Maeling Smith, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Maeling Smith pled guilty to Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement causing serious bodily injury and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. She received an aggregate sentence of three years suspended to probation. Following the revocation of her probation, Smith appeals, contending the trial court abused its discretion by ordering her to execute the remainder of her sentence in the Department of Correction (DOC). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In May 2021, an Evansville Police Department officer was in his police cruiser when a man approached him and told him he had been in an altercation with his girlfriend. At that point, the officer heard a car approach and a female, later identified as Smith, got out of the vehicle and started screaming. In an attempt to deescalate the situation, the officer repeatedly told Smith to get back in her car, but Smith refused. When the officer attempted to place Smith in custody, she avoided him by getting back into her car and closing the door. The officer opened the driver's door and grabbed Smith's arm, but she pulled away, disregarded his commands, and then drove the car in reverse pulling the officer along with her. As he was being pulled, the officer saw a semi-truck coming toward them. Fearing he would be struck, the officer let go and was knocked to the ground by the open car door. Smith continued to back up and ran over the officer's arm, breaking his wrist. The officer was able to arrest Smith after she exited the car and tried to flee.

[3] The State charged Smith with Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement causing serious bodily injury, Level 6 felony criminal recklessness, Level 6 felony attempted resisting law enforcement, and Class A misdemeanor attempted resisting law enforcement. Smith was released on bond and placed on pretrial supervision.

[4] The State filed petitions to revoke Smith's bond in January and February 2022, alleging that she had violated the conditions of her pretrial supervision by committing new offenses. The first petition alleged that in October 2021, she had been charged with misdemeanor operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license. The second alleged that she was cited for speeding twenty-six miles per hour or more over the speed limit and operating on a suspended or revoked operator's license in January 2022.¹ Smith later admitted these allegations, but the court did not revoke her bond.

[5] In August 2022, Smith entered into a plea agreement with the State by which she agreed to plead guilty to Level 5 felony resisting law enforcement causing serious bodily injury and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. She also agreed to pay restitution to the officer she had injured in the amount of $1,344.00. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts. The agreement provided that the trial court would sentence Smith to an aggregate sentence of three years with placement left to the court's discretion. Later that month, the court accepted the plea agreement and ordered Smith to serve her three-year sentence on probation. In addition to the standard terms of probation, the court ordered Smith to comply with various special conditions, including random drug screens as well as anger management and mental health assessments, and that she “not [ ] drive without a valid license.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 76. Smith signed the order and indicated that she understood its contents. Id. at 77.

[6] In February 2025, the State filed a petition to revoke Smith's probation, alleging that in July 2024 and January 2025 she had received infractions for driving while suspended and driving without a valid driver's license, respectively. The State also noted that Smith had been charged with dealing in cocaine/methamphetamine but acknowledged that charge had been dismissed without prejudice.

[7] In July, the court held a dispositional hearing and Smith admitted that she received an infraction in January 2025 for driving without a valid driver's license. Satisfied with the admission, the State did not attempt to lay a factual basis for the other alleged violations, and the parties proceeded to argument.

[8] Smith explained that she was an eighteen-year-old new mother when she committed the resisting law enforcement and criminal recklessness offenses. She argued that she had done the right things while on probation, including completing her therapy and community service obligations, paying the restitution and court costs in full, and testing negative on all drug screens. As for the violation at issue, Smith informed the court that she had obtained a driver's license while on probation. She acknowledged that the BMV had ordered her to complete a defensive driving course, but she claimed that she had not learned of that requirement until an officer pulled her over and informed her that her license was suspended because of her failure to complete the course. At the time, she was driving her three young children, for whom she was the sole provider, to daycare. She “immediately did [the course]” and paid her ticket after the incident. Transcript at 5.

[9] Given these circumstances, Smith asked the court to extend her probation or order her to complete more community service as a sanction for her violation. The State agreed with Smith's recommendation, but the trial court viewed Smith's violation as “pretty serious” given the two petitions to revoke during her pretrial supervision and because it was made “explicitly clear [to her at] sentencing not to drive again and that even a single violation would be a basis to revoke and execute [her] entire sentence.” Id. at 12. Accordingly, the court revoked the remainder of Smith's suspended sentence—two years—and ordered her to serve that time in the DOC. Smith appealed.

Discussion and Decision

[10] Smith argues the trial court's probation revocation sanction constituted an abuse of discretion. “Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Slater v. State, 223 N.E.3d 298, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)), trans. denied. We review a trial court's determination of the appropriate sanction after the revocation of probation for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 306-07. A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision was “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” before it. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013).

[11] “Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation actually occurred. Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, Smith admitted she violated a condition of her probation when she received an infraction for driving without a valid driver's license in January 2025. After accepting Smith's admission, the trial court had significant discretion to impose various sanctions, including “[o]rder[ing] execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended[.]” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h)(3). While “[v]iolation of a single condition of placement is sufficient to revoke placement[,]” Porter v. State, 117 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), “the selection of an appropriate sanction will depend upon the severity of the defendant's probation violation[.]” Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618.

[12] Smith argues that the trial court's sanction “ordering [her] back to prison ․ was unduly harsh and disproportionate[ ] given the circumstances of the case.” Appellant's Brief at 8. This is so, she contends, because her probation violation was “very minor[,]” she was otherwise compliant and demonstrated a “sincere commitment to rehabilitation[,]” her “personal circumstances warranted leniency[,]” and “even the State agreed that a less harsh sanction ․ was [ ] appropriate[.]” Id. at 8-9. Smith made these arguments to the trial court, as was her prerogative. See Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting a probationer who admits a violation of probation must still be afforded the opportunity to present mitigating evidence that revocation is not warranted), trans. denied; but see Porter, 117 N.E.3d at 675 (noting that trial courts are not required to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors when imposing a sanction for a probation violation). After considering them, the court revoked Smith's probation because of her multiple violations of Indiana's traffic laws and her failure to avail herself of the leniency the court had extended to her by not revoking her bond before she pled guilty and by giving her a fully suspended sentence for offenses that resulted in serious injuries to a law enforcement officer.

[13] The trial court was within its authority to impose this sanction and doing so was not an abuse of discretion under the present circumstances. Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582 (stating when the “proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing ․, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation”) (quoting Crump v. State, 740 N.E.2d 564, 573 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied). The basic purpose of a licensing regime for the operation of motor vehicles is to ensure that those who operate motor vehicles know how to do so safely—i.e., to protect public safety. In addition to driving unlicensed for many years, Smith's history shows she did not do so safely.

[14] As a juvenile, Smith was adjudicated a delinquent for leaving the scene of an accident and operating a vehicle without ever receiving a license. Turning to her underlying convictions in this case, Smith, still unlicensed, operated a vehicle to evade law enforcement and seriously injured a law enforcement officer in the process. While she was released on bond, Smith committed further traffic offenses, including driving twenty-six miles per hour or more over the speed limit.

[15] Acknowledging Smith's propensity for driving unlicensed and committing other traffic offenses that could endanger the safety of herself, her children, and other motorists, the trial court ordered her “not to drive without a valid license” when it suspended her three-year sentence to probation. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 76. It also explicitly informed her that a single violation could result in the revocation of her entire suspended sentence. Under these circumstances and in this context, the court was warranted in finding that Smith committed a “pretty serious” violation of her probation by continuing to drive without a valid license. Tr. at 12. Accordingly, Smith has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked her suspended sentence.

Conclusion

[16] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it revoked Smith's probation and ordered her to execute the remainder of her sentence in the DOC.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State also alleged that Smith had left the jurisdiction without permission and failed to pay probation fees.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.