Tremayne Hobson, Jr., Appellant-Defendant, v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In 2021, then sixteen-year-old Tremayne Hobson, Jr., along with three other teenagers, hatched a plan to trade guns with Dusty Lawrence. Unbeknownst to Lawrence, Hobson and his cohorts intended to trick Lawrence into accepting a broken gun for Lawrence's operational gun and a box of ammunition. During the trade, Lawrence was shot in the chest and robbed of his firearm and ammunition. He died from his wound. Hobson was charged as an adult with felony murder and level 2 felony robbery. A jury found Hobson guilty as charged.

[2] Hobson appeals the fifty-five-year aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court following his conviction of felony murder.¹ Hobson asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. Finding that he has not met his burden to demonstrate that his sentence is inappropriate, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In 2021, sixteen-year-old Hobson lived with his mother in a house located in a subdivision on the east side of Indianapolis. On the evening of March 27, and while Hobson's mother was out of town, Hobson threw a party at his home that attracted around sixty teenagers. The party ended in the early morning hours of March 28. Some of Hobson's friends spent the night at his house, including Hobson's best friend, sixteen-year-old Demetrius Coakley; seventeen-year-old Jalen Spivey; and Demarion Bean and Isaiah,² who were sixteen or seventeen years old at the time.

[4] On the morning of March 28, the teens cleaned up the house and the backyard. After Coakley finished his part of the cleanup, he picked up his cell phone and opened an application (app) for a communication platform made popular by gamers. The app was also used to post firearms for sale or trade. As Coakley scrolled through the app looking at pictures of guns, Spivey stopped Coakley at a black Glock handgun that Dusty Lawrence had posted.

[5] Coakley messaged Lawrence and determined that Lawrence wanted to trade his handgun, not sell it. Coakley and Lawrence did not know each other. They used usernames to identify themselves on the app. Spivey used Coakley's phone to send Lawrence pictures of two Glock handguns: a black colored gun, and Hobson's “peanut butter” colored gun that Hobson's mother had given him. Tr. Vol. V at 3. Lawrence agreed to trade his handgun and a box of ammunition for Hobson's peanut butter colored gun and a drum magazine with a fifty-round capacity.

[6] Hobson, Coakley, Spivey, and Bean had no intention of trading Hobson's gun. Instead, they hatched a plan to trick Lawrence into taking a broken, pink-colored gun that belonged to Spivey. The plan was to “swap” the broken gun for Lawrence's gun and ammunition, and “walk away.” Id. The teens concealed the broken gun in a gun case owned by Hobson's mother.

[7] Coakley messaged Lawrence, indicating that he did not have a car, and Lawrence agreed to come to Coakley's location. The teens did not want Lawrence to go to Hobson's house; so, when Lawrence asked for the address, Hobson took Coakley's phone outside to find the address of a nearby house. Hobson messaged Lawrence with a fake address, and Lawrence agreed to meet at that address.

[8] At the time the trade took place, thirty-year-old Lawrence lived in Anderson, Indiana, with his then-pregnant wife and their five-year-old daughter. Lawrence worked at a warehouse facility, but his hobby was buying and trading firearms. Lawrence's wife and daughter would often accompany Lawrence to the transactions, and the transactions typically occurred in a public place. Before March 28, 2021, Lawrence and his family had never been to a residence to make a trade.

[9] On March 28, Lawrence, along with his wife and daughter, drove from their home to the address Hobson had provided. Lawrence was driving his blue sedan, Lawrence's wife was in the passenger seat, and their daughter was seated in the middle of the back seat in a car seat. They arrived in Hobson's neighborhood a little before 3:00 p.m.

[10] When Lawrence arrived at the address that was “closest” to the address that had been provided,³ he pulled into the driveway and saw an older woman standing in the garage. Tr. Vol. III at 205. Lawrence asked the woman about the gun trade, but she appeared to have “no idea what [he] was talking about[,]” telling him and his wife that they “were in the wrong area to be doing what [they] were doing and that [they] needed to go home.” Id. at 205, 232. Lawrence backed out of the woman's driveway, drove a “couple houses down,” and parked along the side of the road. Id. at 206. He sent a message to the username of the person he was supposed to meet, asked if the person could meet him where he had parked, and described his vehicle. Coakley told Hobson, Spivey, and Bean what kind of car Lawrence was driving and where Lawrence was parked.

[11] Spivey, Bean, and Hobson armed themselves before leaving the house to meet Lawrence. Coakley gave his gun to Spivey, “[j]ust in case ․ something went bad.” Tr. Vol. V at 8. Spivey also carried the gun box with the broken gun inside. Bean had a peanut butter colored gun of his own, and Hobson carried his gun. Spivey, Bean, and Hobson left the house to meet Lawrence, wearing hoodies with the hoods pulled up over their faces. Coakley and Isaiah stayed behind.

[12] As the teens approached, Lawrence exited his car and placed his personal firearm in his waistband. He introduced himself to the teens and then retrieved from the driver's side back seat what he had brought to trade: the gun box, which contained the gun, and the ammunition. He closed the back door and handed the gun box to one of the teens. Lawrence and the teens positioned themselves such that they were standing at the trunk of the car. Lawrence's wife and daughter stayed in the car, and Lawrence's wife began “playing” on her cell phone. Tr. Vol. III at 211.

[13] Approximately two minutes later, Lawrence's wife heard five or six rapid gunshots. She looked over her left shoulder and saw two of the teens running away from the car. Lawrence had been shot three times: once in his chest, once in his index finger, and once in his left upper buttock. Lawrence stumbled to the front passenger door, his pants covered with blood, and told his wife, “[Y]ou're gonna have to drive me.” Id. at 212. She climbed out of the car, headed toward the trunk of the car, grabbed from the trunk's surface the gun and gun box Spivey had brought, placed the items in the back seat of the car, and climbed into the driver's seat. Lawrence climbed into the front passenger seat.

[14] Lawrence's wife drove away from the scene of the shooting but only traveled around fifty to one hundred feet before noticing that Lawrence had slumped down in his seat and turned blue. She stopped the car, screamed for help, and called 9-1-1.

[15] When law enforcement officers arrived on the scene at 2:56 p.m., they removed Lawrence from his car and began administering first aid. Lawrence was in critical condition, struggling to breathe and bleeding heavily. Paramedics transported Lawrence to a local hospital, where he died from his injuries that same day. Lawrence's cause of death was determined to be the gunshot wound to his chest; his manner of death was listed as homicide.

[16] After Lawrence was shot, Spivey took the gun and ammunition that Lawrence had brought to trade, and all the teens ran back to Hobson's house, “panicking” and out of breath. Tr. Vol. V at 11. The teens hid the guns around the house, and Hobson, Spivey, and Bean split the stolen ammunition. For several hours, the teens watched from an upstairs window as law enforcement officers canvassed the area.

[17] While they waited for the police to leave, Hobson sent several text messages to a person named “Tati.” Id. at 160. Around 4:00 p.m., Hobson messaged the following: “Sum just happened I'll tell u later ․ we can't leave the house I'll tell u later do say nun tho don't trip[.]” Ex. Vol. III at 110 (State's Ex. 201). Hobson then sent two additional messages: “We f***ed rn I think everything should be coo bae[,]” and “What we just did was not supposed to go like that[.]” Id. at 111-12 (State's Ex. 201). Around 9:30 p.m. that night, Hobson messaged Tati, stating, “[I]t's over with not going home for a few days[.]” Id. at 116 (State's Ex. 203).

[18] After the police left the area, the teens fled from Hobson's house. Spivey sold Lawrence's gun; Hobson's gun “got thrown in the lake”; and Hobson left Indianapolis for several months. Tr. Vol. V at 16. In September 2021, after Lawrence was killed but before Hobson was arrested for that incident, Hobson was arrested for resisting law enforcement and for dangerous possession of a firearm. A true finding was entered for the dangerous possession of a firearm act.

[19] In January 2022, Hobson and Coakley were arrested for the incident involving Lawrence, and both were charged with felony murder and Level 2 felony robbery. Law enforcement officers used the messages that were sent through the app, neighborhood security camera footage, and the stolen ammunition found in Hobson's home, among other incriminating evidence, to implicate the teens in the crimes. Approximately two years later, Coakley entered into a plea agreement with the State and agreed to testify against Hobson. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss Coakley's felony murder charge and assented to a sentence cap of twenty years executed.

[20] After Coakley agreed to testify against him, Hobson made jailhouse phone calls to a female, instructing her to send text messages to Coakley's mother. Hobson told the female to text, “We fiddin’ to beat the f[***]out your rat ass n[****], and be like, motherf[***]ers know he's a rat, and he a rat, b[****] should not sleep.” Ex. Vol. III at 127, 131 (State's Exs. 213A, 214). He also told her to text, “Motherf[***]er's not good in his own block, ․ he on the admin block, he's scared. [M]otherf[***]er's not good up here.” Id. at 128, 136 (State's Exs. 213B, 215).

[21] Hobson's three-day jury trial was held from September 11 through 13, 2024. Coakley testified against Hobson at the trial.⁴ At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Hobson guilty as charged.

[22] Hobson's sentencing hearing was held on October 17, 2024. To avoid double jeopardy, the trial court entered judgment of conviction for the felony murder charge only. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Hobson's counsel submitted a “Private Pre-Sentence Report,” arguing that Hobson should receive a lesser sentence due to mitigating circumstances that included Hobson's mental health challenges and his age when he committed the crime.

[23] At sentencing, the trial court heard arguments from Hobson and the State. The court found as mitigating circumstances Hobson's young age and his post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety. The trial court also found that Hobson had “family support” in dealing with his mental health challenges. Tr. Vol. VI at 38. Regarding aggravating circumstances, the court found that the crime was “senseless.” Id. at 39. The court added:

[N]ot only did you kill this man in terms of a senseless gun swap, but that you did it in front of his wife, in front of the five-year-old child. That five-year-old is going to be scarred for life and there's no way that you can get that back.․

[S]o those are aggravating circumstances. The fact that after this occurred, even though you were young, you still were out running around with a gun. I – it's hard for me to justify that or understand that regardless of young age. You were young enough to know that was wrong. You were still ․ carrying a gun out on the streets in which somebody else could have been hurt. Fortunately, no one was. But it's not because of anything of your choosing.

The fact that you would have – that you conveyed threats to a witness that did the right thing by acknowledging their responsibility in this case is also a significant aggravator in balancing all those things.

Id. The court sentenced Hobson to an aggregate term of fifty-five years, with fifty-two years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) and three years to be served on work release. Hobson now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Hobson has failed to establish that his fifty-five-year aggregate sentence is inappropriate in light of the offense and his character.

[24] Hobson asks us to revise his sentence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which states, “The Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” We apply a “ ‘holistic approach’ ” to our 7(B) review. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Connor v. State, 58 N.E.3d 215, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). In determining whether a sentence is inappropriate, we “ ‘must consider’ both factors, but the defendant need not ‘necessarily prove’ that the sentence is inappropriate on both counts.” Id. at 126 (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 219). When reviewing a sentence, our principal role is to leaven the outliers rather than necessarily achieve what is perceived as the correct result in each case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Hobson bears the burden to show that his sentence is inappropriate. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g 875 N.E.2d 218.

[25] “[S]entencing is principally a discretionary function in which the trial court's judgment should receive considerable deference.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1222. “Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). As we assess the nature of the offense and character of the offender, “we may look to any factors appearing in the record.” Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1060 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Ultimately, whether a sentence should be deemed inappropriate “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell, 895 N.E.2d at 1224.

[26] The two prongs of 7(B) review are “ ‘separate inquiries to ultimately be balanced in determining whether a sentence is inappropriate.’ ” Lane, 232 N.E.3d at 126 (quoting Connor, 58 N.E.3d at 218). “[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger to justify relief.” Id. at 127.

[27] Regarding the nature of the offense, we observe that “the advisory sentence is the starting point the Legislature selected as appropriate for the crime committed.” Fuller v. State, 9 N.E.3d 653, 657 (Ind. 2014). The sentencing range for murder is forty-five to sixty-five years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). Hobson received the advisory sentence for his crime, with fifty-two years served in the DOC and three years served on work release. “Since the advisory sentence is the starting point our General Assembly has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed, the defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

A. The Nature of Hobson's Offense

[28] Hobson asserts that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense. He acknowledges that the offense “was by no means minor[,]” and that “his crime resulted in a horrific loss to Lawrence” and Lawrence's surviving family members, including the “unborn child [Lawrence's wife] carried at the time” the crime was committed. Appellant's Br. at 11, 14. Hobson argues, however, that the nature of the offense “weighs in favor of leniency.” Id. at 14. In support, he asserts that he “never intended to use force”; he “was not the shooter”; and “the robbery plan was devised by a group of collectively imprudent and terminally short-sighted teenagers.” Id.

[29] Hobson's intentions regarding the interaction with Lawrence, and the lack of evidence indicating that he was the shooter, do not change the fact that he actively participated in a scheme to lure Lawrence to Indianapolis and rob Lawrence of his gun by tricking him into trading his operational gun and a box of ammunition for an inoperable gun. Hobson and his teenaged friends were in Hobson's home when they hatched the plan to rob Lawrence. Hobson used Coakley's cell phone to message Lawrence and set up the trade. Hobson did not provide Lawrence with his actual home address, instead giving Lawrence a false address. Hobson's “peanut butter” colored gun was the gun Lawrence thought he would receive in the trade. Tr. Vol. V at 3. The gun case that was used to conceal the inoperable gun belonged to Hobson's mother. And Hobson, Spivey, and Bean were all armed as they approached Lawrence's car.

[30] Lawrence, while standing near the trunk of his car, was shot in the hand, buttock, and chest, as his pregnant wife and his then five-year-old daughter sat inside the car. Five shots were fired in total. Lawrence managed to climb into the passenger side of his vehicle, and his wife attempted to drive him to aid, but she had to quickly pull to the side of the road because Lawrence began to turn blue. When law enforcement officers arrived at the scene and removed Lawrence from the car to administer first aid, Lawrence was bleeding heavily, moaning, and struggling to breathe.

[31] After the shooting, Hobson and the other two teens divided up the ammunition they stole from Lawrence, and they hid other evidence of the crime. Hobson then left Indianapolis for several months.

[32] In his Appellant's Brief, Lawrence characterizes the scheme to rob Lawrence as a “patently ill-thought-out-strategy that bore disastrous unanticipated ramifications.” Appellant's Br. at 15. At sentencing, however, the trial court called the murder “senseless,” and we agree. Tr. Vol. VI at 38. As a result of the plan in which Hobson actively participated, Lawrence's wife was widowed, his children were left without their father, and his oldest daughter now “draws blood on her drawings.” Id. at 34. Given the senseless and reckless nature of the killing, we decline to revise Hobson's aggregate sentence in light of the nature of his offense.

B. Hobson's Character

[33] Hobson also asks this Court to reduce his sentence in light of his character. He urges this Court to consider his mental health challenges, “United States Supreme Court precedent supporting lesser punishment for juveniles,” and “[o]ther considerations” he characterizes as “notable positive achievements.” Appellant's Br. at 22.

[34] We assess a defendant's character by engaging in a broad consideration of his qualities. Madden v. State, 162 N.E.3d 549, 564 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). An offender's character is shown by his “ ‘life and conduct.’ ” Adams v. State, 120 N.E.3d 1058, 1065 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Croy v. State, 953 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

1. Hobson's Mental Health

[35] Hobson argues that his mental health issues “call for leniency” in sentencing. Appellant's Br. at 15. Hobson presented evidence that he was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and severe anxiety when he was around thirteen years old, after suffering two sports-related concussions, and that he still suffers from “severe anxiety.” App. Vol. III at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted). While we are sympathetic to Hobson's mental health challenges, he provides no evidence showing a nexus between the diagnoses and his criminal conduct. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1249 (Ind. 2024) (rejecting defendant's claim that his bipolar disorder rendered his sentence inappropriate because he provided “no evidence showing a nexus between” diagnosis and his criminal conduct).

2. Lesser Punishment for Juveniles

[36] Next, Hobson argues that his youth at the time he committed the offense should persuade us that his sentence should be reduced. He points to three United States Supreme Court decisions to support his claim: Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (holding that Constitution bars imposition of the death penalty on offenders under the age of 18 when their crimes were committed); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that Constitution bars imposition of life without parole sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of non-homicide crimes); and Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (holding that Constitution bars “a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders”).

[37] There is no question that “age is a major factor that requires careful consideration during Appellate Rule 7(B) review.” Wilson v. State, 157 N.E.3d 1163, 1182 (Ind. 2020). Indeed, in State v. Stidham, our Supreme Court held that the maximum 138-year sentence imposed for crimes Stidham committed as a juvenile was inappropriate, “[c]onsidering all these aspects of the nature of the offenses and Stidham's character,” and the Court revised his sentence to eighty-eight years. 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1197 (Ind. 2020).

[38] In reaching its determination, the Stidham Court discussed the Roper/Graham/Miller trilogy of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, noting the following:

The U.S. Supreme Court based these decisions on its recognition of fundamental differences between adults and juveniles. Relying on developments in the fields of psychology, brain science, and social science, along with common sense, the Court summarized three important differences between adults and juveniles: juveniles “have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” an increased vulnerability “to negative influences and outside pressures,” and a still evolving character. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569-70, 125 S. Ct. 1183). See also Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 n.5, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (noting that “the science and social science supporting Roper’s and Graham’s conclusions have become even stronger”). Based in part on these differences, the Court concluded that “juveniles have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform” and that “the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.” Id. at 471, 472, 132 S. Ct. 2455. Therefore, the Court acknowledged that “Roper and Graham establish[ed] that children are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 471, 132 S. Ct. 2455.

Stidham, 157 N.E.3d at 1193-94.

[39] And our Supreme Court has incorporated the U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in Roper, Graham, and Miller into its own sentencing cases involving juvenile offenders. See Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 (Ind. 2014) (revising 150-year sentence to an aggregate sentence of eighty years); Fuller, 9 N.E.3d at 658-59 (revising 150-year sentence to an aggregate sentence of eighty-five years); Taylor v. State, 86 N.E.3d 157, 167 (Ind. 2017) (revising life-without-parole sentence to an aggregate sentence of eighty years); Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1184 (revising 181-year sentence to an aggregate sentence of 100 years). And recently, in Banks v. State, a panel of this Court reduced a 220-year sentence to an aggregate sentence of 135 years, based in part on the juvenile offender's age when he committed the crimes. 228 N.E.3d 528, 538-39 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).

[40] Indeed, there are similarities between the cases cited above, supra ¶ 39, and the instant case, for example, Hobson was sixteen at the time of the offense, as were the defendants in Brown, Wilson, and Banks (the defendant in Fuller was fifteen when he committed his offense), and all of the defendants, except the defendant in Graham, were convicted of murder. However, there are also differences that distinguish this case from those cited above and lead us to conclude that Hobson's sentence is not inappropriate.

[41] We begin by noting that in sentencing Hobson to an advisory fifty-five-year sentence, the trial court considered that he was young when he committed the crime, finding that to be a mitigating circumstance. The court noted that Hobson's “ability to make proper choices and withstand peer pressure [wa]s less than it would be in an adult.” Tr. Vol. VI at 38. We, too, acknowledge that Hobson was just sixteen years old when he committed the offense. But his young age alone does not render his sentence inappropriate; rather, we engage in a broad consideration of factors.

[42] For instance, despite his youth, Hobson actively participated in a scheme to rob Lawrence. He was armed when he approached Lawrence. After Lawrence was shot, Hobson ran from the scene, hid evidence of the crime, shared in the spoils of the robbery, and left town for months. Also, while in jail awaiting trial, Hobson made phone calls, instructing an individual to send profane and threatening text messages to Coakley's mother.

[43] We also note that Hobson had a short, but not insignificant, history of delinquent behavior that reflects poorly on his character. After the murder occurred, but before Hobson was arrested for that crime, he was arrested for resisting law enforcement and dangerous possession of a firearm. And a true finding was entered for the dangerous possession of a firearm act. A typical factor we consider when examining a defendant's character is criminal history. McFarland v. State, 153 N.E.3d 369, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[44] Hobson reported using marijuana daily, “smoking 2 blunts a day,” with his last day of usage being either the day before or the day of his arrest for the instant offense. Appellant's App. Vol. III at 37 (Presentence Investigation Report). Hobson's drug use also reflects poorly on his character. See generally, Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 874 (Ind. 2012) (stating trial court did not err in considering defendant's drug use in sentencing defendant).

[45] Regarding Hobson's childhood, we note that he did not experience the difficult childhood that the defendants in Brown, Taylor, and Stidham experienced. While Hobson's childhood may have been troubled—both of his parents have criminal records and have served time in prison—he reported that he had a “good” childhood with “no family problems” and that his relationship with his family is “still good.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 35 (Presentence Investigation Report). And, regardless, our Supreme Court has held that “evidence of a difficult childhood is entitled to little, if any, mitigating weight.” Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1141 (Ind. 2013) (citations omitted).

[46] We acknowledge that Hobson's fifty-five-year sentence is lengthy, but it does not “forswear[ ] altogether the rehabilitative ideal[,]” Brown, 10 N.E.3d at 8 (internal quotations and citations omitted), as Hobson will have a “reasonable hope for a life outside prison.” Wilson, 157 N.E.3d at 1184. As a person assigned to the Class B credit time classification, which is one day of credit time for every three days served, Hobson will be in his mid-fifties when he is eligible to be released to work release. See Ind. Code §§ 35-50-6-3.1(b) and 35-50-6-4; see also Sharp v. State, 970 N.E.2d 647, 651 (Ind. 2012) (holding, “[E]valuation of a defendant's sentence may include consideration of the defendant's credit time status because this penal consequence was within the contemplation of the trial court when it was determining the defendant's sentence.”). And, as a juvenile offender, Hobson will have the opportunity for sentence modification. Under Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-17(n), youthful offenders can have their sentence reexamined after serving twenty years.

3. Other Considerations

[47] Additionally, regarding his character, Hobson asks this Court to consider what he characterizes as “notable positive achievements,” including the following: during the proceedings, he served 980 days in jail without incurring any conduct reports or disciplinary incidents; he held a valid driver's license at the time of his arrest for the instant offense; on one occasion, he was suspended from school for vaping, but he was “never expelled”; and before his arrest for the instant offense, he was employed at a fast-food restaurant. Appellant's Br. at 22. Hobson also points to the fact that the Indiana Risk Assessment System placed him in the moderate risk category to reoffend.

[48] We do not disregard these as achievements. However, they do not overshadow the poor character demonstrated by Hobson's active participation in a scheme to rob Lawrence, which ended in the senseless killing of Lawrence; Hobson continuing to carry a firearm after committing the offense; and Hobson sending threatening messages to Coakley's mother from jail, through a third party. Also, in sentencing Hobson to fifty-two years executed in the DOC and three years on work release, the trial court accounted for Hobson's youth and his mental health challenges as mitigating circumstances, and we cannot say that further revision of Hobson's sentence is warranted, in light of the circumstances that reflect negatively on Hobson's character. Therefore, we decline to revise Hobson's aggregate sentence in light of his character.

[49] In sum, we acknowledge Hobson's youth at the time he committed the crime. However, Hobson has not met his burden to establish that the fifty-five-year sentence imposed by the trial court for felony murder, with three years served on work release, is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense or his character. Therefore, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

[50] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Due to double jeopardy concerns, the trial court only entered judgment of conviction for felony murder.

2.   Isaiah's last name does not appear in the record.

3.   Lawrence's wife testified that Lawrence was unable to find the actual address that had been provided and that she believed they had been given a “faulty address.” Tr. Vol. III at 233.

4.   At the time the trial took place, neither Spivey nor Bean had been implicated in the March 28, 2021 shooting. Tr. Vol. V at 129. However, Coakley testified that when the teens returned to Hobson's house after the shooting, Bean admitted to shooting Lawrence. Id. at 63.

Crone, Senior Judge.

May, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.