William R. Robertson, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A New Albany police officer initiated a traffic stop of a black Hyundai Santa Fe after determining that its license plate belonged to another vehicle. The vehicle had three occupants: the driver, William Robertson, and two passengers, one of whom fled on foot. When the officer stated that he smelled marijuana, Robertson initially acknowledged that there were some remnants of the drug in the vehicle. But after further questioning, he soon admitted that the vehicle contained bags of it, and a search of the car revealed about a pound of the drug stored under the two front seats. The Hyundai was later determined to be a stolen vehicle.

[2] Robertson was charged with auto theft and possession of marijuana and convicted of both offenses after a jury trial. On appeal, he contends the State failed to prove that he committed auto theft because the evidence did not establish that he knew the Hyundai was stolen. Robertson also claims the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his alleged prior misconduct, including drug dealing. Finding sufficient evidence of auto theft and no error in the admission of the challenged evidence, we affirm.

Facts

[3] Several months before the traffic stop that ended in Robertson's arrest, the Hyundai that Robertson was driving was reported stolen from Louisville, Kentucky. When Robertson was stopped in the Hyundai, the vehicle bore a license plate registered to a BMW owned by Kathy Davis. Davis authorized no one to remove or use her plate that day. Without Davis's apparent knowledge, however, her boyfriend had helped Robertson transfer Davis's plate from the BMW to the Hyundai. Davis became upset when she discovered the missing license plate and told her boyfriend to direct Robertson to return it.

[4] Police surveilling a gas station first observed the Hyundai with three occupants. Tristan Patterson drove the Hyundai to the gas station but switched seats with Robertson once they noticed police observing them. Robertson then drove the car from the gas station and was stopped soon thereafter by the officers. One occupant of the car fled, but Robertson remained in the driver's seat while Patterson remained in the front passenger seat.

[5] After advising Robertson of his rights, an officer questioned Robertson about his connection to the Hyundai. Robertson stated that Davis had traded her BMW for the Hyundai and that was why her plates were on the Hyundai—a claim that Davis later denied. Robertson also told the officers that he had checked the Hyundai's vehicle identification number (VIN) through an application on his phone before driving it. He claimed: “I do that before I drive any other car anymore” because “I'm not going to ride here in a stolen car, man.” Id. at 240.

[6] After the officer noted that Robertson smelled like marijuana, this exchange occurred:

[OFFICER]: Anything in the car you're not supposed to have? Anything illegal in the vehicle?

[ROBERTSON]: There's some roaches 1 in there, that's it.

[OFFICER]: Do you have any marijuana?

[ROBERTSON]: That's roaches.

[OFFICER]: Other than roaches?

[ROBERTSON]: Shouldn't be.

[OFFICER]: No bags?

[ROBERTSON]: No, there is.

[OFFICER]: There is?

[ROBERTSON]: Oh, my god.

Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 25-26.

[7] After noting that the Hyundai also smelled like marijuana, police searched the vehicle and found two bags of raw marijuana—one under each front seat— totaling about a pound. The search also revealed a large amount of copper wire that was so heavy that one of the officers asked for assistance in moving it. Robertson told police that he smokes marijuana “all the time.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 242.

[8] The State charged Robertson with auto theft and possession of marijuana, both Level 6 felonies, and later alleged he was a habitual offender. At Robertson's jury trial, the trial court admitted, over Robertson's objection, Facebook chat messages obtained from his cell phone. In one set of messages, Davis's boyfriend asked Robertson to return the BMW's tag because Davis was upset that it had been removed from her vehicle. Davis's boyfriend also told Robertson in the messages that “someone seen us take the tag” and asked Robertson to return it as soon as possible. Exhs. Vol. VII, p. 132. Another set of Facebook chat messages also included communications in which Robertson arranged to sell marijuana to a third party.

[9] The trial court also admitted over Robertson's objections body-camera footage showing a large amount of copper wire inside the Hyundai. The footage included officers’ brief comments noting the large quantity of copper wire and that it was heavy. However, the footage contained no evidence that the wire was stolen or linked to any separate offense.

[10] A jury found Robertson guilty of both auto theft and possession of marijuana, and Robertson then admitted to being a habitual offender. After entering judgment of conviction on the jury verdicts, the trial court sentenced Robertson to an aggregate term of 10 years imprisonment. Robertson appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[11] Robertson raises two issues on appeal. He first argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the Hyundai. He also contends the court erred by admitting evidence of prior drug dealing and other alleged misconduct. We find both claims unpersuasive.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[12] When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the verdict and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom without reweighing evidence or reassessing witness credibility. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm the conviction “unless no reasonable [factfinder] could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The evidence need not “overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 147 (internal quotation omitted).

[13] To convict Robertson of auto theft, the State had to prove that he knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over property—specifically a motor vehicle—of another person, with intent to deprive the other person of any part of its value or use. See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(B)(i). Robertson does not dispute that the Hyundai was stolen. Instead, he argues the State showed only his later possession of it and therefore was insufficient to demonstrate theft.

[14] He asserts that several people drove the vehicle during the three months it was missing and that Patterson was initially in the driver's seat before switching places with Robertson. According to Robertson, these circumstances negate any inference that he knew the vehicle was stolen.

[15] The “mere unexplained possession of recently stolen property standing alone does not automatically support a conviction for theft.” Fortson v. State, 919 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (Ind. 2010) (rejecting prior rule permitting automatic inference of theft from recent possession). “Rather, such possession is to be considered along with the other evidence in a case, such as how recent or distant in time was the possession from the moment the item was stolen, and what are the circumstances of the possession[.]” Id.

[16] Where, as here, a considerable length of time has elapsed from the theft to the arrest, the State must show either “the defendant has had exclusive possession of the property during that period of time” or produce additional evidence showing the defendant's knowledge that the property was stolen. Shelby v. State, 875 N.E.2d 381, 385 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Knowledge that the property was stolen may be proven by circumstantial evidence. Id.

[17] The State did not prove Robertson's exclusive possession of the Hyundai between its theft and Robertson's arrest about three months later. But it did produce additional circumstantial evidence from which the jury could determine that Robertson knew the vehicle was stolen.

[18] First, the jury could have reasonably found that Robertson gave false information to police about the Hyundai and that he did so because he knew the car was stolen. See Fortson, 919 N.E.2d at 1144 (when determining whether knowledge of stolen property could be inferred from the circumstances, considered whether defendant attempted to conceal theft or provided evasive answers to police). Robertson told police that he borrowed the Hyundai from Davis. He explained that the Hyundai bore the plate belonging to Davis's BMW because Davis had traded her BMW for the Hyundai. But Davis testified she had never owned the Hyundai, had not traded her BMW for it, and had not authorized anyone to remove or use her BMW's license plate on the Hyundai. She also denied loaning the Hyundai to Robertson. In addition, the Hyundai's owner testified he had never met Robertson and had not given him or Davis permission to use the vehicle.

[19] Second, the State presented evidence that Robertson was involved with the placement of the mismatched license plate on the Hyundai, supporting the inference that Robertson knew the car was stolen and could not be properly plated. Davis's testimony that she had no connection to the Hyundai or the transfer of the license plate was largely corroborated by her boyfriend, whose Facebook chat messages to Robertson implicated Robertson in the plate's removal. The messages showed that Robertson and Davis's boyfriend had removed the license plate from Davis's BMW before Robertson's arrest and that Davis demanded its return after she learned someone had seen the two men “take the tag.” Exhs. Vol. VII, p. 132.

[20] Robertson also told police he had checked the Hyundai's VIN through an application on his cell phone before driving it. He explained to police that he takes this precaution anytime he drives a vehicle because “I'm not going to ride here in a stolen car[.]” Tr. Vol. III, p. 240. Yet if he had checked the VIN, Robertson presumably would have ascertained that the car was stolen. Robertson also admitted he had driven the Hyundai to the gas station earlier that day, and the Facebook chat messages suggested that he had control of the vehicle even on days prior to his arrest.

[21] From this evidence—Robertson's participation in the procurement of the mismatched license plate, his statements to police that conflicted with testimony from several other witnesses, his alleged VIN check, and messages suggesting Robertson had been driving the vehicle earlier at a time other than when arrested—the jury could infer that Robertson knowingly exerted unauthorized control over the Hyundai when he knew the Hyundai was stolen. Robertson's contrary interpretation seeks a reweighing of the evidence in contravention of the applicable standard of review. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146.

II. Admissibility of Evidence

[22] Robertson next argues that the trial court violated Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) by admitting: (1) Facebook chat messages showing he arranged a marijuana sale days before his arrest; and (2) body-camera footage capturing police comments about copper wire in the Hyundai. We find no error.

[23] Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) prohibits admission of “evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” solely to prove the defendant's character “in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” Evid. R. 404(b)(1). But the Rule does not preclude admission of evidence if offered “for another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2). Even if the requirements of Rule 404(b) are met, “[t]he court may exclude the evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” Evid. R. 403.

[24] We engage in a two-step analysis when reviewing evidence admitted under Rule 404(b). We first determine whether, consistent with Rule 404(b)(2), the challenged evidence is relevant to a matter at issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the charged crime. Fairbanks v. State, 119 N.E.3d 564, 568 (Ind. 2019). If this relevancy hurdle is cleared, we must then consider under Evidence Rule 403 whether “the evidence's probative value is not ‘substantially outweighed’ by the danger of unfair prejudice.” Id. (quoting Rule 403). Whether the trial court erred in admitting the evidence under Rule 404 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 567-68. “Under that standard, we reverse only when the admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. at 568.

A. Facebook Chat Messages

[25] Nine days before the traffic stop, Robertson exchanged a short string of Facebook chat messages arranging the sale of marijuana with a third party. The State introduced the messages to show Robertson's knowledge of the marijuana in the Hyundai and his intent to exercise control over it. The messages were contained to just a few pages and showed Robertson haggling over price and quantity—nothing more.

[26] This evidence was significant because Robertson's knowledge and intent to possess the marijuana were at issue throughout the trial. When police confronted Robertson at the scene, he readily admitted that he smoked marijuana but initially responded that the only marijuana in the Hyundai was the “roaches.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 241. Only when the officer continued questioning him did Robertson acknowledge the presence of the bags of marijuana. But during opening arguments at his trial, Robertson denied the drugs belonged to him. He argued that Patterson had borrowed the Hyundai, that Robertson “was just in the wrong place at the wrong time,” and that he “basically has been framed by [Patterson] for these crimes.” Id. at 193.

[27] Given these circumstances, the State was required to prove Robertson's constructive possession of the drugs. See Gray v. State, 957 N.E.2d 171, 174 (Ind. 2011) (“When the State cannot prove actual possession, a conviction for possessing contraband may rest instead on proof of constructive possession.”). A person constructively possesses contraband when the person has both the capability and the intent to maintain dominion and control over the item. Id.

[28] This capability and intent may be inferred from the defendant's possessory interest in the “premises” at which the officer found the contraband. Id. “When that possessory interest is not exclusive, however, the State must support this second inference with additional circumstances pointing to the defendant's knowledge of the presence and the nature of the item.” Id. at 174-75. These additional circumstances include the defendant's incriminating statements, attempts to leave or furtive gestures, the item's proximity to the defendant; and the mingling of contraband with other items the defendant owns. Id. at 175. As Robertson's possession of the Hyundai was not exclusive, the State needed to present evidence connecting Robertson's mental state to the drugs.

[29] The earlier Facebook chat messages did exactly that. They were not introduced exclusively to suggest that Robertson was a “drug dealer” in general or a person of bad character. Instead, they filled a narrow gap: they showed that Robertson was familiar with selling marijuana, understood quantities, and had recently negotiated a sale. From that, the jury could reasonably infer that he recognized—and intended to control—the substantial amount of marijuana hidden inches from where he sat.

[30] The trial court also acted well within its discretion in concluding that the messages’ probative value outweighed any risk of unfair prejudice. The exchange was short, recent, and directly tied to the central question of whether Robertson knowingly possessed over a pound of marijuana. The court did not permit the State to delve into remote history or to portray Robertson as a habitual dealer. Rather, it allowed only those messages that bore on an element the State was required to prove and that Robertson expressly disputed.

B. References to Copper Wire in Body-Camera Footage

[31] Robertson also challenges the admission of body-camera footage capturing police comments about copper wire found in the Hyundai during the traffic stop. He argues the footage implied he was involved in some other form of theft or wrongdoing, such as theft of the copper wire to sell for scrap, although the State offered no evidence connecting the copper wire to any criminal activity. In Robertson's view, the comments carried a risk the jury would infer a criminal propensity in violation of Evidence Rule 404(b), and any minimal relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403. See Perryman v. State, 13 N.E.3d 923, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“The paradigm of ․ evidence [inadmissible under Rule 404(b)] is a crime committed on another day in another place, evidence whose only apparent purpose is to prove the defendant is a person who commits crimes.”).

[32] We find no abuse of discretion. Rule 404(b), by its express terms, applies when the State offers evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” to prove a defendant's propensity to commit the charged offense. Here, the copper-wire footage did not describe or depict a prior act by Robertson at all. The comments constituted observations of items that the officers observed in the vehicle during the stop. The comments were very brief and focused on the large quantity and weight of the copper wire.

[33] The copper-wire footage did not convey to the jury the negative inference that Robertson attributes to it. The footage included no statement that the copper wire was stolen, no suggestion that Robertson possessed it unlawfully, and no testimony connecting it to any criminal act. Nor did the State argue that the presence of the copper wire bore on Robertson's character or propensity for theft. See Rogers v. State, 897 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (ruling that possession of a steak knife, by itself, is not a “bad act” that falls within the scope of Rule 404(b)).

[34] In these circumstances, the footage falls outside Rule 404(b). See id. (ruling that 404(b) does not apply when evidence does not describe a defendant's prior misconduct). But we still must determine whether the footage was admissible under Rule 403, which, as earlier noted, allows even relevant evidence to be excluded if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.

[35] The copper-wire comment was brief, incidental, and not emphasized by the State. Given the nature of the copper-wire reference and the absence of any link to criminal activity, the trial court could reasonably conclude that any minimal prejudice did not substantially outweigh the footage's probative value as part of the narrative of the stop. See Richmond v. State, 685 N.E.2d 54, 55-56 (Ind. 1997) (ruling that brief references to defendant's street gang during murder trial was not inadmissible under Rule 403 because those references were not introduced to exploit or inflame the jury).

Conclusion

[36] Contrary to Robertson's claim, the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Facebook chat messages or the body-camera footage. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   A roach is the “discards of a marijuana cigarette.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 215.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.