SEELIG v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Tyler Scott Allen Seelig (“Seelig”) was convicted after a jury trial of rape ¹ as a Level 1 felony, burglary ² as a Level 3 felony, and criminal confinement ³ as a Level 4 felony and was sentenced to an aggregate term of sixty-six years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“the DOC”). Seelig appeals and raises the following restated issues for our review:

I.  Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Seelig's conviction for Level 1 felony rape;

II.  Whether Seelig's convictions for Level 1 felony rape and Level 4 felony criminal confinement violated the protections against double jeopardy;

III. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Seelig; and

IV.  Whether Seelig's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] On April 20, 2024, A.H. (“Victim”) went to visit her friends Jackie Yazel and Sydney Selvage, who lived together on Cherry Street in Huntington, Indiana; another friend, Chloe Shepperd, was also visiting at the time. The four women had been friends since high school, and they socialized often. Chloe, Jackie, and Victim planned to go out to the local bars later that night, and Sydney planned to stay home. After sharing some wine that Victim brought over, the three of them walked to the bars located on Market Street, taking Cherry Street to Market Street. They went first to Legends Bar to meet another friend, Trent Glaze, because they wanted a man with them since their boyfriends were not in town. Because Victim's ex-boyfriend was at Legends Bar, they left and went to the Market Street Bar instead. After staying there for about an hour, they went back to Legends Bar, and while there, they met Seelig.

[4] Victim took photographs that evening for a Snapchat story that showed her group of friends socializing with Seelig, who was wearing a light-colored flannel shirt and jeans, near the pool tables. Trent left the bar early, and the women stayed a couple more hours and left before closing time. After leaving the bar, the women walked back home from Market Street to Cherry Street. They encountered no one on the way home, and when they got back to the house on Cherry Street, the women went inside and found nothing amiss either inside or outside the house. Victim lay down on the futon downstairs in the living room, and the others got ready for bed. She was wearing black leggings and an off-the-shoulder t-shirt. She soon fell asleep on the futon, and Jackie and Chloe went upstairs to sleep.

[5] At some point, Victim heard a loud noise, which woke her up, but she did not see anything and went back to sleep. When she woke up again, a man, later identified as Seelig, was breathing behind her and his hand was in her pants touching her vagina. Victim could smell his cologne and felt his hand on her vagina inside her underwear. Because she had just awakened, she was confused and said, “Jamie, stop,” believing Seelig was her boyfriend, whose name is Jamie. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 199. She realized it could not be Jamie because he was away at drill with the National Guard, and the man did not smell like her boyfriend, nor did his breathing sound like her boyfriend.

[6] Victim tried to push him away with her elbow, and he pushed her back down and told her to “shut the fuck up.” Id. She was on her stomach and could not move. Seelig took her arms and wrists and attempted to get his hand into her vagina. Seelig slammed Victim's arms to the ground, injuring her and causing bruising to her wrists. She tried to resist and flip over from her stomach, but he continued to hurt her more. He slammed her head down and put his knee into her back to keep her on her stomach. He then began strangling her by putting his bicep and forearm around her neck and squeezing. This caused Victim to be unable to breathe. She tried to tell him things that would make him stop, like she needed to use the bathroom, but he did not relent. He then told her that she had invited him there and that she wanted this, neither of which were true.

[7] Victim tried to hit and kick Seelig and put her nails in his skin, but these actions only made him more violent, strangling her more aggressively. In addition to strangling her with his arm, Seelig also strangled her with his hands; he strangled Victim approximately three separate times. Victim could not breathe and began running out of strength. Seelig also repeatedly slammed her head to the floor while strangling her, which caused her head to pound. Victim believed Seelig was going to kill her because he told her multiple times, “I'm going to fucking kill you.” Id. at 208. Eventually, Victim ran out of strength and finally said, “[O]kay, do whatever.” Id.

[8] Seelig repeatedly said, “[s]hut the fuck up, bitch” and “if you make a sound, I will fucking kill you.” Id. Victim said she tried to make sounds but could not because Seelig was strangling her. At some point, Seelig pulled off her underwear and leggings to her thighs, but because they restricted her legs, which she wanted to be able to move, she pulled them down farther. He then said, “Put your fucking ass up.” Id. at 209. Because she was so weak, she told Seelig she could not do that, and he responded, “Do it or I'll kill you.” Id. Seelig then positioned her body and put his fingers inside of her vagina. She heard him lower his pants, and then he raped her, placing his penis in her vagina.

[9] During the rape, Victim saw the flash from Seelig's phone and believed that he was recording the assault. Victim said, “please no,” and tried to cover herself with her hand, and he told her to “shut the fuck up.” Id. at 211. At some point, he grabbed her by her hair and pulled her around to face him. While he was sitting, he forced her head onto his penis, telling her, “suck my dick, bitch.” Id. at 212. Seelig had no pants on, but Victim could see his light-colored flannel shirt. Victim told him “no, please, I don't want to,” and he punched her in the face with his closed fist, on her right cheek, which was very painful. Id. at 213. Seelig held her by the back of her head and forced it down on his erect penis multiple times. Because it tasted bad, she felt bad, and she could not breathe, she threw up on him. He released her, and she threw up again on Seelig. She then ran upstairs.

[10] The entire assault lasted a long time, and although it was dark, Victim was able to see parts of her assailant and noticed that he was white, was not fat, and was not large. She saw the flash from the phone camera at least twice and could tell the light was continuous, which led her to believe he was recording videos and not taking still pictures.

[11] When Victim fled upstairs, she pounded on the bedroom doors with both hands and thought she could still hear Seelig downstairs. Jackie and Chloe opened the door, and Victim told them to close and lock the door because Seelig was still downstairs. Victim was hysterical and told her friends that a man just raped her and tried to kill her. Victim was only wearing her shirt, so one of her friends got her sweatpants to wear. Jackie called 911.

[12] Police officers arrived while Victim was still upstairs in Jackie's bedroom. Victim immediately recognized Huntington County Sheriff's Deputy Austin Bullock (“Deputy Bullock”), as he is related to Victim. While speaking to Deputy Bullock, Victim was hysterical and told him that she had been raped and that the man had tried to kill her. Officers took Victim and the other women to the police station. On her way out of the house, Victim remained anxious. Once at the station, Victim told Deputy Bullock that she thought she was going to die.

[13] Huntington City Police Department Detective Darius Hillman (“Detective Hillman”) was contacted to investigate the crime. He went to the scene after the women had already been transported to the police station. He observed that several screens had been removed from windows of the house, and one of the kitchen windows was open. Detective Hillman then went inside and noticed that the living room was in disarray, that the futon cushions had been separated, that there was vomit on the floor, and that Victim's leggings and underwear were on the floor near the futon. Detective Hillman also observed a wet footprint that was made from either a bare or socked foot on the floor. Officers collected evidence from the scene including Victim's leggings, underwear, and swabs for possible DNA matches from the windows and floor.

[14] Detective Hillman then went to the station to interview the women, including Victim. He interviewed Victim at about 6:40 a.m., and Victim was crying and had difficulty answering questions. Victim told Detective Hillman what occurred and recounted to him how she woke up with Seelig's hand in her pants on her vagina, her confusion, and how she was unable to get up because Seelig was on top of her. She also recounted how he strangled her and threatened to kill her, told her to shut up, and became more violent as she resisted. She told Detective Hillman that Seelig digitally penetrated her and also penetrated her with his penis and forced her mouth onto his penis. Victim also stated her belief that Seelig had recorded the sexual assault and her fear that she and her friends were going to die because of his threats.

[15] After interviewing the young women, Detective Hillman retrieved video surveillance footage from businesses located along the route the women took home that night. He was able to retrieve video footage from several businesses, including one of the bars that the women had been at the night before. Detective Hillman saw Seelig in the video footage from the bar and retrieved Seelig's receipts from both bars. Detective Hillman also interviewed Trent, who accompanied the women at the bars, and his description of Seelig matched that given by the women and was confirmed by the video footage. The video surveillance footage from nearby businesses showed Seelig trailing the women home after they left the bar. As a result of this footage, Detective Hillman, who was already familiar with Seelig, was able to identify Seelig.

[16] Victim was examined at the Sexual Assault Treatment Center in Fort Wayne. Evidence was collected, including numerous DNA samples, and the police obtained a warrant for Seelig's DNA. After testing, the samples from Victim's neck, hands, fingernails, and hip showed a mixture of Seelig's and Victim's DNA standards. Presumptive testing of Victim's t-shirt showed seminal fluid, and oral swabs from Victim contained DNA from both Victim and Seelig. As a result of the assault, Victim suffered bruising, broken blood vessels in her eyes, and abrasions to her arms, face, and neck, and she experienced pain in her back, neck, jaw, and head.

[17] Seelig was arrested on April 22, 2024. During the investigation, Detective Hillman also obtained a search warrant for Seelig's cell phone, and a digital examination was conducted on it. Seelig's internet search history included numerous searches focused on “rape play torture pornography,” and his browser history included websites showing men performing acts matching Seelig's actions during his assault of Victim. Three deleted videos were also recovered, which were video recordings of Seelig's confinement and sexual assault of Victim. The voices in the recordings matched the voices of Seelig and Victim, one video showed Seelig's face, and the scene of the videos matched the living room in Jackie's and Sydney's home. In one video, Seelig was holding a knife that went missing from the kitchen drawer. The timestamps of the videos spanned a period of over thirty-two minutes. The police also used CellHawk mapping software to map the locations of Seelig's cell phone between April 20 and April 22, which showed Seelig at his girlfriend's house, then at the two bars, and then at the residence where Victim was assaulted. Officers went to the girlfriend's house and collected Seelig's clothing, most of which he had attempted to wash.

[18] On April 24, 2024, the State charged Seelig with Level 1 felony rape, Level 3 felony burglary, Level 4 felony criminal confinement, Level 6 felony strangulation, and Level 6 felony intimidation. A four-day jury trial was held on January 21 through January 24, 2025. Due to the large amount of evidence demonstrating that Seelig committed the sexual assault upon Victim, in his opening statement, he told the jury that he was admitting to the majority of the elements of the offenses as alleged by the State. However, he opposed the allegations that, at any time during the events of April 21, 2024, he threatened to kill Victim. During the trial, in addition to testimony setting out the above facts, Kenneth Collins (“Collins”), Seelig's cellmate, testified. Collins stated that Seelig discussed the crimes with him and admitted to Collins that there was a weapon involved in his crimes against Victim, that he held the weapon in his hand, and that the weapon was a kitchen knife.

[19] At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Seelig guilty as charged on all five counts. On February 24, 2025, the sentencing hearing was held. As aggravating circumstances, the trial court found Seelig's “criminal history, his repeated violent behavior, the fact the harm to the victims was greater than necessary for the elements of the crimes, and the fact [Seelig] has repeatedly violated conditions set forth by the [trial court].” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 30. No mitigating circumstances were found, and the trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances. In sentencing Seelig, the trial court vacated his convictions for strangulation and intimidation and imposed a forty-year sentence for Level 1 felony rape, a sixteen-year sentence for Level 3 felony burglary, and a ten-year sentence for Level 4 felony criminal confinement. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of sixty-six years executed in the DOC. Seelig now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[20] Seelig first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for Level 1 felony rape. When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016), cert. denied. Instead, we consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.” Id. Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[21] To convict Seelig of Level 1 felony rape, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally engaged in sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Victim when she was compelled by force or imminent threat of force, and the act was committed by using or threatening the use of deadly force. Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1), (b)(1). Seelig concedes that the State proved most of the elements of the offense. On appeal, he is only challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support that he used or threatened to use deadly force in the commission of the rape. Specifically, Seelig asserts that Victim's testimony was incredibly dubious because Victim was the only witness to testify regarding his threats, no direct evidence was presented to prove the use or threatened use of deadly force, and Victim's testimony was inherently improbable due to her consumption of alcohol prior to the offenses and how it affected her recollection of the events.

[22] “A conviction can be sustained on only the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the victim.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012) (citing Ferrell v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1070, 1072–73 (Ind. 1991)). However, the incredible dubiosity rule recognizes that, in very rare cases, a witness's credibility is so untrustworthy and lacking as to justify reversal on appeal. Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 755 (Ind. 2015). The Indiana Supreme Court has explained that we should only invoke this doctrine “where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant's guilt.” Id. (emphases in original). The incredible dubiosity rule applies only when a witness contradicts herself in a single statement or while testifying; the rule does not apply to conflicts between multiple statements. See Chambliss v. State, 119 N.E.3d 182, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). This standard is not an impossible burden to meet, but it is a difficult one, and the testimony must be such that no reasonable person could believe it. Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756.

[23] Here, we conclude that the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply. Although Victim was the sole witness to testify regarding the threats of deadly force made by Seelig, Victim did not contradict herself when testifying at trial. See Chambliss, 119 N.E.3d at 193. Instead, throughout her statements to the police after the crimes occurred and continuing to her testimony at trial, Victim consistently stated that Seelig threatened to kill her repeatedly throughout the assault. She testified that he repeatedly told her, “I'm going to fucking kill you.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 208. Additionally, Seelig told her to “Put [her] fucking ass up,” and when she told him that she could not, he threatened her stating, “Do it or I'll kill you.” Id. at 209. And after this threat, he proceeded to insert his fingers into her vagina and then to insert his penis into her vagina. Victim's testimony at trial was consistent and unequivocal that Seelig repeatedly threatened the use of deadly force during the commission of the rape. Victim's testimony of what occurred and the threats that Seelig made to her were not inherently improbable. Therefore, the incredible dubiosity rule does not apply. Sufficient evidence was presented to support Seelig's conviction for Level 1 felony rape.

II. Double Jeopardy

[24] Seelig next asserts that his convictions for both Level 1 felony rape and Level 4 felony criminal confinement violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy because he contends that criminal confinement is an included offense of rape. Where a single act or transaction implicates multiple statutes, Wadle v. State, 151 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. 2020), requires that we engage in a multi-step process to determine whether the convictions comport with double jeopardy principles. Id. at 235. The first step is to review the two statutes under which Seelig was convicted. If the language of the statutes “clearly permits multiple punishment,” then there is no double jeopardy violation. Id. at 248. Seelig was convicted of Level 1 felony rape under Indiana Code section 35-42-4-1(a)(1), (b)(1), and he was convicted of Level 4 felony criminal confinement under Indiana Code section 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(2). Neither of the statutes at issue expressly authorize multiple punishments for the same criminal act. Nor are they part of a statutory scheme that requires multiple punishments. Because neither statute clearly permits multiple punishments, either expressly or by unmistakable implication, we must move to the next step in the Wadle analysis. Id.

[25] The second step is to determine whether either of the offenses is included in the other, either inherently or factually. Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248. An offense that is inherently included in another is one that

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168.

[26] “An offense, even if not inherently included in another, is factually included in the other if the charging information alleges ‘that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense[.]’ ” Robinson v. State, 251 N.E.3d 1124, 1132 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Norris v. State, 943 N.E.2d 362, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied). The Indiana Supreme Court has recently clarified that “when assessing whether an offense is factually included, a court may examine only the facts as presented on the face of the charging instrument.” A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1067 (Ind. 2024) (emphasis in A.W.). We assess whether the charging instrument shows that the “ ‘means used’ to commit the alleged greater offense ‘include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’ ” Bradshaw v. State, 239 N.E.3d 864, 867–68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067). “Step 2 has core constraints: it does not authorize courts to probe other facts, such as evidence adduced from trial.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067. If the charging instrument is ambiguous as to whether one of the offenses is included in the other, we construe that ambiguity in favor of the defendant and proceed to step three presuming a double jeopardy violation. Id. at 1069. “ ‘If neither offense is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged), there is no violation of double jeopardy’ and the analysis ends—full stop.” Id. at 1067 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 248).

[27] We first must determine if Seelig's offenses for Level 1 felony rape and Level 4 felony criminal confinement are inherently included. The relevant statutory language with respect to those offenses is as follows:

Level 1 felony Rape:

(a) ․ [A] person who knowingly or intentionally has sexual intercourse with another person or knowingly or intentionally causes another person to perform or submit to other sexual conduct ․ when:

(1) the other person is compelled by force or imminent threat of force;

․

commits rape, a Level 3 felony.

(b) An offense described in subsection (a) is a Level 1 felony if:

(1) it is committed by using or threatening the use of deadly force

․

I.C. § 35-42-4-1(a)(1), (b)(1).

Level 4 felony Criminal Confinement:

(a) A person who knowingly or intentionally confines another person without the other person's consent commits criminal confinement. Except as provided in subsection (b), the offense of criminal confinement is a Level 6 felony.

(b) The offense of criminal confinement defined in subsection (a) is:

․

(2) a Level 4 felony if it results in moderate bodily injury to a person other than the confining person ․

I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(2).

[28] These offenses are not inherently included. First, neither of these two offenses are an attempt to commit the other. Second, each of the two offenses at issue contains at least one element the other does not. The offense of Level 1 felony rape requires proof that a defendant committed the offense of rape by using or threatening the use of deadly force, and the offense of Level 4 felony criminal confinement requires that the confinement results in moderate bodily injury. Moreover, the two statutes do not differ only in that one involves a “less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest[ ] or a lesser kind of culpability” than the other. See Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168(3). The harm involved in Level 1 felony rape is a person is compelled by the use of or the threat of deadly force to submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct, while the harm involved in Level 4 felony criminal confinement is that a person is confined resulting in moderate bodily injury.

[29] We next must determine if the offenses, as charged, are factually included. Looking to the charging information, the Level 1 felony rape count was charged as follows:

On or about April 21, 2024 in Huntington County, State of Indiana, said [Seelig] did knowingly or intentionally engage in sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct with Victim [ ]; when such person was compelled by force or the imminent threat of force, and the act was committed by using or threatening the use of deadly force.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 60. The Level 4 felony criminal confinement was charged as follows:

On or about April 21, 2024[,] in Huntington County, State of Indiana, said [Seelig] did knowingly or intentionally confine Victim [ ] without the consent of Victim[ ], said act resulting in moderate bodily injury to Victim [ ].

Id. at 64. Both counts simply track the statutory language and lack any specific facts, particularly as to the means used, the moderate bodily injury suffered by Victim, or what deadly force was involved in the rape. The lack of specific facts makes it entirely conceivable that the means Seelig used to confine Victim was the same means used to compel her to submit to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct. The charging instrument provides no indication of the timing of the offenses, how they were committed, or what deadly force was used or threatened. Because there are conceivable facts that could show the means used to commit the confinement include all the elements of the rape, we find the charging instrument ambiguous. Construing that ambiguity in Seelig's favor, we proceed to step three with the presumption that there is a double jeopardy violation. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1069.

[30] In the third step, we must then “examine the facts underlying those offenses, as presented in the charging instrument and as adduced at trial.” Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249. “If the underlying facts reveal the two offenses are indeed separate, there is no Wadle violation, even if one offense is, by definition, included in the other.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at. 249). However, the convictions will be found to violate substantive double jeopardy if the two offenses were “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). “Any confinement of a victim beyond that inherent in the force used to effectuate the rape constitutes a violation of the confinement statute apart from the violation inherent in the offense of forcible rape.” Parks v. State, 734 N.E.2d 694, 701 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added) (citing Griffin v. State, 583 N.E.2d 191, 195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)).

[31] The evidence that the State presented at trial established that Seelig's acts of criminal confinement against Victim were separate and distinct from the acts that constituted his rape of her. In addition, the acts were separated by sufficient passage of time to constitute a separate offense. Stated differently, if Seelig had abandoned his intention of raping Victim for any reason, there was sufficient evidence to prove that he had confined Victim. Likewise, even without consideration of his acts of confinement, there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction of rape.

[32] Looking to the timestamps of the videos, the portion of Seelig's criminal episode that he recorded spanned over thirty-two minutes. The evidence revealed that Victim was awoken with Seelig breathing behind her and his hand was in her pants touching her vagina, which had to have occurred after approximately 3:50 a.m. as Victim appeared to still be sleeping in the first video that began at 3:48 a.m. and lasted about two minutes. Sometime after 3:50 a.m., when the first video ended, and 4:09 a.m. when the second video began, Victim woke up and the confinement occurred. Once awoken, Victim tried to push Seelig away, and he initially pushed Victim down into the futon cushions, causing her to be unable to move. He then took her arms and wrists and slammed them to the ground, injuring her and causing bruising to her wrists. At this time, no rape had yet occurred. Victim tried to resist, but Seelig then slammed her head down and put his knee in her back to keep her on her stomach. He began strangling her, causing Victim to be unable to breathe, and then slammed her head to the floor, causing her head to pound. All of these actions took place before the vaginal and oral rapes had occurred. At this point, Seelig had confined Victim for a time period of close to nineteen minutes, and only after this period of confinement by holding her arms, slamming her head to the floor, and strangling her, did he pull her pants down, order her to “[p]ut [her] fucking ass up” or he would “kill” her, and then begin vaginally raping her and subsequently forcing her to perform oral sex. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 209. Based on this evidence, Seelig confined Victim for a significant period of time before the rape began such that he would have been guilty of criminal confinement based on those facts, with or without any evidence of the rape.

[33] Under Wadle, if the State can show that the evidence used to prove the two offenses were distinct, there is no double jeopardy violation. This case involved multiple acts of force by Seelig that led to his confinement of Victim, and which resulted in moderate bodily injury to Victim, and these acts of force were separate and distinct from the force and threats of deadly force that he used to effectuate the rape of Victim. We, therefore, conclude that Seelig's convictions for both Level 1 felony rape and Level 4 felony criminal confinement do not violate double jeopardy.

III. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing

[34] Seelig additionally argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it sentenced him. The trial court has discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement that includes a “reasonably detailed recitation of the ․ reasons for imposing a particular sentence.” Id. If the sentencing statement “includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating.” Id. “The reasons given, and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion.” Id. at 491.

[35] Seelig contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to find his relatively young age and that he would “respond well to any terms, conditions of his incarceration, parole or probation” as mitigating factors. Appellant's Br. p. 28. When the defendant claims “the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor,” the defendant must “establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record.” Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. However, “[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist.” Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)).

[36] Here, after finding several aggravating factors, the trial court stated that it found no mitigating factors. Seelig argues that the trial court should have found that because he was only twenty-nine years old at the time of sentencing, he had a great chance of being rehabilitated while serving his sentence and essentially had his whole life in front of him, which he argued were mitigating factors at sentencing. He also asserts that his proffered mitigator that he would likely respond well to any terms and conditions of the sentence imposed by the trial court was supported by the evidence.

[37] However, we conclude that Seelig's proffered mitigating factors were not supported by the record. Although Seelig was only twenty-eight years old when he committed the instant offenses, the record revealed that he began breaking the law at the age of ten, and over the course of his twenty-eight years, he accumulated six known juvenile adjudications, two prior felony convictions, and seven prior misdemeanor convictions, in addition to the five Level 5 felony possession of child pornography counts that he pleaded guilty to prior to sentencing. Seelig also argues that he was likely to respond positively to the terms or conditions of sentencing. However, Seelig's criminal history and repeated violations of probation suggest just the opposite conclusion. Despite his previous terms of incarcerations and probation, Seelig continued to commit multiple felony offenses, and therefore, such mitigating factor was not supported by the record. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Seelig's proffered mitigating factors. There was no abuse of discretion in the sentencing of Seelig.

IV. Inappropriate Sentence

[38] Seelig also contends that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and the character of the offender. The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). “That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[39] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on “the forest—the aggregate sentence—rather than the trees—consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[40] Seelig was convicted of Level 1 felony rape, Level 3 felony burglary, and Level 4 felony criminal confinement. A person who commits a Level 1 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between twenty and forty years, with the advisory sentence being thirty years. I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b). A person who commits a Level 3 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between three and sixteen years, with the advisory sentence being nine years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b). A person who commits a Level 4 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two and twelve years, with the advisory sentence being six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. Here, the trial court sentenced Seelig to forty years for his Level 1 felony rape conviction, sixteen years for his Level 3 felony burglary conviction, and ten years for his Level 4 felony criminal confinement conviction, with all of the sentences to run consecutively for an aggregate sixty-six-year sentence.

[41] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers “the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense.” Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In arguing that his sentence is inappropriate, Seelig acknowledges that “his particular crimes were very egregious” but contends that “the rape of Victim [ ] is similar in nature to other rapes that take place,” his entry into the house “did not cause property damage,” and the criminal confinement was “not a separate and distinct act such as locking Victim [ ] in a room and preventing her departure.” Appellant's Br. p. 31.

[42] Seelig targeted Victim for his crime and engaged in a predatory and violent rape of Victim after forcing entry into the residence. His actions terrorized Victim and the other women in the home on the night he committed his crimes. After encountering the women at the local bars, Seelig surreptitiously followed them back home, and after they had gone to bed, he removed screens from the windows of the home and entered the home through a kitchen window. Once inside, Seelig approached Victim, who was asleep on a futon in the living room, and began to sexually assault her. When she resisted, Seelig violently attacked Victim, pinning Victim to the floor and repeatedly slammed her head to the floor and began strangling her. Seelig repeatedly told Victim that he was going to kill her and told her he would kill her if she made any sound. After subduing Victim, Seelig proceeded to assault and rape her, first inserting his fingers into her vagina, then inserting his penis into her vagina and then grabbed her by her hair and forced her head onto his penis, forcing Victim to perform oral sex on him. When Victim resisted, Seelig punched her in the face. Only when Victim threw up on him did Seelig release her, and she was able to run upstairs. As a result of the assault, Victim suffered bruising, broken blood vessels in her eyes, and abrasions to her arms, face, and neck, and she experienced pain in her back, neck, jaw, and head. The women that lived in the house felt compelled to move out shortly after the night of the brutal assault. Finally, Seelig videotaped much of his assault and rape of Victim on his cell phone. Victim was aware she was being filmed and pleaded with Seelig to not video the assault. The violence and depravity with which Seelig committed his crimes fail to demonstrate compelling evidence portraying the nature of his offenses in a positive light, accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[43] When we look to a defendant's character, we engage in “a broad analysis of the defendant's ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Cramer, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Crabtree v. State, 152 N.E.3d 687, 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied). As to Seelig's character, he concedes that he has an extensive criminal history but also asserts that the evidence established that he has two minor children, graduated high school, and was employed before the crimes occurred, and he had very strong family support. He argues that this evidence of his character supports a downward revision of his sentence because his almost maximum sentence should be “reserved for those that are truly the ‘worst of the worst.’ ” Appellant's Br. p. 32.

[44] Considering Seelig's character, the evidence revealed that he has an extensive criminal history that included two prior felony convictions, seven prior misdemeanor convictions, and eight prior probation revocations. Additionally, Seelig's contacts with the criminal justice system included twelve juvenile matters with six known adjudications, one of which resulted in Seelig being sent to the DOC. Further, at the conclusion of Seelig's jury trial in the present case, he pleaded guilty to five counts of Level 5 felony possession of child pornography in two separate cause numbers that had been pending at the same time as this matter, and he was sentenced on these two cause numbers on the same date as the instant matter. Looking at Seelig's criminal history, it is clear that past punishments and interventions did not dissuade him from committing further criminal acts and escalating in severity of such acts. Moreover, the nature of the instant offenses, which included burglarizing a home, fondling Victim while she slept, strangling and confining Victim, and then videotaping his violent rape of her while threatening to kill her does not place Seelig's character in a positive light. We conclude that Seelig has not demonstrated substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character to portray his character in a positive light such that sentence revision is warranted. See Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[45] Based on the facts in the record, Seelig has not shown that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

Conclusion

[46] We, therefore, conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support Seelig's conviction for Level 1 felony rape and that his convictions for both Level 1 felony rape and Level 4 felony criminal confinement did not violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it sentenced Seelig, and his sentence is not inappropriate.

[47] Affirmed.

[48] I agree that sufficient evidence supports Seelig's conviction for rape. And as for whether his convictions for both rape and criminal confinement constitute substantive double jeopardy, I agree with the majority's analysis of Steps 1 and 2 of the Wadle test culminating in a presumptive double jeopardy violation. See slip op. at ¶¶ 24–29. That leaves the question under Step 3: was there a single offense or two distinguishable offenses? The majority concludes the State has overcome the presumptive double jeopardy violation and shown the two offenses were separate and distinct. See id. at ¶ 33. But I conclude there was only one offense, and therefore respectfully dissent.

[49] In Step 3 of the Wadle analysis (and only in Step 3), we may “probe the underlying facts—as presented in the charging instrument and adduced at trial—to determine whether a defendant's actions were ‘so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.’ ” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071 (quoting Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 249). “[I]t is the State's burden to expressly delineate the facts at trial in a manner that will rebut a presumptive double jeopardy violation that the State itself has created by the opaque manner in which it has chosen to write the charging information.” Bradshaw v. State, 239 N.E.3d 864, 868–69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). “Any doubt counsels against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses.” Powell v. State, 151 N.E.3d 256, 265 (Ind. 2020) (internal quotation omitted).

[50] “[T]he act of forcible rape necessarily entails some degree of confinement.” Zamilpa v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1079, 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). To show two separate and distinct crimes, the State must show the defendant confined the victim beyond what was inherent in the act of rape. Id. In Zamilpa, a panel of this Court concluded “neither the charging information nor the way the State presented the charges to the jury differentiated between the force [the defendant] used in raping [the victim] and the additional degree of force meant to support the criminal confinement conviction[.]” Id. at 1086; cf. Parks, 734 N.E.2d at 701 (concluding rape and criminal confinement convictions did not violate double jeopardy where defendant was charged with confinement involving removal from one place to another which was proved separate and apart from the incidents that proved rape). Here, like Zamilpa, the State did not demonstrate a distinction between the criminal confinement allegation and the rape allegation.

[51] The facts presented at trial indicate Victim woke up and “heard someone breathing behind [her], and someone's hand was in [her] pants touching [her] vagina” under her leggings and underwear. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 197. Victim elbowed Seelig to push him off, but he pushed her back down, took her arms by the wrists and slammed them on the ground, all the while “[s]till trying to get his hand into [her] vagina.” Id. at 200. Victim tried pushing, kicking, and moving away but Seelig “just continued to hurt [her].” Id. at 201. When Seelig told Victim to “[p]ut [her] ․ ass up” or he would kill her, he had pulled her pants down and was behind her with “his fingers inside [her] ․ vagina” before lowering his own pants and putting his penis in her vagina. Id. at 209–10.

[52] The State argues on appeal that only after Seelig told Victim to “[p]ut [her] ․ ass up” did his “intention of raping her” become clear. Appellee's Br. p. 23. And the majority also parses the events into the crime of confinement before Seelig pulled Victim's pants down and the crime of rape after. See slip op. at ¶ 32. But Victim testified she awoke with Seelig's hand touching her vagina and that Seelig was “trying to get his hand into [her] vagina” throughout the assault, including having his fingers inside her vagina when he told her to “[p]ut [her] ․ ass up.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 200, 209. And the State did not so clearly delineate Seeling's acts to the jury as it attempts to do now. In fact, during the State's closing argument, it stated:

[Seelig] engaged not only in sexual intercourse with [Victim], but also other sexual conduct․ And sexual intercourse means an act that includes any penetration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ․ [Victim] told [investigators] that [Seelig] inserted his penis into her vagina.

Other sexual conduct is defined as one of two things. You do not have to have both but in this case we do. The first part of that definition is that the sex organ of one person and the mouth or anus of another person is involved, and the second definition is that it's an act involving the penetration of the sex organ or anus by an object. And here that object is a finger. A finger qualifies as an object under the Indiana statutes. And we know that this occurred because [Victim] told [police] that [Seelig] put his fingers inside her vagina multiple times․ She indicated to you that she woke up with [Seelig's] fingers inside her․

* * *

There is no question that [Seelig] subjected [Victim] to sexual intercourse or other sexual conduct.

Tr. Vol. 5 pp. 59–61.

[53] In other words, the State argued to the jury that the evidence proved forcible rape in several ways from the first act Victim remembers—waking up to find Seelig's hand in her pants touching her vagina—to one of the last—Seelig inserting his penis into her vagina. Seelig's confinement of Victim and his rape of her were coextensive. The assault lasted approximately thirty minutes—a significant passage of time to the Victim, to be sure—and it was continuous and restricted to a single location. Seelig showed a “singleness of purpose” when he put his hand down Victim's pants while she was still sleeping and continued to touch or try to touch her vagina while he physically assaulted her for the next half hour. I conclude the State did not present the crimes as separate and distinct to the jury so as to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation. Seelig's acts constitute a single transaction and convictions for both criminal confinement and rape are a substantive double jeopardy violation.

[54] In this scenario, we reverse “the conviction with the lesser penalty.” Eversole v. State, 251 N.E.3d 604, 609 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing Wadle, 151 N.E.3d at 256), trans. denied. I would therefore reverse Seelig's criminal confinement conviction and remand to the trial court to vacate the conviction and issue a new sentencing order. Accordingly, I would not consider the sentencing arguments Seelig raises in this appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1), (b)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-43-2-1(2).

3.   I.C. § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(2).

Foley, Judge.

Scheele, J., concurs. Kenworthy, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.