Robert Reed, Jr., Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On November 8, 2022, Robert Reed, Jr., shot his sometime-girlfriend Sherry Wolfe multiple times. Before she died, Wolfe identified Reed as her assailant. Reed was charged with murder. At trial, Reed admitted to shooting Wolfe, but claimed that he had acted in sudden heat. The jury found Reed guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced him to an aggregate fifty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Reed contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for murder, claiming that the State had failed to disprove that he had acted in sudden heat. Reed alternatively argues that his fifty-five-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Prior to November of 2022, Reed and Wolfe had been involved in an on-again, off-again romantic relationship. As of November 8, 2022, the relationship had ended. On that date, Reed, driving his gray SUV, followed Wolfe as she was driving with some of her grandchildren in Indianapolis. Wolfe called her daughter, Destiny Bellamy, and told her that “Reed's following me.” Tr. Vol. II p. 125.

[3] After Wolfe had arrived back at her apartment complex, neighbors heard Reed yelling at Wolfe. Makeesha Britt, who was both a neighbor and close friend of Wolfe's, heard and saw Reed yelling at Wolfe from inside his vehicle. Britt described Reed's voice as having been “loud.” Tr. Vol. II p. 133. This was not the first time that Britt had heard Reed arguing with Wolfe.

[4] While Britt was looking out her window and listening to Reed yell at Wolfe, she heard gunfire and then heard Wolfe “scream for [Britt's] help[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 134. Britt's daughter, Ad.C., had also heard Reed yelling at Wolfe, but had not heard Wolfe yelling back at Reed. Prior to Reed “shooting at” Wolfe, Ad.C. had observed that Wolfe had merely been speaking to Reed while Reed had been yelling at Wolfe. Tr. Vol. II p. 144. Ad.C. also described Reed's voice prior to the shooting as having been “[l]oud.” Tr. Vol. II p. 144. Britt's other daughter, Au.C., heard and saw multiple gunshots come from Reed's SUV. Two of Wolfe's grandchildren had also been present at the time of the shooting and had called Bellamy and told her that Reed had shot Wolfe.

[5] When police arrived at the scene, Wolfe was still able to speak and identified Reed as the person who had shot her. Likewise, when officers presented Britt with a photograph array, she identified Reed as the person who had shot Wolfe. Officers recovered evidence, including one fired bullet and four spent casings, from the scene. A subsequent search of Reed's SUV led to the discovery of “two fired cartridge cases[,]” which included headstamps that read “CBC 9mm Luger.” Tr. Vol. II p. 248. Reed was eventually located and arrested. After Wolfe died, the State charged Reed with murder.

[6] Dr. John Cavanaugh, a forensic pathologist employed by the Marion County Coroner's Office, took part in Wolfe's autopsy. Dr. Cavanaugh observed that Wolfe had suffered multiple injuries, including six separate gunshot wounds. Dr. Cavanaugh determined that “[t]he cause of [Wolfe's] death was multiple gunshot wounds. And the manner of [her] death was homicide.” Tr. Vol. II p. 235.

[7] At trial, Reed acknowledged that he had shot and killed Wolfe but argued that he had acted in sudden heat, which would reduce the level of the offense from murder to voluntary manslaughter. The jury disagreed, finding Reed guilty of murder. The trial court sentenced Reed to a fifty-five-year executed sentence.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[8] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, appellate courts must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. It is the fact-finder's role, not that of appellate courts, to assess witness credibility and weigh the evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction. To preserve this structure, when appellate courts are confronted with conflicting evidence, they must consider it most favorably to the trial court's ruling. Appellate courts affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is therefore not necessary that the evidence overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. The evidence is sufficient if an inference may reasonably be drawn from it to support the verdict.

Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146–47 (Ind. 2007) (internal brackets, citations, emphasis, and quotations omitted). Stated differently, in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the convictions, neither reweighing evidence nor reassessing witness credibility” and “affirm the judgment unless no reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty.” Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 958 (Ind. 2016).

[9] In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his murder conviction, Reed does not dispute the fact that he shot Wolfe. Instead, Reed argues that the State failed to disprove his claim that he had acted in sudden heat and, as a result, should have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, not murder. “A person who: (1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being ․ commits murder, a felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. A person who “knowingly or intentionally: (1) kills another human being․ while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Level 2 felony.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(a). “The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder under section 1(1) of this chapter to voluntary manslaughter.” Ind. Code § 35-42-1-3(b).

[10] The existence of sudden heat is a “mitigating factor”—not an affirmative defense—and it “reduces what otherwise would be murder to voluntary manslaughter.” [Ind. Code] § 35-42-1-3(b); Isom v. State, 651 N.E.2d 1151, 1152 (Ind. 1995). Once sudden heat has been “injected” into the heart of the case, “the burden is on the State to negate its existence.” Bane v. State, 587 N.E.2d 97, 100 (Ind. 1992), reh'g denied. When injecting the issue, the defendant must point to some evidence in the record supporting sudden heat. Watts v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1228, 1234 n.2 (Ind. 2008). Because sudden heat functions as an “evidentiary predicate,” Bane, 587 N.E.2d at 100, it requires the jury to decide whether the record evidence supports it. Id.

Sudden heat exists when a defendant is “provoked by anger, rage, resentment, or terror, to a degree sufficient to obscure the reason of an ordinary person, prevent deliberation and premeditation, and render the defendant incapable of cool reflection.” [Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 572 (Ind. 2018)] (quoting Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 486 (Ind. 2015)). The issue of whether adequate provocation legally exists is an objective— not a subjective—measure. See Stevens v. State, 691 N.E.2d 412, 426 (Ind. 1997); Suprenant v. State, 925 N.E.2d 1280, 1282–83 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Indeed, “[e]vidence of sudden heat may be found in either the State's case or the defendant's.” Brantley, 91 N.E.3d at 572. And because juries are in the unique position to assess the veracity of evidence, they must decide whether the evidence contained in the record “constitute[s] sudden heat sufficient to warrant a conviction for voluntary manslaughter.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459–60 (Ind. 2023) (first and second sets of brackets added).

[11] Reed claims that “[t]his is a classic sudden heat scenario.” Appellant's Br. p. 12. He claims to have become upset after Wolfe told him that she did not have money that he had asked her to hold for him, stating that

[i]t made me angry to a certain point, but then when she started calling me out on my name, that really made me angry because there wasn't no call for her to do that. And it just made me mad, and I just snapped.․ I just snapped. I just -- and I got real mad, and I -- ․ I pulled out a gun, and I shot her.

Tr. Vol. III p. 76. Reed claims that he was provoked into shooting Wolfe “by a combination of” financial hardship, grief from the loss of his wife, who had died in March of 2021, and verbal abuse from Wolfe. Appellant's Br. p. 12. Reed further claims that the record is devoid of “evidence suggesting premeditation or a cooling off period.” Appellant's Br. p. 12.

[12] Contrary to Reed's claim that Wolfe had provoked him, the evidence most favorable to the jury's verdict demonstrates that Reed had provoked the confrontation with Wolfe. Reed followed Wolfe in her vehicle while some of her grandchildren were present. Wolfe had known that she was being followed as she had called her daughter to report Reed's behavior. Reed continued to follow Wolfe until she arrived at her apartment complex. Reed sought out Wolfe, indicating that he knew he was about to confront a person that he was no longer in a romantic relationship with and whom he claimed owed him money. Witnesses had previously heard Reed and Wolfe arguing, discounting any element of surprise to Reed that his act of confronting Wolfe might have resulted in an argument. Moreover, just prior to the shooting, witnesses had overheard Reed yelling at Wolfe, but not Wolfe yelling at Reed. Finally, at the time of the shooting, Reed was in his vehicle while Wolfe was standing on the sidewalk in front of her apartment, and the record is devoid of any evidence suggesting that Wolfe was acting in a threatening manner or was in possession of any object that could reasonably have been threatening to Reed. Based on these facts, we cannot say that the jury's determination that the evidence sufficiently rebutted Reed's claim that he acted in sudden heat was not objectively reasonable.¹

[13] In sum, the evidence established that Reed followed Wolfe and instigated a confrontation with Wolfe before shooting her six times. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the jury's guilty verdict for murder.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[14] Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that “[t]he Court may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In analyzing such claims, we “concentrate less on comparing the facts of [the case at issue] to others, whether real or hypothetical, and more on focusing on the nature, extent, and depravity of the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced, and what it reveals about the defendant's character.” Paul v. State, 888 N.E.2d 818, 825 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal quotation omitted), trans. denied. The defendant bears the burden of persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate. Sanchez v. State, 891 N.E.2d 174, 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[15] “A person who commits murder shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between forty-five (45) and sixty-five (65) years, with the advisory sentence being fifty-five (55) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). In this case, the trial court imposed an advisory sentence, sentencing Reed to a fifty-five-year sentence. We have said that an appellate court is “unlikely to consider an advisory sentence inappropriate[,]” Shelby v. State, 986 N.E.2d 345, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied, and that a “defendant bears a particularly heavy burden in persuading us that his sentence is inappropriate when the trial court imposes the advisory sentence.” Fernbach v. State, 954 N.E.2d 1080, 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[16] With regard to the nature of his offense, Reed claims that “[t]he nature and circumstances of this fatality are no more than a modal fatality.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. We cannot agree. Reed shot Wolfe six times, with many of the shots striking Wolfe in the breast and pelvic areas. One could reasonably infer that Reed intended, if he did not succeed in his object killing Wolfe, at least to injure Wolfe in areas sensitive to their past romantic relationship. Reed also shot at Wolfe from inside his vehicle in the direction of an occupied apartment building, potentially placing others at risk of injury or death had any of his shots been off target.

[17] As it relates to his character, Reed claims that up until he shot and killed Wolfe, he had lived a largely law-abiding life, with “an almost flawless criminal history.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. Reed's criminal history includes misdemeanor convictions for operating a vehicle while intoxicated in 1987 and criminal trespass in 1982.² “ ‘The significance of a criminal history in assessing a defendant's character and an appropriate sentence varies based on the gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.’ ” Denham v. State, 142 N.E.3d 514, 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 875 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), trans. denied. Given the gravity of the instant offense, i.e., murder, we cannot say that Reed's relatively minimal criminal history is of much significance.

[18] Reed also claims that he had “led a life with a distinguished history of working hard in difficult jobs” and “undergone a series of deeply troubling personal losses before this offense.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. Reed further claims that due to his advanced age—he was born in October of 1957—and his recent cancer diagnosis, his sentence amounts to a “de facto life sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 14. In imposing a fifty-five-year advisory sentence, the trial court considered Reed's age and medical diagnosis to be mitigating factors, effectively offsetting the aggravating factors that there were witnesses to the murder and the number of times that Reed shot Wolfe. Reed has failed to carry the “particularly heavy burden” of convincing us that his fifty-five-year advisory sentence is inappropriate. Fernbach, 954 N.E.2d at 1089.

[19] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent that Reed claims that his grief over his wife's death, which again had occurred more than a year before Wolfe's murder in March of 2021, provoked his actions in this case, we agree with the State that “growing older and dealing with deaths in the family is not the kind of trigger our law has in mind when it defines ‘sudden heat.’ ” Appellee's Br. pp. 11–12. We are also unpersuaded by Reed's assertion that the fact that none of the six shots struck Wolfe in the head proved that he had not intended to kill Wolfe.

2.   The pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) completed in advance of Reed's sentencing indicates that Reed had amassed three prior misdemeanor convictions. However, two of the convictions listed in the PSI seem to relate to the same offense, an act of operating a vehicle while intoxicated on December 7, 1987.

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.