N.E., Appellant/Respondent v. L.E. and T.W., Appellees/Petitioners (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] N.E. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of B.E. (d/o/b September 5, 2014 and C.E. (d/o/b August 28, 2016) (collectively, “Children”), who have lived with L.E. (Mother's mother) and T.W. since their births. Mother appeals from the juvenile court's denial of her motion to withdraw her consents to the adoption of Children by L.E. and T.W., arguing that the record establishes that her consents had been the product of fraud or coercion. Because be disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] B.E. and C.E. were born to Mother in 2014 and 2016, respectively, and have resided with L.E. since birth; L.E. was appointed Children's legal guardian on October 24, 2018. C.J.¹ is the father of B.E., and J.B.² is the father of C.E. On July 31, 2023, Mother executed a consent to the adoption of C.E., and Mother and C.J. executed consents to the adoption of B.E.

[3] On October 9, 2023, L.E. and T.W. petitioned to adopt Children. On July 12, 2024, Mother and C.J. moved to withdraw their consents to B.E.’s adoption, and Mother moved to withdraw her consent to C.E.’s adoption. At a June 17, 2025, hearing, Mother indicated that she had only signed the consents to adoption of Children because L.E. had promised her that she would be able to be in their lives following the adoption.

[4] On June 24, 2025, the juvenile court found that it was not in the Children's best interests for the consents to adoption to be set aside. The juvenile court found that “parental remorse, after the fact, does not support the vacating of consents that were previously freely and voluntarily made.” Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 92–93. On July 25, 2025, the juvenile court granted L.E. and T.W.’s petitions to adopt Children.

Discussion and Decision

[5] We note that L.E. and T.W. have not filed a brief. When an appellee has not filed a brief, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee's behalf.” Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006). “[W]e will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Id. Prima facie error is error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (citation omitted).

[6] That said, Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her requests to withdraw her consents to L.E. and T.W.’s adoption of Children.

“When reviewing adoption proceedings, we presume that the trial court's decision is correct, and the appellant bears the burden of rebutting this presumption.” In re Adoption of J.L.J. and J.D.J., 4 N.E.3d 1189, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citation omitted), trans. denied. We generally give considerable deference to the trial court's decision in family law matters, because we recognize that the trial judge is in the best position to judge the facts, determine witness credibility, “get a feel for the family dynamics,” and “get a sense of the parents and their relationship with their children.” MacLafferty v. MacLafferty, 829 N.E.2d 938, 940 (Ind. 2005). We will not disturb the trial court's ruling “unless the evidence leads to but one conclusion and the trial judge reached an opposite conclusion.” Rust v. Lawson, 714 N.E.2d 769, 771 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (citation omitted), trans. denied. The trial court's findings and judgment will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous. In re Paternity of K.I., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). “A judgment is clearly erroneous when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the judgment.” Id. “We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess the credibility of witnesses, and we will examine only the evidence most favorable to the trial court's decision.” In re Adoption of A.M., 930 N.E.2d 613, 616 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).

In re Adoption of O.R., 16 N.E.3d 965, 972–73 (Ind. 2014). “[A]n adoption obtained by fraud or duress, or other consent[-]vitiating factors would be subject to attack as any other judgment obtained through fraud, duress, or other such practices under Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 60(B)(3).”³ Matter of Adoption of H.S., 483 N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (all brackets supplied).

[7] Mother contends that the juvenile court should have allowed her to withdraw her consents to the adoptions of Children because they had been obtained by fraud and duress. To support her argument, Mother points to her testimony stating that L.E. had promised her that she and Father would “continue to have liberal access and participation” in Children's lives and that “these conversations took place over a period of months and that there were many of them[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 105. Mother also points to her testimony stating that she would not have given her consent to the adoptions of Children had L.E. not made those promises.⁴ Even if we assume, arguendo, that this evidence would be sufficient to establish fraud, it is not favorable to the juvenile court's judgment, so we do not consider it. See, e.g., O.R., 16 N.E.3d at 973. In any event, the juvenile court was under no obligation to credit any of this evidence and apparently did not, finding that the consents had been executed voluntarily. Mother's argument amounts to nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See id.

[8] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although C.J. participated below, he does not take part in this appeal.

2.   J.B. was served with notice of the adoption petition for C.E. but did not respond. On February 15, 2024, the juvenile court ruled that J.B.’s irrevocable consent to the adoption had been implied by operation of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-8.

3.   Trial Rule 60(B) provides, in part, that “the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a judgment [due to] fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party[.]”

4.   Mother also points to allegations made in her motions to withdraw the consents, but these are not evidence, and we do not consider them in evaluating her argument.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.