-42-3-2(a), (b)(3). Elsewhere in the opinion, the court concluded there was “insufficient evidence that Holman's actions were the proximate cause of Smith's death.” No. 24A-CR-13, at *4.

[11] As to reckless homicide, a person commits this offense if they recklessly kill another human being. I.C. § 35-42-1-5. In the instant charging information, the State alleged Holman recklessly killed Smith “by dragging her from a vehicle and leaving her laying in snow while exposed to subfreezing temperatures[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 39. The State focuses on the fact that Holman I authorized entering a sentence for reckless homicide, making no attempt to distinguish among the charges or evidence involved. See Appellee's Br. p. 14 (asserting that the Holman I Court implicitly “found ․ sufficient evidence to support the reckless homicide verdict when it remanded for sentencing”).

[12] If Holman used lawful force in removing Smith from the vehicle and leaving her in the snow—and, as a matter of law, these actions did not proximately cause Smith's death—the law of the case is such that the reckless homicide conviction cannot stand. As there is no contention that extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant deviating from the law of the case, we apply the doctrine, which necessitates reversal of the conviction. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the conviction for reckless homicide.

[13] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-5.

Foley, Judge.

Altice, C.J. and Scheele, J., concur.