IN RE: G.R. and B.R. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] W.R. (“Father”) and A.R. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”), are the biological parents of G.R. (d/o/b September 7, 2022) and B.R. (d/o/b January 4, 2025) (collectively, “Children”). In November of 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have G.R. (and later, B.R.) found to be children in need of services (“CHINS”) due to concerns about the condition of the family's home. In April of 2025, the juvenile court found Children to be CHINS. Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding Children to be CHINS.¹ Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Parents and Children reside in Anderson. G.R. was born in 2022 with a bad heart valve, which had to be surgically repaired and requires yearly checkups. On November 1, 2024, DCS received a report that G.R. had been present during an incident of domestic violence in the home. At the time, Parents and G.R. lived in Father's parents’ home with them, an aunt, and the aunt's husband, the last two of whom had been involved in the domestic violence. DCS Family Case Manager Jessica Milliner (“FCM Milliner”) visited the home, and, by the time she arrived, aunt's husband had been arrested.

[3] FCM Milliner became concerned about the home's condition, noticing that “there was an extremely strong odor of animal waste[,] both urine and feces,” and that the feces were “caked and dried on to the floor.” Tr. Vol. II p. 77. FCM Milliner saw cockroaches on the wall. At one point, FCM Milliner saw G.R. on the floor, playing. On November 4, 2024, DCS petitioned to have G.R. found to be a CHINS due to the poor conditions in the home and domestic violence. FCM Milliner put in a referral for family preservation, wanting to address the issues without removing G.R.

[4] Between November of 2024 and January of 2025, home-based case manager Kaylynn Duffy worked on parenting education with Parents. Duffy noticed that the home was cluttered and that the family had no routine. While Parents initially complied with the service and were receptive to it, the home reverted to a poor condition, and on quite a few occasions there were animal feces on the floor of the home.

[5] FCM Cody York had also begun working with the family in December of 2024 and was already familiar with Parents and G.R. because he had visited the home in mid-November. In mid-November, FCM York had noticed that the home was very cluttered, with animal feces and urine on the floor. Mid-December photographs of the home show clutter, dirty bathrooms, and swept but still-dirty floors.

[6] B.R. was born on January 4, 2025, and, because he had feeding issues caused by a medical condition affecting his mouth, he was placed in the neonatal intensive-care unit. On January 8, FCM York visited the family's home to determine if B.R. could be released to Parents and found the home to be in much worse condition than when he had initially become involved. Even though FCM York had told the family to reduce the number of animals in the household, the family had acquired six baby chickens and a puppy. There were fresh animal droppings on the floor.

[7] On January 10, 2025, DCS petitioned to have B.R. found to be a CHINS due to the conditions present in Parents’ home. DCS also filed emergency motions to detain Children. DCS detained Children pursuant to a court order and placed them in foster care. In mid-January of 2025, DCS learned that aunt's husband was hiding in the family's basement. FCM York visited the family's residence again, where he saw “clothes all over the place that were soaking wet” and mold and animal feces everywhere in the basement. Tr. Vol. II p. 129.

[8] In February of 2025, Parents moved to a two-bedroom apartment. Parents’ new home was appropriate; FCM York's only concerns were the lack of a baby gate at the top of the stairs and a missing lock on a door opening into an unfinished attic area from Children's bedroom. By the time of the fact-finding hearing, Parents had installed a baby gate at the top of the stairs.

[9] Parents participated in home-based casework and visitation with Rachel Boes, who holds a degree in psychology and child advocacy. Boes's work with Parents concentrated on parenting skills and home maintenance. Around March of 2025, Boes was working with Mother on setting boundaries and saying no to a toddler, namely, G.R., while maintaining consistency; this was a new skill for Mother, who felt uncomfortable with it.

[10] At the fact-finding hearing conducted on March 25 and April 23, 2025, Boes opined that it would take Mother some effort to learn to set boundaries and say no to G.R. and have her respond to it, while maintaining consistency. Boes testified that maintaining a home was also a new skill for Parents, who were unfamiliar with milestones and Children's needs and still needed help to be successful and safe parents. Boes added that reunification would not be safe until Parents learned additional skills, noting that Parents had relied on each other heavily during visits, and it was unclear if either could care for Children without the other.

[11] FCM York expressed similar concerns about Parents’ parenting skills and their ability to manage their home. FCM York noted that, in their previous home, Parents had obviously struggled with cleanliness, and, based on the information he had received from Boes, he opined that Parents still needed help with their interactions with Children. FCM York was also unable to obtain information about G.R.’s medical condition because Parents had refused to sign the necessary releases. At the time of the CHINS fact-finding hearing, two domestic battery charges against Mother were active, with active arrest warrants in both cases. These cases have since been dismissed. See Dkts. 18H01-2108-CM-826 and 18H01-2103-CM-246.

[12] On May 15, 2025, the juvenile court issued an order on the fact-finding hearing, in which it found that Children were medically fragile and concluded that their physical and mental conditions were seriously endangered by their continued exposure to unsafe home conditions, exposure to domestic violence, and Parents not having the skills necessary to provide safe care and supervision to them. The juvenile court adjudicated Children to be CHINS.

[13] On June 3, 2025, the juvenile court held a dispositional hearing, during which FCM York testified that the only one of DCS's recommendations that Parents had not yet completed was a parenting assessment. FCM York also testified that Parents had canceled some visits due to their own doctor's appointments. FCM York further testified that Boes had also canceled some visits and that he had spoken to her about increasing her hours. When asked when Children could be reunited with Parents, FCM York stated that Parents first needed to complete their parenting assessment and that DCS would evaluate that along with Boes's recommendation. According to FCM York, Boes had recommended unsupervised visitation with pop-in visits by the supervisor, but more recently had recommended against that because Parents had acquired a cat and there were animal feces on the floor again. In addition, during a recent visit, Parents had been aggressive with each other and had commented that they feared each other. Parents denied having any domestic violence issues. Father testified that the family was going to start counseling.

[14] On June 12, 2025, the juvenile court entered a dispositional order, which required Father, inter alia, to keep in touch with DCS, participate in recommended services, keep all appointments with service providers, sign necessary releases, maintain suitable and stable housing, secure and maintain a stable source of income, obey the law, complete a parenting assessment, and meet all personal medical needs.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Father contends that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to sustain the juvenile court's finding that the Children are CHINS, specifically, that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that he was unable to provide care, rehabilitation, or treatment without resorting to court intervention. In a CHINS proceeding,

“the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a child is a CHINS as defined by the juvenile code.” In re N.E., 919 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind. 2010). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. Egly v. Blackford County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ind. 1992). We consider only the evidence that supports the [juvenile] court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We reverse only upon a showing that the decision of the [juvenile] court was clearly erroneous. Id.

In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1253 (Ind. 2012) (footnote omitted). “We give due regard to the [juvenile] court's ability to assess the credibility of witnesses.” In re Des.B., 2 N.E.3d 828, 836 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

I. Challenged Findings

[16] Father first challenges several of the juvenile court's findings, specifically numbers 13, 17, 19, 21, and 22. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). Even if a finding is clearly erroneous, it is not grounds for reversal where the other findings support the court's judgment. See, e.g., In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding that “[b]ecause there is evidence sufficient to support the trial court's ultimate findings on the elements necessary to sustain the judgment, [․] the erroneous finding was merely harmless surplusage that did not prejudice Mother and, consequently, is not grounds for reversal”), trans. denied.

[17] Findings 13 and 17 are that “[G.R.] is a medical [(sic)] fragile child with a heart condition that has required several surgeries” and that “[n]ow that Mother and Father have their own residence, Mother and Father need DCS Services to learn the skills necessary to budget and keep the home in a condition that is safe for medically fragile children[,]” respectively. Appellant's App. Vol. III. p. 3. It is undisputed that G.R. was born with a bad heart valve, and Father testified that she had had surgery to repair the valve. Father added that G.R. required checkups because of her medical issue. Mother testified that B.R. had had feeding issues due to a medical condition affecting his mouth, and because of that, he had been placed in the neonatal intensive care unit. This evidence supports findings that the Children are medically fragile. Moreover, even though the record does not specifically state that Parents need specialized training to deal with Children, the findings referring to Children as medically fragile are not clearly erroneous and the need for training to address their conditions can reasonably be inferred.

[18] Finding 19 is that “[n]either Mother nor Father submitted photos of the new home to the court. The court finds that any testimony Mother and Father provided to the conditions of the current home to be self-serving and have little weight.” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 4. Father's challenge to this finding is that the juvenile court gave insufficient weight to Parents’ testimony regarding the cleanliness of their new home. The juvenile court, however, was in the best position to evaluate this testimony, and we will not second-guess it on this point. See, e.g., Tharp v. State, 942 N.E.2d 814, 816 (Ind. 2011) (noting that the factfinder is best positioned to judge the credibility of witnesses and is free to credit or discredit testimony and weigh conflicting evidence).

[19] Finally, Father challenges Findings 21 and 22, which are that “Mother had outstanding warrants for her arrest for pending domestic violence charges out of Delaware County City Court” and that “Mother has two separate pending criminal charges for domestic violence[,]” respectively. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 4. Father notes that these criminal proceedings against Mother have been dismissed. These findings are nonetheless not clearly erroneous because, at the time of the fact-finding hearing, the cases were still pending, and Mother did, in fact, have active warrants. While it is true that cause number 18H01-2108-CM-826 was dismissed on May 27, 2025, which is between the end of the fact-finding hearing and the issuance of the CHINS adjudication, the other case, cause number 18H01-2103-CM-246, was not dismissed until June 11, 2025, which was after the juvenile court had issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law. When the juvenile court issued its findings of fact, it appropriately used the evidence admitted at the fact-finding, which showed both cases as pending cases with active warrants. We have concluded that the juvenile court should consider the parents’ situation at the time the case is heard by the court. In re R.S., 987 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). Father's arguments regarding the juvenile court's findings are nothing more than invitations to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See, e.g., In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d at 1253 (“We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses.”). The rest of the findings are unchallenged, and “must be accepted as correct.” Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992).²

II. CHINS Adjudication

[20] Father also contends that the juvenile court's conclusion that Children are CHINS is clearly erroneous. A decision is clearly erroneous if the facts do not support the findings or if the juvenile court applied the wrong legal standard to properly-found facts. In re D.J. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 68 N.E.3d 574, 578 (Ind. 2017). Here, DCS alleged that Children were CHINS pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1. To meet its burden, DCS was required to prove that Children are under the age of eighteen and that

(1) the [Children]’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or neglect of the [Children]’s parent, guardian, or custodian to supply the [Children] with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision:

(A) when the parent, guardian, or custodian is financially abl to do so; [and]

(B) due to the failure, refusal, or inability of the parent, guardian, or custodian to seek financial or other reasonable means to do so; and

(2) the [Children] need[ ] care, treatment, or rehabilitation that:

(A) the [Children are] not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coerciv intervention of the court.

Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1. The CHINS statute does not require that a court wait until a tragedy occurs to intervene. In re A.H., 913 N.E.2d 303, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Rather, a child is a CHINS when he or she is endangered by parental action or inaction. Id. We have little hesitation in concluding that the juvenile court's CHINS determinations are not clearly erroneous.

[21] Father first contends that DCS failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that Parents failed to provide Children “with necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or supervision[.]” Ind. Code § 31-34-1-1(1). The record, however, supports a conclusion that the Children, both of whom have or have had special medical needs, have been put at risk by Parents’ historical failure to maintain a safe environment for them and evidence that they require assistance in developing parenting expertise. Over the course of this case, DCS case workers repeatedly found the conditions in Parents’ two homes to be of concern, often regressing after brief periods of improvement. From November of 2024 to February of 2025, FCMs Milliner and York and Duffy all observed animal feces and urine on the floor, clutter, and cockroaches, and photographs of the home from December of 2024 show clutter, dirty bathrooms, and dirty floors. By the next month, conditions had become worse due to Parents’ acquisition of six chickens and a puppy, despite having been advised to reduce the number of animals in the home. In February of 2025, the basement was covered in wet clothing, mold, and animal feces. Parents did move to a new apartment in February of 2025, but it lacked a baby gate at the top of a stairway, and there was no lock on a door that allowed access to an unfinished attic. Boes also informed FCM York after the fact-finding hearing but before the dispositional hearing that Parents had recently acquired a cat and there were, again, animal feces on the floor.

[22] In addition to issues with the physical environment in both of Parents’ homes, concerns regarding conflict between them surfaced later in the case. Shortly before the dispositional hearing, Boes reported that Parents had been aggressive with each other during a home visit, and Parents had both commented that they were afraid of the other.

[23] Moreover, the record contains ample evidence that Parents need assistance with their parenting skills. Boes testified that setting appropriate boundaries for G.R. was a new skill for Mother, one with which Mother was uncomfortable and that would take time to acquire. Boes also indicated that Parents were unfamiliar with milestones and Children's needs and required help to be successful and safe parents. Boes testified that reunification would not be safe until Parents learned additional parenting skills, opining that Parents needed help with their interactions with Children and noting that Parents had relied on each other during visits, making it unclear that either could care for Children without the other. In summary, there is ample evidence to support the conclusions that Parents are either unwilling or currently unable to provide Children with a safe environment and that they require assistance with their parenting skills.

[24] Father draws our attention to In re E.M., 581 N.E.2d 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied, in which we concluded that the Bartholomew County Department of Public Welfare had failed to establish that a thirteen-year-old child was a CHINS. Id. at 956. We agree with DCS that E.M. is nothing like the case before us. E.M. involved the allegedly-excessive discipline of a thirteen-year-old that posed no real threat to her well-being and was found to be not excessive under the circumstances. Id.at 953–55. Here, there is evidence that Children, both very young and entirely dependent on Parents, have not been consistently provided with a safe and healthy environment, and there is no suggestion that Parents’ failure to do so can be justified as some sort of punishment. Father's reliance on E.M. is unavailing.

[25] Finally, Father contends that the juvenile court erred in concluding that coercive intervention was necessary. DCS is permitted to intervene in a family's life when that family cannot meet the child's needs without the coercive intervention of the court. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1286 (Ind. 2014). When determining whether coercive intervention is necessary, “the question is whether the parents must be coerced into providing or accepting necessary treatment for their child.” Matter of E.K., 83 N.E.3d 1256, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied.

[26] The juvenile court did not err in this regard. Parents have demonstrated more than once that conditions in their home deteriorate when they are left to their own devices. Many DCS visits found Parents’ home in worse condition than the last, and Parents, in particular, do not seem to be able to help themselves when it comes to acquiring and appropriately taking care of animals. Advising Parents to stop acquiring more animals did not work; this is clear evidence that Parents need coercive intervention.

[27] This is also true for Parents’ need to develop their parenting skills. While there is ample evidence that Parents’ parenting skills are not yet where they should be, there is also encouraging evidence that they are willing to improve their parenting skills. Duffy, who had worked with Parents from November of 2024 to January of 2025, testified at the fact-finding hearing that they were “really receptive to the parenting portion” of her work with them, and she also indicated that her main focus had been on parenting education. Tr. Vol. II p. 62. Boes testified that Mother wanted to learn parenting skills but that it was difficult for her. By the time of the fact-finding hearing, Parents had completed all recommended services except for the parenting evaluation. The fact that Parents want to be effective and safe parents but have yet to develop the necessary skills strongly supports a conclusion that they require additional help to achieve that goal. Father has failed to establish that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that coercive intervention is necessary.³

[28] We affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not participate in this appeal.

2.   While Father also challenges findings 20, 23, 24, and 25, which concern Parents’ lack of parenting skills, their need to learn those skills, and the need for court coercion, it seems to us that these are more accurately characterized as conclusions, so we do not address them separately.

3.   Father cites to Matter of A.R. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 121 N.E.3d 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), to support his argument. In that case, we reversed a CHINS adjudication, mostly because the mother had demonstrated that she was able to accomplish a great deal on her own, including “secur[ing] employment, creat[ing] a budget, rent[ing] a new condo that was appropriate for the Children, actively and successfully participat[ing] in the services DCS had authorized, and [seeking] out, again, with success, counseling on her own in order to stay sober.” Id. at 605. In this case, Father and Mother have yet to demonstrate this level of initiative.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.