IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of T.B. (Minor Child) (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.B. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's termination of her parental rights to T.B. (“Child”), on petition of the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”). Mother presents the consolidated and restated issues of: (1) Did DCS fail to make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the parent-child relationship?; and (2) Did DCS fail to present clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's termination decision? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born in March 2018 to Mother and D.D. (“Father”).¹ Mother and Father were not married, and paternity was not established at birth.

[3] First CHINS case – From January to July 2021, Mother and Child were living in a home with a convicted sex offender, Sean-Michael Murphy; his wife, father, and brother; and three minor children. Mother was aware Murphy was a convicted sex offender. In July, Murphy was arrested and charged with Level 1 child molesting for acts perpetrated on a child in the home.² On July 5, the entire household was evicted because of failure to pay rent, presence of bugs, and lack of cleanliness, including dog feces throughout the house. Mother took Child to the hospital for an examination of what she believed was a cyst. When DCS case workers encountered Mother and Child at the hospital, Child was unkempt, dirty, and had decaying teeth. Mother stated she was homeless and unable to provide shelter, medication, or food for Child. Child was removed on an emergency basis, and DCS filed a petition alleging Child was a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). Child was placed in foster care.

[4] Sometime thereafter, Mother began living with Jamie Hardy (“Hardy”). In 2014, Hardy pleaded guilty to Class C felony child molesting and Class D felony dissemination of matter harmful to minors. The victim of Hardy's offenses was his nine-year-old daughter. As a result of his convictions, Hardy was required to register as a sex offender against children and was not permitted to live within 1,000 feet of a school, youth program center, or public park.

[5] Child was adjudicated a CHINS on February 16, 2022. DCS located Father and placed Child with him. In March, the trial court entered an agreed order establishing Father's paternity of Child, custody, parenting time, and support. Father was awarded legal and physical custody of Child, and Mother was to have parenting time “at reasonable times and places as the parties agree; however, there shall be no direct or indirect contact between [Child] and [Murphy] or [Hardy].” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 100. With Child now placed in Father's care, DCS moved to dismiss the CHINS case, which the trial court granted on March 22, 2022.

[6] Second CHINS case – In October 2023, DCS received a report that now five-year-old Child was living with Mother and Hardy. DCS, with law enforcement's assistance, located all three in a home that was not Hardy's registered address. Law enforcement arrested Hardy for failure to register his updated address and for possession of marijuana. Mother became hostile and briefly allowed DCS to view Child but not have contact with him. Mother indicated she would not move or ask Hardy to leave. DCS contacted Father, who stated he placed Child in Mother's custody several weeks before but claimed to be unaware Hardy had contact with Child. Father said he would pick up Child from Mother and meet with DCS but never did so. The trial court granted DCS's petition for emergency custody of Child. When DCS arrived to detain Child, Child was home alone with Hardy while Mother was at work. Child smelled strongly of urine from soiled clothing. DCS placed Child in his prior foster home.

[7] DCS petitioned to file a second CHINS case. In addition to the allegations Mother knowingly left Child in the care of a child sex offender and Child was dirty and unkempt, DCS alleged in a second amended petition that (1) since the last CHINS case, Mother failed to obtain follow-up medical care for Child after he underwent heart surgery at birth, and (2) when Child's foster family took him to the doctor, the pediatrician suspected Child was malnourished based on his body mass index.

[8] On January 9, 2024, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS and in the February 15 dispositional order, ordered Mother to, among other things: allow the Family Case Manager (“FCM”) and other service providers to visit and enter Mother's home to monitor progress toward compliance with court orders; enroll and participate in any program and assessment recommended by the FCM or other provider; maintain suitable, safe, and stable housing with functional utilities; assist in the formulation and implementation of a protection plan which protects Child from abuse or neglect from any person; meet with medical or psychiatric personnel as directed by them; meet all medical and mental health needs by, among other things, attending all appointments; see that any person responsible for Child's physical care or custody is first approved by the FCM; provide Child with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment free from abuse and neglect; and receive homebased casework services to help establish and maintain a safe household and including community resources. See id. at 195–97.

[9] As of a periodic case review hearing in May 2024, Mother was partially compliant with the case plan. She completed a psychological and parenting assessment, which recommended she engage in parenting classes and individual therapy. Mother participated in homebased case management, which included parenting education and classes, and DCS referred her to therapeutic services. She attended supervised visitation with Child in the community three times per week. But Mother did not see any problem with allowing Child to be alone with Hardy. She stated to DCS she would maintain her relationship with Hardy, do what was necessary to close the CHINS case, and then move Child back in with Hardy.

[10] In July 2024, Mother was again partially compliant with the dispositional order. She secured part-time employment at Dollar General and was living with Hardy in a camper parked on a friend's property. She was participating in homebased casework and supervised visitation. DCS moved visitations to the DCS office after the visitation provider observed Hardy at the park where Mother's visitation was to occur. After Child saw Hardy, Child became physically ill and would not engage with Mother during the visit. As of a periodic case review in October 2024, the situation remained largely the same.

[11] Following a permanency hearing held in January 2025, the trial court adopted a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and adoption. At the time, Mother was employed and engaged in homebased casework. She was attending supervised visitation, which had moved from the DCS office back to the community. Her housing was still unstable, as she continued to live with Hardy in the camper. DCS's therapy referral for Mother remained active, but she had not engaged in therapeutic services because she did not feel she needed them. Although Child's therapist explained to Mother the safety concerns related to Child being around Hardy, Mother did not accept the therapist's professional opinion. Mother said she was now engaged to marry Hardy. Mother was no longer staying in contact with DCS.

[12] On January 27, 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights. The trial court held a factfinding hearing on May 7, 2025. At the hearing, Kari Michaels, sex and violent offender coordinator at the Cass County Sheriff's Office, testified that Hardy was required to register his address annually, notify the sheriff within seventy-two hours of any address change, and was required to stay 1,000 feet from parks, schools, daycares, and youth group areas. There was no blanket prohibition on him living with children. Hardy updated his registered address in April 2025 to the same address as Mother's.

[13] Deanna McGee was the FCM in both CHINS cases involving Child. She testified Child was removed in 2021 because Mother was in a polyamorous relationship with Murphy and his wife when Murphy committed Level 1 felony child molesting against three children in the home. According to FCM McGee, DCS moved to dismiss the prior CHINS case because Father was granted custody “with the understanding ․ [Child] would not be around [Murphy] or [Hardy].” Tr. Vol. 2 at 26. FCM McGee explained DCS sought removal of Child the second time because Mother knowingly violated the trial court order in the paternity case by leaving Child in Hardy's care. Mother's psychological assessment recommended she engage in individual therapy because of her “pattern of being in relationships with sex offenders ․ and past and present trauma.” Id. at 28. But Mother never complied with the trial court's order in that regard. FCM McGee also had concerns for Child's wellbeing, as Child was “really thin” when removed. Id. at 35.

[14] Child's therapist from November 2023 to April 2025 testified Child “spoke positively” about Mother and enjoyed being able to play and visit with her; but he was “usually withdrawn and resistant to further questioning” about their relationship. Id. at 23. Child would withdraw “[v]ery abruptly” whenever the therapist broached the topic of Hardy. Id. at 24. According to FCM McGee, Child displayed negative behaviors at home and school after visits with Mother. Although not unusual for children who have been removed to act out after parent visits, FCM McGee thought that “with as far [a]long as we have been [in the case,] it should be decreasing” but was not. Id. at 41. FCM McGee testified Child was doing well in placement, “fits right in” with foster family, and “feels [a] sense of ease.” Id. at 38. Child was participating in scouting and sports. Child also gained weight in foster care and received appropriate medical care. FCM McGee testified it was in Child's best interest to terminate parental rights and for Child to be adopted because Mother cannot provide him with a safe, stable home. Child's guardian ad litem (“GAL”) Braden Dean also testified, noting that between the two cases, Child had been involved with DCS for nearly four years and “has experienced a lot of turmoil.” Id. at 44. GAL Dean believed Child needed the permanency and stability his current placement affords, and recommended adoption as in Child's best interests.

[15] The trial court granted the State's petition from the bench, then entered a written order finding, in relevant part:

[4]a. The cause of the child's out-of-home placement has not been alleviated. While Mother is working on home based services and visits with the Child, she does not maintain contact with [DCS]. She does not understand how her relationship with a registered child sex offender is endangering the Child. Mother [a]lso does not have stable housing, as they are currently residing in a camper that has to be moved from location to location.

* * *

[5]a․ Mother has complied with visitation and home based case management, but refuses to do the therapy recommended by her Psychological and Parenting assessments. Mother does not see the need for therapy. Mother also does not think her child should have been removed[.] She does not see the danger of leaving her child in the care of a known, registered child sex offender.

* * *

7. The child participated in therapy in order to address the trauma of removal, the ability to regulate emotions, as well as the child's relationship with [M]other. Although the child spoke positively about his mother, he became withdrawn and resistant when discussing the topic of the relationship with his mother. The child would not want to talk and would instead play with toys. Additionally, the child would abruptly become withdrawn and resistant to questions about [Hardy].

* * *

9. Additionally, [M]other has failed to maintain suitable, safe and stable housing. In addition to moving on numerous occasions, Mother continues to live with and maintain a relationship with [Hardy]. He is an offender against children and is required to register as a sex offender annually. Although he is not prohibited from being around minors in the home, he has a 1000-foot restriction from schools, parks, and daycares. In 2014, [Hardy] plead[ed] guilty to Child Molesting ․ The victim was [his] then 9-year-old daughter. After [M]other moved to the [current] address, [Hardy] changed his address in April of 2025 to the same address. Currently, [Hardy's] registered address is the same address in which [M]other lives. Pursuant to the ongoing court order in [the paternity case], “there shall be no direct or indirect contact between the child and [Murphy] or [Hardy].”

* * *

13. DCS believes it is in the best interests of the Child to be adopted[.] The Child just turned seven years old, and at least three of those years he has been involved with DCS. His preadoptive placement has been a source of stability for him during those years.

Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 106–07. The trial court found DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence the elements of the termination statute and terminated the parent-child relationship.

Standard of Review

[16] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). But “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[17] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must allege that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child, and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2), (3) (2024).³ DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more of twelve statutory circumstances warranting termination. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)–(12). If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (burden of proof).

[18] We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and second, whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We do not reweigh the evidence but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). And we do not judge witness credibility for ourselves, instead giving due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses firsthand. Id. When findings of fact are unchallenged, we accept them as true. In re C.C., 153 N.E.3d 340, 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143.

1. Mother waived any due process challenge based on an alleged failure to provide housing services.

[19] Mother alleges DCS “failed to provide Mother assistance in obtaining an alternative residence, or services like long-term rental assistance, referrals to housing agencies, or anything of that nature” to alleviate her need to live in a camper. Appellant's Br. at 16. Mother contends the lack of these specific Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 25A-JT-1440| December 22, 2025 Page 11 of 20 services or referrals shows DCS failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to preserve the parent-child relationship. See id. (citing I.C. § 31-34-21-5.5(b) (2012) (providing DCS “shall make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families” in CHINS proceedings)).

[20] The CHINS provision requiring reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families “is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute[.]” In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); see also In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1136 (Ind. 2010) (“It is of course true that the provision of family services is not a requisite element of our parental rights termination statute.”) (quotation omitted). Indeed, “failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.” H.L., 915 N.E.2d at 148 n.3.

[21] Still, “[w]hen the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.” In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011). To protect a parent's due process rights in the context of termination proceedings, “DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case[.]” In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. But “[w]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case, and ․ it does not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the parents.” Id.

[22] The record shows DCS provided Mother with homebased case management services throughout the CHINS matter, which assist with “establishing and maintaining safe housing, budgeting,” and parenting skills. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 162. Nowhere does the record show Mother requested additional housing-related services. A parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue DCS denied them services that would assist with parenting. In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[23] Moreover, Mother does not equate the alleged lack of housing-related services in the CHINS case with a due process violation. And Mother made no due process argument in the trial court. It is well established “a party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim.” McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Mother cannot attack the termination order directly on the basis DCS failed to provide certain services in the CHINS case. And having made no due process argument, Mother's independent argument about reasonable efforts is waived.

2. Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

[24] Mother next argues the trial court clearly erred in terminating her parental rights. Mother does not challenge the trial court's factual findings, and so we accept them as true. See Matter of A.M.J., 228 N.E.3d 1132, 1139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“When, as in this case, the factual findings are unchallenged, we accept those findings as true.”). Instead, Mother argues the findings do not support the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved the elements of the termination statute by clear and convincing evidence.

A. Subsection (d) Circumstances

[25] As discussed above, DCS must allege and prove the existence of “one (1) or more” of twelve statutory circumstances warranting termination. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d). Of the twelve circumstances under Subsection (d), DCS alleged three existed:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a child in need of services or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(2)–(4); see Appellant's App. Vol. 3 at 86 (petition to terminate).⁴

[26] Here, the trial court found DCS proved all three alleged elements by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at 108 (trial court's order). On appeal, Mother challenges only one of the three as clearly erroneous: that there is a reasonable probability the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. Because the trial court found two other alleged circumstances under Subsection (d), and DCS was required to prove only one, Mother has effectively conceded DCS met its burden under Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(d). See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)) (holding that when a parent does not specifically challenge the trial court's findings or conclusions, the parent waives the issue by failing to make a cogent argument), trans. denied.

[27] Waiver notwithstanding, the evidence shows DCS originally became involved with Mother and Child after they were living with a convicted sex offender who committed child molesting against three other children in the home. Mother had been evicted and had no means to provide housing, medical care, and food for Child. During the first CHINS case, Mother moved in with Hardy knowing he had been convicted of molesting his nine-year-old daughter. Mother later agreed as part of her custody arrangement with Father that Hardy would have no direct or indirect contact with Child, which the trial court incorporated into its agreed order on paternity, custody, and parenting time. This led to closure of the first CHINS case.

[28] Just over a year later, DCS discovered that Child was living with Mother and Hardy and Mother left Child alone in Hardy's care. Child was unkempt and malnourished. During the second CHINS case, Mother failed to acknowledge—let alone mitigate—any risk to Child posed by leaving him unsupervised with a man convicted of child molesting. Mother refused to engage in therapy recommended by the parenting and psychological assessments to address her pattern of relationships with sex offenders. Child became physically ill upon unexpectedly seeing Hardy at a supervised visit. Still, Mother would not accept Child's therapist's professional recommendation that Mother's living arrangement posed a threat to Child's safety. Mother was living with Hardy in a camper at the time of the termination hearing and intended to marry him. Based on this evidence, we readily agree with the trial court's finding and conclusion that there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in Child's removal will not be remedied. See, e.g., C.C., 153 N.E.3d at 348 (noting the evidence presented by DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; DCS need only establish there is a reasonable probability the parent's behavior will not change).

[29] Although Mother waived any challenge to the Subsection (d) requirements, we nevertheless hold the trial court did not clearly err when it determined DCS proved at least one of the twelve statutory circumstances by clear and convincing evidence.

B. Best Interests

[30] Mother next challenges the trial court's finding that termination was in Child's best interests. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(3). When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, trial courts “must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parents’ interests to those of the children.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Children's need for permanency is a central concern. Id. “Indeed, ‘children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.’ ” Id. (quoting In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 648 (Ind. 2014)). And trial courts “need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that the child's physical, mental and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235).

[31] As to best interests, FCM McGee and GAL Dean testified it was in Child's best interests to terminate the parent-child relationship. “Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[32] Still, Mother's primary argument on appeal is that there was no evidence Hardy physically or sexually abused Child, and so the trial court erred in terminating her parental rights based on “mere supposition” that Hardy's presence in the home presented a risk to Child. Appellant's Br. at 19–20. In support, Mother points to V.A., in which our Supreme Court held there was insufficient evidence to support termination of a father's parental rights because he was unwilling to live separately from his spouse (the child's mother), who suffered from mental illness that interfered with her ability to care for the child. 51 N.E.3d at 1147–48.

[33] Mother's argument ignores that she agreed in the paternity case that Hardy was to have no direct or indirect contact with Child. This was essentially a concession that contact with Hardy presented a risk to Child. DCS moved to dismiss the first CHINS case only after Father agreed to custody under this condition. The second CHINS case began when DCS discovered Child living with Mother and Hardy. There is a rebuttable presumption a child is a CHINS if the State establishes the child lives in the same household as an adult convicted of child molesting. See I.C. § 31-34-12-4.5(a) (2018). Child became physically ill when Hardy unexpectedly showed up at a visit, and Child abruptly withdrew when his therapist broached the subject of Hardy. We cannot say the trial court's order was based on mere speculation about the safety risk Hardy posed to Child. Child's own reactions to Hardy suggest otherwise. And unlike the father in V.A. who “complied fully with the safety plan that DCS put in place” and participated in services that addressed the safety concerns, 51 N.E.3d at 1147, Mother did not comply with the trial court's dispositional order to assist in the formulation and implementation of a plan to protect Child from abuse by any person. Indeed, Mother refused to even acknowledge the safety risks to Child. In addition, the record contains evidence of other risks to Child's health and safety beyond Mother's relationship with Hardy. Child was dirty and malnourished when removed the second time. And Mother's housing situation remained insecure at the time of the termination hearing, despite DCS’ provision of services to address housing instability. The trial court did not clearly err in finding it was in Child's best interest to terminate the parent-child relationship.⁵

[34] Clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court's termination decision.

Conclusion

[35] Mother waived any due process challenge arising from DCS's alleged failure to provide housing-related services. The trial court's order terminating the parent-child relationship was not clearly erroneous.

[36] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and is not a party to this appeal.

2.   The State later amended the charges to include three counts of Level 1 child molesting involving three victims. Murphy pleaded guilty to all three charges.

3.   In crafting her argument, Mother cites an earlier version of the termination statute. See Appellant's Br. at 14 (quoting the contents of I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2019)). We use the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS filed its petition to terminate.

4.   Among the twelve statutory circumstances is that the child has, on two separate occasions, been adjudicated a CHINS. See I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(5). DCS did not allege, and the trial court did not find, this circumstance, although Child was twice adjudicated a CHINS.

5.   Mother also asserts Hardy “had a right to participate in the CHINS case” as a custodian, and therefore the trial court “erred by not requiring DCS to include [Hardy], a custodian, as a party to the CHINS and termination cases.” Appellant's Br. at 20 (capitalization omitted). Yet Mother also admits in her appellate brief that during the two CHINS cases, she “denied [Hardy] was actually a custodian at times.” Id. Indeed, neither Mother nor Hardy petitioned the trial court to include Hardy as a party in the CHINS cases. As to the termination of parental rights proceedings, Mother has not explained how Hardy could have been joined as a party, even if she had raised the issue in the trial court. See I.C. § 31-9-2-88 (2022) (defining “parent” in this context as a biological or adoptive parent, including an alleged father, but not a custodian). Mother has waived any argument arising from DCS’ alleged failure to include Hardy as a party to the underlying CHINS or termination proceedings for failure to raise the issue below. Matter of D.H., 119 N.E.3d 578, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (“Generally, a party waives on appeal an issue that was not raised before the trial court.”), trans. denied.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.