DOUCETTE v. STATE (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Mark Doucette was convicted of two counts of Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor.¹ On appeal, Doucette argues the testimony of Victim was incredibly dubious and therefore insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Victim and her sister began living with their aunt and her husband, Doucette, when Victim was around three years old. As Victim grew older, she became Doucette's favorite. He showed greater affection and concern for Victim than for her sister. When Victim was approximately thirteen, she enrolled in a weightlifting class at school. Doucette provided Victim with massages to deal with the soreness associated with lifting weights.

[3] One spring night, when Victim was around fourteen years old, she watched a movie with Doucette and her aunt in the living room. All three were reclined on the “L-shaped” couch, with Victim's aunt alone on one side of the couch and Victim and Doucette together on the other side. Tr. Vol. 3 at 27. Victim and Doucette were under a blanket. The lights were off. Toward the end of the movie, Doucette placed his right hand on Victim's left leg and “kept getting closer” to her “area down there.” Id. at 33. Eventually, Doucette's hand “came in from the top,” under Victim's shorts, and with a “back and forth” motion touched her vagina. Id. at 34. Victim remembered Doucette's palm faced her stomach during the incident. A few days later, when the two were alone, Doucette grabbed Victim's arm and stated she “couldn't tell anybody” about what happened. Id. at 37.

[4] Several months later, in early 2023, Doucette once again touched Victim inappropriately. One day after having lunch together, Doucette and Victim returned home where they found themselves alone. Doucette offered to give Victim a massage. She accepted and placed herself on her stomach on the living room couch. Doucette “went on his knees” and started massaging her legs. Id. at 45. He “ended up getting closer and closer” to Victim's “down area[.]” Id. at 46. Doucette rubbed Victim's butt, and using a “back and forth” motion, he touched her vagina “in between [her] legs” over the leggings she was wearing. Id. at 46–47.

[5] After the first incident, Victim felt she “couldn't tell anybody” about the touching; she feared “what was going to happen” if people knew about the incidents. Id. at 37. However, soon after the second incident, she revealed to a school friend what occurred. The two then told an adult friend who had previously dated Victim's brother. Word of the abuse ultimately reached Victim's father, who reported the matter to law enforcement. On February 17, Victim underwent a forensic interview where she recounted the sexual abuse. The police interrogated Doucette about the allegations on February 20. During the interview, Doucette vacillated between denying the abuse, not remembering specific facts, and admitting he may have touched Victim inadvertently while providing a massage. Tr. Vol. 4 at 24–25; Ex. Vol. 1, page 14 at 18:45–19:00, 33:42–34:00 (Doucette interrogation).

[6] The State charged Doucette with two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor. Victim testified about the sexual abuse at Doucette's jury trial. The jury found Doucette guilty of both counts.

Victim's testimony was not incredibly dubious and sufficient evidence supports Doucette's convictions.

[7] A sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim warrants a “deferential standard of review in which we ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility[.]’ ” Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Brantley v. State, 91 N.E.3d 566, 570 (Ind. 2018), cert. denied). Instead, we respect the fact-finder's exclusive province to weigh conflicting evidence, Phipps v. State, 90 N.E.3d 1190, 1195 (Ind. 2018), and consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact, Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Teising v. State, 226 N.E.3d 780, 783 (Ind. 2024). It is “not necessary that the evidence ‘overcome every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Sallee v. State, 51 N.E.3d 130, 133 (Ind. 2016) (quoting Moore v. State, 652 N.E.2d 53, 55 (Ind. 1995)).

[8] Indiana Code Section 35-42-4-9(b) defines the offense of sexual misconduct with a minor and provides:

A person at least eighteen (18) years of age who knowingly or intentionally performs or submits to any fondling or touching with a child less than sixteen (16) years of age with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person, commits sexual misconduct with a minor, a Level 6 felony. However, the offense is:

(1) a Level 5 felony if it is committed by a person at least twenty-one (21) years of age[.]

[9] Generally, the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We may make an exception, however, when that testimony is incredibly dubious. The incredible dubiosity rule allows the reviewing court to impinge upon the factfinder's responsibility to judge the credibility of witnesses when confronted with evidence that is “so unbelievable, incredible, or improbable that no reasonable person could ever reach a guilty verdict based upon that evidence alone.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 751 (Ind. 2015).

[10] We apply the rule where there is: “1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Id. at 756. Application of the incredible dubiosity rule is “rare[,] and the standard to be applied is whether the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Love v. State, 761 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind. 2002). Although not impossible, “it is a ‘difficult standard to meet, [and] one that requires great ambiguity and inconsistency in the evidence.’ ” Moore, 27 N.E.3d at 756 (quoting Edwards v. State, 753 N.E.2d 618, 622 (Ind. 2001)).

[11] Each of the three factors must be satisfied to invoke the incredible dubiosity rule. See id. at 758.

1. Victim's testimony was necessary to prove Doucette's crimes.

[12] The incredible dubiosity rule generally applies to cases with one testifying witness. The rule also applies when there are multiple testifying witnesses but the testimony of other witnesses lacks “specificity to establish the necessary factual basis of the crime.” Smith v. State, 163 N.E.3d 925, 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). Although Victim was not the only testifying witness, her testimony was necessary “to prove or establish the elements of the crime.” Id. Doucette has shown the first factor of the incredible dubiosity rule applies. That said, even if the first factor is satisfied, he must still demonstrate the remaining factors are met. See id.

2. Victim's testimony was not inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion.

[13] Doucette contends Victim's testimony was not credible for several reasons. He points out Victim was never challenged about the allegations before trial. Doucette notes Victim “was unable to provide details regarding the date, time, or year of the incidents in question.” Appellant's Br. at 17–18. And in part because Victim “told no one about the abuse immediately after it happened,” he alleges the second factor of the incredible dubiosity rule is satisfied. Id. at 18.

[14] But Victim testified about the facts necessary to prove Doucette committed sexual misconduct with a minor. She testified the first offense occurred when she was in middle school. At trial, she described how Doucette touched her while they watched a movie in the living room under a blanket. She specifically recalled Doucette's palm faced her stomach as he touched her private parts under her shorts. Victim “froze” and “wanted it to stop,” which it did when the movie ended. Id. at 35. She recounted how, a few days later, when Victim was cleaning up in the basement, Doucette grabbed her arm and told her she “couldn't tell anybody” about the touching. Id. at 38.

[15] Victim testified the second offense occurred in early 2023. One day, after returning home from lunch together, Doucette offered to massage Victim. Victim got on her stomach on the living room couch for the massage. The two were alone. Doucette “went down on his knees” and started to massage Victim's legs. Id. at 45. Victim testified Doucette rubbed her vagina and her butt during the massage. Victim closed her eyes throughout the massage and “felt like [she] couldn't” stop it. Id. at 49. The touching stopped when Doucette suggested the two watch a movie in the primary bedroom.

[16] Victim unequivocally testified about the locations of the offenses, the way Doucette touched her, her position during the incidents, and what she was wearing at the time of the offenses. The important facts regarding Doucette's sexual misconduct remained consistent throughout her testimony. A reasonable jury could have reached a guilty verdict based on her testimony alone. See Cruz Angeles v. State, 751 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (noting elements of “intent of child molesting may be established by circumstantial evidence and inferred from the actor's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct usually points”), trans. denied. The State presented additional testimony by a child forensic interviewer who testified regarding responses to abuse. She explained some children choose “to either never talk about it or they take time to be ready to talk about it[.]” Tr. Vol. 3 at 175. There is nothing intrinsically dubious about Victim's difficulty in remembering the exact dates of Doucette's abuse. See Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169, 1174 (Ind. 2011) (recognizing in child molesting cases children have difficulty remembering specific dates, “particularly when the incident is not immediately reported”) (citation omitted). We conclude Victim's testimony was not inherently contradictory or equivocal, and therefore, Doucette has not met the second Moore factor.

3. Circumstantial evidence analysis is not necessary.

[17] Doucette next argues incredible dubiosity applies because “there is a complete absence of circumstantial evidence”—particularly given “there was no medical evidence, physical evidence, recordings, photographs, text messages or phone calls” to prove he committed sexual misconduct. Appellant's Br. at 18–19. But application of the rule is limited “to cases where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or coerced and there is a lack of circumstantial evidence of guilt.” Whedon v. State, 765 N.E.2d 1276, 1278 (Ind. 2002) (emphasis added). Because we have determined Victim's testimony was not inherently contradictory or equivocal, we need not address the remaining factor under Moore. At any rate, lack of physical evidence does not on its own render Victim's testimony incredibly dubious. Smith, 163 N.E.3d at 930.

Conclusion

[18] Victim's testimony was not incredibly dubious and was sufficient to support Doucette's convictions.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(b) (2019).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Foley, J., and Scheele, J., concur.