Ronald Dion Robinson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Ronald Dion Robinson appeals his conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Robinson raises a single issue for our review, namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On April 21, 2025, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Luke Hughes initiated a traffic stop of a green Honda Civic that had merged onto I-65 in Indianapolis without properly yielding. Robinson was in the front passenger seat of the Civic. After Officer Hughes had collected licenses from the driver and Robinson, Officer Hughes returned to his vehicle.

[3] At that point, Officer Hughes observed the Civic's front passenger door “swing open” and Robinson “dart headlong into the wood line.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 15. Officer Hughes gave chase, “announced [him]self as the police[,] and ․ commanded [Robinson] to stop” multiple times. Id. at 16. But Robinson continued to flee. Shortly thereafter, Robinson tripped and fell down, at which point Officer Hughes caught up to Robinson and placed him under arrest.

[4] The State charged Robinson in relevant part with Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement. Officer Hughes testified at Robinson's ensuing bench trial. Thereafter, the court found Robinson guilty and entered its judgment of conviction and sentence accordingly.

[5] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] On appeal, Robinson asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[7] To prove that Robinson committed Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement, the State was required to show that Robinson knowingly or intentionally fled from a law enforcement officer after the officer had, by visible or audible means, identified himself and ordered Robinson to stop. Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3) (2024). Further, our Supreme Court has held that the statutory requirement that the officer has ordered the person to stop “must be understood to require that such order to stop rest on probable cause or reasonable suspicion ․ that criminal activity is afoot.” Gaddie v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1249, 1255 (Ind. 2014).

[8] Robinson argues that the State did not present any evidence to show that Officer Hughes had probable cause or reasonable suspicion that Robinson was engaged in criminal activity at the time Officer Hughes ordered Robinson to stop. In support of his position, Robinson relies on case law that discusses the legality of an officer's stop of a person walking away from a house following a report of a disturbance, a person walking down the street minding his own business, and a person walking near an apartment complex near the time of a report of a stolen vehicle. See Appellant's Br. at 9-10, 12 (discussing Gaddie, 10 N.E.3d at 1255-56; Griffin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 375, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; and M.J. v. State, 19 N.E.3d 796, 799 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

[9] But we agree with the State that Robinson's reliance on authority that does not involve a lawful traffic stop is inapposite. As Senior Judge Shepard explained for our Court in Griffin, “as long as a seizure has not taken place within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a person is free to disregard a police officer's order to stop and cannot be convicted of resisting law enforcement for fleeing.” 997 N.E.2d at 380 (quotation marks omitted). Conversely, then, if a lawful seizure has occurred, a person is not free to disregard an officer's order to stop. See id.

[10] Here, Officer Hughes observed a traffic infraction and initiated a lawful traffic stop of the Civic in which Robinson was a passenger. At that point, the Civic and all of its occupants, including Robinson, had been lawfully seized under the Fourth Amendment for the duration of that stop. Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327 (2009). Accordingly, once Robinson fled from that lawful seizure and Officer Hughes then identified himself and ordered Robinson to stop, Robinson was obliged to comply. As he did not, the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction under Indiana Code section 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).

[11] For all of these reasons, we affirm Robinson's conviction for Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.