In the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.L. (Minor Child), and R.W. (Father), Appellant-Respondent v. Kids’ Voice of Indiana Appellee-Guardian Ad Litem (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] R.W. (“Father”) appeals the involuntary termination of his parental rights to his minor child, J.L. (“Child”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Child was born prematurely to Jer.L. (“Mother”)¹ and Father in April 2021. Child was removed from Mother's and Father's care shortly after birth due to being born drug exposed. Child suffered from withdrawal and developed significant medical needs, including extreme difficulty swallowing and feeding. Mother indicated that she used methamphetamine “a couple times a week” during pregnancy, and Father indicated that he smokes “spice.” Exhibits Volume I at 4. On April 20, 2021, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”). Following a hearing during which Father admitted “that he needs assistance in learning how to care for [Child],” the court adjudicated Child a CHINS on February 23, 2022. Id. at 13. The court entered a dispositional decree ordering Father to participate in Father's Engagement. The court subsequently entered a modified dispositional decree ordering Father to also participate in home-based case management, a psychological evaluation, home-based therapy, and nurse case management.

[3] The court held a review hearing on February 24, 2023. “Food specialist, Marrissa Barrett,” appeared at the hearing and stated that she and her agency would no longer work with Father. Id. at 19. She reported that Father was aggressive and that, after eight months of working with him, he still could not “follow the proper steps for feeding, which, if not learned, could cause [Child] to aspirate.” Id. Another review hearing was held on June 2, 2023. DCS reported its concern due to Father's lack of progress in understanding Child's “high medical needs.” Id. at 22. Father had also been missing Child's medical appointments and parenting time. The Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) reported that a home visit with Father and Child during feeding time was “very overwhelming,” that Child was at risk of choking and has significant sleep apnea, and that Father had shown little “progress in understanding the extreme measures that are required to safely care for [Child].” Id. at 23. Further review hearings were held on September 22 and December 15, 2023, and February 23, 2024, after which the permanency plan for Child remained reunification as service providers continued to try to work with Father.

[4] On August 9, 2024, the court held a review hearing during which DCS and the GAL requested the permanency plan be changed to adoption. The record revealed that Father had failed to participate in recommended services including failing to participate in therapy, missing medical appointments and scheduled parenting time with Child, and home visits had been suspended due to “an infestation of rats” in Father's home. Id. at 34. DCS reported that it was extremely difficult to maintain contact with Father because he was often unable to be reached or located. DCS reported that it had “offered all available services and resources to assist in reunification of Father with [Child]” but Father “cannot safely care for [Child].” Id.² On August 19, 2024, the court changed the permanency plan to reunification and adoption.

[5] On October 1, 2024, DCS filed a verified petition for termination of Father's parental rights to Child. On February 10, 2025, the court held another review hearing following which it changed Child's permanency plan to solely adoption. On March 24, 2025, Father became incarcerated after being charged with robbery resulting in bodily injury as a level 3 felony and intimidation as a level 5 felony.

[6] The court held a termination factfinding hearing on May 22, 2025. Although Father remained incarcerated, he appeared by video and his counsel appeared in person. DCS presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Jeffrey Theil (“FCM Theil”), Nursing Case Manager Lindy Kenworthy (“Nurse Kenworthy”), Child's foster mother, J.J., and GAL Brittnay Lismon (“GAL Lismon”). Father presented the testimony of Home-Based Caseworker Kiara Marks. He also testified on his own behalf.

[7] FCM Theil testified that Father failed to successfully complete ordered services and that he failed to truly appreciate and understand the severity of Child's medical needs. There were also safety concerns with Father's home, and Father was often unreachable by service providers. Nurse Kenworthy stated that Father appeared to have great difficulty retaining information regarding the care required for Child that he had been repeatedly taught and that he was unable “to grasp the seriousness of her medical needs.” Transcript Volume II at 36. She also noted that the conditions of Father's home were “deplorable.” Id. She stated that, based on her observations of Father with Child, she did not believe that Child would be safe in Father's care. J.J. testified regarding Child's significant medical needs, stating that to “sum it up, its 24/7 care.” Id. at 44. GAL Lismon testified that, although Father was currently incarcerated, even when not incarcerated, there “were ongoing concerns with conditions of the home” as well as a “lack of engagement and participation” in services by Father. Id. at 68. She stated that over the three years she had been working with the family, Father had not progressed in his parenting ability despite her numerous recommendations trying to help him with learning how to care for Child.

[8] On June 2, 2025, the court issued its findings of fact, conclusions thereon, and order terminating Father's parental rights. Specifically, the court found that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or continued placement outside Father's care will not be remedied; continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being; termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests; and there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child, that being adoption by Child's current placement.

Discussion

[9] Father challenges the termination of his parental rights. Regarding petitions seeking the termination of parental rights, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 provides in pertinent part that DCS must allege as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

[10] If the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a). A finding in a proceeding to terminate parental rights must be based upon clear and convincing evidence. Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2. We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses but consider only the evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We confine our review to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. We give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. Id. “Because a case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. To the extent Father does not challenge the court's findings of fact, the unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[11] Father challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside his care will not be remedied.³ In determining whether the conditions that resulted in Child's removal will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. See E.M, 4 N.E.3d at 642-643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent's recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that a parent's past behavior is the best predictor of future behavior. Id. The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child's removal for purposes of determining whether a parent's rights should be terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home. In re N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). A court may consider evidence of a parent's prior criminal history, drug abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent's response to those services. Id.

[12] The record reveals that Child was removed from Father's care due to being a drug exposed premature infant with “severe,” “unfortunate permanent medical conditions” that developed as a result. Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 74. Father failed to successfully complete any of the numerous ordered services or follow recommendations which caused Father to not make adequate progress in developing the skills necessary to appropriately care for Child. As observed by the trial court, “[a]n opportunity has been afforded to [Father] to demonstrate the ability to tend to those needs and care for those needs, and unfortunately, [Father] has not shown the ability to do so in a way that this Court would feel comfortable that [Child] would remain safe.” Id. In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Father's care will not be remedied.

[13] Father also challenges the trial court's conclusion that termination of his parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining the best interests of children, the trial court is required to look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children. Id. The court need not wait until children are irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. The recommendation of a case manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the children's best interests. A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1158-1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

[14] FCM Theil opined that termination of Father's parental rights and adoption was in Child's best interests. He testified that Child had been in her preadoptive foster care home for approximately four years, so “pretty much her entire life.” Transcript Volume II at 21. When asked if he thought if Father “will ever be able to be consistent or meet [Child's] medical needs, FCM Theil responded, “I do not.” Id. at 28. FCM Theil agreed that Child's needs are such that, “it could be fatal if she's not treated properly[.]” Id.

[15] Similarly, GAL Lismon opined that termination of Father's parental rights was in Child's best interests. She stated that during the three years she had been working with Father, he was inconsistent with services, there were “ongoing concerns with conditions of the home,” and Father “struggled ․ to obtain and retain the information needed to take care of [Child].” Id. at 68.

[16] In light of the evidence set forth above and in the record outlining Father's habitual failure to demonstrate that he has the ability to provide for Child's substantial medical needs or to remedy the conditions resulting in removal, we cannot say the trial court clearly erred in finding that termination of Father's parental rights is in Child's best interests.

[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's termination order.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother's parental rights were terminated in a separate order issued on February 18, 2025.

2.   Child's foster mother testified at the hearing and reported that Child has “13 different doctors,” is in “outpatient therapy in Muncie,” and must go to Cincinnati “to a feeding specialist twice a year for 3 hour visits.” Exhibits Volume I at 35.

3.   To the extent Father challenges the trial court's conclusions regarding additional subsections of Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d), we need not address those arguments as the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed.

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.