Cedric Clardy, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Cedric Clardy was convicted of possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony, and resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony. Clardy appeals and argues the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug because the State did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had actual or constructive possession of the fentanyl pills found in the trunk of the vehicle he was driving. Finding that the evidence is sufficient to sustain Clardy's conviction, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Clardy raises one issue, which we restate as whether sufficient evidence supports his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug.

Facts

[3] On May 13, 2024, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Officer Carter Hess of the Lawrence Police Department was patrolling the area near North Shadeland Avenue when his attention was drawn to a vehicle he believed was stolen. The vehicle was a black Toyota Corolla with an Iowa license plate. Officer Hess ran the license plate through his computer system and confirmed that the vehicle was stolen.

[4] Officer Hess was behind the Corolla at a red light and activated his emergency lights. The Corolla immediately accelerated and fled. The pursuit covered approximately two and a half miles. During the pursuit, the vehicle reached speeds of approximately eighty miles per hour, and the pursuit ended when the vehicle lost control and crashed head-on into a pole. Officer Hess approached the driver's side and observed a man, later identified as Clardy, exit the vehicle. Clardy was taken into custody. A juvenile passenger also exited the vehicle and was taken into custody.

[5] After informing Clardy of his Miranda rights, Officer Hess asked Clardy who owned the car, and Clardy told him it was a rental. Officer Hess later confirmed that the vehicle had been reported stolen on April 2, 2024, from Enterprise rental company. Because Clardy was being taken into custody and the vehicle needed to be impounded, officers conducted an inventory search of the vehicle. Officer Hess searched the passenger compartment and found two AR-15 style magazines in the glovebox, a pair of gardening gloves, and a ski mask.

[6] Sergeant Jason Heiney inventoried the contents of the vehicle's trunk. While Sergeant Heiney was inventorying the trunk, Clardy “requested a pair of shoes out of the trunk.” Tr. Vol. II p. 181. Officer Hess did not give Clardy the shoes because Clardy “already had shoes on.” Id. Inside the trunk, Sergeant Heiney then found a pair of blue jeans that were “heavy,” and he felt “a lump” in the front right pocket of the jeans. Id. at 196. Sergeant Heiney removed the item from the pocket and observed a “large, clear plastic bag that contained a large number of [ ], small, [ ] circular pills.” Id. The blue jeans were size 34, and Clardy was wearing size 32 jeans at the time of the crash. Officers also located in the trunk a black backpack, multiple pairs of tennis shoes, and an extended Glock magazine.

[7] Amanda Mohaupt, a quality assurance assistant manager at the Indianapolis Marion County Forensic Services Agency, analyzed the pills recovered from the jeans. Mohaupt tested two batches of tablets, which had been separated from the original bag based on coloration. The first batch contained 751 white/gray tablets with a total weight of 72.88 grams, and the second batch contained 347 blue tablets with a total weight of 32.42 grams, for a combined total of 1,098 tablets weighing approximately 105.3 grams. Both batches tested positive for fentanyl.

[8] On May 14, 2024, the State charged Clardy with Count I, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony; Count II, possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony; Count III, resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony; and Count IV, possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. On June 9, 2024, the State dismissed Counts I and II and amended the charging information to add Count V, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony, and Count VI, possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony, to identify the controlled substance as fentanyl rather than oxycodone. On February 3, 2025, the State dismissed Count IV, possession of marijuana.

[9] A jury trial commenced on February 4, 2025. Because Counts I, II, and IV had been dismissed before trial, the jury considered only Count III, resisting law enforcement, a Level 6 felony; Count V, dealing in a narcotic drug, a Level 2 felony; and Count VI, possession of a narcotic drug, a Level 3 felony. The jury returned verdicts finding Clardy guilty of Count III and Count VI.

[10] On February 27, 2025, the trial court sentenced Clardy to nine years for the Level 3 felony possession conviction—six years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (“DOC”) followed by three years suspended to probation; and two years for the Level 6 felony resisting conviction, to be served on Community Corrections and home detention, consecutive to the possession sentence. Clardy now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Clardy argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug. Sufficiency of the evidence claims warrant a deferential standard of review in which we “neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility, instead reserving those matters to the province of the jury.” Hancz Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024). A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if “there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. In conducting this review, we consider only the evidence that supports the trial court's determination, not evidence that might undermine it. Id. We affirm the conviction “ ‘unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.’ ” Sutton v. State, 167 N.E.3d 800, 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146-47 (Ind. 2007)).

[12] On appeal, Clardy challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for possession of a narcotic drug. Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-6 provides:

(a) A person who, without a valid prescription or order of a practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner's professional practice, knowingly or intentionally possesses cocaine (pure or adulterated) or a narcotic drug (pure or adulterated) classified in schedule I or II, commits possession of cocaine or a narcotic drug, a Level 6 felony, except as provided in subsections (b) through (d).

* * * * *

(d) The offense is a Level 3 felony if:

(1) the amount of the drug involved is at least twenty-eight (28) grams

[13] Here, the undisputed evidence established that the 1,098 pills with a weight of 105.3 grams of fentanyl ¹ were recovered from the trunk of the car Clardy was driving, which exceeded the statutory threshold of twenty-eight grams. And Clardy did not have any prescription or professional reason to possess that quantity of the drug. Clardy argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he had actual or constructive possession of the fentanyl pills found in the trunk. The State concedes that Clardy did not have actual possession. The question before us is, thus, whether the State proved that Clardy had constructive possession of the pills in the trunk.

[14] Our jurisprudence on the issue of possession is rather straightforward—“it can be either actual or constructive.” B.R. v. State, 162 N.E.3d 1173, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Sargent v. State, 27 N.E.3d 729, 732-33 (Ind. 2015)). In Gray v. State, our Supreme Court explained that “[a] person actually possesses contraband when she has direct physical control over it.” 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011). “When the State cannot show actual possession, a conviction for possessing contraband may rest instead on proof of constructive possession.” Id. “A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has (1) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the item; and (2) the intent to maintain dominion and control over it.” Id. (citing Lampkins v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 1997), modified on reh'g, 685 N.E.2d 698)) (emphasis added).

[15] We first consider whether the evidence demonstrates that Clardy had the capability to maintain dominion and control over the fentanyl pills. “The capability requirement is met when the state shows that the defendant is able to reduce the controlled substance to the defendant's personal possession.” Goliday v. State, 708 N.E.2d 4, 6 (Ind. 1999) (citing Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1275). In Goliday, our Supreme Court held that the defendant was capable of maintaining control and dominion over items in the trunk of the car he was driving. The defendant possessed the key to the vehicle, he had been living out of his vehicle, and clothes found in the truck near the drugs belonged to him. Similarly, here, Clardy was driving the vehicle and his personal belongings were found in the trunk along with the pills. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence that Clardy was capable of exercising control over the vehicle, including the trunk where the pills were found.

[16] We next consider whether the evidence demonstrated that Clardy had the intent to maintain dominion and control over the pills. The intent element may also be inferred from “the defendant's possessory interest in the premises, even when that possessory interest is not exclusive.” Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 174. “When that possessory interest is not exclusive, however, the State must support this second inference with additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence and the nature of the item.” Id. at 175. We have previously identified some possible examples of such additional circumstances, including:

(1) a defendant's incriminating statements; (2) a defendant's attempting to leave or making furtive gestures; (3) the location of contraband like drugs in settings suggesting manufacturing; (4) the item's proximity to the defendant; (5) the location of contraband within the defendant's plain view; and (6) the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns.

Id. (citing Henderson v. State, 715 N.E.2d 833, 836 (Ind. 1999)). “[T]he State is required to show that whatever factor or set of factors it relies upon in support of the intent prong of constructive possession, those factors or set of factors must demonstrate the probability that the defendant was aware of the presence of the contraband and its illegal character.” Gee v. State, 810 N.E.2d 338, 344 (Ind. 2004); B.R., 162 N.E.3d at 1177 (emphasis added). “This list of circumstances is not exhaustive, as other circumstances can just as reasonably demonstrate the requisite knowledge.” Williams v. State, 240 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (citing Gray, 957 N.E.2d at 175); accord B.R., 162 N.E.3d at 1177.

[17] The State acknowledges that Clardy's possession was not exclusive because a juvenile passenger was riding with him.² The State, however, presented additional circumstantial evidence pointing to the inference that Clardy was aware of the fentanyl pills and thus demonstrated the intent to possess them. Clardy fled immediately when Officer Hess activated his emergency lights, leading police on a high-speed chase through a neighborhood for approximately two and a half miles, during which Clardy reached speeds of approximately eighty miles an hour before crashing the vehicle.³ Clardy was the driver of the Corolla. The fentanyl pills were concealed in a pair of size 34 blue jeans located in the Corolla's trunk; Clardy was wearing size 32 jeans at the time.⁴ The blue jeans were commingled with other items, including multiple pairs of tennis shoes. Most significantly, Clardy had access to the trunk; he asked officers for a pair of shoes from there before the pills were discovered, and Officer Hess denied the request because Clardy “already had shoes on.” Tr. Vol. II p. 181.

[18] Clardy's arguments challenging the factual findings of the jury merely invite us to reweigh the evidence in his favor, which we cannot do. Boner v. State, 243 N.E.3d 354, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (reiterating that sufficiency review does not permit an appellate court to reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility). All the circumstantial evidence, when considered together, points to Clardy's knowledge that the fentanyl pills were concealed inside the blue jeans located in the trunk of the Corolla. It was, therefore, reasonable for the jury to conclude that Clardy had the requisite intent to constructively possess the pills.

Conclusion

[19] Sufficient evidence supports Clardy's conviction for possession of a narcotic drug. Accordingly, we affirm.

[20] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code Section 35-48-2-6 classifies fentanyl as a Schedule II controlled substance. See I.C. § 35-48-2-6(c) (listing “Fentanyl (9801)” among Schedule II opiates).

2.   Clardy argues that “the pills could have belonged to the passenger,” who was a juvenile. Appellant's Br. p. 12. Nothing in the record suggests that the items found in the trunk, including the clothing and weapons, were connected to the juvenile passenger. Additionally, even if the juvenile might theoretically have knowledge about the pills, that possibility does not preclude a jury from finding beyond reasonable doubt that Clardy had the requisite capability and intent to possess the pills. Furthermore, Clardy also challenges the juvenile passenger's age, arguing there was “no evidence that the passenger was actually fourteen.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. However, Clardy's counsel repeatedly referred to the passenger as a “juvenile” during trial and acknowledges in his appellate brief that the passenger was a “juvenile male.” Id. at 6.

3.   Clardy argues that his flight was due to the fact that he was driving a stolen vehicle, not because he knew of the fentanyl pills. Appellant's Br. p. 11. His argument might have carried weight had the attempt to flee been the only evidence the State presented to prove his knowledge of the pills. The State, however, provided additional circumstantial evidence which, when considered together, supports the conclusion that Clardy was aware of the pills. Furthermore, the motivation behind his fleeing behavior is a factual determination that lies squarely within the province of the jury. We cannot reweigh the evidence to overturn the jury's decision. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1244 (holding that although a single piece of circumstantial evidence may not be sufficient to support a conviction, multiple pieces of circumstantial evidence considered together may be, and an appellate court may not reweigh the evidence where a reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty).

4.   Clardy argues that the blue jeans in which the fentanyl pills were concealed were “not the same size” as the jeans he was wearing, suggesting that the jeans did not belong to him. Appellant's Br. p. 7. We do not find this argument persuasive.

Tavitas, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur