IN RE: A.W. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] S.W. (Mother) and T.M. (Father) (collectively, Parents) separately appeal the trial court's determination that their children are Children in Need of Services (CHINS), alleging the evidence is insufficient to support the adjudications. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the biological mother of G.E., born 2012, L.E.M., born 2014, A.W., born 2016, T.W., born 2018, M.M., born 2023, and L.M., born 2024. Father is the biological father of M.M. and L.M.¹ In 2024, Parents were residing together in Vigo County with all six children.

[3] On September 30, 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) received a report that one-year-old M.M. had left the home alone and was “attempting to walk into the road[.]” Mother's App. Vol. II p. 161. The report also stated M.M.’s diaper was “overflowing” and that the home was “filthy.” Id. Family Case Manager (FCM) Chelsea Koenig went to the home to investigate, but Parents refused to allow her full access to the home. At this time, Father also had pending 2023 charges for Level 5 felony domestic battery with bodily injury to a pregnant woman, Level 5 felony strangulation, Level 6 felony domestic battery committed in the presence of a child, Level 6 felony intimidation, and misdemeanor domestic battery—all with Mother as the alleged victim. See Cause No. 84D04-2306-F5-002027.²

[4] On October 17, DCS received a report that Parents strike the children when they leave their bedrooms. FCM Koenig again attempted to investigate, but Parents would not allow her in the home. On October 23, DCS received another report indicating the home lacked food. DCS filed a motion to compel access to the home, which the trial court granted on November 20, but Parents still refused access. On November 21, DCS filed petitions alleging the children to be CHINS, citing Parents’ lack of cooperation with DCS and concerns over the home's condition, domestic violence within the home, and excessive physical discipline. That same day, the trial court authorized the children's removal from the home.  ³

[5] DCS recommended Parents engage in home-based casework as well as services to address anger management and domestic violence. Parents refused to participate in any services except visitation with the children. While visitation went well, Father was “insulting and belligerent” to DCS workers. Mother's App. Vol. II p. 161. He continued to refuse DCS access to the home. DCS eventually told Parents to reach out to DCS when they were willing to allow access to the home, but Parents never did.

[6] A factfinding hearing was held over the course of three days in January, March, and April 2025. FCM Alexis Overstreet testified that she met with Mother in December 2024, during which Mother told FCM Overstreet that Father threatens to slash her car tires or break her car windows, “spanked the children harder than a child should be spanked” including one-year old M.M., and shakes the children while telling them to “shut the f*ck up[.]” Id. at 162. FCM Overstreet also testified she had not been able to verify that the home's conditions are safe for the children to return. She testified that Parents refused access, and she did not feel safe showing up to the property unannounced because Father had made statements that “if an FCM [ ] went to his house, his trigger finger still worked and he knows how to use it.” Tr. Vol. II p. 142.

[7] Mother testified and at first denied that she or Father spank the children. She then testified “we only spank our children when it is necessary[.]” Id. at 12. She acknowledged that she told FCM Overstreet that when spanking the children, Father would “make more contact than was necessary” but denied that he ever left marks or bruises. Id. at 19. Mother also testified as to the domestic violence with Father, stating he “strangled” her while she was pregnant with L.M. Id. at 15. She acknowledged she filed a protective order against him in December 2024 because he made “threats of harm” against her and “threats to take the children away from [her].” Id. at 16. Mother also testified she did not “feel that there is a need for [her]” to participate in DCS services. Id. at 163. Father similarly testified he did not believe he needed to complete any services.

[8] Following the hearing, the trial court issued orders finding the children to be CHINS.⁴ Parents now appeal separately.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Parents contend the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's determination that the children are CHINS. Specifically: (1) Father contends one finding is clearly erroneous, (2) Parents both challenge the trial court's conclusions that their actions seriously endangered the children and that the children's needs were unmet, and (3) Mother alone challenges the court's conclusion that the children's needs would go unmet without coercive intervention.

I. Standard of Review

[10] In reviewing a trial court's CHINS determination, “we do not reweigh evidence or judge witness credibility” but consider only the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment and the reasonable inferences therefrom. In re D.J., 68 N.E.3d 574, 577-78 (Ind. 2017). Where, as here, the court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we consider “first, whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. at 578 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We reverse only if the CHINS determination was clearly erroneous, which occurs if “the record facts do not support the findings” or the wrong legal standard is applied. Id. “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Matter of W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

[11] The trial court found the children to be CHINS under Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1, which provides a child is a CHINS if that child is under eighteen and:

(1) the child's physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the child's parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially able to do so; or

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the child needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that:

(A) the child is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive intervention of the court.

[12] DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the child is a CHINS. Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3 (1997). In sum, a CHINS adjudication “requires three basic elements: that the parent's actions or inactions have seriously endangered the child, that the child's needs are unmet, and (perhaps most critically) that those needs are unlikely to be met without State coercion.” In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014), reh'g denied.

II. Finding 15

[13] Father argues Finding 15 is unsupported by the evidence. Finding 15 states,

DCS has been unable to verify that the conditions in the home are safe for the children, and [Father] admitted during the final day of testimony that he had received the home when his uncle passed away, that he had moved a lot of stuff in and out of the house, that he has been doing home repairs since he received the house, and that the house was a “wreck” when he received it.

Mother's App. Vol. II p. 161.⁵ Father contends this was inaccurate because “DCS did verify the conditions of Parents’ home when FCM Koenig inspected the home on October 1, 2024.” Father's Br. p. 12. But during that visit, Parents only allowed FCM Koenig to see certain rooms. Subsequently, Parents refused DCS access to the home entirely. FCM Overstreet eventually told Parents to reach out to her when they were ready for her to inspect the house, and they never did. As such, we cannot say the court's finding that DCS was unable to verify the conditions of the home is clearly erroneous.

[14] Father also challenges the portions of the finding relating to his testimony. However, he does not argue the finding is erroneous; rather, he argues it “failed to include all of Father's relevant testimony on the conditions of his home.” Id. at 13. In other words, Father argues the court should have considered other, more favorable, evidence. This is a request to reweigh evidence, which we do not do.

III. Seriously Impaired or Endangered

[15] Parents both argue the trial court's findings do not support the conclusion that the physical or mental condition of the children is seriously impaired or endangered. But a child's exposure to domestic violence may support a CHINS adjudication. K.A.H. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 119 N.E.3d 1115, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “[A] single incident of domestic violence in a child's presence may support a CHINS finding, and it need not necessarily be repetitive.” Id. at 1121. Here, Mother testified that Father strangled her while she was pregnant with L.M., and at the time of the factfinding hearing Father had pending charges for a variety of domestic-violence felonies, including domestic battery against Mother in the presence of a child. In December 2024, just one month prior to the first day of the CHINS factfinding hearing, Mother told FCM Overstreet that Father made threats of harm against her. That same month she received a protective order against Father on behalf of her and the children.

[16] In addition, the trial court's findings support a determination that the children are endangered due to Father's excessive corporal punishment. We are mindful of Indiana Code section 31-34-1-15, which states that our CHINS statutes do not “[l]imit the right of a parent, guardian, or custodian of a child to use reasonable corporal punishment when disciplining the child.” However, Mother herself, despite initially testifying Parents do not use corporal punishment, testified Father spanks the children “harder than a child should be spanked” and shakes them while telling them to “shut the f*ck up.” Mother's App. Vol. II. p. 162. FCM Overstreet attempted to check the children for marks or bruises, but Father would not allow her to. Given this evidence, we cannot say the trial court erred in determining the physical or mental condition of the children is seriously impaired or endangered.

IV. Unmet Needs

[17] Parents next argue the trial court's findings do not support the conclusion that the children's needs are unmet. As an initial matter, we note that Father contends “before a court can conclude that a child is in need of services it must find that the child's needs of food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, and supervision are unmet” and cites Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. Father's Br. p. 15. Father is misquoting the statue as inclusive. The statute is disjunctive, stating a court must find that a child is seriously impaired or endangered because of the parent's inability, refusal, or neglect “to supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision[.]” Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(1) (2019) (emphasis added). Because this subsection is disjunctive, a finding that a parent is unable to provide one of these necessities would satisfy this element. See e.g., In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1233 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (because termination of parental rights statute subsection is written in the disjunctive, a trial court need only find one of the three requirements of that subsection).

[18] The trial court's findings support its conclusion here. As noted above, the children's need to reside in a safe home free from violence was not being met by Parents due to domestic violence between Parents and Father's excessive physical punishment of the children. See Matter of L.T., 145 N.E.3d 864 872, (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (affirming CHINS adjudication in part due to the child's “exposure to domestic violence in the house” and concerns the child “will not receive the protection he needs”). Parents’ arguments to the contrary focus on Mother's testimony and admissions to FCM Overstreet. These are requests to reweigh evidence, which we do not do.

V. Coercive Intervention

[19] Finally, Mother contends the findings do not support the conclusion that the children's needs are unlikely to be met without the State's coercive intervention. This element guards against unwarranted State interference in family life by reserving that intrusion for families “where parents lack the ability to provide for their children[,]” not merely where they “encounter difficulty in meeting a child's needs.” Lake Cnty. Div. of Family & Children Servs. v. Charlton, 631 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). “[T]he question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[20] The record reflects Parents’ consistent refusal to cooperate with DCS or engage in services other than visitation. Parents repeatedly refused to allow DCS access to the home, even when court-ordered; Father was hostile and aggressive with DCS workers, to the point of threatening the use of his “trigger finger” should they come to the home; and Parents both refused to engage in services and testified there was no need for them to do so. Tr. Vol. II p. 142. This is sufficient to show the trial court's conclusion that the children's needs are unlikely to be met without the State's coercive intervention is not clearly erroneous. See Matter of N.E., 228 N.E.3d 457, 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (trial court's determination that child's needs were unlikely to be met without State coercion was not clearly erroneous where the parents refused to engage in services). Still, Mother argues there is evidence she “is seeing a counselor” and working with Father to “address their conflicts in a healthy way.” Mother's Br. p. 23. This is a request to reweigh evidence, which we will not do. The unchallenged findings show the trial court's determination is not clearly erroneous.

[21] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The biological fathers of G.E., L.E.M., A.W., and T.W. do not participate in this appeal.

2.   As of the date of this decision, these charges remain pending.

3.   G.E. and L.E.M. were placed with their maternal grandmother. A.W. and T.W. were placed with their father. L.M. and M.M. were placed in foster care.

4.   The trial court issued three separate orders—the first covering G.E. and L.E.M., the second covering T.W. and A.W., and the third covering M.M. and L.M. All three orders are substantively the same, with small deviations involving the children's names, ages, and fathers.

5.   Finding 15 is identical in all three orders.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.